CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027100010020-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 21, 2007
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: October 30, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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To Secret
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Top Secret
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 30, 1974
ISRAEL: National Religious Party returns to the govern-
ment. (Page 4)
VIETNAM: Communists' strategy for 19.75 similar to this
year's. (Page 6)
NORTH VIETNAP-4: Hanoi editorial suggests widespread dis-
satisfaction with current party policy. (Page 8)
JAPAN: Press highlights speculation about Tanaka res-
ignation by end of year. (Page 9)
INDIA: Nuclear test unlikely until spring. (Page 12)
ARGENTINA: '.Perrorists continue to goad military. (Page 13)
ITALY: Foreign Minister Moro to attempt to form govern-
ment. (Page 14)
SPAIN: Two liberal ministers leave cabinet. (Page 15)
UNITED KINGDOM: Wilson's legislative proposals closely
follow election manifesto. (Page 16)
SAUDI ARABIA: Jidda reportedly pressing for "symbolic
cutcut"in world oil prices. (Page 19)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 22)
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Nlational Intellig~en~~ Bu11e#i~
October 30, 1974
The return to the cabinet yesterday of the National
Religious Party--after an absence of nearly five months--
and the resulting shuffle of the coalition will broaden
Prime Minister Rabin's parliamentary base but will also
strengthen conservative influence in the government.
These developments could complicate Rabin's efforts
to adopt a flexible negotiating position in peace talks
with the Arabs. The Religious Party is strongly opposed
to returning the Israeli-occupied west Bank, with its
numerous Jewish religious sites, to Arab control.
Rabin insisted that the coalition agreement with
the Religious Party- -essentially the same as the one
worked out by Mrs. Nieir's government--will not restrict
his ability to negotiate with the Arabs. He told an
interviewer last week that. the Religious Party, as a
member of the coalition, would not support any efforts
to oust the government over the issue of peace negotia-
tions themselves. The party will be free, however, to
vote against any specific agreement presented to the
Knesset for approval.
Last week, Rabin reiterated that the government
would agree to hold national elections before it signed
any agreement involving Israeli territorial concessions
on the West Bank if one of the coalition partners asked
for elections. The Religious Party is on record as sup-
porting such a call.
The new coalition gives the government a more com-
fortable majority of eight votes in the 120-member Knes-
set, in spite of the withdrawal from the cabinet of the
small Citizens Rights Movement. The government can prob-
ably still count on the Citizens Rights Movement and the
more leftist parties in the Knesset to support Rabin on
Middle East peace issues.
No major cabinet changes occurred as a result of
the Religious Party's return. The party regained the
three ministerial portfolios--interior, religious af-
fairs, and social welfare--it has traditionally held,
and filled them with the men who previously held them.
Rabin had kept these posts open as ucement for
the party to rejoin the government.
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Na#~C3E'tal ~1'ItE:~~IF~LCIC!e ~l~~@~tf1 actober 30, 1974
Communist cadre are beginning to receive instruc=
tions on the party's strategy in South Vietnam during
1975.
Although there has been some discussion of a big
offensive during the year, the most reliable source so
f ar indicates that the party plans to continue the mix
of political and military action at a level similar to
that of 1974. This is the message contained in an enemy
document captured recently in the delta. Claiming to
be a "resolution'? for next year's strategy, the document
reaffirmed the policy outlined earlier this year in a
similar "resolution." That document directed Communist
forces in the south to try to undermine Saigon's author-
ity with political and military action, but not to in-
tensify the fighting to a level t~iat would jeopardize
the cease-fire agreement.
The new document was issued in late August follow-
ing a COSVN-level conference to review the progress of
the "anti-pacification" campaign since th.e first of the
year. Another eanference will be held in about a year
to review the current campaign.
Communist forces are credited with succeeding "be-
yond expectation" in expanding their holdings in the
countryside, but C?SVN concedes that the government
still holds the upper hand, The document shows that
the southern Communist command still regards Viet Cang
political forces as the weak Link in the revolution and
admits that the Communists must rely almost solely on
military action and intimidation to reach the people.
The lack of initiative among leadership elements at the
local level is cited as one of the principal problems,
As with other guidance of this kind since the first
of the year, COSVN demands that greater attention be
focused on strengthening political and military farces
in the countryside. The document outlines a detailed
program for recruiting more people and indicates that
overall improvement must be made in these local units
without help from outside the COSVN area.
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hlational Intelligence Bulletin October 30, 1974
Other recent information suggests the Communists
plan a higher level of fighting i O5VN area than
is outlined in the new document.
laims that there will be a two-p ase
mayor o ensive" in 197 rol the countr side
and occu cities while
ain gins a
"nationwide general offensive w~. e conducted in
January 1975.
Both claims, however, were predicated on a "massive"
political upheaval in the South and smack more of a
morale boosting campaign among the troops than a real
reflection of intentions. Even without the rhetoric,
however, both seem to be saying that the Communists will
continue to maintain fairly intense military pressure
in the coming months in hopes of complicating the gov-
ernment's political and economic problems further, This
strategy is in line with guidelines in the delta document
and the other policy statemen s from both COSVN and Hanoi
f'r of the ear.
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Natlca~na! lntallg+~en+c+e Bul1e#in
NORTH VIETNAP4
October 30, 1974
A highly unusual editorial in Forth Vietnam's the-
oretical journal Hoc ~ suggests there is widespread
dissatisfaction wit current party policy.
The article, published in September, stated that a
"current of evil thoughts" is being conveyed from mouth
to mouth and has been reflected in the press, literature,
and the arts, indicating that this "nonrevolutionary, non-
socialist" ideology has gained widespread acceptance.
There have been several references in the media
over the past several months to problems relating to the
motivation of workers and peasants. There have also
been low-level reports that the continued diversion of
men and materiel to the south, despite the claimed "vic-
tory" of the cease-fire agreement and the new emphasis
on reconstruction, has contributed to this discontent.
Government efforts to root out private enterprise have
also added to the disruption, because the state dis-
tribution system is not able to do the-job alone .._
The appearance of the strongly worded article sug-
gests that Hanoi may also be encountering resistance on
these basic issues at high levels of the government and
party. The author denounced those cadre and people who
"would deny the necessity to resort to revolutionary
warfare to liberate the nation." On the domestic front
the editorial comes down hard on those who "oppose so-
cialist reform? of the economy.
As yet there have been no indications of any move
to purge the party ranks or of any public crackdown on
dissent. It is quite likely that the Hoc T~ article
is intended as a warning, especially to party cadre,
that "erroneous thou hts" will no lon er be tolerated.
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National Intelligence F3t.~lletin c~ctober 30, 197
The Tokyo press ib giving prominence to reports
that prime Minister Tanaka may bra forced 'Go resign in
late November, soon afi,