NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027000010038-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 38
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 9, 1974
CONTENTS
SAUDI ARABIA - IRAN: Oil price increases. (Page 1)
ISRAEL: Rabin makes unusual concessions in public
statements. (Page 3)
GREECE: Caretaker government to take over until
elections in November, following cabinet's resigna-
tion. (Page 5)
LAOS: Non-communist officials apprehensive that
Souvanna will lean more toward accommodating the
Pathet Lao. (Page 7)
PORTUGAL: Two members of left-leaning Armed Forces
Movement added to junta. (Page 8)
ETHIOPIA: Situation calm. (Page 13)
CHILE: Terrorists suffer major setback with death
of leader. (Page 16)
ARGENTINA: Guerrillas propose truce. (Page 17)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 18)
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 9, 1974
Saudi Arabia and Iran plan to boost their take from
oil sales, in conformity with recent OPEC decisions reached
at Quito and Vienna.
Saudi Arabian Petroleum Minister Ahmad Zaki Yamani
has notified the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco)
that his government will apply the Quito formula to all
oil lifted since July 1 and the Vienna formula to all
liftings since October 1. This move would increase the
average cost of Saudi crude oil from an estimated $9.47
per barrel to between $9.85 and $10.00 per barrel. At
present production levels, Saudi Arabia's annual oil
revenue would increase by $1.2 billion to $1.7 billion.
It is not clear whether King Faysal has approved the
price hike. Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Omar
Saqqaf, no friend of Yamani's, contended to a US official
that the petroleum minister's action was unwarranted
and illegal, having been taken without the knowledge of
the Supreme Petroleum Council. Saqqaf said he would
advise the King to rescind this increase.
Saudi Arabia had been expected to adjust prices
eventually, in line with other oil-exporting countries
of the region. Aramco has a long-standing agreement to
provide most-favored-nation status to the Saudis on
gulf oil prices. Nevertheless, this new adjustment
flies in the face of Yamani's assertions that Saudi
Arabia would like to see prices lowered.
Meanwhile, the National Iranian Oil Company has
sent a letter to the consortium operating in Iran with
its preliminary views on the implementation of the
Vienna OPEC decision. The Iranian oil company is sug-
gesting an average government take for Iranian light
crude oil of $9.92 per barrel, roughly $1.10 per barrel
more than Iran received for its oil in June.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 9, 1974
This move is not surprising, in view of the Shah's
agreement with the consortium that guarantees him a per-
barrel revenue equal to the rest of the gulf oil pro-
ducers. A $1.10 per barrel increase in prices would
augment Iran's annual oil revenue by about $2.2 billion,
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 9, 1974
. ISRAEL
Since Prime Minister Rabin returned from the US last
month, he has made a series of public statements designed
to open a new stage in Israel's approach to negotiations
with the Arab states. His statements, often markedly
softer than Israeli pronouncements made before his trip
to Washington, have drawn sharp questions from moderate
and right-wing commentators and forced the convening of
a special session of parliament today demanded by the
conservative opposition coalition.
Public attention has been focused primarily on
Rabin's assertion, made first in a US television inter-
view on October 1, that Israel is prepared to make ter-
ritorial concessions to the Arabs, specifically Jordan,
in return for a declaration of "nonbelligerency." Rabin
has also pressed the argument--addressed as much to Arabs
as to Israelis--that peace must be approached by stages
in which each side offers portions of its ultimate peace
package. He specifically said that Israel should be
ready to give up parts of the West Bank in return for a
Jordanian guarantee of nonbelligerency, but he acknowledged
that this would involve risks for Israel.
Rabin's proposal represents a further break with
Israel's pre-disengagement position that each side's con-
cessions must be negotiated fully and at length, after
which a comprehensive peace treaty would be signed; only
then would an actual surrender of territory take place.
The opposition and even moderate commentators have
charged that Rabin's formula makes interim concessions
that no other Israeli leader had been willing to propose.
Rabin has retorted that "anyone with a head on his
shoulders knows that Israel must make territorial con-
cessions" and that peace is impossible on the present
cease-fire lines. Reiterating the government's view
that peace is equally impossible along the pre-1967 lines
demanded by the Arabs, Rabin has said there is room for
maneuver between the two positions.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 9, 1974
The degree of support in the cabinet for Rabin's
formula is unclear, although Deputy Prime Minister Allon
has recently spoken out strongly in favor of the non-
belligerency proposal.
The ca net is scheduled to discuss Israel's negotiating
position Friday, the day before Secretary Kissinger ar-
rives in Tel Aviv.
Unlike his predecessor, Rabin is taking his case
for a major shift in policy directly to the people, ap-
parently in the expectation that his persuasiveness and
his enhanced prestige resulting from talks in Washington
will attract sufficient support to overcome the objections
of political leaders.
The US embassy, impressed with Rabin's display of
independent leadership, believes he will weather both
the parliamentary debate today and the cabinet session
Friday, although not without sharp questioning. The
core of resistance on the West Bank issue will come from
the right wing of the opposition Likud and from the
"youth wing" of the National Religious Party. Of the likely
critics within the Labor Alignment itself, former
defense minister Dayan is the key figure, and the embass
acknowledges that he remains an unknown auantity
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 9, 1974
The Greek cabinet resigned yesterday to clear the
decks for a caretaker government that will conduct par-
liamentary elections on November 17. Prime Minister
Karamanlis and other key ministers, including Foreign
Minister Mavros, will remain in the interim cabinet.
Principal competitors in the elections are Foreign
Minister Mavros' Center Union and the New Democracy
party headed by Prime Minister Karamanlis, who is still
riding a wave of popular support generated by the re-
cent return to civilian rule. Two left-of-center par-
ties--the New Political Forces and the Democratic So-
cialist Union--have decided that they will align them-
selves with the Center Union for the election.
On the extreme left, "Democratic Defense," which
was active in resistance efforts against the junta, has
announced its support for Andreas Papandreou. Papan-
dreou has been denouncing the elections as an "electoral
coup" designed to deprive the left of enough time to
organize an effective campaign. The Communist-front
United Democratic Left received 11 percent of the vote
in the last elections in 1964.
On the extreme right, former minister of defense
Petros Garoufalias' newly formed National Democratic
Union is expected to appeal to royalists, businessmen,
and some members of the armed forces. The new party,
although allegedly royalist, so far has avoided taking
a stand on restoration of the monarchy.
In assessing the role of the armed forces, the U-S
defense attache in Athens notes that:
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 9, 1974
--Karamanlis' recent suspension of officers who
represented the hard core of Major General Ioan-
nidis' power base in the army has done much to
restore the chain of command and make the army
more responsive to the government.
--The army has been involved in politics too
long to be counted out. Many officers believe
that politicians are unable to give Greece the
stability they feel is necessary to avoid the
threat of communism and anarchy. Should they
perceive that Karamanlis is letting the left get
out of hand, the army could be expected to inter-
vene again.
--In the longer term, a stable and effective
right-of-center government under Karamanlis could
lead to neutralization of the army as a threat
to parliamentary government.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 9, 1974
Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma is tentatively sched-
uled to return to Laos on October 18, but some influen-
tial non-communist officials are not enthusiastic at
the prospect of his early reappearance.
The non-communists have taken advantage of Sou-
vanna's absence to delay action on a number of Pathet
Lao policy initiatives, including dissolution of the
National Assembly, Souphanouvong's 18-point political
program, and recognition of Communist shadow regimes
in South Vietnam and Cambodia. Most recently, they
have blocked cabinet approval of an economic assistance
agreement negotiated by Communist minister Soth Phetrasy
with North Vietnam.
The non-communists, however, are clearly apprehen-
sive that a physically weakened Souvanna will be more
inclined than ever to accommodate to Pathet Lao pressures.
This fear has been newly reinforced by Souvanna's re-
ported approval of the controversial speech delivered
by Communist Deputy Prime Minister Phoumi Vongvichit
before the UN General Assembly. Phoumi's speech, which
contained polemical language against Cambodia and South
Vietnam and chastised "imperialism, colonialism, and
neo-colonialism" everywhere, outraged the non-communists
because it departed from a more moderate version ap-
proved by the coalition cabinet.
Powerful right-wing Finance Minister Ngon Sanani-
kone, who was in Washington last week for meetings of
the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, pri-
vately stated to US officials his view that the coali-
tion government--meaning the non-communist side--was
doing better without Souvanna, "who gave in too much"
to Communist demands. Ngon added that, during a stop-
over in Paris en route to Washington, he had urged
Souvanna to extend his convalescence abroad, ostensibly
because the mass of decisions awaiting him in Vientiane
was likely to endanger his health again.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 9, 1974
Tianethone Chantharasy, the coalition's highly re-
garded non-communist deputy minister of foreign affairs,
recently echoed Sananikone's fears, warning that if the
Prime Minister's propensity for accommodation continues,
the Pathet Lao will outmaneuver the non-communists on
every ma-ior noliti ca1 i .s?-?
The left-leaning Armed Forces Movement appears to
have strengthened its hold on the Portuguese government
by naming two of its members to fill vacancies on the
seven-man junta.
Brigadier Carlos Soares Fabiao and Lieutenant
Colonel Lopes Pires will fill vacancies created by the
departure of President Spinola and his conservative
supporters. Two air force officers will also be se-
lected for the junta, but no names have yet been re-
leased. The Council of State is expected to meet next
week to approve the appointments.
The selections are likely to cause some ill feel-
ing within the military by officers who resent rela-
tively junior officers being propelled into top posi-
tions. Little is known of the political views of the
men selected, but they were chosen by some 150 fellow
officers who reportedly respect their intelligence and
efficiency. The grumbling therefore is likely to re-
main at a low level, although it could precipitate the
voluntary retirements of additional conservative army
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 9, 1974
There have been no further outbreaks following a
skirmish on Monday between government troops and dissi-
dent units.
The clash was touched off by the arrest of leftist
elements in the army engineering and aviation battalions
opposed to the Armed Forces Coordinating Committee. Com-
bat patrols are still in place around the engineer unit's
compound and the aviation battalion's headquarters.
None of the committee's opponents have so far shown any
sign of organizing resistance to the arrests.
Further arrests of civilian and military opponents
of the committee are expected shortly, and more violence
is possible.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
CHILE
October 9, 1974
Miguel Enriquez, leaden of the Movement of Revolu-
tionary Left (MIR), was killed on October 5 by Chilean
security forces during a two-hour gun battle in Santiago.
As many as nine other persons were detained and a si nif-
icant arsenal
The police action came on the heels of a bank robbery
on October 1. Police reportedly recovered nearly half of
the stolen money from the house where Enriquez was killed,
apparently tying the MIR to the robbery.
His death is a serious blow to the group, whose
leadership now passes to untested second-echelon members.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 9, 1974
The Marxist People's Revolutionary Army has proposed
a truce with the government in return for legal recogni-
tion, a repeal of "repressive" legislation, and the re-
lease of all "political" prisoners. The petition, which
coincides with a meeting between President Peron and key
political leaders, appears to be a well-timed psychologi-
cal maneuver to cause further political dissension be-
tween the Peronists and opposition parties.
Leaders of the opposition are increasingly concerned
over President Peron's failure to keep them abreast of
major decisions. Last week they issued a public declara-
tion calling for s. renewal of the dialogue generated by
late president Juan Peron. Their criticism of the gov-
ernment was muted, however, because Mrs. Peron, in a
pre-emptive move, had already scheduled a broadly based
conference with representatives from the political
parties, the church, the military, and business.
The move by the guerrillas could hinder Mrs. Peron's
efforts to promote a consensus, since several political
leaders are sympathetic to some of the guerrilla demands.
There will undoubtedly be an attempt by a few conferees
to negotiate on behalf of the terrorists, but with ex-
tremist violence at an all-time high, the government is
not in a conciliatory mood. In a strongly worded speech
yesterday, President Peron stated that her government
will press ahead vigorously with anti-terrorist measures.
The President's remarks implied a rejection of the pro-
posed terrorist truce.
the meeting from concentrating on major political dis-
agreements such as the government's sanction of right-
wing death squads, the new penal reform law, official
Debate on the guerrillas' petition could still keep
use of the media for the Peronists' own political pur-
poses, and the closing of the national university.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 9, 1974
Turkey: President Koruturk met yesterday with polit-
ical and parliamentary leaders in an effort to reach
agreement on forming a nonpartisan government of "national
unity." There has been no official announcement on the
results of the meeting, but the comments of party leaders
indicate that Koruturkrs effort was unsuccessful. The
President may make further efforts to form a broadly
based coalition, but it seems likely that he will again
turn to Prime Minister Ecevit if agreement cannot be
reached on a nonpartisan government to lead the country
into elections. If given the nod, Ecevit might try again
to form either a coalition with the conservative Demo-
cratic Party or a minority government.
West Europe: The consortium of European countries
seeking a replacement aircraft for the F-104--Belgium,
Norway, the Netherlands, and Denmark---.decided on October
7 to postpone its decision for at least two months. The
postponement indicates that the consortium intends to
make its choice only after the US air force has decided
which aircraft it will purchase.
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