NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027000010006-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
~. _ional Intelli~en~e
lletin
State Dept. review completed.
DIA review
completed.
Top Secret
N?_ 639
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 20, 1974
CONTENTS
CHINA: Chou apparently recaver:~ng; political posi-
tion unchanged. (Page 1)
SOUTH KOREA - JAPAN: Seoul and Tokyo settle.
EAST - WEST GERMANY:
(Page 7)
(Page
Relations beginning to improve.
3)
FRANCE: Review of defense policy continues. (Page 9)
OPEC: Results of oil ministers' meeting in Vienna.
Page 11)
EC: Agriculture ministers still deadlocked. (Page 13)
ROMANIA: Party program widens gap between Bucharest
and Moscow. (Page 14)
NORTH KOREA: Pyongyang looks to West for machinery
and equipment. (Page 20)
ETHIOPIA: Labor unionists join students in ciemanding
civilian participation. (Page 21)
CUBA: Economy in best shape since Castro as:~umed
power. (Page 25)
ARGENTINA: Violence increases. (Page 2.6)
FOR THE RECORD : (P age 2 8 )
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 20, 1974
Chinese remarks to foreign visitors and domestic
media treatment of Chou En-lai's illness seem to be try-
ing to convey the message--both at home and abroad--
that Chou has indeed been very ill, that he is new re-
covering, and that he has not been shunted aside polit-
ically. Chinese officials told visiting Nigerian. Presi-
dent Gowon that Chou has had an operation but is now
"recuperating well."
as a result of his latest bout of illness,
Chou is performing very few, if any, duties during his
convalescence. His last public appearance, on July 31,
reportedly was made against his doctors' orders, and his
consistent failure over the last few months to follow
his doctors' advice has undoubtedly contributed t:o his
medical problems. This time, his doctors are liA:ely to
be more insistent that Chou not resume any activities
until they have decided that he has recovered sui`fi-
ciently .
Chows name continues to appear on messages sent
to foreign countries, and the domestic media coni:inue
to replay the remarks of visiting dignitaries wi.~hing
Chou a speedy recovery. Two visiting heads of si:ate,
in their toasts to Chinese leaders, inserted the word
"respected?' before Chou's name, an honor not eve n
accorded Mao. .This was presumably done with the ap-
proval of Chinese officials, but the practice wa;a not
repeated by the visiting Mauritanian president.
Whether or not Chou will again tackle many-?-al-
though almost certainly not all--of his duties a:~
premier and senior vice chairman of the party will ob-
viously depend on the further progress of hi.s il:Lness.
A partial recovery from the heart condition which has
presently incapacitated him is possible, but little is
directly known about the complications that have ap-
parently again confined him to bed. References ley Chi-
nese officials to party Central Committee concern that
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National Intelligence bulletin
September 20, 1974
Chou pace himself better in the future suggest that at:
this juncture at least the hierarchy in Peking hopes and
perhaps expects that Chou will continue to be an impor-
tant factor in the decision--making process?
Chinese media have recently on occasion linked
Chows name with .those of aging leaders Mao and the 87-
year-old acting head of state Tung Pi-wu. This has led
some foreign observers--and some Chinese as well--to
suggest that Chou should now be regarded as a party
elder, greatly respected, but out of the direct line of
authority. If Chou lingers on, alive but essentially
incapacitated, this state of affairs will obviously
come to pass, but the coupling of Chou's name with that
of Tung Pi-wu is not unique, and no clear pattern of
linking the Premier with honorary elders has yet been
established. Mao, although. reclusive for over a decade,
remains at the core of Chinese politics, and so long
as he is not permanently hospitalized, Chou is likely
to retain a large measure of influence even if he shou:Ld
delegate most of his day-to--day duties on a permanent
basis. Some of Chou's influence, however, derives di-
rectly from his unmatched capacity to manage the de-
tailed problems of running the Chinese bureaucracy.
Even in the event of a partial recovery, this aspect
of his authority is certain to be diluted.
In the meantime, Chou's representational duties
continue to be divided abou-L: equally between vice
premiers Teng Hsiao--ping and Li Hsien-nien,o Recent
television coverage of Mao warmly shaking hands with
each of them suggests that they both have i:he Chairman?s
approval. Neither is likely to press for substantial
changes in current Chinese domestic and foreign policies
i
n the event Chou is permanently incapacitated.
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Na~tic~nel Intelligence Bulletin September ~;0, 1974
The arrival of a special Japanese envoy in :~eoul
yesterday officially resolved the sharpest and longest
dispute between Seoul and Tokyo since the two esi:ablished
ties in 1965,
In settling the controversy, Tokyo went a long way
to meet insistent Korean demands. The special e3zvoy
brought President Pak Chong-hui both a personal :Letter
from Prime Minister Tanaka and assurances--riegot:Lated
in advance--that Tokyo accepted a degree of responsibil-
ity for the assassination in Seoul last month an~i would
curb anti-Pak Korean activists in Japan. A compromise
was struck on language referring to Chosen Soren, the
pro-Pyongyang group in Korea that Seoul wanted e:icplicitly
condemned. Both Seoul and Tokyo have acknowledged pub-
licly that U5 mediation played an important role in bring-
ing about a settlement.
President Pak this week provided the US ambassador
in Seoul with some additional insight into Korean objec-
tives in the recent dispute. Emphasizing hi.s deep con-
cern over what he described as a leftward trend in Japan
over the past two or three years, Pak pointed out the
potential danger to South Korea if this continued and
Tokyo adopted neutralist or pro-Communist policies.
Pak's remarks reinforce the view that Seoul's heavy-
handed anti-Japanese campaign of recent weeks cannot be
explained fully by Korean emotional and domestic factors,
but that it was also a deliberate attempt by Pak to
check a policy drift in Tokyo, including moves toward
Pyongyang, at least until Seoul can shore up its own
international standing.
A question being pondered now in both Seoul and
Tokyo is what impact the dispute will have on future
relations.. The fact that Tokyo has gone far to accom-
modate Pak's demands has probably encouraged him. to be-
lieve in the effectiveness of tough tactics in dealing
with the Japanese. In his talk with the US ambassador,
Pak gave the impression that he took satisfaction from
the latest turn of events.
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National Intelligence bulletin September 20, 1974
In Tokyo, there is no doubt that the recent con-
troversy, at least over the near term, ha:c resulted in
greater Japanese sensitivity to South KorE:an interests.
Japanese diplomats have recently told US and Canadian
officials that Tokyo places a high priority on. improving
relations with Seoul, whic}1 have deteriorated over the
past year. The Japanese say that any rapproch.e.nent with
North Korea will have to be very gradual and can only
take place during a period of good Seoul-Tokyo relations.
Still, over the long term, there is ]Little room
for optimism that the path of Seoul-Tokyo relations wi?11
be smooth. Korean-Japanese animosities a~?e deeply rooted,
and there is likely to be :lingering reseniyment: in Tokyo
for some time over recent Korean pressure tactics and
the events of the past year. At some future date, Tokyo
may prove unwilling to continue the sort of special re?-
lationship which Seoul feels it needs whi:Le still facing
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National Intelligence bulletin September 20, 1974
Signs of a thaw in East - West German relations are
evident for the first time since the Guillaume s~~y case
of last May. Although major obstacles still remain, both
sides now appear interested in improved cooperation.
East German interest took a more concrete f arm in
talks earlier this week. In a meei~ing with West German
mission chief Gaus in East Berlin on September 16, East
German party chief Honecker reportedly proposed that
negotiations get under way on a number of outstanding
bilateral issues, including agreements on culture, postal
services, and legal assistance. To launch this new move-
ment, Honecker said his government would be willing to
eliminate, within the next three weeks, the compulsory
currency exchange requirement for old-age pensioners
wishing to visit East Germany. Pankow's move last No-
vember to double the minimum amount of money that visi-
tors mush change into East German currency cut signifi-
cantly into the number of visitors, particularly from
West Berlin. Bonn has tried for several months to achieve
a relaxation of this requirement. The reported offer
falls short of the West German objective, however, be-
cause it rescinds the requirement only for old-age pen-
sioners .
West German leaders, including Chancellor Schmidt,
are reported to be happy with the East German offer. It
has, however, run into opposition from West Berlin Govern-
ing Mayor Schuetz, who argues that Bonn must hold out for
the elimination of the currency requirement for all visi-
tors to East Germany.
Despite its shortcomings, this latest step by Pan-
kow should prove encouraging to the West Germans. Chan-
cellor Schmidt has recently given several hints of a
positive West German at.'titude toward inter-German ?~ela-
tions, but he has pointed out that he cannot alcne change
the climate resulting from t`he Guillaume affair.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 20, 1974
There may be a number of reasons for this shift.
U5 embassy sources believe Schmidt may have begun to
realize that some East German concessions on inter-German
issues could, if handled properly, be useful to his gov-
ernment. These sources feel that Schmidt must also allow
for the continuing strong interest in Ostpoli.tik of the
Brandt wing of his party.
East Germany stands t:o gain substantially if it can
obtain West German technology and a renewal of the swing
credit. In addition, the Soviets could k~e encouraging
East Germany to sustain West German interest in detente,
particularly in view of Chancellor 5chmidt's visit to
the Soviet Union, scheduled for late next month.
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National Intelligence bulletin september 20, 19x4
The French government :~,s cont:i..nuing the defer.~.se re-
view begun by President G:~.scard last month. Various
policies reportedly are under consideration, but con-
tinued economic, social, and political problems at: home
will make it difficult for Discard to make major defense
policy changes .
In a wide-ranging d.scussi.on with departing ambas-
sador Irwin, French Defense Minist~.er Soufflet claimed he
is ready to talk with the US about defense, inclucii.ng
tactical nuclear weapons, even though the French defense
review wi:11 probably contanue to year"s end. Key sub-
jects probably still under study a.re armaments produc-
tion, nuclear policy, European defense, conscript~..on
problems, and cond:it.ions associated with military serv-
ice.
Soufflet predicted that G:iscard will propose to
hi.s European allies that some form of European defense
cooperation be cons:tde.red~ Problems, of economic and
political unity and a desire for continued US engagement
in European defense will probably make this unatt::cactive
to France's allies., Paris m:~.ght propose a plan fc~r lo-
cating its Pluton tactical missi:ies with. i.ts army corps
in West Germany, but. concern over Bonn's demand t~~ have
a say in employment, and Soviet objections, make -this un-
likely for the present
In order to gain advantage in the European arms
market., France may well increase its efforts to inte-
grate European weapons manufacture. If no other alter-
native is available, Paris may eventually opt to consider
limited participation in the Eurogroup for this purpose.
Closer cooperation with NATO allies may come in the form
of greater willingness t.o coordi.nat.e exercises and plans,
Soufflet admitted he could :imagi.ne contingency planning
for NATO lines of communication acrass France. He
stressed, however, that, no US troops could be stationed
there .
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National Intelligence bulletin SeptE~mber 20, 1974
Soufflet has announced reforms designed to improve
the lot of servicemen and induce greater support among
French youth, but recent demonstrations against national
service and service conditions will certainly prompt
further study of this probleme The 12-moni_h term of
service will probably not h~+ reduced at this time.
-1C1?-
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IVationai Intelligence Bulletin September 20, 1974
At their conference in Vienna last week, the oil
ministers of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries decided to freeze posted prices, but to raise
the, taxes paid by the international oil companies. De-
pending on how each of the OPEC members implement: the
tax increase, the average cost of oil to the comp~~nies
is expected to increase between 40 and 50 cents pE~r
barrel.
The ministers made an effort to convince the con-
suming nations that the increase in taxes could came out
of oil company profits and should not result in higher
oil prices to the consumer. It is unlikely that -the
companies will absorb much of the increase.
If the companies pass on the full tax increase, the
oil bill far consuming countries will rise by bet`aeen
$4.4 billion and $5.5 billion annually. The increase
for major oil-consuming countries would be as fol.Lows:
(Million U5 $) US 900--1,130; Japan 775-970; LJK 33:5--420;
West Germany 450?560; France 410-510; and Italy 2".ap-360.
The ministers also decided that:, beginning i:n Jan-
uary 1975, the rate of inflation in the industrialized
countries will be taken into account in setting oil
prices. This action would preclude any easing of the
burden of oil prices as a result of continuing would
inflation.
The OPEC ministers agreed on little else at 'Vienna.
Some of the more contentious issues like managing pro-
duction cuts and schemes to establish a single price
for oil were referred to working groups in preparation
for the December OPEC meeting. The prorationing issue
was particularly touchy. Iran's representative,
Amouzegar, was opposed to any scheme that could r~lquire
his country to cut production.
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Nati?n~l IntelligE'ncE'. bulletin September 20, 197
Saudi-oil minister Yamani was odd man out in Vienna,
just as he was at Quito in ;July. He' refused to g? along
with the other members? plans to .increase oil revenues
by raising company taxes. :Cnstead, he indicated that the
Saudis had increased rytheir revenuesA by rai"sing "the buy-
back price of government-owned oil to nearly 95 percent
of posted price--the buyback price for most of the Gulf
countries being 9"3 percent. If the Saudis stick to triis
formula, they will be receiving at least 20 cents per
barrel less than other OPEC members. Yamani probably
was posturing, publicly choosing a smaller price increase
while knowing that the Saudis would later insist that
Aramco pad Saudi Arabia at least as much per barrel as
other Gulf producers are getting. Aramco will doubtless
price its oil wiirh this in mind. In any case, the
Saudis apparently plan to take 100-percent control of
the company next month and to introduce a :new pricing
system.
Despite a production cutback of 300,000 barrels
per day in Abu Dhabi, the world oil surplus still ex-
ceeds a million barrels a day. At the OPEC conference,
a number of countries reportedly announced decisions to
cut production, but no details are available. If the
initiative to re~.uce liftin.gs is left to the companies,
the cuts would fall, most heavily on high-priced buyback
oil. Most affected would be those Arab countries that
have already borne the brunt of the cutbacks--Kuwait
Abu Dhabi, and Libya.
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I I
National I ntelligenCe E3ulletin September 2 0 , 19 ~ ~
Political repercussions from failure to res~~lve dis-
agreements over EC farm policy would be so serio7~s that
the agricultural ministers' meeting now under wasr in
Brussels is continuing at unprecedented length. In an
attempt to break the deadlock, the ministers have called
on their technical experts to work up a package ~~f com-
promise measures.
The common agricultural policy, which is one of the
principal pillars of the Community, has been wea'~.ened
considerably over the past year as a number of member
countries have sought to protect their farm interests
through national policies. Costs of fertilizer, farm
machinery, and fuel have skyrocketed, but prices paid
to farmers have not kept pace. In same cases, beef and
pork for example, prices have fallen. The resulting
farmer unrest has created heavy pressure for remedial
action.
The EC Commission has proposed a number of measures
aimed at helping the farmers, including a 4-percent hike
in farm support prices and a 7.5-percent devaluation of
the special currency exchange rate used to calculate
prices for British and Irish agricultural produce. West
Germany and Denmark oppose the 4-percent increase in
support prices because of its inflationary impact, while
France and Belgium want a boost of at least 8 percent.
London wants the British and Irish exchange rates to
remain on a par, at the present level to maintain British
farmers? competitive position and hold down domestic food
prices. Ireland, however, is demanding a 15-percent
devaluation o.f the Irish rate in the hope of raising its
farm incomes. Disagreements also remain over th.e solu-
tion of Britain's sugar shortage and the legality under
the common agricultural policy of measures taken by France
and Belgium to aid their :farmers .
The Council meeting was originally sch.edu.lE~d to end
yesterday, but the ministers appear willing to continue
until agreement is reached on the major issues. Latest
indications are that the meeting will continue ttoday.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 20 , 19 74
The new Romanian party program codifies Bucharest's
National Communist Course and challenges the Kremlin's
claim to be the sole authority of Marxism-.Leninism.
The program widens the gap between Moscow and Bucharest,
and leaves Romania open to charges of pursuing a "re-
visionist" and "national Communist" course.
The cardinal Leninist tenet of a world divided into
capitalist and socialist camps is rejected. Instead,
the Romanian program contends it is necessary to recog-
nize that the world is made up of developed, developing,
and undeveloped nations. This formulation runs counter
to Soviet doctrine by taking a non-class approach to
political groupings and moves Bucharest closer to the
views of Peking and the nonaligned states. It implicitly
lumps the Soviet Union wit=h the developed capitalist
states .
The program reasserts past Romanian positions, thus
confirming Bucharest's parting of ideological company
with the Soviets by:
--Criticizing the Sirio-Soviet dispute as harmful
to socialism and pledging the Romanian party to
act with all "determi_nation" to surmount differ-
ences between socialist states.
--Describing the "not:ion" as an abiding and en-
during force, one of Ceausescu's favorite themes
that leaves Bucharest vulnerab le to charges of
"bourgeois nationaliti.m.'?
--Asserting that socialist, as well as capitalist,
societies contain "inner contradict:ions," a view
similar to Chinese formulations.
The program criticizes the socialist movement
(read Moscow) for seeing all parties in the same light
without recognizing the special needs of each in its
development. The document: also asserts that integration
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National Intelligence bulletin September ~;0, 1974
can be achieved only when equal levels of develo~~ment
have been reached by all socialist countries. Fi.na~ly,
the program pays lip service to the "humanist purposes"
of society, a subject conspicuously avoided elseti~here
in the Saviet camp since Dubcek's Czechoslovakia..
The program is to be formally adopted at thE: party
congress in late November. In the meantime, nationwide
debates and discussions are to be held to educatE: the
ublic and to drum u support for the program.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 20, 1974
North Korea has quietly turned to the West as a
major source for its modern machinery and equipment.
This deliberate shift in policy will reduce Pyongyang?s
long-standing dependence on the USSR and other Communist
countries for capital equipment.
Since 1970, the North Koreans have :signed contracts
with firms in Japan and Western Europe for mare than
$500 million worth of industrial plants and related
equipment. If current negotiations are successful, the
total could reach $1 billion within the next year or two.
North Korea has been able to diversify i.ts sources
of capital goods because of the willingness of the Japa-
nese and West Europeans to finance plant sales through
medium-term credits. As a result of this sort of financ-
ing for capital imports as well as for record grain im-
ports, North Korea ran a trade deficit with non-Communist
trading partners of almost. $170 million last year. This
was the first time North Korea's trade dE.fici.t with non-
communist countries surpassed that with Communist coun-
tries. North Korea's total trade last yE~ar with all non-
communist partners was $400 million.
The aims of the plant. import program are to develop
export-oriented industries and to strengi~hen industries
producing agricultural supplies, processed foods, and
consumer manufactures. P~ajor installations Pyongyang
has purchased in Western :Europe include a petrochemical
complex, a fertilizer plant, a refractory plant, and
equipment for the metals .industry. Japan sold a cement
plant, a textile spinning mill, a polyesi;er fiber plant,
a vinylon plant, and other installations?
The North Koreans have attempted through. third
parties to buy US equipment; they seemed particularly
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Natienal Intelligence Bulletin
ETHIOPIA
September ~.0, 1974
Ethiopian labor unionists have joined studen-~s in
demanding the end of military rule and the format:Lon of
a broadly based government in which civilians would share
power. The military responded to these demands bar threat-
ening to use force if labor and students challenge mili-
tary rule.
The Confederation of Ethiopian Labor Unions ~.dopted
a resolution early this week that criticized the ;provi-
sional military government's ban on strikes and called
for an immediate end to military rule. In only slightly
veiled terms, the resolution threatened a general strike
if the military closed down the confederation's head-
quarters. The labor group is probably also concerned
about the fate, now that th.e military has dissolved par-
liament, of the new labor law promised to the confedera-
tion earlier this year in return for_ ending a general
strike.
On Wednesday, the ruling military committee pub-
licly castigated the labor leaders and promised swift
action against anyone opposing the programs of the new
government.
University and secondary students, meanwhile, met
with members of the military committee in the aftermath
of Monday's student sit-ins and meetings. The military
is reported to have appealed to the students to ~.upport
its programs, but warned them of its willingness to use
force if they took to the streets. The students subse-
quently held another large meeting at which stud~:nt
leaders reiterated their earlier demands for the im-
mediate end to military rule and called for the ~iuthor-
ization of political parties and civil liberties.
In the face of opposition from students and their
teacher allies, the military has still not deterrlined
whether to press on with its plan to send most uriiver--
sity students to the countryside to provide the ~~easants
with literacy training and indoctrination on the ntili?
tary's programs.
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National Intelligence l~~lletin September zo, 1974
Increasing civilian pressure on the mil.i,tary occurs
at a time when divisions besetting the military committee
appear to have sharpened. These include a split between
those who favor the swift adoption of far~re:aching polit?~
ical and social changes and an early trial of the former
emperor and those who favor a slower pace toward consti-
tutional civilian rule and want to protect I~iaile Selassie.
-The head of the provisional military gr~vernment~.
General Aman, sides with the latter faction, but his
power relative to the military committee remains unclear?
According to a source of the U5 defense attache in Addis
Ababa, Aman's opponents on the committee believe he has
expanded his influence at their expense The source also
reports that Aman is resisting the role of mere front
man and is attempting to assert his dominance over the
committee.
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i i M
CUBA: FOREIGN TRADE
ioo~~~
Non-
communist
Countries
Other
Communist
Countries
1974
Projected
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1~lation~l inteliigenoo Bulletin
September ~!0, 1974
Cub a?s economic situation has brightened dramatically
this year because of an improved sugar harvest of 6 mil-
lion tons, a tripling in world sugar prices to mcxse than
30 cents a pound, and greatly increased economic ~~ssist-
ance from Free World countriesN The gains have put the
Cuban economy on the soundest footing since Castro took
over o
Export earnings. almost all fram sugare should jump
more than 65 percent, to $2~2 billion in 19744 Mere than
$1 billion will be realized fram the sale of 35 percent
of the sugar crop to non-Communist countries/ com;oared
with $320 million in 1973
The remainder of the crop is being sold to tze Com-
munist countries, principally the USSR, for :12 cents a
poundo The Sov~.ets are expected to adjust the price to
20 cents, probably in 1975 Cuba, however, would not
come out ahead if Havana were forced to pay world market
prices f.or Soviet oil, as seems likely
Increased imports from Free World countries this
year will give a large lift: to the economy and go a long
way toward erasing the lingering effects of the US denial
programo Cuba is going to get. several thousand U5-designed
automobiles and trucks under a $1?2a~billion Argentine
trade credit
Credit purchases of Canadian locomotives an c. coastal
tankers and Peruvian fishing vessels will provide further
benefits
Free World economic assistance over the next, sev-
eral years probably w~..11 average about $250 mill~..on, or
one half of recent, annual disbursements from the Commu-
nist countriesm
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 20, 1974
ARGENTINA
The government of President Peron has yet to find
a formula to stem violence as extremists on the right
and left of the Peronist movement continue their politi-
cal fratricide.
Sa.nce the Montonero guerrillas broke with the gov-
ernment two weeks ago, bo~r~k~ings and assassinations have
taken a quantum jump. So far, the wave of violence has
included over a hundred bombings and nearly a dozen
killings. Yesterday, Juan and Jorge Born, two of Argen-
tina's most prominent businessmen, were kidna~?ed by
terrorists in spite of the fact that they were surrounded
by bodyguards.
Earlier this week, representatives of Peronist work-
ers met with a number of leftist and Marxist union lead-
ers in the provincial city of Tucuman and announced the
formation of an organization to rival the orthodox Peron-
ist labor confederation. Although the new grouping does
not yet include national-level unions, it does create an
important nucleus of anti-government sentiment that
could cause serious problems for Mrs. Peron.
The poor performance of police in dealing with the
terrorists has increased tYae prospect that the military
will be forced to take a more active role, especially
now that Peronist extremists have stepped up their ac:
-26-
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I I
Nati?nal Intelligence Bulletin
September 20, 1974
The struggle against the terrorists is likely to
be fierce, however, especially if the Monto:neros coordi-
nate operations with the Marxist Peoples Revolutionary
Army. If public order breaks down completely oz if Mrs.
Peron shows signs of wavering, military leaders ultimately
may demand a more active and open role in the political
process.
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~ ~
~c"~~~Ot"'Mc']~ It"1tE:~ll~~ll~@ ~1.1~~4t111 September 20, 1974
Turkey: Turkey is purchasing 20 F-1045 aircraft,
produced in Italy under US license, to replace aging
F-84s in tactical and air defense roles. Turkey has 38
F-104G aircraft in its inventory. DeliveY~y of the fas-
ter and more versatile F-1045 fighter and including two
trainer models will be at a rate of six per month; the
initial delivery date is not known. The Turkish air
force was upgraded by delivery of the first two of 40
US-made F-4E aircraft in late Au ust and i ne otiati,n
for the purchase of 20 more.
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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