NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A026800010024-8
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
20
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 9, 2012
Sequence Number:
24
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 31, 1974
Content Type:
REPORT
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CIA-RDP79T00975A026800010024-8.pdf | 750.36 KB |
Body:
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Top Secret
PC- -&
National Intelligence
Bulletin
Top Secret
31 July 1974
N2 631
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 31, 1974
CONTENTS
GREECE-TURKEY-CYPRUS: First phase of Geneva peace talks
ends successfully. (Page 1)
GREECE: Makeup of new cabinet assessed. (Page 4)
USSR-FEDAYEEN: Moscow will seek to drive wedge between
Egypt and fedayeen leader Arafat during his visit to
Moscow. (Page 6)
USSR: Satellite placed in stationary orbit. (Page 7)
WEST GERMANY: Bonn reacts to East German harassment of
autobahn traffic. (Page 8)
ARGENTINA: Peronist youth group repudiates leadership
of Mrs. Peron. (Page 10)
SOUTH KOREA: President's repressive measures have un-
settling effect both at home and abroad. (Page 11)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 14)
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GREECE
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Rhode
Crete
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MEDITERRANEAN SEA
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National Intelligence Bulletin
GREECE-TURKEY-CYPRUS
July 31, 1974
The first phase of the Geneva peace talks came to
a successful conclusion yesterday when the foreign min-
isters of Britain, Greece, and Turkey signed an agreement
formalizing the cease-fire on Cyprus. Major negotiating
difficulties lie ahead, however, when the ministers meet
again on August 8 to discuss the political future of the
island. Representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot
communities will participate in the next round of talks.
The agreement indicates that Athens conceded to
Turkey's major demands. The tricky question of Turkish
troop withdrawal was resolved by a statement calling for
measures that will lead to the "timely and phased reduc-
tion" of the number of armed forces and amount of mate-
riel on Cyprus. Ankara had adamantly refused to accept
the word "withdrawal."
The agreement also recognizes the existence in prac-
tice of two autonomous administrations on Cyprus, al-
though it was noted that this recognition would not
"prejudice the conclusions to be drawn from this situa-
tion." The ministers agreed to discuss this matter at
the next stage of the talks, as well as the "constitu-
tional legitimacy" of the Turkish Cypriot vice president
of Cyprus. The agreement also notes that all Turkish
enclaves occupied by Greek Cypriot forces should be
evacuated immediately.
The agreement is clearly a victory for the Turkish
side, which used its new strength on the island to ex-
tract significant concessions.
The agreement's failure to provide for complete
withdrawal of Turkish forces probably will place some
strain on Prime Minister Karamanlis' new government.
Karamanlis should be able to transfer this criticism to
the former junta, however, since it was the junta's
policies that initiated the crisis.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 31, 1974
A permanent. political solution for Cyprus is clouded
by the prospect that Archbishop Makarios might return
to the island. Makarios said in London yesterday that he
was the elected president of Cyprus and that "nothing"
could prevent him from returning. He qualified his state-
ment, however, by noting that his main concern was the
future of Cyprus and that his return would depend on de-
velopments.
A former cabinet minister under Makarios also pre-
dicted civil war if the archbishop returns. He told a
US embassy official that President Clerides was generally
acceptable to all political groupings.
Clerides reportedly intends to form a government of
national unity, which will include elements of all "na-
tional thinking people" and will establish the "closest
possible relations" with the Greek government. Clerides
said he had advised Makarios not to return to Cyprus and
hoped he would resign, but Clerides added that he would
not object to Makarios' contesting the presidency in the
future.
In a press conference of July 28, the general secre-
tary of the powerful Cypriot Communist Party made a state-
ment which seemed to endorse Clerides' candidacy. The
party had previously been a staunch supporter of Makarios.
Scattered incidents of fighting on Cyprus were re-
ported again yesterday. President Clerides phoned the
U5 embassy in Nicosia yesterday afternoon to complain
about reported Turkish movements near Sisklipos, north-
west of Nicosia. Turkish military sources told US embassy
officials that there were still pockets of Greek resist-
ance in this area, including one artillery piece that has
been shelling Turkish forces on the beaches.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
The attache speculated that the two incidents were re-
lated, and that the Greeks are attempting to hide from
the. US a possible resupply attempt of Greek forces on
Cyprus. There is no evidence that a military resupply
effort is under way, although press reports indicate
the. Turks are concerned about supplies and reinforcements
July 31, 1974
The US defense attache in. Athens has reported that
the airport at Soudha Bay has been closed. A US air-
craft was not permitted to approach within five miles of
either Elevsis or Tanagra air bases on the Greek mainland.
reaching Cyprus from either Crete or Rhodes.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 31, 1974
In evaluating the cabinet named by Prime Minister
Karamanlis last week, the US embassy in Athens feels
the Prime Minister has vindicated the old political es-
tablishment by honoring those who resisted the junta
regimes.
Karamanlis in his appointments made no concession
to the far left or to popular heroes, but nominated a
solid profile of those who stood in firm, consistent
opposition to the junta. At the same time, however, he
denied positions of influence to those most inclined to
seek revenge against the military.
The embassy feels it is still unclear whether the
cabinet as a whole will have much responsibility or power.
While some ministries were assigned to men perhaps better
suited to other offices, the key posts of interior, de-
fense, foreign affairs, and public order are in the hands
of patriots and proven leaders. Nevertheless, the cabi-
net's overall makeup suggests that family ties and
respectable connections were still helpful in obtaining
appointments.
Karamanlis will focus on stopping the military from
meddling in politics once the critical aspects of the
Cyprus situation are under control
cautiously in order to avoid stirring up internecine
conflicts within the armed forces.
He is aware that he will have to move
The Prime Minister said that he had angrily rebuked
Defense Minister Averoff for not consulting him before
issuing a statement last week praising the army and in-
dicating that Greek strongman Ioannidis was still on duty.
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 31, 1974
USSR-FEDAYEEN
Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasir
Arafat is in Moscow seeking assurances of support for the
Palestinians in the next round of Middle East peace nego-
tiations. The Soviets seem unlikely, however, to recog-
nize him and his organization as the sole representative
of all Palestinians.
Arafat is particularly eager to win an explicit state-
ment of Soviet backing at this time, since he is under
heavy fire in fed.ayeen councils for the alleged failure
of his relatively conciliatory policies toward a negoti-
ated settlement. He lost some of the strength he had
gained through cooperation with the Egyptians when Presi-
dent Sadat recently agreed with Jordan's King Husayn that
Amman should represent Palestinians resident in Jordan.
Although the Soviets may take further steps toward
acknowledging Arafat's leadership, their concern over
fedayeen disunity probably precludes formal recognition
of the PLO at this time. A Soviet Foreign Ministry of-
ficial recently stated that the nongovernmental Afro-
Asian Solidarity Committee will again be Arafat's offi-
cial host.
advantage of Arafat's visit to urge the Palestinians
once again to intensify their efforts to arrive at a
The Soviets continue to be frustrated in dealing
with the faction-ridden fedayeen movement. In a press
article on July 29, the editor of Izvestia criticized
both the extremists and the "reactionaries" among the
Palestinians for their divisive tactics. The article
said the fedayeen will be successful only when they
achieve unity of direction and purpose. Moscow may take
common program.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 31, 1974
The Soviets for the first time have put a communica-
tions satellite in stationary orbit. Launched Monday,
the satellite, identified by Tass as "Molniya 1-S," is now
in position over the Indian Ocean and is relaying commu-
nications between ground stations in the USSR. An earlier
geo-stationary satellite, launched successfully in March,
probably involved only an engineering test.
Since 1969, Soviet space scientists have spoken of
the desirability of having a communications satellite in
stationary orbit over the Indian Ocean. From this posi-
tion most ground stations in the Soviet Union could relay
messages via a single satellite 24 hours a day. In the
past, more than one communications satellite was required
for the Soviets to achieve 24-hour coverage. The US uses
geo-stationary communications satellites in similar orbits
over the Atlantic and the Pacific.
Communications relay is not the only potential use
of geo-stationary satellites. The Soviets have mentioned
placing meteorological and scientific payloads in geo-
synchronous orbits. Other missions, such as strategic
early warning and intelligence gathering, could also be
performed by satellites in such orbits.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
Bonn requested a special meeting of the Inter-German
Transit Commission yesterday to clarify problems result-
ing from sporadic East German harassment of traffic on
the autobahns during the past few days.
The request. followed an incident on July 29 when,
for the first time, an employee of the Federal Environ-
mental Office was denied access to West Berlin. After
the employee declined to answer questions, the East
Germans refused to allow him to proceed and only per-
mitted his family to continue on to West Berlin.
At least five employees of the environmental office
are known to have used the autobahns without incident.
All employees have been instructed to avoid provocative
behavior and to produce only their personal passports,
which do not show the nature of their employment.
July 31, 1974
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The West Germans hope to resolve the issue in the
commission and thus avoid escalation. Bonn's representa-
tive in East Berlin is prepared, however, to demand con-
sultations with the East German Foreign Ministry if
Pankow refuses to attend the talks or if the commission
fails to resolve the problem.
To support its position, Bonn is urging the three
Western allies to issue a formal demarche to Moscow de-
manding that East Germany desist from acts that contravene
the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
ARGENTINA
July 31, 1974
The Montoneros, the largest terrorist youth group
within the Peronist movement, have disavowed Mrs. Peron
as long-term successor to her husband and have threat-
ened violence against her government. The warnings come
amid speculation that the Montoneros are about to be de-
clared illegal.
The threat was made last weekend during memorial
ceremonies on the anniversary of Eva Peron's death.
Spokesmen for the Montoneros, which claim to have shunned
illegal acts since the end of military rule, also called
for removal of some cabinet ministers, revision of the
national economic social pact, freedom for political
prisoners, end of repression, and removal of "agents of
imperialism" from Argentina.
Although an outbreak of violence that would require
the imposition of martial law is not anticipated at this
time, greater participation by the military in internal
security may become necessary.
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 31, 1974
The political situation in Seoul, especially Presi-
dent Pak's intolerance of any opposition to his rule,
has become a matter of serious concern in the US, Japan,
and to other supporters of South Korea in its competition
with the Communist North.
Pak's repressive measures are receiving wide coverage
in the Western press. He has gradually discarded repre-
sentative institutions and civil liberties since his re-
election in 1971, a process that culminated earlier this
year in the promulgation of "emergency decrees" outlawing
virtually all criticism of Pak or his political system.
There is no reliable evidence that any of those ar-
rested under the "emergency decrees" are connected with
the persistent North Korean effort to subvert the South
Korean government. The trials in Seoul, moreover, are
contributing to a growing uneasiness among important
segments of the South Korean population. Although it
is likely that the rural areas, the main source of Pak's
popular strength, are relatively unconcerned, activist
student and Christian groups probably remain alert to
any signal that an overthrow of the Pak system is feasible.
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 31, 1974
At governmental and political levels in South Korea
there is fear that the US Congress will react to Pak's
actions by making substantial cuts in military and economic
aid. Another concern is that US, Japanese, and other
foreign investment may be cut back in the face of an
apparent increase in political instability. South Korean
diplomats, for their part, are worried over the possi-
ble effect on Seoul's international standing, particu-
larly in light of the UN General Assembly session this
fall when "Korea" may again be a controversial issue.
President Pak is calling the signals in Seoul, and
his personal appraisal of the situation is what counts.
Pak toughened his line against dissenters in April in
response to what: he saw as a well-knit student conspiracy
to topple his regime. He professes to see the Communist
hand behind the alleged conspiracy, but his dragnet has
included nonleftist oppositionists whom he also looks
upon as threatening.
In moving against such elements, including some of
the nation's most respected figures, Pak hopes to nail
down the point that opposition of any stripe will simply
not be tolerated. It has been assumed that, as in the
past, Pak would relax the political pressure once he had
driven this point home. But Pak's willingness to shift
gears at any early date cannot be assumed. While he is
not ignoring the external pressures, he may well see a
greater peril in easing up on his opponents too soon.
In any case:, Pak is not greatly interested in the
democratic precepts that his opponents in Seoul con-
stantly clamor about. Western liberalism, in his view,
is alien to the Korean nature. At best, as Pak sees it,
Koreans will be ready for "democracy" when they reach
Western economic: levels.
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 31, 1974
In the past, despite personal distaste, Pak made
some effort to live with at least the forms of represen-
tative government, largely in deference to the US. It
may be that with US military aid levels declining year
by year, and with South Korea almost on its feet economi-
cally, he no longer feels compelled to give as much weight
to American appraisals of his regime.
Pak is not insensitive to the dangers in the present
situation, and he is a politician with a demonstrated
capacity for tactical adjustment at critical moments.
His actions of recent weeks., however, and particularly
the scope of the current arrests and trials, appear to
have taken him closer to the point of no return politi-
cally than he has ever been. He may have so antagonized
his opponents that they are now inalterably committed to
his overthrow.
In such circumstances, the political situation in
South Korea is likely to become more unsettled and the
outcome increasingly unpredictable.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 31, 1974
Saudi Arabia - Abu Dhabi: Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi
on July 29 signed a preliminary agreement resolving their
to Prince Juan Carlos on July 19.
among informed Spaniards that although Franco has re-
covered from an acute attack of phlebitis, his general
health may not be as good as the official pronouncements
claim. Indeed, Franco has not yet taken back the func-
tions of chief of state that he temporarily relinquished
Spain: General Franco's departure from the hospital
yesterday and the attendant publicity given to his re-
covery have relaxed the political tensions that arose
during his illness. Both the political establishment and
the general population have resumed their usual summer
preoccupation with holiday plans. Summer leaves of high
government officials had been canceled, but have now been
rescheduled. Behind this optimism, however, is a feeling
to Saudi Arabia, presumably in the next few months.
long-standing border dispute.
the agreement gives the Saudis a
corridor to the Persian Gulf and control over part of the
Zarrara oil fields on the border. The Saudis, in return,
renounced their claims to the Buraimi oasis and are likely
soon to extend diplomatic recognition to the UAE. A
final agreement will be signed when Sheikh Zayid, the
ruler of Abu Dhabi and president of the UAE, makes a visit
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 31, 1974
Chile: The four death sentences handed down by an
air force court-martial yesterday are likely to be com-
muted. The junta, which will have the final word on the
death sentences, has been increasingly sensitive to the
damage that executions have done to Chile's international
image. All death sentences handed down by military courts
so far this year have been commuted. Other sentences im-
posed yesterday, ranging from 300 days to life in prison,
may also be reduced on appeal to higher military authori-
ties.
to Smith's party since it came to power in 1962.
at stake in the general election. The result will be
especially disappointing to the more moderate Rhodesia
Party, which had presented the most concerted challenge
Rhodesia: Prime Minister Ian Smith and his Rhodesian
Front Party have won re-election in a landslide victory.
The party appears almost certain to win all 50 white seats
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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