CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A026900010020-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 20
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
Balm a_m_
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
N2 652
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 6, 1974
CONTENTS
ISRAEL-FEDAYEEN: Fedayeen incursions increase tension
on Israeli-Lebanese border. (Page 3)
SPAIN-MOROCCO: Madrid augments its air force in the
Canary Islands. (Page 5)
VIETNAM: National Day commentaries continue more aggres-
sive propaganda line. (Page 6)
PORTUGAL-MOZAMBIQUE: Agreement on independence reported
near. (Page 7
PORTUGAL: Right-wing parties to form coalition. (Page 8)
ITALY: Political debate resumes. (Page 9)
USSR: New appointment indicates Soviet interest in ap-
p iy ng systems analysis to military problems. (Page 11)
BURMA: Ten percent of rice crop reportedly destroyed
by floods. (Page 14)
ARGENTINA: New leftist labor organization will further
------------
divide the Peronist movement. (Page 16)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 17)
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 6, 1974
ISRAEL-FEDAYEEN
Attempts by Lebanon-based fedayeen on September 2
and again on September 4 to mount cross-border raids
into northern Israel have raised tensions along the Is-
raeli - Lebanese border to the highest level in some weeks.
Israeli forces intercepted both operations before
they caused civilian casualties. The death of two Is-
raeli soldiers in the incursion on September 4, however,
could result in Israeli retaliation. The Israelis had
already stepped up security precautions along the border
and have mounted artillery strikes and shallow penetra-
tion raids to disrupt fedayeen activity in southern Leb-
anon.
Although the nominally autonomous Popular Struggle
Front claimed responsibility for the operation on Sep-
tember 2, that group has been inactive for some time
and the operation may actually have been carried out by
Fatah elements. The Popular Democratic Front for the
Liberation of Palestine, which has developed close polit-
ical ties with Fatah and has coordinated some terrorist
operations with that organization, announced that it was
responsible for the operation on September 4.
These two incidents may have been intended to help
focus greater Arab and international attention on the
continuing struggle of the Palestinians and thereby en-
sure that they are not disregarded during the next phase
of the Middle East peace negotiations. The participation
of two relatively moderate groups in cross-border activ-
ities probably also represents an effort by these organ-
izations to refurbish their activist credentials. This
comes at a time when moderate leaders of the fedayeen
movement are being attacked by the more radical organi-
zations for their alleged willingness to pursue a polit-
ical solution to the Palestinian problem.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 6, 1974
Spain has augmented its air force in the Canary
Islands. Although Madrid hopes to settle its dispute
with Morocco over the fate of Spanish Sahara by diplo-
macy, the Spaniards evidently see the need to balance
Rabat's buildup of its forces in southern Morocco.
umber of Spanish F-5 tactical
fighters have moved from their mainland base at Moron
to the islands. a number 25X1
of C-54 transports from Getafe and DHC-4 Caribou trans-
port aircraft from Valladolid also have shifted to the
islands.
Normally some 40 to 45 F-5 fighters are stationed
at Moron. The attache does not believe that all have
been transferred to the islands, however, because it
lacks adequate support facilities. The relocated
fighters reportedly are to be used in support of the
ground units in the Spanish Sahara in the event of fight-
ing along the border. The attache believes relocation
of the transport aircraft reflects Spain's desire to
shorten the time needed to airlift the airborne battalion
based on the islands, some 150 miles from the African
mainland.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 6, 1974
VIETNAM
Vietnamese Communist propaganda surrounding Hanoi's
National Day suggests that Hanoi'sees a more favorable
strategic situation developing in the South and is more
optimistic about the prospects for achieving its goals
by stepped-up military and political pressure.
Various National Day commentaries persist in call-
ing for the forcible overthrow of the Thieu regime, a
line that resurfaced in mid-August for the first time
since the cease-fire. Communist propaganda also keeps
stressing what it perceives as "new opportunities" in
light of its recent military successes and the American
political situation.
Premier Pham Van Dong struck a relatively mild tone
on the war in his National Day address. In contrast
with other Hanoi propaganda, which gave relatively lit-
tle attention to the Paris Accords, Dong emphasized that
Hanoi stood by the accords and that Communist military
action was only aimed at forcing US and South Vietnamese
compliance with the agreement. An unusual editorial in
the official party newspaper, however, attempted to put
a more militant cast on the Premier's remarks. It at-
tributed to Dong a theme not touched on in his speech--
that a new strategic situation and "turning point" have
developed in the South.
Dong's remarks did hint that there are differences
within Hanoi's leadership on the situation in the South.
His speech concluded with the unusual admonition to
party cadre to "achieve a unanimity of views and unity
of action in the great revolutionary struggle of the
people."
Soviet and Chinese public commentary on-Hanoi's
anniversary was muted. The Soviets concentrated almost
entirely on congratulating Hanoi on its economic achieve-
ments in the North, while Peking offered only its stand-
ard perfunctory pledges of support for Hanoi.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
PORTUGAL-MOZAMBIQUE
September 6, 1974
An agreement looking toward early independence for
Mozambique appears near, and, according to the Portuguese
ambassador to the United Nations, could be announced as
soon as today. Talks between the two sides opened yes-
terday in Zambia.
The agreement reportedly will provide for a transi-
tional government to rule from September 26, 1974 to June
25, 1975, at which time Mozambique will become fully in-
dependent. Portugal will appoint the government's high
commissioner and the Liberation Front will name the prime
minister. Portuguese troops will remain in Mozambique
during the transitional period. A joint military commis-
sion, half Portuguese and half Frelimo, will be created
to deal with security problems.
The Portuguese appear to have given in to liberation
movement representatives on several points, presumably
to hasten the negotiations. Contrary to Lisbon's ex-
pectations, the Liberation Front reportedly will hold
two thirds of the cabinet portfolios. Furthermore, Lib-
eration Front negotiators rejected the Portuguese refer-
ence to a "democratically selected" government after in-
dependence. Lisbon will not insist that this point be
included in the agreement, but may publicly express an
expectation that the Liberation Front will ensure that
the people of Mozambique decide their own future through
democratic means.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 6, 1974
After several months of informal discussions, three
right-of-center parties in Portugal have decided to form
a coalition in order to meet the challenge from the left,
The new coalition, which intends to present itself as a
"non-Marxist democratic alternative," will attempt to
consolidate its forces in time for the. elections to the
constituent assembly next March.
In preparation for the elections, the provisional
government will soon promulgate a law on political par-
ties. The law is expected to establish numerical mini-
mums that political groups must meet in order to par-
ticipate as a party in elections.
The coalition group is not expected to present a
serious challenge to the center-left Social Democrats
or to the moderate center-right party. Although the
coalition has not yet issued a joint program, anti-
Communism is likely to be the main plank in its plat-
form. Unless the coalition softens its right-wing image
and improves its grass-roots organization, it is not ex-
pected to a 1 o more than 5 or 10 ercent of the
electorate.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 6, 1974
Now that the August holiday is over, Italian polit-
ical leaders have resumed their public debate on the
question of relations between Italy's major governing
party--the Christian Democrats--and the Communist opposi-
tion.
The fall of Prime Minister Rumor's government in
the near future is now taken for granted by many leading
personalities in the four governing parties. The Italian
press is referring routinely to an imminent political
"clarification." No viable alternative to the center-
left coalition formula--Christian Democrats, Socialists,
Social Democrats, and Republicans--is yet in sight, but
the Communists are again pressing hard for a "new re-
lationship" with the coalition partners.
Communist leaders cite the country's new austerity
program--passed by parliament in mid-August--as fresh
evidence that the coalition cannot govern against them.
In parliamentary debate over the austerity measures,
Communist-sponsored amendments attracted enough support
from left-of-center elements within the coalition to
secure their passage. The amendments did not signifi-
cantly reduce the amount of revenue that will be taken
in by the program, but they did lighten the tax burden
on low-income groups at the expense of corporations and
.the more affluent.
The Communists do not appear to be angling for
direct participation in the governing coalition at this
time. in line with their policy of gradually condition-
ing the ruling parties to accept such an eventuality,
the Communists want some official recognition of their
"potential" for sharing power with the other parties.
Accordingly, they would probably be satisfied with a
limited step, such as the formalization of parliamentary
consultations between the Communists and the coalition
parties.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 6, 1974
Christian Democratic leader Fanfani recently recited
all the practical reasons why the Communist overture
should be turned down, but he did not refer to the fa-
miliar argument that the Communists were ideologically
incompatible. He noted instead that a deal with the
Communists would mean a loss of votes for his party, the
souring of relations between the Christian Democrats and
their coalition partners, and another round of right-
wing violence.
Fanfani also claimed that such a development would
create security problems in the Mediterranean and upset
US-USSR detente--charges that were immediately denied
by the Communists. The Communists implied in a series
of statements that they could live with NATO, providing
Italy did not increase its commitment to the alliance
by agreeing to accept bases or US troops displaced by
Athens' withdrawal from NATO's military structure.
In what was perhaps the most significant part of
his statement, Fanfani emphasized that any change in the
Christian Democrats' relations with the Communists would
have to be decided by a national party congress. Fanfani
may have intended this remark as a trial balloon to de-
termine whether a majority of Christian Democrats are
prepared for a full-scale airing of the Communist issue.
The Christian Democrats, however, would probably
prefer not to schedule such a meeting before next summer.
They would want to await the outcome of two events--the
Italian Communist Party congress, set for early 1974,
and the regional elections next June, which will provide
an important test of strength for the two narfi ac
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 6, 1974
Moscow has named Gen-
eral i o ay gar ov to a new created post of deputy
minister of defense for systems analysis. The establish-
ment of this position attests to the increased importance
the Soviets attach to the application of systems analysis
to the solution of military problems.
From 1968 to at least last December, Ogarkov was
first deputy chief of the general staff. He was a mem-
ber of the Soviet delegation during the early SALT nego-
tiations. Although appointed a deputy minister of de-
fense some time last spring, his duties were not im-
mediately specified.
According to a report from the army attache in Mos-
cow, Ogarkov's role will be both to assess weapons ef-
fectiveness and to devise more effective methods for
allocating military resources. A specific example cited
to the attache of the kind of problem that would lend
itself to systems analysis was whether it would be better
to build more ships for the navy or more missiles for the
Strategic Rocket Forces.
Although the Soviet military has taken some interest
in operations research since before World War II, it was
not until after 1964 that Soviet military studies began
to discuss the techniques of applying systems analysis
to the areas of command and control and weapons effective-
ness. A recent book by Defense Minister Grechko stressed
the need to take a "SVstPmG aDoroach" to military prob-
lems.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 6, 1974
BURMA
Approximately 500,000 tons of rice, or about 10 per-
cent of Burma's crop. severe floods in
August This amount,
roughly equa to past annua exports, represents a pro-
spective loss of foreign exchange earnings in excess of
$150 million.
The flood losses will aggravate food shortages in
Burma that earlier this year helped spark labor disorders.
At that time, Rangoon temporarily halted rice exports
and promised to increase imports of food and other con-
sumer goods.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 6, 1974
ARGENTINA
A plan by militant leftist labor leaders to form a
national front will be a direct challenge to the orthodox
Peronist trade union apparatus that Juan Peron employed
to maintain his grip over Argentine workers. Since the
new union will apparently include the Peronist working
youth, this move is likely to be a further threat to the
unity of the Peronist movement that President Peron has
struggled to maintain.
Left-wing Peronist and Trotskyite union leaders in-
tend to meet this weekend to draw up details for an or-
ganization that will serve as a national coordinator
for the "combative" trade unions. While they deny that
the new body would be a competitor of the Peronist-
controlled General Confederation of Labor, it probably
will in fact become a serious rival.
Leftist proselytizers apparently have made strong
,inroads among younger workers, many of whom now belong
to militant unions favoring "class warfare." Political
agitation of this sort has been most prevalent in the
industrial city of Cordoba where labor unrest is endemic.
Even now, leftists are fomenting work stoppages and slow-
downs to protest actions by government and national labor
officials aimed at eliminating the legal status of the
combative unions and expelling their leaders. In addi-
tion, a campaign by labor extremists in Cordoba to spread
the use of "guerrilla" tactics has provoked almost daily
incidents of arson, fire-bombing, and attacks against
management and right-wing Peronists.
If leftist labor as well as Peronist youth groups
take a stronger stand in defiance of Mrs. Peron's govern-
ment, they are likely to erode further the broad consen-
sus her husband achieved and provide fertile ground for
development of a broad leftist coalition opposed to mod-
erate and right-wing Peronists.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 6, 1974
New Zealand: The New Zealand Labor Party selected
Wallace Row ling today to succeed Prime Minister Kirk,
who died suddenly last weekend. Rowling was finance
minister in Kirk's government. Rowling is considered
a skillful politician and is acceptable to all sections
of the governing party. He is a moderate, and will main-
tain the government's friendly ties with the US.
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