NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027000010012-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 12
• Content Type: REPORT

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STAT
National 1 ntel l igen~ce
Bulletin
Top Secret
24 5ep7ember 1974
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IVatianal Intelligence Bulletin
September 24, 1974
CONTENTS
EC: Agriculture ministers reach compromise. (Page 2)
MBFR: The fourth round opens in Vienna today.
Page 4)
ITALY: Some Communist Party, members believe their
leaders are moving too fast toward participation in
the government. (Page 6)
LEBANON: Prime Minister reportedly plans to resign.
Page 11)
ETHIOPIA: Crown Prince says he is willing tc~ become
const ~utional monarch. (Page 14)
FOR THE RECORD: (.Page 16)
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National Intelligen~a ~~~lotin
September 24, 1974
The hay?d-fought comps?omise reached ~.ast week at the
three-day farm ministers' meeting probabl.~r wi~Ll yield a
brief respite in the dispute over agricultural policy,
but no EC member is sat.isff.ed.
The compromise includes the followings a 5-percent
across-the-board hike in support prices, a devaluation
of the special British and. T:r:ish exchange rates for cal-
culating farm prices by 7.5 and 10 percent. respectively,
a 5-percent. increase i.n premi.ums pas.d for not slaughter-
ing cattle, and an advance of the da~t.e fo:~? implementing
new milk and beef support prices. During the meeting,
EC Commissioner for Agr%.cult.u.re Lardi:noi.s proposed EC
subsidies for open market sugar pu:e?chases from abroad
after the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement expires next
January, a move that primarily would ai.d the LJK.~
The mid-year _i.ncrease i.n support prices ~~s unpre-
cedented in EC ]~istory, but ~i.t.s impact on. farm income
will be small. It will not raise farm ~.ncomes enough
to offset rising produc~t.ion costs . Crain prices are
already far above support levels and therefore will not
be affected. For' pork and beef, the p~?esent system of
buying supplies for storage i.n order to maintain the
minimum price is i.n troub.le, because storage f~acili.ties
are filled to capacity. J~.asing the m.in-4.rnum i.s not
likely to help.
Th.e devaluation of B:~:i.~~,ain" s and :Ireland" s special
exchange rates is aimed at improving farm .income .in
these two countr_i.es and will fur.th.er erode the uniform
application of common farm poi..icy. Deval~zation and the
across-the-board increase will. raise support prices l~
percent in the UK and about.. l/ percent in Trel.and.
Ireland, a net exporter of food, will be the main ben=s-
ficiary of the moves t.o ra.:se pricesy Because the
British and Trish currencies, which had bE:en on a parity,
were not devalued er~ually, Irish farm prociucts will be
more competitive in Briti,sln markets
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September ~~4, 1974
The ministers refused to sanction measures t~~ken
unilaterally last summer by France to aid its farmers,
thus in effect giving the E,C Commission approval t:o
continue court proceedings against this action. The
decision is a victory for Community authority, but: it
will add to the political problems Paris already ryas
in coping with national disillusionment over EC fe~rm
policy.
The difficulties facing European farmers and con-
sumers and the failure to solve them through the common
agricu~.tural policy are increasingly becoming a hi.gh-
level EC political issue. Pressure from Bonn, su~~ported
by London, for a fundamental review of the policy is
growing. EC leaders have only three to four montr~s to
undertake a review before they must again argue ak~out
new minimum prices to be set on February 1 for thE~ 1975
crop year.
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National Intelligenoo bulletin September 24, 1974
The fourth round of force reduction negotiations
opens today in Vienna. Soviet Foreign P~linister Gromyka
suggested last week that Moscow would make some new pro-
posals in the talks, Most West European participants,
however, believe there will be little progress during
this round and advocate that the West not offer any con-
cessions to the Soviets.
During a meeting with West German Chancellor Schmidt
last week, Gromyko repeated the standard Soviet, criticism
of the Western position in the force reduct=ion talks.
He said that only equal percentage reductions based on
the present force relationship would be acceptable to
Moscow and objected to the West's concept of a common
ceiling.
The Soviet Foreign Minister added that the Soviets
would take "new initiatives." West German officials
believe that Gromyko was hinting only at another and
more explicit presentation of the Soviet proposal for
symbolic reductions. In its draft treaty of November 8,
197.3, the USSR proposed that East and West each make a
symbolic reduction of 20,000 men in 1975. Earlier this
year, the Soviet delegates modified this pr_opos~al some-
what, but the Western delegations have continued to re-
ject it because it calls for equal reductions by both
sides and requires Western states other than the US to
participate in the reduction process from the outset.
The West has argued that only US and Soviet ground forces
should be reduced in a first phase of reductions.
Most of the other Western negotiators share the
West German view that the Soviets will show little flex-
ibility. The West Europeans apparently be:Lieve that the
Soviets wish to r_ontinue to stall in Vienna until a firm
date is agreed for the concluding phase of the European
security conference. Moscow wants to conclude that
conference with a summit meeting, and the course of the
negotiations in Vienna and Geneva has shown that Moscow
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Nat6onal Intelligence Bulletin September 2 ~, 1974
is reluctant t.o move in the force reduction talks until
the West. agrees to the summit meeting The West Euro-
peans presumably also believe that the Soviets will wish
to assess further the new governments i.n Europe and the
US before moving in Viennao
With the exception of the Netherlandsa repres~nta-
tive, most West European negotiators in Vienna agree
that the West should avoid making any substantive con-
cessions during this round The Hague, under domestic
pressure to reduce Dutch forces, has stated that it will
do so only in the context of a multilateral force reduc-
tion agreement and hopes that an agreement can be
reached soono The Dutchy therefore, would like the Allies
to hint to the Soviets by the end of the year that the
West would be willing to reduce the number of nuclear
warheads and delivery systems in return for Soviet ac-
ceptance of the Western proposal that they withdraw
68,000 men and 1x700 tanksa
The British representative also advocates giving
such a signal at the end of this rounder The issue of
introducing nuclear elements into the talks is a poten-
tially divisive one for the Western Allies, however,
and obtaining Allied agreement for such. a move may prove
difficulto
Given the evident desire of most West Europeans to
go slow and the lack of any firm indications that the
East will offer any substantial concessions, it is un-
likely that the many issues that divide East and ti'est
will be resolved during this round of the force reduc-
tion talks.,
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National Intolligence E3ulletin
ITALY
September 24, :1974
In :recent weeks, the Communist Party~s national
leaders have issued numerous calls for a direct Communist
voice in national poli.cy~-~rnak.%nga Although they appear to
exclude the possibility of formally entering the govern-
ing coalition at this time, the Communist spokesmen
stress that the country"s problems cannot: be solved with-
out greater Communist involvement in the national deci-
sion-making pracess~ Accordingly they are aiming for
some sort of agreement with the government which would
allow consultations on legislative matter?s~ Communist
chief Enra.co Berlinguer believes that such steps would
accustom the public gradually to a larger Communist role
in the government and pave the way for actual coalition
membership at a later dated
Even. this gradualist approach is apparently too
much for some 1.oca1 Communist officials? In general,
they feel that Communist headquarters in Rome does not
have an accurate idea of reactions among the .rank and
filem In Italyss central regions, for example, Communist
cadres reportedly are saying that they will not "extend
their hands" to right-wing Christian Democrats whom they
have been battling for 20 yearsm In addition, some
middle-level Communist labor leaders fear that any deal
with the Christian Democrats will result in a net loss
for labor The party~s highly organized youth movement,
moreover, harbars doubts about. party policies?
The most prevalent concern, however, is that when
the party reaches the point of actual entry into the
government? it will make the same mistakes the Social-
ists made in joining the center-left coalition more
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National Intelligence Bulletin September', 24, 1974
than a decade ago. Specifically, local Communist'offi-~
cial~ fear that their national ~.eaders may end up ac-
cepti~g cabinet posts in exchange for promises th~~.t will
never be realized.
Although local Communist officials realize that they
cannot alter the course set by the national partyleader-
ship, they do hope at least to affect the speed o~ the
party's drive for a government role. National le~~ders
cannot afford to ignore the views of heir local ~~~ounter-
parts, because it is only at the local level that the
Communists participate directly in Italian government.
The Communists administer--usually with the collaT~ora-
tion of the Socialists and other leftist forces--three
of the 20 regions, about a dozen of the 94 provin~~es,
and about 20 percent of the mur}icipal councils. _Gocal
Communist cadres who take issue with the strategy devised
in Rome will have a chance to argue their case at!their
next national congress in early 1975.
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Natlt~ila0'~'lt@~~IG~ei'7C4 ~U~~E'tll"1
LEBANON
September 24, 1974
Lebanese Prime Minister 5ulh reportedly indicated
to journalists after a meeting with President Fr.~njiyah
that he would resign within a few days. The Lebanese
leader apparently has been unable to resolve the con-
flict within the cabinet that has centered axoun~~ his
government's inabil~.ty to deal effectively with inter-
nal security problems .
Kamal dumblatt--pro-fedayeen, leftist, and :head of
the Progressive Socialist Party--tYireatened last week to
withdraw two o~ his supporters from the cabinet in pro-
test of the government's failure to oppose the series
of Israeli violations of Lebanese territory and its
failure to stop the Christian political parties from
importing arms for their private arsenals.
Leaders of the Christian parties had also considered
withdrawing their representatives from the cabinet.
They have little confidence in Sulh, are unhappy with
his reluctance to impose controls on the fedayeen in
the cities or in southern Lebanon, and feel they must
retain their militia forces to protect their own in-
teres is .
According to the. US embassy in Beirut, 5ulh may
attempt to succeed himself by simply re~.rranging his
cabinet--perhaps with the addition of some new Faces.
Should this tactic fail, $ulh may head a caretaker gov-
ernment far a more or less protracted period while major
politicians jockey to improve their political fortunes
and those of their followers .
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National intelligence Bulletin
ETHIOPIA
September 240 1.974
Crown Prince Asfa Worsen has stated publicly that he
is willing to return to Ethiopia and to bE:come a consti-
tutional monarcYi; this will force the military to make a
decision on the future of the monarchy. Meanwhile, the
failure of university .authorities to appear for the first
day of registration at the university in Addis Ababa yes?
terday points to the threat of renewed student. unrest.
The military announced two weeks ago that. it was
offering Asfa Worsen the post of 91figux?ehead k:ing," but
apparently did not communicate with him directlya The
public offer may have been made on the as:~ump~:ion the
Crown Prince would be unable or unwilling to return, and
may have been one of the militaryus plays to prepare the
Ethiopian people gradually for the abolit:Lon of the
monarchy.
A recurrence of the student disorders last week may
be spurred by the failure of university o:ffici_als to
show up for registration yesterday. The students may
infer that the military plans not to open the university.
Last week, the students were demanding that the military
share power with them.
Delegates of the Confederation of Ethiopian Labor
Unions similarly demanded an immediate share of power,
and clerks in the Finance Mministry yesterday published
a statement demanding an end to military :rules,
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~ca~ll'~f1~~ filtE:~I1C~Gt"1GE' BU~setil'1 September 24, 1974
Barlier, there were signs that the military was
trying to regain the backing of civilian groups that
had supported it.
--Lieutenant General Aman, head of the military gov-
ernment, said at a press conference Friday ghat plans
to have students go to the countryside for t:wo years
to help with literacy and other programs woixld not
be campuls ory .
--The government announced on Sunday the fog^mation
of a broadly based Civilian Advisory Board :including
students, teachers, and labor. It will. adv.~se the
Provisional Military Administration on cons-~itutional
and other policy questions.
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I\lational Intelligences E3ulletin
September 24, 1974
France: The French Council of Ministers approved
on September 18 the proposed 1975 national budget, which
wi11 now be referred to parliament. It calls for an
increase in defense spending of around $1.1 billion.
The outlay for defense is about 14 percent greater than
last year. This represents little real change, however,
as the increase will be almost entirely absorbed by in-
flation. The total defense figure of $9.1 billion repre-
sents almost 17 percent o:f. the French budget, about the
same proportion as last vear.
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