CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027100010026-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: April 19, 2000
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27100010026-1
Top Secret
t/ ~' .
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
NAVY review(s) completed.
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
N2 654
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27100010026-1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27100010026-1
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27100010026-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27100010026-1
National Intelligence Bulletin
November 2, 1974
CONTENTS
ARAB STATES: "War fund" to provide financial backing
for major combatants. (Page 1)
EGYPT: Military movements in the vicinity of Ismailia.
Page 2 )
ITALY: Political atmosphere remains tense. (Page 3)
SOUTH VIETNAM: Saigon quiet on National Day. (Page 5)
ANGOLA-CABINDA: Oil-rich exclave the scene of fighting
yesterday. (Page 7)
ARGENTINA: Assassination of police chief certain to
spark more drastic counterterrorist action. (Page 8)
CHILE: Santiago reaches compensation agreement with
ITT. (Page 9)
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27100010026-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00975A027100010026-1
I I
National Intelligence Bulletin November 2, 1974
ARAB STATES
The annual $2.35-billion "war fund" for Egypt, Syria,
Jordan, and the PLO, which was established by the oil-rich
Arab states at the Rabat summit meeting, nails down finan-
cial backing for the next four years for the "front-line"
countries abutting Israel.
The $1 billion to be provided Egypt each year almost
equals the annual levels received during the past two or
three years. The Rabat agreement, however, provides the
long-term financial security that Egypt has been seeking
since the October war.
The impact of the subsidy on Egypt's relations with
its creditors will be mixed. In the West, most outstand-
ing official debts are covered by long-term agreements
that are unaffected by Egypt's financial status. Private
lenders, on the other hand, will be impressed by this
further evidence of strong Arab backing.
The principal difficulties may come from the USSR;
repeated Egyptian postponement of military debt repay-
ment has long been a sore subject. This additional
evidence of growing Egyptian affluence may inspire Moscow
to press Cairo harder for repayment of some of its $1.3
billion in military debts.
Syria also is to receive $1 billion annually--about
equal to what it received during the past year. The per
capita commitment to Damascus, however, far exceeds.that
to the other recipients. The new guaranteed payment will
reinforce the Syrian financial situation, which has im-
proved as a result of earlier aid and increasing domestic
output and exports. If the USSR continues to sell arms
on credit, it will permit Syria to channel a sizable por-
tion of the new commitment to economic projects.
The allocation set aside for Jordan is a substantial
increase. The $300-million annual payment is 40 percent
more than the Arab states provided Amman during the past
year.
The Rabat agreement also recognizes the improved
status of the PLO by s ttina aside $50 million annually
for that organization. 7
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00975A027100010026-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27100010026-1
I I
National Intelligence Bulletin November 2, 1974
US and British naval officers have seen Egyptian
movements of military equipment in the vicinity of Is-
mailia, in the northern sector of the Suez Canal, over
the past three days. This may represent a buildup of
Egyptian forces in anticipation of hostilities, or it
may be related to the extensive exercise activity that
has been under way in Egypt for over a week. At this
time, however, neither Egypt's intention nor the scale
of these force movements is clear.
Yesterday, US naval officers saw as many as 80
tanks, most of them covered with camouflage netting,
on the outskirts of Ismailia, the first time they had
seen tanks there in six months. On Wednesday and Thurs-
day, at least one and perhaps two convoys of 40 vehicles,
most pulling artillery, were seen on separate occasions
on the Cairo-Ismailia road.
US military and embassy personnel.in Egypt have
also reported tightened nighttime security measures be-
tween Ismailia and Cairo. US personnel are being stop-
ped at each control point, and sometimes have been denied
permission to travel in the area at night.
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27100010026-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27100010026-1
National Intelligence Bulletin November 2, 1974
ITALY
The arrest this week of General Vito Miceli, former
head of Italy's principal intelligence and security,
agency, adds another controversy to Rome's tense polit-
ical atmosphere.
Miceli is charged with complicity in a plot by right-
wing civilian and military elements in 1970 to overthrow
the government. He may also be accused of covering up
similar schemes reportedly under consideration during
the last year.
The move against Miceli grew out of a report turned
over to judicial officials by Defense Minister Giulio
Andreotti. The intelligence agency is subordinate to
the Defense Ministry, and Andreotti's report apparently
dealt with the agency's alleged involvement in subversive
activities.
Miceli claims that he is innocent and the victim of
a "political and judicial" plot.
Whatever, the outcome, political considerations al-
most certainly figured in Andreotti's decision to take
a critical look at the intelligence agency. The move
was probably calculated to aid efforts by Andreotti--a
right-wing Christian Democrat--to mend fences with the
Italian left, including left-of-center elements within
his own party.
Andreotti may also be settling a political score
with Social Democratic leader Tanassi, who was defense
minister during the period under investigation. Tanassi
torpedoed an effort by Andreotti to put together a cen-
ter-left coalition in 1970.
Andreotti has been criticized by the left, partic-
ularly since 1972 when he agreed to serve as prime min-
ister in a weak coalition that substituted the conserv-
ative Liberal Party for the Socialists---the only right-
leaning government that Italy has had since the early
1960s. The Christian Democrats have now returned to a
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27100010026-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27100010026-1
I I
National Intelligence Bulletin November 2, 1974
policy of allying with the Socialists, and Andreotti does
not want to be shunted aside because of his right-wing
image.
The US defense attache in Rome reports that some
military leaders are disenchanted and impatient with the
political authorities, but at present there is apparently
no move afoot to resort to unconstitutional solutions to
Italy's problems.
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27100010026-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00975A027100010026-1
National Intelligence Bulletin November 2, 1974
Saigon was quiet during National Day celebrations
yesterday. Catholic dissidents postponed a march on the
presidential palace. Buddhist leaders celebrated the
holiday with speeches and rallies in their pagodas, call-
ing for continued street demonstrations and for the Pres-
ident's resignation. Smaller demonstrations were con-
ducted in some northern towns, but no violence was reported.
In his National Day address, President Thieu implied
that the government would, if necessary, get tougher with
demonstrators and blamed much of the recent agitation
on the Communists. He indirectly accused the protest
groups of actively supporting the Communists and claimed
that demonstrations would only encourage the enemy to
step up the fighting. The Communists responded on Lib-
eration Radio, labeling the speech a poor effort to blame
the Communists for Thieu's own mistakes.
The President promised to continue his campaign to
clean up the government and to push for liberalization
of restrictions on the press and political parties. He
did not announce any new personnel changes.
Appealing for national unity, Thieu urged the pop-
ulation not to join minority elements in protests against
the government. Alluding to next year's presidential
election, he said it was not important who was president,
but only that the country remain in the hands of nation-
alists who will continue to fight the Communists.
Some Western press reporting has interpreted these
remarks to mean that Thieu is considering resignation.
Over the years, however, Thieu has often indicated his
willingness to step aside if necessary, mainly to show
that he is interested primarily in the country's welfare
rather than his own.
Thieu also issued a press release quoting President
Ford's recent letter affirming US support for South Viet-
nam. Thieu no doubt hopes the letter will help lessen
fears of eventual US abandonment, show that he retains
the full confidence of the US, and dispel rumors of secret
US support for the dissidents.
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00975A027100010026-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27100010026-1
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27100010026-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00975A027100010026-1
I I
National Intelligence Bulletin
November 2, 1974
An outbreak of fighting yesterday in the oil-rich
exclave of Cabinda between Cabindan nationalists and the
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola points to
a difficult future for Portugal in its attempt to decol-
onize Angola. The Portuguese military have now restored
order to Cabinda city.
Oil pumped from Cabinda exceeds 150,000 barrels a
day and could reach 250,000 barrels by the end of the
decade. Portugal would like to retain easy access to
this important: energy resource. Lisbon, therefore, wants
to treat the exclave as a part of Angola and grant inde-
pendence to the territory as a whole, thus enabling it
to deal with a single and favorably disposed national
entity.
The future of Cabinda is uncertain, however. The
divergencies between and within the liberation movements
in Angola assure no early or clear solution to the ques-
tion of status for the territory and its 100,000 inhab-
itants. The interest shown in Cabinda by the Congo and
Zaire also complicate the issue. These governments sup-
port opposing Cabindan liberation groups and nurture a
mutual suspicion of the other's designs on the area.
Meanwhile, the movement within the exclave for Cabindan
independence is gathering strength, and m onstra-
tions with more violence can be expected.
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00975A027100010026-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27100010026-1
National Intelligence Bulletin November 2, 1974
The assassination yesterday of the country's top
police officer, Alberto Villar, is certain to set off
more drastic countermeasures against leftist terrorists.
The government may implement some sort of state of
emergency in accordance with contingency plans report-
edly drawn up recently. The Montoneros, a leftist Peron-
ist guerrilla group, reportedly has delivered a commu-
nique to a Buenos Aires newspaper in which they claimed
responsibility for the assassination.
The bomb explosion that killed the federal police
chief, his wife, and several bodyguards occurred on a
yacht near Buenos Aires. Villar was high on the ter-
rorists' target list because of his close association
with presidential adviser Lopez Rega and his alleged in-
volvement with right-wing death squads. Juan Peron
brought Villar out of retirement last year to lead the
antiguerrilla effort.
Villar's death is another heavy blow to the federal
police, which were already weakened by serious problems
such as bureaucratic inertia and corruption. Moreover,
the terrorists' success in eliminating Villar suggests
that the security forces may be penetrated to some ex-
tent by subversives.
If the police fail to improve their effectiveness,
the military may feel they must take on additional re-
sponsibility for combating the terrorists. The assas-
sination campaign directed by left-wing terrorists will
continue to serve as a strong provocation to younger
groups within the army eager to avenge the deaths of
six fellow officers.
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27100010026-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00975A027100010026-1
National Intelligence Bulletin November 2, 1974
The junta and International Telephone and Telegraph
have reached a preliminary compensation agreement for
the Chilean Telephone Company--an ITT subsidiary seized
by the Allende government in 1971. The $126-million ac-
cord must be approved by ITT's board of directors and
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the US agency
that insured the investment. The Chilean minister for
economic coordination hopes to secure approval this month.
Formal nationalization of the company will be announced
simultaneously with the compensation agreement.
The settlement will resolve the last major compensa-
tion issue arising from the takeovers by the Allende
government. The junta hopes that the settlement, along
with recent legislation eliminating most restrictions on
foreign investors, will greatly improve the Chilean in-
vestment climate, which has received little direct for-
eign input since the coup. Continuing economic troubles
have been a more important factor in investment decisions,
however, than uncertainty over the settlement with ITT.
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00975A027100010026-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27100010026-1
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27100010026-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27100010026-1
Top Secret
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27100010026-1