NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027000010010-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 10
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
STAT
National Intelligence
Bulletin
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completed.
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N? 639
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 23, 1974
CONTENTS
EGYPT-SYRIA-PLO-JORDAN: Egypt recognizes the PLO as the
sole representative of the Palestinian people. (Page 1)
CUBA: Dorticos speech seen as maneuver to make it diffi-
cult for OAS to lift sanctions. (Page 3)
GREECE-TURKEY-CYPRUS: Clerides shows flexibility on
issue of population transfers. (page 5)
USSR-CYPRUS: Visit by Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev
keeps Soviet Cyprus proposal alive. (Page 7)
CAMBODIA: Return of Lon Non is likely to cause: political
tensions. (Page 9)
CAMBODIA: Economic reforms bring unpopular reaction.
(Page 10)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 12)
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National Intelligence Bulletin
EGYPT-SYRIA-PLO-JORDAN
September 23, 1974
Egyptian, Syrian, and Palestinian officials on Sat-
urday ended two days of talks in Cairo with a statement
supporting the Palestine Liberation Organization as the
"only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people."
This represents a significant concession to the PLO by
Egypt. President Sadat in July had joined Jordan's King
Husayn in declaring that the PLO represented only Pal-
estinians residing outside Jordan.
Sadat almost certainly modified his stand to reduce
the likelihood of a Palestinian attempt to subvert fur-
ther progress in Middle East negotiations and to ease
his recently strained relations with PLO Chairman Yasir
Arafat.
Arafat will interpret the Egyptian move as a major
victory. He is likely to remain apprehensive about the
extent of Egyptian support, however, because the commu-
nique failed to provide for a Palestinian role in nego-
tiating an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied West
Bank.
The omission from the communique of any direct ref-
erence to the West Bank or to Jordan suggests that Cairo
is still insisting that. Amman take the lead in negotiat-
ing an Israeli withdrawal. Sadat probably hopes that by
standing fast on this concrete issue, he will temper
Husayn's reaction to Egypt's concession to Arafat on the
less tangible issue of representation of Palestinians.
Jordan has reacted strongly to Egypt's repudiation
of its earlier pro-Jordan stand. According to a gov-
ernment communique issued yesterday, Jordan has "frozen"
its position until the Arab summit--now scheduled for
late October--and will not participate further in nego-
tiating activities, including preparations for another
session of the Geneva peace talks, until that time.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 23, 1974
Jordanian officials yesterday cited the results of
the two-day Cairo conference as the reason for Amman's
refusal to meet with representatives of Egypt, Syria, and
the PLO to work out a common Arab policy. The invitation
for a larger meeting was extended to the Jordanians by
Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam, who stopped in Amman on
his return to Damascus from Cairo to report the results
of the tripartite meeting to King Husayn.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 23, 1974
President Dorticos' speech on Saturday appears to
be a deliberate attempt to make it more difficult for the
Organization of American States to agree on lift:.ng the
sanctions imposed on Cuba in 1964.
At an event honoring visiting Tanzanian President
Nyerere, Dorticos made a point of lauding a Cuban army
officer who had served with anti-Lisbon guerrillas in
then-Portuguese Guinea and was recently amnestied by
the Spinola government. He promised that "in Latin
America the future course of history will also be that
of the triumph of liberation movements," despite "tem-
porary setbacks such as Chile."
The Cuban President also cited US press sources as
acknowledging that Cuba's pace of development--despite
the so-called blockade--had outstripped that of those
countries supported by the Alliance for Progress,, and
he noted that this had been predicted by Che Guevara
when the Alliance for Progress was initiated.
He had warm praise for Venezuelan President Carlos
Andres Perez' public reply to President Ford's UN ad-
dress, and he characterized President Ford's remarks as
a "threat against Venezuela, its people, and its legiti-
mate economic interests." He pledged Cuba's solidarity
and moral support against alleged US blackmail, "despite
the fact that we have no official or diplomatic relations
with Venezuela," and guaranteed continued Cuban support
for "the cause of liberation."
Dorticos' references to liberation movements, Che
Guevara, and the guerrilla adviser, came less than 24
hours after the OAS had voted unanimously to convene a
meeting of foreign ministers to study lifting the sanc-
tions. His speech was apparently designed to make it
extremely difficult for certain OAS members to vote
for lifting sanctions, which were originally imposed
because of Cuban support for subversion.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 23, 1974
The Castro regime prefers a sharp split in the OAS
on the sanctions question in the hope of damaging the
organization itself. Dorticos' kind words for Venezuela
were meant to tempt the Perez administration to forgo
joint action through the OAS and instead unilaterally
restore ties with Cuba--a move likely to compromise OAS
unity. Havana is confident that the sanctions--if they
are not lifted--will eventually be bypassed by most OAS
members and recognizes that a formal agreement to lift
them is aimed more at preserving the OAS than at satis-
fying Cuba.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 23, 1974
The agreement to begin a general release of all
prisoners this week indicates that acting Cypriot Presi-
dent Clerides may be willing to compromise on the larger
question of a population transfer.
In his meeting with Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash
last Friday, Clerides agreed to allow Turkish Cypriot
prisoners to travel to the Turkish-controlled sector in
the north. Another sign of flexibility on Clerides' part
is his reported agreement to permit the UN peace force
to transfer Turkish Cypriots out of the Larnaca area on
the southeast coast to the Turkish-controlled area.
Clerides and Denktash will meet the question of
population transfers head on next Friday when they take
up the subject of family reunification. The Greek Cyp-
riot leader probably hopes that by letting some Turkish
Cypriots move north, the Turks will be more flexible
about returning Greek Cypriot refugees to their homes.
Meanwhile, the governments in both. Greece and Tur-
key are turning their attention to internal politics.
In Athens, there are press reports that several cabinet
ministers, including Foreign Minister Mavros, are
expected to resign to campaign for elections. Prime
Minister Karamanlis has not officially set a date, but
the press quotes informed sources as saying the elec-
tions will probably be held on November 24.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 23, 1974
In Ankara, Prime Minister Ecevit is meeting strong
opposition to his effort to gain approval for new elec-
tions this year. Leaders of both the Justice :Party and
the Republican Reliance Party have announced they will
oppose a call for new elections. The Democratic Party,
with whom Ecevit is seeking to form a new coalition, has
opposed holding elections before next year but is recon-
sidering the question. Democratic leader Bozbeyli said
he would have an answer for Ecevit on Tuesday after he
meets with his party's executive council.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 23, 1974
The visit by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev
to Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia kept alive Moscow's pro-
posal for a Cyprus peace conference under UN auspices,
but achieved minimal substantive results.
In Athens, Ilichev met with Greek Foreign Minister
Mavros. Mavros has told US Ambassador Kubisch that no
new ground was covered. Another Greek official who
participated in the session with Ilichev put the matter
more bluntly, terming the dialogue "a waste of time"
since the Soviet side had advanced only familiar themes.
Mavros told Ilichev that, while Athens would welcome dis-
cussion of Cyprus in "any" forum, it has serious reserva-
tions about the ability of a broad conference, such as
that proposed by the USSR, to achieve a settlement.
After Ilichev left, a high-ranking Greek official. briefed
Athens newspaper publishers and stressed that the Soviet
posture toward Greece is not particularly friendly, not-
ing that Moscow had not interfered against Turkey.
Ilichev was most warmly received in Nicosia., After
his initial meeting with acting President Clerides on
September 18, the two sides noted their "identity of
views" on independence, sovereignty, and territorial
integrity of Cyprus. They also called for the w_th-
drawal of "all foreign forces" from the island and
stressed the need to find new ways to guarantee :Lts in-
dependence. Clerides later stated that the visit would
"contribute substantially to the correct facing of the
Cyprus problem."
Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash was much less en-
thusiastic and said after his meeting with Ilichev that
he still opposed Soviet efforts to arrange a broader
peace conference. The US embassy in Nicosia noted that
the initial high level of public interest in Ilichev's
visit had dropped rapidly by the time he departed last
Friday.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 23, 1974
During his earlier stop in Ankara, Ilichev went
out of his way to avoid offending the Turks. He sought
renewed Turkish assurances that Ankara is not opposed
to a sovereign and nonaligned Cyprus. In return, he
offered explicit Soviet approval of a federated state.
In a further attempt to keep bilateral relations on the
right track, Ilichev promised that Turkish Finance
Minister Baykal will have a "most fruitful" visit to
Moscow this October.
The Turks did receive the impression from Ilichev's
conduct that Moscow is increasingly concerned the sit-
uation on Cyprus will become frozen, amounting to a de
facto partition that could result in US military use of
the island.
Although Ilichev's mission did not break new
ground, it has reasserted the USSR's interest in a
Cyprus settlement, kept alive the Soviet proposal for
an international conference, and enabled Moscow to sound
out attitudes toward UN General Assembly dehatP nn 1-hp
question.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 23, 1974
CAMBODIA
Brigadier General Lon Non has returned to Cambodia
after an absence of nearly 18 months. According to press
reports, Cambodian President Lon Nol's troublemaking
younger brother turned up in Phnom Penh over the weekend.
Although last week Lon Nol reportedly had ordered his
brother to remain abroad, it is doubtful that Lon Non
would have risked returning without the President's ac-
quiescence.
Lon Nol's presence in Phnom Penh for a few weeks
need not have serious consequences, although tensions
are likely to rise. If the highly controversial gen-
eral prolongs his stay, some political backlash--par-
ticularly from Sirik Matak and fellow members of his
Republican Party--seems inevitable.
A major resurgence of political squabbling among
Phnom Penh's leadership, generated by Lon Non's return,
could only harm Cambodia's cause in the critical. creden-
tials battle at the UN. It would also complicate the
government's effort to deal with growing popular unrest
over recently enacted economic reform measures.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 23, 1974
Popular reaction to the government's recently an-
nounced economic reform package has been swift and nega-
tive.
Residents in a number of Cambodia's province have
been unanimous in their strong criticism of the reform
measures enacted on September 15. Their basic complaint
is that stiff commodity price increases have not yet
been matched by promised salary hikes for civilian em-
ployees and military personnel.
Lon Nol is particularly concerned that once non-
combat garrison troops in Phnom Penh and in provincial
capitals learn that their pay increases will be substan-
tially lower than those earmarked for combat troops and
government functionaries, serious civil unrest---possibly
exploited by disgruntled teachers, students, and leftist
dissidents--may occur.
The government's sweeping economic reform package
was prompted by continuing rampant inflation, the pros-
pect of a substantial cut in US economic aid, and the
need to bring domestic prices more in line with world
levels. The reform measures provide for greatly in-
creased prices for both domestic and imported rice, for
similar steep increases in the price of petroleum prod-
ucts, and for a malor devaluation of Cambodia's currency.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 23, 1974
Denmark: The minority Liberal Danish. government
survived another threat Friday when a controversial tax
reform bill passed parliament by a vote of 88 to 40.
The bill, which will reduce personal income taxes in
1975, is part of a tax package designed to bolster the
sagging Danish economy. Prime Minister Hartling's fu-
ture is scarcely bright, however, since he can count on
only 22 of the 179 votes in parliament.
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