NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A026600010035-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: June 4, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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M, National Intelligence
Bulletin
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National Intelligence Bulletin
June 4, 1974
CONTENTS
ISRAEL: Prime Minister Rabin announced no signifi-
cant policy changes yesterday in statement to
Knesset. (Page 1)
NPT-ITALY: Rome's opposition to NPT hardens, in
wake of India's nuclear explosion. (Page 3)
CHINA: New air force commander identified. (Page 4)
USSR-CHINA: New agreement calls for increased trade.
(Page 5)
USSR: Lunar probe placed in orbit around moon.
Page 6)
JAPAN: Economic slump worsens. (Page 9)
JAPAN-CHINA: Tokyo signs a $230-million contract
to build steel rolling mill for China. (Page 10)
USSR: Soviet Detente Policy Assessed. (Page 11)
LAOS: Communists Fail to Withdraw Troops. (Page 15)
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National Intelligence Bulletin
June 4, 1974
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin announced no signifi-
cant policy changes yesterday in his statement before the
Israeli Knesset.
On foreign policy, Rabin reiterated his long-held
belief that Israel must seek to advance toward peace with
its Arab neighbors in stages through partial agreements
to test Arab intentions. He said the government will
closely examine Cairo's and Damascus' implementation of
the disengagement agreements as an indicator of the pros-
pects for additional progress in reaching a Middle East.
peace. He praised Cairo's adherence so far to the disen-
gagement accord.
Citing the attitude of Egypt as the key to the Arab
states' policy toward Israel, Rabin said that talks with
Cairo should be the next stAge in the negotiations.
These could be to obtain either a full peace treaty or
an interim agreement in which Egypt would renounce the
state of belligerency with Israel. Once an additional
agreement with Egypt is reached, Rabin said he hoped
that a final peace agreement with Syria could be worked
out.
Rabin said he is prepared to hold peace negotiations
with Jordan, and that his government will not accept the
creation of an independent Palestinian state on the West
Bank. Jerusalem, he added, must remain united and the
capital of Israel. Rabin renewed the Meir government's
pledge that no peace treaty with Jordan, involving ter-
ritorial concessions on the West Bank, will be signed
without holding new elections first. Rabin reiterated
the long-standing Israeli position that there can be no
return to the pre-1967 borders, which he said are not
defensible.
The Prime Minister went on to say that Israel will
not deal with the Palestinian terrorist organizations
and that it objects to their presence at Geneva either
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National Intelligence Bulletin
June 4, 1974
as participants or as observers. He warned the Leba-
nese government that it must bear full responsibility
=)r terrorist activities against Israel launched from
Lebanon, but claimed that it will be easy to obtain a
peace settlement with Beirut.
Rabin said efforts should be made to improve Israel's
relations with other countries, especially in Europe and
in Africa, and called on Israelis not to give in to iso-
lationist tendencies.
While citing Israel's close relationship with the
us, Rabin said the government would, nevertheless, stick
positions it deemed vital to Israel's survival, even
II these are not acceptable to Washington.
On domestic issues, Rabin discussed at length the
need for governmental leadership in education, housing,
income maintenance, and social services. He said that
the government will heed the ferment among Israeli youth
a,nd attempt to bring them into the decision-making proc-
ess.
Following a lengthy and at times heated debate, the
:nesset approved the new 18-member Rabin cabinet by a
;vote of 61 to 51.
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National Intelligence Bulletin June 4, 1974
Italy has made clear in recent talks with the West
Germans that its opposition to the nuclear Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty is hardening, in the wake of India's nuclear
explosion. the Italian
position may make it difficult, for Bonn to deposit its
instruments of ratification for the treaty.
the Indian test
and the USSR's failure to protest it had made Italian
parliamentary approval of the treaty less likely. The
Italian position is complicated by the fact
that Mediterranean states---including Libya, Algeria,
Eygpt, Israel, Spain, and Albania--are not parties to
the pact.
Italian political leaders evidently feel that a
formal commitment by the government to ban the develop-
ment of nuclear weapons would be politically unwise at
this time, even though they do not want Italy to join
the nuclear club. The Rumor government now plans to
delay asking parliamentary approval of the treaty. It
will, however, seek parliamentary approval of an agree-
ment providing for verification, under International
Atomic Energy Agency procedures, that Italy will allow
no nuclear material to be diverted for the manufacture
of nuclear weapons. Italy apparently believes that in
order to continue to receive fissionable material for
industrial purposes, it must ratify the verification
agreement.
Bonn has taken the position that the NPT and the
verification agreement are inseparable and has pointed
out that a nation is required to sign the verification
agreement after it has become a party to the treaty.
The West German government assured the Bundestag
at the time of ratification that all. EC partners except
France were prepared to ratify, and that the two agree-
ments would come into force simultaneously. Bonn may
now feel. that Rome's plan to separate the two treaties
would invalidate this assurance and create political
difficulties for Chancellor Schmidt and the Social Demo-
crats.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
June 4, 1974
The identification of an air force commander on June
fills a vacancy that has existed since the Lin Piao af-
-t'air. Several other posts in the military high command
that were vacated at that time, including minister of de-
a'ense and PLA chief of staff, remain unfilled.
The new commander, Ma Ning, is a civil war hero in
his mid-50s and a full member of the Central Committee.
1 .lthough Ma has been in the air force since 1949, little
is known about his previous political alignments. Most
()f his known assignments have been as a professional mil-
~tary commander; he had not been identified in a national-
evel position prior to June 1973. His background and
relative obscurity suggest that his appointment is in ac-
=.~ord with the trend toward increasing the professionalism
of the military and playing down PLA involvement in poli-
ui cs .
Based on his ranking at previous occasions, Ma may
have been heading the air force for the past year. De
facto heads can also be identified for the Ministry of
Defense and the PLA chief of staff. Peking's failure
io formalize the appointments may have been a result of
persistent political divisions among the top leadership.
In any event, there is no evidence that the vacancies
11ave had any impact on the military effectiveness of the
?LA.
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The recently signed annual trade agreement between
the USSR and China calls for a total trade level of more
than $345 million, compared with $270 million last year.
According to a Soviet broadcast, exports from the USSR
will consist primarily of aircraft and power-generating
equipment. Most of China's exports will be raw materials,
agricultural products, and consumer goods.
The trade agreement is another indication that both
sides want to maintain some semblance of normal state
relations, despite the increased frictions resulting
from China's detention of a Soviet helicopter crew for
more than two months. F_ I
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National Intelligence Bulletin
June 4, 1974
The Soviets' latest lunar probe, Luna 22, was suc-
cessfully placed into orbit around the moon on Sunday.
Tass has announced that the probe is completing one
revolution of the moon every two hours and ten minutes
and that the instruments carried on the craft are func-
tioning normally. The Soviets reported that Luna 22 will
continue the program, begun by Luna 19, of conducting
scientific research of the moon from an orbiting artifi-
c j.al satellite.
Luna 19 was placed into orbit around the moon in
the fall of 1971.
The US lunar orbiter program resulted in the dis-
covery in August 1968 of the moon's gravitational irreg-
ularities caused by mass concentrations under the lunar
surface. The information obtained from the program was
necessary for planning the later manned missions.
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National Intelligence Bulletin June 4, 1974
The economic slump worsened in April. Industrial
production slipped 1.7 percent, to a level nearly 6 per-
cent below the high reached last November. The motor
vehicle and construction materials industries were
especially hard hit.
Despite the decline, industrial production con-
tinued to outrun shipments of finished goods, and manu-
facturers' inventories rose 6.4 percent. Production may
be cut back further to stop the accumulation of inven-
tories unless recently granted wage increases trigger a
surge in consumer buying.
Government officials still. vow to continue restric-
tive policies in order to dampen inflation. Tokyo wants
to minimize the impact of recent increases in wages and
oil prices on the consumer price level, but economic
activity will remain sluggish until there has been a
broad easing of monetary and fiscal restraints.
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Japan yesterday signed a $230-million contract to
build a steel rolling mill for China, according to press
reports. The deal is the largest in China's wave of
plant purchases from non-Communist countries. Japan, the
biggest supplier, has previously concentrated on provid-
ing petrochemical facilities.
Under the new contract, Nippon Steel will deliver
equipment for a section of the steel complex at Wuhan in
which a West German company also is participating. The
Japanese firm will train 300 Chinese technicians. This
agreement will add to the already burgeoning trade be-
tween Peking and Tokyo. Trade doubled last year to about
$2 billion and was up 50 percent in the first quarter of
this year.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
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The USSR sees in detente the international atmos-
phere best suited to maximizing the power and security of
the Soviet state and its influence abroad. Soviet leaders
neither expect nor intend their "peace program" to end
rivalry with the outside world, but rather to set prudent
limits on that rivalry in the nuclear age and allow for
greater Soviet policy maneuver.
For the Soviets, detente is at least as much a need
as a choice. The major contributing factors include:
the necessity to avoid nuclear war and, by extension, to
manage local crises with great care; the problem of coping
with Chinese hostility; a need for Western capital and
technology; opportunities to have the USSR's superpower
status recognized and to consolidate its hegemony in
Eastern Europe; and the chance to inhibit Western military
programs without accepting corresponding limits on those
of the USSR.
Pursuit of detente also raises problems for the So-
viets at home and abroad: the problem of maintaining
internal discipline in a more relaxed international at-
mosphere; possible erosion of Soviet control in Eastern
Europe; and complications in relations with client states
and within the international communist movement. These
problems do not appear critical. at the moment.
(continued)
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National Intelligence Bulletin June 4, 1974
Brezhnev and the detente approach seem well en-
trenched, but both must sustain a defensible record of
accomplishment. Foreign policy setbacks of a magnitude
to bring the overall detente approach into question would
pose a challenge to Brezhnev's position. He would prob-
ably be able to head off such a challenge by initiating
some policy shifts. But if these setbacks were to coin-
cide with serious domestic difficulties, he might not be
able to carry off such a maneuver.
While Soviet leadership changes are likely over the
next few years, successors will face much the same set
of opportunities and imperatives. After some hiatus for
domestic political consolidation, they will probably be
predisposed by Soviet national interests to look favorably
on a detente approach.
The most durable elements of the Soviet detente ap-
proach are the drive for expanded economic relations and
the avoidance of threat and challenge in relations with
the highly developed countries. Barring a radical change
in Sino-Soviet relations, which we think unlikely, the
rivalry with China will also serve to keep Moscow on this
track. But some easing of this conflict, perhaps after
Mao's passing, could reduce Soviet incentives to pursue
detente.
In the Middle East, the USSR is concerned to regain
lost ground and hopes to do so at the more difficult
later stages of Arab-Israeli negotiations. In any crisis
within the next year or so, if Moscow were forced to make
a clear choice between detente and its regional interests,
the chances are better than even that, within the require-
ment of avoiding a confrontation with the US, the USSR
would be willing to'risk a setback to detente.
Soviet relations with the US are central to the fu-
ture of detente, and arms control negotiations are cen-
tral to those relations. While Soviet policy does not
allow for a collapse of MBFR and SALT, Moscow still
appears to be searching hard for advantage in these talks,
and would like to believe that this behavior does not
threaten other Soviet interests bound up in detente.
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National Intelligence Bu lletin
June 4, 1974
In the meantime, the USSR continues to pursue ambi-
tious military programs. These extend beyond its vig-
orous ICBM development efforts to embrace many other
weapon systems as well.
While the Soviet balance sheet on detente is becom-
ing more complicated, the leaders will prefer to deal
with various problems in pragmatic fashion and to keep
detente as a whole from coming into question. Even if
only partial gains are realized, Moscow will not choose
deliberately to abandon detente unless forced to do so
by critical repercussions at home or in Eastern Euro e.
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National Intelligence Bulletin June 4, 1974
LAOS: Communists Fail to Withdraw Troops
The formation of a new coalition government on April
5 started the countdown on a 60-day deadline for the with-
drawal of all foreign military personnel from Laos and the
return of all prisoners of war. The withdrawal period
ends today
On the Communist side, sizable numbers of North Viet-
namese troops are still in Laos, and they show no sign of
leaving. No prisoners have been exchanged and there is
little prospect of their early release.
The North Vietnamese Stand Fast
Although the number of North Vietnamese troops in
Laos has declined by some 36,000 since the cease-fire
agreement in February 1973, Hanoi has withdrawn only one
:major unit ince the 60-day
countdown egan. An estimated. 47,000 North Vietnamese
troops (18,000 in infantry and, combat su ort units and
29 000 rear services personnel) remain.
Approximately three fourths of the North Vietnamese
personnel are concerned primarily with supporting Hanoi's
war effort in South Vietnam by keeping supplies and per-
sonnel moving along the eastern Lao infiltration corridor,
and they will probably stay there in force for some time.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
June 4, 1974
Given the high priority Hanoi assigns to maintaining
an adequate flow of troops and supplies to South Vietnam,
there was never any real prospect of significant and per-
manent withdrawals of North Vietnamese logistic and en-
gineer forces from the Lao infiltration corridor. The
North Vietnamese have spent many months developing the
Ho Chi Minh trail route structure into a dual-lane, all-
weather road net that spans almost the entire length of
the central and southern Lao panhandle. Despite the de-
velopment and refinement of a parallel supply and infil-
tration corridor across the border in western South Viet-
nam, there is still little likelihood that Hanoi will
abandon its route structure in eastern Laos as long as
the fighting continues in Vietnam.
The North Vietnamese apparently are also determined
to maintain, at least for the time being, a limited main
force combat presence in parts of the Lao interior to
prevent potential rightist military moves against so-
called "liberated areas" or against the new coalition
government itself. In addition., Hanoi evidently plans
to continue to train, advise, and to some extent logis-
tically support the Pathet Lao until they are convinced
their Lao Communist clients can. hold their own against
the Lao army and do reasonably well in future general
elections.
For their part, the Pathet Lao have shown no inter-
est in having the North Vietnamese leave. On the con-
trary, they probably welcome a continued North Vietnamese
presence to aid in protecting their political and mili-
tary interests in the new coalition environment.
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Communist Public Posture
Lao Communist officials in the new coalition overn-
ment have emphatically denied
the presence of North Vietnamese forces in aos.
The Communists have also engaged in a major campaign
LO shift the focus of attention on the foreign troop with-
drawal issue to the US and Thailand. The comprehensive
national political program that Pathet Lao leader Prince
Souphanouvong recently pushed through the coalition's
Joint National Political Council calls specifically upon
Washington and Bangkok to stop their "interference, ag-
qression, and military involvement in Laos." No other
countries are mentioned.
I_n ad.a tron, urere has been a marked increase in
tn.e intensity and frequency of Communist propaganda at-
tacks charging the US and Thailand with violating the
tY62 and 1973 Lao Accords. Recent broadcasts from Hanoi
aad the Viet Cong as well as the Pathet Lao have empha-
~;t.aed Lao Communist and North Vietnamese demands that
he US military presence be withdrawn not only from Laos
but especially from bases in Thailand.
(continued)
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Non-Communist Reactions
June 4, 1974
Despite the agitation of some rightist and other non-
Communist members of the coalition, Prime Minister Souvanna
apparently is not overly concerned at this stage with North
Vietnam's continued military presence in Laos. He has
pointed out on several occasions that there is little the
non-Communists can do to eject Hanoi's troops from portions
of the Lao interior or to prevent their unimpeded use of
the eastern trail network, particularly since these areas
lie within the zone controlled by the Pathet Lao.
Withdrawal Inspection Machinery Founders
Under the terms of the Lao Accords, the military
committee of the two-party Joint Central Commission to
Implement the Agreement, assisted by the International
Control Commission, is charged with inspecting and veri-
fying foreign troop withdrawals. The Lao Communists,
however, have blocked.the development of any effective
inspection procedures. Largely as a result of Pathet
Lao initiative, the commission has decided that check-
points for monitoring troop withdrawals cannot be estab-
lished until demarcation stakes separating each side's
zone of military control are in place. The protocol
specifies that some 27 temporary boundary markers or
stakes must be implanted by the commission at "hot points"
to preclude the possibility of future armed conflict.
The commission has authorized the creation of ten
12-man joint mobile teams to ;participate in the stake-
planting and troop-withdrawal inspection exercises, but
to date only three teams have actually been established,
and they have no transportation.
(continued)
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to addition to their stake-planting ploy, the Commu-
nists seem to be insisting that some lingering problems,
such as the withdrawal of unauthorized Royal Lao Army
military personnel and combat aircraft from the twin cap-
itals, must be resolved before the commission can take up
the troop-withdrawal question.
Prisoners Stay Put
There has been no progress on the prisoner issue.
The Pathet Lao admit to holding only one American prisoner--
civilian contract pilot Emmet Kay--who was captured on
gay 7, 1973. Four other Americans are believed to have
been captured in Laos prior to the cease-fire agree ent,
and some 314 are listed as missing in action.
The non-Communist side holds an estimated 135 North
Vietnamese captives. Neither Lao side has admitted to
holding any Lao prisoners.
The Communists' failure to release any prisoners
prior to the June 4 deadline strengthens earlier indica-
tions that they intend to use some of their captives to
force changes in US and Thai policy toward Laos. J
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