NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027000010018-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 18
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review
completed.
DIA review
completed.
Top Secret 25X1
27 September 1974
N?_ 639
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September.27, 1974
PORTUGAL: Political tensions in Lisbon heightened. (Page 2)
ISRAEL: Prime Minister Rabin appears to be preparing
public for more flexible approach to peace talks. (Page 3)
EGYPT: Cabinet reorganization has economic focus. (Page 5)
PALESTINIANS: Dissension within PLO. (Page 6)
BELGIUM-NATO: Brussels will purchase US-built Lance
tactical missile system. (Page 9)
USSR-CYPRUS: Soviets appear increasingly concerned that
Cyprus may be partitioned. (Page 12)
USSR: Dissident artists to hold art show Sunday. (Page 13)
CHILE: Release of political prisoners. (Page 16)
ARGENTINA: Sweeping antisubversion bill will be rushed
through Congress. (Page 17)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 19)
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National Intelligence Bulletins September 27, 1974
PORTUGAL
The turmoil surrounding a rally to be held this
Saturday in support of President Spinola has sharpened
differences between factions within the government and
heightened political tensions in Lisbon.
The leftist-dominated media has heavily criticized
the rally,, which is now scheduled for September 28, for
being a "fascist-sponsored" attempt to resurrect the old
regime. The Communist and Socialist parties have issued
strong statements opposing the rally, but center-right
parties are welcoming it as a means for the Portuguese
people to express support for Sp.ino:La0
Incidents of violence could serve as a, pretext
for the dismissal of Prime Minister Goncalves0 Spinola
has been dissatisfied over Goncalves''management of the
government, particularly the decolonization process.
The Portuguese press also has suggested that the Commu-
nists are considering pulling out of the government in
view of the defeats it has suffered in the cabinet re-
cently.,
These developments, particularly if they are
accompanied by violence, might encourage a power grab
by conservative forces,
The evolving situation is a risky one for Spinolam
The media's coverage of the rally has connected him with
a resurgence of fascism that may be difficult for him to
live down, In addition, if the rally is a failure, his
opponents will use it as evidence of his lack of popular
support, On the other hand? a successful rally will
strengthen Spinola''s position and will provide impetus
to his renewed efforts to establish a system of govern-
ment that is not in danger of being overtaken by authori-
tarian elements of the right or the left,
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 27, 1974
ISRAEL
Prime Minister Rabin appears to be preparing the
Israeli public for a more flexible approach by the gov-
ernment to Middle East peace negotiations, and particu-
larly for additional US pressures on Tel Aviv in the
tough negotiations ahead with the Arabs?
In a press interview at the end of his visit to the
US earlier this month, the Prime Minister cautioned Is-
raeli readers that although US support for Israel con-
tinues, it would be wrong to disregard the importance
Washington attaches to consolidating its position with
the Arab states. Rabin stressed that the nature of US
relationships in the area had changed since the October
war, He assessed US concern over the use of the oil
weapon as only one factor in US policy, but noted that
it is, nevertheless, an element that does not work in
Israel's favor.
Rabin, in a subsequent interview on Israeli tele-
vision, again rejected a withdrawal to pre-1967 lines,
but said that if there was a "real" prospect of obtain-
ing "true" peace with one or more Arab states, he would
favor a compromise, and perhaps even a "far-reaching"
compromise. Noting, however, that the Arabs were not
ready to agree to negotiations without preconditions
that looked toward definitive peace settlements, Rabin
said that Israel would have to accept the risks inherent
in attempting to achieve peace by stages. The Prime
Minister suggested that Israel would withdraw from part
of the area it intended to give up in a final peace
agreement in return for a declaration of nonbelligerence
by the Arab states. The Prime Minister also said that
Israel should test the Arabs with concrete proposals to
see if they are ready to move toward peace,
Early this week, Rabin said in a newspaper inter-
view that he had a "clear and detailed Israeli peace
map," but that he would disclose it only to Arab nego-
tiators in peace talks. In the past, Israeli government
leaders have said that no maps would be prepared until
the time came for detailed discussion with the Arabs
of possible Israeli withdrawals to agreed borders,
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 27, 1.974
The Prime Minister's statements come at a time when,
according to the US embassy in Tel Aviv, an increasing
number of Israelis have come to believe that a new war--
even if won--would not solve anything and that political
answers to the Arab-Israeli conflict must: be found.
These Israelis reportedly recognize that any political
approach must involve Israeli concessions.
Rabin's statements, however, are likely to distress
those inside and outside the government who oppose terri-
torial concessions. The embassy notes that a significant
minority of Israelis remain convinced that no amount of
Israeli moderation or concession will bring peace closer.
Meanwhile, public statements on Israeli prepared-
ness made this week by Defense Minister Peres and Chief
of Staff Gur revealed a marked change toward Syria from
the strident militancy of the past few months. Peres,
whose warnings against Syria have been among the tough-
est made by Israeli leaders, called. on Syria "not to
believe that Israel does not want agreement when in fact
we are ready to make peace?" He added that if the Syr-
ians want to talk, "they will find us ready." Chief of
Staff Gur--who has frequently accused Syria of violating
the disengagement agreement--cautioned against exagger-
ating the seriousness of Syrian violations, noting that,
as with all agreements, various interpretations are pos-
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 27, 1974
Newly appointed Prime Minister Hijazi has reorgan-
ized the cabinet as the first step of a new effort to
alleviate problems in the economy. The revamped cabinet
was sworn in last night; Hijazi himself was elevated
from first deputy prime minister on Tuesday.
Hijazi created two new cabinet posts, both concerned
with various aspects of economic planning, and replaced
four ministers whose performance in the economic sector
has recently come under fire. The rest of the 37 cabi-
net members are holdovers from the outgoing government.
The new post of minister of state for economic co-
operation upgrades to cabinet level. the former Agency
for Arab and International Economic Cooperation, created
earlier this year to coordinate foreign investment in
Egypt. The agency's head, Tahir Amin, follows his or-
ganization into the cabinet, Another new minister of
state, handling "coordination and control," will appar-
ently attempt to centralize and streamline the implemen-
tation of economic planning amid a welter of overlapping
but uncoordinated government agencies.
Hijazi has also named new men to head the minis-
tries of health, agriculture, industry, and supply in
an apparent effort to speed movement toward economic
development. Industrial revitalization is a key element
of the government's plan, as is an improvement in the
clogged internal distribution system under the jurisdic-
tion of the Ministry of Supply. The recent rise in
consumer discontent over commodity shortages has been
attributable in large measure to the inadequacy of the
distribution system.
Hijazi and President Sadat have been attempting
for some months to cut through the red tape that has
traditionally slowed the working of the government.
Thus far, they have been unsuccessful in injecting
vitality into an overstuffed public sector bureaucracy
that has a vested interest in opposing efforts to stream-
line and liberalize the economy.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
PALESTINIANS
September 27, 1974
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine,
led by George Habbash, yesterday withdrew from the Pal-
estine Liberation Organization in protest against al-
leged PLO contacts with the US. Ahmad Yamani, the
front's representative on the PLO executive committee,
charged at a press conference that Saudi King Faysal
was sponsoring the Palestinian-US contacts. The PLO
has replied that this accusation is "based on false in-
formation" and has called on the popular front to rescind
its decision.
Yamani said that his group, which has been a lead-
ing perpetrator of international terrorism, will continue
the armed struggle against Israel. He added that the two
other radical groups cooperating in the so-called Rejec-
tion Front--the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine-General Command and the Arab Liberation Front--
may also leave the PLO.
The three radical groups had threatened in August
to withdraw if the PLO's moderate leaders did not end
their cooperation with Egypt's President Sadat in seek-
ing a negotiated settlement. The PLC) success last week-
end in getting Egyptian and Syrian endorsement of the
PLO as the "only" legitimate representative of the Pal-
estinian people, which removed one impediment to Pales-
tinian participation in formal peace talks, almost cer-
tainly contributed to the decision to withdraw at this
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National Intelligence Bulletin
BELGIUM-NATO
September 27, 1974
The Belgian government decided on September 25 to
go ahead with its commitment to purchase the US-built
Lance tactical missile system. The decision, which was
reported by the Belgian armed forces procurement offi-
cer to the US.defense attache in Brussels, comes after
three years of negotiations.
The Lance is designed to provide battlefield nu-
clear or conventional fire support at the army and corps
level. NATO plans call for the Lance to replace the Hon-
est John and Sergeant missiles in European NATO forces
over the next four years. The US began replacing the
older missiles in its European forces with the Lance in
late 1973. In the NATO central region, only the Nether-
lands has refused to buy the Lance, despite an earlier
understanding with West Germany, Britain, and Belgium
that each purchase the system as part of its nuclear
contribution to the defense of Europe.
The cost to Belgium amounts to $24.3 million. This
price includes 5 launchers, 100 missiles, and support
equipment.
Belgian Defense Minister Vanden Boeynants report-
edly will tell the press tomorrow about its purchase of
the Lance. This move should soothe Bonn, which has ex-
pressed concern that its two Benelux allies were con-
sidering ways to reduce their nuclear responsibilities.
Brussels
intends to replace its two aging Hones john battalions
with one Lance battalion, and hopes to have the Lance
unit operational by May 1978.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
USSR-CYPRUS
September 27, 1974
The Soviets appear increasingly concerned that the
lack of progress toward a solution of the Cyprus problem
will result in partition.
General Secretary Brezhnev, in a speech at a Kremlin
dinner on Wednesday in honor of visiting Hungarian party
chief Kadar, devoted more time to the Cyprus issue than
to any other subject. He stressed that the danger posed
by NATO to international peace was demonstrated by "two
NATO member countries" being responsible for the fight-
ing and destruction on Cyprus. He emphasized that the
international aspects of the situation could immediately
and effectively be solved only within the framework of
the UN and with appropriate international guarantees.
Brezhnev's indirect reference to Turkey's role in
the affair is the closest Moscow has come to criticizing
the Turks in public and may indicate a slight tactical
shift in Moscow's approach to the Cyprus problem.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 27, 1974
The Soviet government is trying to minimize the
damage done to its international image by the heavy-
handed suppression of an unofficial art exhibit in a
suburban Moscow field on September 15. After a week
of negotiations, the dissident artists say they have
now received firm permission from Moscow authorities--
in writing, as they had insisted--to hold the art show
on September 29 at an alternate site.
In making its decision, the government has been
confronted by some difficult choices. It is concerned
over the Soviet image abroad in an era of detente, and
at a moment when CSCE negotiations are focused on cul-
tural affairs. At the same time, it perceives the af-
fair as a challenge to its authority at home. The gov-
ernment may hope that by allowing the show to be held--
a public concession to unofficial art--in exchange for
the artists' implicit admission that regulations and
proper channels cannot be flaunted, it can minimize its
losses on both counts.
The artists, for their part, appear to have backed
off from their initial determination to return to the
location of the original fracas and have apparently
accepted the authorities' offer of space in an outlying
park. Despite press attacks on the artists as publicity-
seeking provocateurs, the offer was a culmination of
other conciliatory gestures, including the prompt re-
lease of those arrested on September 15 and the subse-
quent return of some confiscated paintings.
The apparent compromise between artists and author-
ities has not precluded the possibility of -trouble this
Sunday, if in fact the show comes off. Many of the
artists would probably like to set a precedent for the
public showing of their officially disapproved art,
rather than to provoke another confrontation. Others,
however, may feel that to let the regime set the terms
for the showing smacks of defeat for their cause and
costs them an opportunity to dramatize the harshness
of current cultural policies.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
CHILE
September 27, 1974
The government has begun to make good on its promise
to release many political prisoners. The pace of the
program could be slowed, however, by reluctance on the
part of other nations to receive more Chilean refugees.
When he announced the initiative on September 11,
Junta President Pinochet implied that only prisoners
who agreed to leave Chile would be released. It now ap-
pears that many of these prisoners will, in fact, be
freed and allowed to remain in the country. On the other
hand, the government has begun using a decree law issued
last year to expel the "political activists?` it has ar-
rested, but has not brought to trial. The number of
prisoners who will fall into the various categories can-
not yet be determined. It seems likely, however, that
several thousand Chileans soon will be looking for new
homes abroad, faced with a general lack of enthusiasm
for receiving them.
The negative attitude in Europe appears to be due
primarily to economic considerations. Whatever the rea-
sons for reluctance to receive more refugees, resettle-
ment problems may compel. Santiago to allow more former
prisoners to remain in the country. This probably will
slow the release program somewhat.
The government is likely to castigate publicly for-
eign critics who now fail to give refuge to the "op-
pressed" Chileans about whom they have professed to be
so concerned. Chile also has not forgotten Pinochet's
call on the Soviet Union and Cuba to free some of their
political prisoners. Santiago has been collecting names
of those prisoners from friends and relatives and urging
international organizations to press Moscow and Havana
on the issue. Foreign Minister Carvajal probably will
raise the matter anew in his speech t-n the UN General
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 27, 1974
President Peron?s effort to rush a sweeping anti-
subversion bill through Congress will be successful,
but may arouse suspicion among members of the opposition
Radical Party. The bill was passed by the Senate last
night and will likely be approved by the Chamber of
Deputies later today.
The proposed legislation would give the government
broad powers of enforcement, including the right to im-
prison accomplices of guerrillas, newsmen who report sub-
versive activities, and recalcitrant strikers. This
could involve jailing foreign correspondents. In the
past, selected newsmen have been invited to secret press
conferences held by leaders of extremist groups. Cover-
age of such events has been severely criticized by the
government, which sees in such activity a conspiracy by
the media to undermine its' authority.
Radical senators reportedly objected to the bill
on the grounds that generally worded provisions could be
applied against opposition political activity. Earlier
this year, they and several leftist Peronists used simi-
lar arguments to delay passage of a reform of the penal
code backed by former president Juan Peron. Although
the draft does include special provisions for convicted
government workers that could also be challenged on con-
stitutional grounds, criticism is unlikely to hold up
enactment in light of ongoing rampant violence.
Full support for the measure from orthodox Peronists
who make up the congressional majority is strengthened
by the recent resignation of the remaining two leftist
Peronist senators. In addition, members of small ultra-
nationalist groups may assist passage, because the bill
calls for the expulsion of convicted naturalized citi-
zens and foreigners. Mrs. Peron*s introduction is well-
timed for quick enactment. The regular session of Con-
gress ends next week, and discussion cannot be delayed
for the special session, scheduled for late October,
since penal reform is not on the agenda.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 27, 1974
Panama: The government announced on September 25
that it had directed all chiefs of diplomatic and con-
sular missions to resign. The action is apparently de-
signed to replace veteran personnel with diplomats more
attuned to the government's present goals as the sixth
anniversary of the October 1968 revolution approaches.
It is not expected to result in the replacement of Ambas-
sador to Washington Nicolas Gonzalez Revilla. Panamanian
government leader General Torrijos apparently is very
pleased with his performance both as ambassador and Pan-
ama's deputy negotiator in canal treaty talks with the
US.
India: While visiting Moscow from September 11 to
13, the chairman of the Indian Space Research Organization
signed agreements with the Soviet Academy of Sciences
establishing details for the launching of India's first
satellite early next year. The 660-pound payload is
expected to be launched from the Kapustin Yar test center
in the USSR and placed in orbit at an altitude of 370
miles. Experiments aboard the vehicle will include x-ray
astronomy, and solar neutron and gamma ray electron
probes. Tracking facilities in India will be the pri-
mary center for receiving data transmitted by the satel-
lite. Original plans included the use of an Indian-
designed launch vehicle, but technical difficulties have
slowed the development schedule for the Indian missile.
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