CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A026900010048-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 48
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
20 August 1974
N2 631
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 20, 1974
CONTENTS
GREECE-CYPRUS-TURKEY: Karamanlis purges military;
Turkey presses for return to the conference table.
(Page 1)
SOUTH VIETNAM: Military situation. (Page 3)
KOREA-JAPAN: Japan accused by both Koreas in assas-
sination aftermath. (Page 4)
WEST GERMANY: Chancellor may visit Peking after Mos-
cow trip this autumn. (Page 5)
WEST GERMANY - POLAND: No improvement in relations
likely. (Page 6)
FRANCE: Atmospheric nuclear tests support future
missile systems. (Page 8)
ZAIRE-PORTUGAL-ANGOLA: Mobutu reportedly to discuss
Angolan independence with Spinola. (Page 9)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 10)
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I I
National Intelligence Bulletin August 20, 1974
GREECE-CYPRUS-TURKEY
The Karamanlis government yesterday put distance be-
tween itself and its discredited predecessors by carrying
out a major purge of military officers. The purge fo-
cused on officers identified in the public mind with the
last regime's Cyprus policy.
Ousted were armed forces chief General Bonanos and
army chief General Galatsanos, as well as several other
senior military officers. The new armed forces chief is
General Dionysios Arbouzis, who commanded the Greek army
contingent in Korea. He has been retired since shortly
after the first military coup in 1967. Lieutenant Gen-
eral Davos, who was a critic of the last junta and is
believed to have been instrumental in the recall of
Karamanlis, was named army chief. Lieutenant General
Gratzios, also a Karamanlis man, was given the key post
of commander of the "C" Corps. The appointments appear
designed to consolidate Karamanlis' hold and ease the
fears of those who viewed the continued presence of key
junta leaders in power as evidence that the civilian
government was not in full control.
Defense Minister Averoff told the US ambassador in
Athens that the navy and air force leadership will not
be affected by the shakeup. The navy and air force have
not been as closely associated with the previous military
regimes. Averoff said that strongman Brigadier General
Ioannidis, who is on six-months leave but is frequently
seen in army headquarters, has "not yet" been affected
by the changes.
In a press conference yesterday, Cypriot President
Clerides said that he would not negotiate again under the
threat of an ultimatum. Clerides said any future talks
would have to take place in a "spirit of free discus-
sion." Clerides flatly rejected the current Turkish
military holdings as a basis for negotiations but said
that negotiations could take place in a "propitious"
atmosphere if such problems as the return of refugees
and displaced persons could be resolved.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 20, 1974
Turkey is still pressing for a return to the confer-
ence table, although, according to a Turkish diplomat in
Cyprus, an early resumption of the talks appears unlikely.
The same official said that as long as the Greeks con-
tinued to refuse to negotiate, Turkish authorities will
administer their portion of the island as if it were a
Turkish province and keep their troops in place. The dip-
lomat rejected the notion that a partial Turkish with-
drawal might persuade the Greeks to reconsider and thought
it doubtful that Turkey would revert to the multi-canton
proposal floated at Geneva.
The military situation in Cyprus remained quiet early
this morning. The Turks have not attempted to move west-
ward toward the Nicosia-Limassol road or south toward
Larnaca. The situation is reportedly under control in
Nicosia, following a day of violent demonstrations that
led to the death of US Ambassador Davies. President
Clerides has banned public meetings and the US embassy
is being guarded by contingents of the Cypriot national
guard, Cypriot armed police, and a small UN force
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 20, 1974
The loss of the district town of Minh Long in Quang
Ngai Province on August 17 does not seriously affect the
military situation in the northern provinces. It will,
however, give the Communists some psychological and
propaganda advantage; it is the second district capital
they have captured in two weeks.
Stepped-up Communist attacks north and west of
Saigon seem to indicate the start of a limited campaign
in Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, and Bien Hoa provinces. The
Viet Cong hope, according to captured documents
to eliminate Saigon's presence from some
areas o these provinces in order to get closer to
population centers and food-producing areas.
The upsurge in fighting north and west of Saigon,
together with government setbacks in the northern prov-
inces, undoubtedly is causing the South Vietnamese high
command some nervousness. Contingency plans already
have been drawn to move a division from the delta to
act as a reserve for the capital region if the Communist
campaign proves too much for government forces already
in the area. The marine or airborne division in Mili-
tary Region 1 also could be pulled back to the Saigon
are
South Vietnamese forces presently appear capable
of handling the stepped-up fighting on all fronts. De-
spite some tactical setbacks and disruption of rural-
pacification efforts, the government retains firm con-
trol over the country's major population centers and
highways.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 20, 1974
The North Koreans have denied any involvement in the
attempt to assassinate South Korean President Pak Chong-
hui last week. A lengthy, semi-official press release
from Pyongyang, markedly defensive in tone, attempts to
refute South Korean allegations that the assassin acted
under North Korean direction in an operation personally
sanctioned by Kim Il-song.
The North Koreans charge the Pak government with
concocting a scheme "in league with the Japanese reac-
tionaries" to justify repression of all pro-Pyongyang
activities among Korean residents in Japan. This is a
clear indication that the North is worried about possible
damage to an apparatus that has long served as a useful
instrument in its campaign to subvert South Korea.
Meanwhile, Seoul appears to be mounting an effort
to place partial responsibility for the events of August
15 on the Japanese. A Seoul radio commentary tries to
make the case that the North Koreans are "using Japan
as a base" against South Korea. Asserting that "Japan
should assume its due responsibility for the incident,"
the Seoul commentary implies a demand for much tougher
action by Japanese security agencies against Korean
leftists in Japan.
The South Korean cabinet, the Korean ambassador to
Japan, and a host of presidential aides and police offi-
cials submitted their resignations today to assume
responsibility for the death of Mrs. Pak. The resigna-
tions are primarily a gesture, but Pak may take the op-
portunity to make some personnel changes.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 20, 1974
WEST GERMANY
West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has said that
he may visit Peking "in the foreseeable future."
The possibility of such a trip was raised in an in-
terview published on August 14 in Die Welt, a leading
West German newspaper. Schmidt indicated that he was
prepared to make the journey after he completes a visit
to the Soviet Union this autumn. The Chancellor provided
no information on preparations that had already been made,
but an article by Die Welt's Peking correspondent on
August 15 indicatedthat tie visit, which has been under
discussion for some time between West German and Chinese
authorities, could occur at the end of this year.
Schmidt's intention to visit China will not sit well
with the Soviet leaders, who remain wary of Bonn's con-
tacts with the Chinese. The Soviets are also concerned
that Schmidt may place a lower priority on Ostpolitik
than Brandt. This may have prompted the Soviets to in-
form Schmidt recently of the need for bilateral discussions.
The Chinese have also invited the leaders of West
German conservative opposition parties to visit China;
Christian Democratic Union Chairman Helmut Kohl will leave
for Peking on September 2 for a ten-day visit.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 20, 1974
WEST GERMANY - POLAND
The Schmidt government is apparently prepared to
accept a period of stagnation in its relations with Warsaw
rather than yield on basic issues such as German compen-
sation payments and emigration of ethnic Germans. Al-
though Bonn's attitude toward Poland does not necessarily
imply stagnation in other areas of Ostpolitik, it suggests
that Chancellor Schmidt does not intend to try to buy
concessions from the East European states.
In a letter to Polish Communist Party leader Edward
Gierek in late July, Schmidt reaffirmed West Germany's
hope of solving outstanding problems and expanding coop-
eration on the basis of the Polish - West German treaty
of December 1970. The Chancellor made it clear that an
earlier West German offer--a $400-million credit at a
subsidized interest rate in return for Polish agreement
to permit 250,000 ethnic Germans to emigrate during the
period from 1974-76--remained in effect. Apart from a
hint that the interest rate could be negotiated, Schmidt
did not suggest that the offer would be improved. Bonn
officials have already turned down a Polish request for
a $1.2-billion credit.
German Foreign Office officials have noted that,
ever since diplomatic relations were established in
1970, the Poles appeared to believe that there was more
to be gained by attempting to reach the chancellor
either directly or through influential members of his
party than by dealing with the foreign office. In order
to dispel any illusions Warsaw might have about the
firmness of the German offer, Social Democratic Party
Chairman Willy Brandt also sent a letter to Gierek sup-
porting the Schmidt-government's position. Recent Polish
contacts with Social Democratic parliamentary floor
leader Herbert Wehner and other members of the party's
parliamentary group suggest that the Poles had still
hoped to obtain some concessions through this channel.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 20, 1974
Foreign Office officials believe that the Schmidt
letter may have made the differences even more difficult
to resolve and could make it harder for either side to
retreat from its position without loss of face. A visit
by Polish party leader Gierek to Bonn this year is now
virtually ruled out, and Bonn officials foresee a long
pause before there is any improvement in Bonn-Warsaw
relations.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 20, 1974
indicate that at least two French atmospheric nuclear
tests this year were aimed at developing the nuclear com-
ponents for a multiple re-entry vehicle (MRV) planned for
a future missile system.
According to press reports, the third test, which
had an estimated yield of four kilotons, involved testing
a detonator for the warhead of a new air-to-ground tacti-
cal missile. Information on the fourth test is consistent
with earlier judgments that it was dropped from a Jaguar
fighter and was a retest of the type of tactical bomb
dropped during last year's series.
Press reports have repeatedly cited a fifth test of
high yield on July 29. Although a safety test with a
very low yield did occur on July 28, the fifth full-scale
nuclear test did not occur until August 14 when a 110-
kiloton device was detonated beneath a balloon. In view
of the high yield, this test may also have been related
to the MRV development program.
Two more tests later this month are expected to wind
up France's atmospheric test program. Underground test-
ing in the South Pacific is expected to begin early next
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National Intelligence Bulletin
ZAIRE-PORTUGAL-ANGOLA
August 20, 1974
President Mobutu of Zaire will meet with Portuguese
President S inola later this week to discuss the future
of Angola Mobutu
has been a principal supporter of liberation for Angola.
Moreover, he is determined to ensure that the government
of an independent Angola is headed by someone friendly
to Zaire and responsive to Mobutu.
The meeting, which reportedly will take place on
the Cape Verde Islands, was arranged earlier this month
following talks in Kinshasa between Mobutu and one of
Spinola's top advisers. Mobutu for some time has been
anxious for a meeting with Portuguese leaders, primarily
to determine Lisbon's attitude toward the Zairian-based
National Front for the Liberation of Angola and the ex-
clave of Cabinda with its valuable oil deposits, which
is administered from Angola. At the present time, Lis-
bon apparently has no clear-cut plans for the territory.
To push his own interests, Mobutu has been working
behind the scenes to boost front leader Roberto as the
leader of future negotiations with Lisbon. Mobutu's
plan has centered on securing the presidency of the
rival Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
,for Daniel Chipenda,
Mobutu believes that Chipenda is
reconciliation with Roberto, with the
latter as the dominant partner.
Mobutu is a long-time adversary of Agostino Neto,
president of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola. Mobutu apparently believes that an independent
Angolan government under Neto--more widely known in
Angola and Lisbon as a liberation leader than either
Roberto or Chipenda--might jeopardize Zaire's access
to the sea and cut off Zairian access to Cabindan oil.
If Mobutu believes he cannot get a friendly government
in Angola, he will probably try to convince Lisbon to
exclude Cabinda from any negotiations over Angola.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 20, 1974
Lisbon is clearly in a quandary over what to do
about Angola. Although it-wants desperately to talk
with the insurgents as it has done in Portuguese Guinea
and Mozambique, negotiations in Angola have been pre-
cluded by the rivalry between the two leading rebel
groups and factionalism within the once-dominant Pop-
ular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. Lisbon
probably regards Mobutu as their best hope for ending
the impasse.
Iran-Iraq: Iran has taken further steps to increase
the readiness of its military forces. The US defense
attache in Tehran reported yesterday that in addition to
the three army brigades recently moved closer to the Iraqi-
Iranian border, Iran has now placed a fighter base near
the border on an advanced state of readiness. Two squad-
rons of F-4 Phantom fighters are at the base and presum-
ably would be used to defend Iranian airspace against any
violations by Iraqi aircraft attacking Kurdish targets
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