CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A026600010037-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2007
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: June 5, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
DOE review completed.
State Dept. review completed
14ational Intelligence
Top Secret
June 5, 1974
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National Intelligence Bulletin
LATE ITEM (0345 EDT)
Bolivia
June 5, 1974
Late press reports from La Paz indicate that some
dissident military units may have revolted against the
Banter government. A presidential spokesman is reported
to have said that the palace guard has been ordered to
vacate the premises within the hour. President Banter,
meanwhile, is in Sucre some 360 miles southeast of the
capital.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
June 5, 1974
CONTENTS
GREECE-TURKEY: Turkish ship leaves contested area.
Page 1)
CAMBODIA: Phnom Penh calm in wake of student vio-
lence. (Page 2)
MOZAMBIQUE: Talks between insurgents and Lisbon be-
gin today in Lusaka. (Page 3)
CANADA: Ottawa debates usefulness of nuclear safe-
guards. (Page 6)
PERU: Split between army and navy widens. (Page 9)
USSR-JAPAN: Both parties seek to still controversy
caused by Soviet oil minister's remarks. (Page 11)
THAILAND: Leadership crisis spurs interest in early
elections. (Page 12)
SOUTH VIETNAM: Air force reacts to Communist at-
tacks. (Page 13)
EGYPT-USSR: Cairo has signed technical assistance agree-
ment with Moscow. (Page 15)
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.National Intelligence Bulletin June 5, 1974
Ankara's withdrawal of its "research" ship from the
contested areas of the Aegean Sea has further diminished
chances of a confrontation. A Turkish foreign ministry
official announced publicly yesterday that the ship has
"completed its mission" and is returning to Turkish waters
with its naval escort. The official said that Ankara
would soon respond to the Greek note of May 25 in which
Athens stopped short of agreeing to negotiate the seabeds
issue, but suggested that some basis for discussion might
be possible. The Turkish official added that Ankara
would seek to resolve problems in a spirit of "mutual
understanding," but would defend its rights to the "bitter
end."
Athens is resting its stand on the rules of inter-
national law, which from its viewpoint endorse the Greek
position on the contested median line. A Greek minister
noted in a public speech on June 1 that Greece understands
the need to cooperate with Turkey but would not permit
threats to its territorial integrity.
The US consul in Thessaloniki reported on June 3
that military movements were continuing in northern Greece,
but observed that the alert was being eased. Turkish
forces also are presumed to be in an advanced stage of
readiness, but somewhat relaxed from the alert levels set
late last week.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
CAMBODIA
June 5, 1974
Phnom Penh is calm in the wake of violence trig-
gered by student agitators. The police have imposed an
extended curfew and have managed to disperse without
'..ncident crowds at the high school where the minister of
education and a presidential aide were killed by stu-
dents yesterday. In a further attempt to defuse the
=situation, Prime Minister Long Boret announced that
schools will suspend classes for three days starting
today. Many students have been arrested, but a few
apparently are still holed up in the high school. At
Last six students have been killed or wounded.
The students who seized the two government officials
at the Ministry of Education planned to exchange them
or nine students and teachers recently detained by
police on grounds of subversive activity. It now appears
!hat the officials were shot by their captors when police
stormed the high school.
The bloodshed yesterday has its roots in the stu-
dents' and teachers' long-standing discontent with the
`3overnment's performance. During the past year, teach-
ers have staged strikes, public protests, and a work
slowdown to dramatize their demands for higher wages.
The teachers were joined on occasion by students protest-
~fig such familiar grievances as the government's failure
1'o reduce corruption and inflation. The confrontation
on June 4 was preceded by several days of small-scale
and orderly student demonstrations.
The students' use of such unprecedented extreme
measures may generate public sympathy for the government.
At the same time, however, the killings may inspire
(Jpportunistic critics within Lon Nol's dominant Socio-
~epublican Party to increase their attacks on Prime Min-
;ster Long Boret for failing to curb the unrest sooner.
If the government overreacts, more violence may
.3sult. The government thus far has tended to use re-
:traint when possible in dealing with student-teacher
unrest. Lon Not, in particular, has been concerned about
'jetting into any confrontations with the students and
"oachers that could lead to massive disorders. In the
_ong run, however, the government probably will still
not be able to do much about redressing the grievances
_hat generated the bloodshed.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
MOZAMBIQUE
June 5, 1974
Talks between the Portuguese and leaders of the in-
surgent movement in Mozambique open today in Lusaka,
Zambia. Both sides will probably concentrate on setting
forth basic positions in preparation for more detailed
discussions at a later date.
The insurgent leaders are likely to take a tough
stance. In a press conference in Dar es Salaam on June
2, Samora Machel, president of the Front for the Libera-
tion of Mozambique (FRELIMO), stated that his organiza-
tion will insist that the talks concentrate on the means
of transferring political power "to the Mozambican people,
under the leadership of FRELIMO." The insurgents consist-
ently have argued that independence is a right of the
people in the territory, and is not subject to negotia-
tion. Lisbon continues to hold out for a popular refer-
endum that would determine whether the people desire in-
dependence or federation with Portugal. In recent weeks,
however, it has become apparent to the Portuguese that
the latter alternative is increasingly unrealistic.
The insurgents are in a good bargaining position,
largely because of their strong military situation. Since
the first of the year, they have extended their operations
into central Mozambique, an area of heavy white settler
concentration. The settlers have protested inadequate
government security measures and fear that Lisbon intends
to pull out its troops and turn the area over to the in-
surgents.
In recent weeks, unrest among whites has also spread
to the capital of Lourenco Marques, an area that has not
been touched by the insurgency. The situation there has
been aggravated by labor agitation, signs of growing sup-
port for the insurgents among the African population,
and Lisbon's long delay in appointing a new governor gen-
eral for the territory.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
June 5, 1974
Lisbon is likely
to hold out for gradual political change in the territory.
The Portuguese, however, may be forced to meet the front's
demands for early recognition of an independent Mozambique
or risk intensified insurgency.
The insurgents seem to realize they have a better
chance of achieving their demands through negotiation
rather than in a popular referendum. Because they have
concentrated on military activity for more than a decade,
they have virtually no political organization and few
politically or technically experienced people capable of
mounting a political campaign.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
CANADA
June 5, 1974
Canada's disillusionment with its involvement in
India's nuclear program is causing some rethinking in
Ottawa about the usefulness of nuclear safeguards.
In light of India's recent atomic explosion, some
Canadian officials concerned with industry, trade, and
atomic energy are arguing that "safeguards are an ex-
ercise in futility whether conducted bilaterally or by
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)." This
group also asserts that commercial considerations should
be paramount in decisions regarding nuclear cooperation.
A more influential group, including the External Affairs
Ministry and some officials of Canada's Atomic Energy
Control Board, on the other hand, continues to believe
that safeguards are imperative, despite the Indian
development.
The Canadian government believes that the plutonium
used in the Indian test device came from the Cirus re-
search reactor Canada provided India under a 1956 agree-
ment. Although the agreement was concluded before the
international safeguards system was established, sub-
sequent efforts by the Canadians to bring this facility
under IAEA controls were rejected by New Delhi.
Some Canadian experts believe that even safeguarded
Indian reactors probably contributed to the production
of the weapons-grade fissionable material required for
the explosion. Although this view may be erroneous, it
strengthens the contention of critics of safeguards that
an effective detection program cannot be assured be-
cause of staffing and technical inadequacies, even when
safeguards are in force.
Canada has reacted sharply to the Indian test and
has taken a number of initiatives to translate into ac-
tion its dismay over the effect of the test on nuclear
proliferation. The Canadians last year ruled out new
contracts to ship fissionable materials to India. They
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National Intelligence Bulletin rune 5, 1974
have now canceled all such shipments. They have also
called on the committee of nuclear exporting countries,
when it reconvenes in Geneva, to consider how best to
minimize damage to the Non--Prol_Lferation Treaty and to
discourage other states from following the Indian example.
The Canadians continue to question the "muted" US response
to the Indian test.
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National Intelligence Bulletin rune 5, 1974
The split between 'the army and the navy, occasioned
by the forced resignation last week of Navy Minister Vargas,
has widened with the resignation of two more cabinet-
level admirals. President Velasco remains secure, how-
ever, with all important army troop commands apparently
still loyal to him. The split between the services and
between the so-called moderates and radicals in the cab-
inet is likely to have important long-range effects on
the style and pace of the six-year-old, military-led revo-
lution
Yesterday, the housing minister and the director of
the national integration office resigned, apparently in
protest against Vargas" retirement. Admirals have al-
ready been named to replace them, avoiding a more seri-
ous split that could have arisen had Velasco ,placed army
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Radical army generals, some of whom reportedly
urged Velasco to take strong measures against his crit-
ics, have gained at least a temporary increase in influ-
ence Although Velasco has apparently determined that
military unity is no Longer crucial to the success of
the revolution, any decisions by top-level moderate army
officers to disassociate themselves from the President
could precipitate an important shift in Velasco?s strat--
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wand if Velasco were to accept their departure, the
regime probably would shift leftward and become much
more authoritarian. It appears, however, that the mod-
erates will await further developments and assess how
much power the radicals have gained before deciding on
a course of action.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
June 5, 1974
An unknown element at this time is Prime Minister
Mercado, with whom Velasco has deep personal and politi-
cal differences. Velasco's successful power play against
Vargas sets an important precedent for ousting the Prime
Minister. Mercado---who is scheduled to retire next Janu-
ary--may now feel that he must make a move against Velasco
soon or risk being permanently shut out. A further prob-
lem for Velasco lies in the fact that the new navy minis-
ter, Vice Admiral Arce, appears ready to challenge the
President's more radical policies, as did his predecessor.
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National Intelligence Bulletin June 5, 1974
USSR-JAPAN
Moscow and Tokyo are trying to still some of the con-
troversy touched off :last week by press reports on Soviet
Oil Minister Shashin's remarks on foreign participation
in developing Siberian resources. Moscow, in particular,
has hailed the signing on June 3 of a coking coal develop-
ment agreement as the beginning of large-scale and long-
term economic cooperation. The accord will eventually
provide Tokyo with an opportunity to purchase $8 billion
of coking coal in return for $450 million in credits for
Soviet purchases of Japanese steel and machinery.
Several Western newspapers gave the impression that
Shashin had ruled out further Western and Japanese par-
ticipation in the development of Siberian gas and oil re-
sources. The Soviet ambassador in Tokyo immediately stated,
however, that Moscow's attitude toward Siberian develop-
ment projects had not changed. Tass then issued a state-
ment reaffirming development talks with all countries--
particularly Japan. The Japanese press also declared that
Shashin's statements were not accurately interpreted, and
that the Soviets may be prepared to sell more--and not
less--oil to Japan. It appears, therefore, that neither
Moscow nor Tokyo has lost interest in the exploration of
offshore oil deposits along the Sakhalin Island continen-
tal shelf.
Nevertheless, Shashin's comments are another indica-
tion that the Tyumen oil development project is dead, and
that certain Soviet circles believe it is necessary to
take a tough line in dealing with the Japanese on other
Siberian projects. The Japanese have been losing interest
in the Tyumen deal as the estimates for the oil to be made
available to Japan went down and the price per barrel in-
creased. The Soviet suggestion several months ago that
Japan help finance an expensive second Siberian railroad
to carry the oil--rather than transport it by pipeline--
dampened any remaining Japanese enthusiasm for the project.
Shashin's remarks appear to reflect an argument that
has appeared prominently in the USSR, that Siberian re-
sources--particularly oil--should be developed to satisfy
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National Intelligence Bulletin. June 5, 1974
growing domestic demand rather than for export. Shashin
reiterated the recent Soviet line that exports of oil, in
-tny event, would not be increased during the 1970s.
THAILAND
The leadership crisis last month has spurred high-
I-evel moves to speed up the process of holding elections,
currently awaiting promulgation of a new constitution.
Concern is mounting that further drifts under a caretaker
=government in the face of serious economic and social
problems will bring recurring political turmoil.
King Phumiphon reportedly favors setting the elec-
Lion process in motion by shelving the draft constitu-
.ion currently under review in the National Assembly and
adopting one of the earlier constitutions. Army chief
Krit Siwara, the chief power broker behind the scene,
has come out publicly for such a scheme. The Bangkok
caress has also gone on record with editorials urging
rapid promulgation of the draft constitution so that
t-,l.ections can take place this fall.
In response to this pressure, Prime Minister Sanya
has set a rough timetable which holds that the draft now
before the assembly can be completed as early as August
and that elections can be held in September or October.
By Sanya's timetable, an elected government could take
office no later than December.
Besides promulgating a constitution, several impor-
tant measures must be adopted before the election pro-
cess can begin in earnest. The assembly has yet to pass
a bill authorizing political parties; a military decree
1)anninq such activity is still on the books. The as-
sembly must also decide how the prime minister will be
ti;o_>lected, although most Thai currently favor some form
of parliamentary system. National Assembly speaker
Khukrit Pramot remains the current frontrunner to suc-
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National Intelligence Bulletin June 5, 1974
During the past three months of increased Communist
ground operations throughout South Vietnam, South Viet-
namese air force (VNAF') tactical missions have increased
from 50-100 percent in response to these initiatives.
VNAF air strikes against Communist supply routes in the
western highlands in early 1974 had some success. F
While the above activity was generally occurring in
MR 1 and MR 2, the South Vietnamese air force was support-
ing ground operations reacting to Communist initiatives
in MRs 2 and 3. Between March 28 and May 2, for example,
over 3,000 tactical air sorties were conducted near the
Cambodian border in the Parrot's Beak area, resulting in
over 250 troops reportedly killed, 51 secondary explosions,
and numerous artillery sites claimed to have been destroyed.
Although VNAF operations have increased in response
to Communist initiatives, several problems are impairing
their effectiveness. Ever-present Communist air defense
regiments comprising an SA-2 regiment in MR 1 and 22 anti-
aircraft regiments throughout the country continued to
pose a threat, and their presence kept certain areas free
of VNAF overflights. A recent development has been the
increased effectiveness of the SA-7 missile against close
support aircraft. During the past 18 months, the Communists
have maintained an effective SA-7 fire-to-kill ratio--
only five missiles to one shootdown--with the high per-
centage of firing incidents taking place in the area west-
northwest of Saigon. These factors have forced attacks
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June 5, 1974
from higher altitudes, which reduce the effectiveness of
the air force in both bombing and close support roles.
This development has caused the South Vietnamese field
commanders in MRs 1, 2, and 3 to criticize air force sup-
port of their ground units.
Recent cuts in the US proposed military aid to South
Vietnam, coupled with shortages of spare parts for specific
aircraft and the increased cost of aviation fuel, have
all imposed restraints upon air division commanders' abili-
ties to respond to air support requests. F
Morale of air units, like that of other South Viet-
namese forces, has also been adversely affected by the
country's economic conditions. Air commanders continue
to cite inflation, specifically spiraling food prices,
as seriously lowering morale. They note that when pilots
and aircraft maintenance personnel are deployed to air
bases away from their families, the out-of-pocket costs
to these servicemen for daily sustenance doubles. As a
result, pilots and aircrews attempt, when possible, to
"moonlight" during their off-duty hours.
One positive note is the recent introduction of a
bombing system which relies on a ground-placed beacon to
assist aircraft in locating targets and bombing from
safer altitudes, curtailing combat losses. Although
this system cannot be used effectively in close support
missions, it should to some extent nullify the effec-
tiveness of the SA-7 missile against VNAF aircraft in
area bombing missions.
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National Intelligence Bulletin June 5, 1974
EGYPT-USSR
The Egyptian minister of electricity has signed an
agreement in Moscow calling for Soviet technical assist-
ance in developing a high dam electric power station, the
reopening of the Suez power station and the electrifying
of barges on the Nile River
The agreement shows Moscow's willingness to con-
tinue its economic aid program in Egypt, despite prob-
lems between the two countries over military assistance.
No new Soviet credits were reported but some financing
could develop if the new projects are implemented. Mos-
cow's last credits to Cairo, extended in 1971, were for
$195 million.
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