CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A026400140001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 11, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
c 308
May 11, 1974
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May 11, 1974
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
ISRAEL-SYRIA: Moderate fighting on Syrian front.
(Page 5)
ISRAEL: Labor Party action clears way for forma-
tion of new coalition. (Page 6)
EUROPE - WEST GERMANY: Assessment of reaction to
Brandt's resignation. (Page 7)
VIETNAM: Viet Cong pulls out of two-party military
talks. (Page 12)
CAMBODIA: Khmer Communist "defense minister" rules
out negotiations with Phnom Penh. (Page 13)
ITALY: The Politics of Divorce. (Page 15)
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Syrian Front
Mediterranean
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ISRAEL-SYRIA: Fighting on the Syrian front
was at a moderate level yesterday. Both Israeli
and Syrian aircraft conducted strikes.
Israeli aircraft attacked targets around Mount
Hermon for the second consecutive day. According
to Tel Aviv, the targets were "guerrilla" concentra-
tions in southern Lebanon. Syrian aircraft struck
Israeli targets inside the Israeli-held salient.
Tank, artillery, and mortar fire also was exchanged.
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*ISRAEL: Leaders of Israel's Labor Party yes-
terday voted overwhelmingly to authorize its negotia-
ting team to try to form a labor coalition that would
include the Citizens Rights Movement and the Inde-
pendent Liberal Party, two minor liberal parties.
Such a coalition would command a one-vote majority
in the Knesset, but would have the prospect of addi-
tional votes on vital security issues. A new gov-
ernment may be formed next week.
Labor left its options open, however, includinq
the possibility of forming a minority government.
The leadership also agreed to continue contacts with
the National Religious Party, although it agreed not
to offer any further concessions on the religious
conversion issue.
The Labor Party's decision in effect overrode
Prime Minister Meir's strong objections to a coali-
tion with Mrs. Shulamit Aloni's small Citizens Riqhts
Movement. Mrs. Meir stormed out of the session in
protest.
Although the Prime Minister charged that a
coalition with the Aloni group would bring too many
doves into the government, her personal differences
with Mrs. Aloni may have weighed more heavily in her
decision. This apparently was recognized by the rest
of the Labor Party leaders, including Pinhas Sapir,
who refused to accede to the Prime Minister's wishes.
Mrs. Meir, however, said she will support a Labor-
Liberal coalition if Rabin is successful.
If, as seems likely, the party's central com-
mittee ratifies this decision on Sunday, Rabin will
have a party mandate flexible enough to permit forma-
tion of a government to replace Mrs. Meir's in the
week remaining for him to do so.
"Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the
analytic interpretation presented here has been produced by the
Central Intelligence Agency without the participation of the Bureau
of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.
May 11, 1974
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EUROPE - WEST GERMANY: The reaction in both
Eastern and Western Europe to Chancellor Brandt's
resignation has been one of shock and disappoint-
ment. The crisis in Bonn, coming on the heels of
Prime Minister Heath's defeat and the subsequent
hardening of UK attitudes toward the Common Market,
President Pompidou's death, and the uncertainty sur-
rounding the situation in Italy, has added to a
general sense of malaise and drift in Western Europe.
A Soviet Embassy officer in Bonn told a US offi-
cial that it will take Moscow several months to
evaluate Schmidt's policies. Nonetheless, he indi-
cated that Brandt's fall is a real problem for the
Soviets.
Soviet - West German reconciliation is basic
to Brezhnev's policy of detente. Brandt's exit and
the fact that Schmidt has been more leery of Ost-
politik than his predecessor can only cause more
concern in Moscow about future prospects for Soviet
detente policy and, by extension, about Brezhnev's
wisdom in relying heavily on his personal relation-
ship with Brandt.
French officials have privately expressed con-
cern over Schmidt's past record, which they believe
clearly demonstrates that he puts more importance on
relations with the US than on those with France. The
recent events in Bonn will probably figure in the
French presidential elections, because some of
Giscard's supporters are expected to cite the Guil-
laume case as an example of the dangers that could
be posed by Communist participation in a Mitterrand-
led government.
In Italy, the media are giving considerable
play to developments in West Germany, despite pre-
occupation with domestic matters such as the divorce
referendum this weekend'and the sensational kidnaping
of a public official. There has been no official
government reaction, but the state-controlled radio-TV
network has accorded Brandt sympathetic treatment.
(continued)
May 11, 1974
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One of the strongest West European reactions
came from Swedish Prime Minister Palme, who lashed
out at East Germany in a nationwide TV statement on
May 7. Palme accused Pankow of undermining the
goals Brandt had sought to achieve during his
chancellorship.
The East Europeans have scarcely concealed
their concern about the possible effect of Brandt's
resignation on the future of detente. A Polish
commentary expressed deep regret over the resigna-
tion, but it was left to the Yugoslavs to weigh in
with what is probably on the minds of most East
Europeans: "The harm done to peace in Europe is
much greater than the usefulness of the information
supplied."
May 11, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin 8
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VIETNAM: The Viet Cong yesterday pulled out
of the two-party military talks in Saigon. The move
apparently was intended to counter South Vietnam's
boycott two weeks ago of political discussions be-
tween the two sides in Paris and its suspension of
the Viet Cong military delegation's diplomatic priv-
ileges in Saigon. The South Vietnamese had taken
these actions to protest the Communist capture of a
border outpost and a general rise in the tempo of
Communist military action.
Both sides recently have exchanged increasingly
charged rhetoric over who is responsible for the
erosion of the cease-fire agreement. The Communists
apparently felt their words had to be coupled with
some strong action.
Neither side presently wants to see a total
breakdown of the cease-fire agreement, and each has
left itself enough room for maneuver to reconvene
both the Saigon and Paris talks whenever this is
desired. The Viet Cong are apparently maintaining
their delegation in Saigon and have stated that they
are prepared to resume the two-party military talks
once the Thieu government restores their delegation's
privileges and freedom of movement.
Nevertheless, the events of recent weeks indi-
cate the extent to which both sides have already dis-
counted the effectiveness of the cease-fire mechan-
isms established by the Paris Accords.
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CAMBODIA: Touring Khmer Communist "defense
minister" Khieu Sam han continues to take a hard line
on negotiations.
Samp an sal in e ing in eariy
pry. an again in ucharest this month that the Com-
munists would not negotiate with the Phnom Penh gov-
ernment, "no matter how the current dry season offen-
sive turns out."
The Communist leader boasted that the insur-
gents control "90 percent" of Cambodian territory
and thus have no reason to negotiate. He cited his
own travels abroad during the dry season as indica-
tive of the Communists' confidence in their overall
military position.
Looking ahead, Samphan claimed that after a
Communist victory in Cambodia, he would eventually
take Sihanouk's place as "chief of state." One of
the main reasons for his foreign travels, he said,
was to enhance his political image for that future
role. As for Sihanouk, Samphan said the Prince would
be allowed to return to Cambodia but would subse-
quently be relegated to a figurehead capacity--an
arrangement he claimed Sihanouk has accepted.
Samphan--who is winding up his visits to a
number of European and African countries--believes
that his trips to China and North Vietnam were highly
successful, and that they strengthened the Khmer Com-
munists' relations with those two countries.
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ITALY:' ' The Politics of Divorce
"Do you favor the abrogation of the law of
December .1, 1970, Number 898, concerning the dis-
cipline of cases of dissolved marriages?"
This is the question Italians will be answering
in the referendum on divorce this Sunday and Mondays
Many Italians who have strong feelings about divorce
will be puzzled over how to reflect their views with
a "yes" or a "no." A majority of "yes" votes would
result in repeal of the 1970 law that made divorce
legal in Italy.
More is at stake than the fate of a specific
law. The battle over divorce has widened the split
among Italy's ruling parties, and the outcome, which
is expected to be close, could affect the Communist
Party's drive for a role in the national government.
The law that brought legalized divorce to Italy
was passed in 1970 after a long and bitter parlia-
mentary struggle between church.-oriented and anti-
clerical forces. Catholic activists promptly col-
lected enough signatures to schedule a national
referendum on whether to keep or repeal the new law.
Most political leaders were nervous about a
plebiscite on divorce, however, and were relieved
when it was postponed by technicalities in 1972 and
1973. This year, efforts to postpone the vote failed
despite frantic behind-the-scenes negotiations in-
volving Christian Democrats, Communists, and the
Catholic Church
The referendum campaign began in earnest in
early April. Most politicians expressed a preference
at the outset for a "civil and responsible" campaign
As the campaign wore on, however, the rhetoric became
increasingly bitter. Now in its last week, the con-
test has transcended the issue of divorce and acquired
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the air of a general political campaign. Feelings
have run so high that sporadic violence has punctuated
the closing days of the campaign.
The Vatican last week abandoned its "hands off"
policy toward the referendum and issued a ringing
statement against divorce. For the first time in
the divorce fight, the Pope's moral authority was
invoked. Partisans on both sides of the question
have obviously decided that because the ramifica-
tions of the referendum are so important, a no-holds-
barred campaign is justified to ensure victory.
Divorce Drives a Wedge
The campaign has driven a wedge between the
Christian Democrats and their three center-left
coalition partners. The Christian Democratic leader-
ship spurned efforts to postpone the referendum for
a third time and is campaigning hard against divorce.
Many Christian Democrats are unenthusiastic about the
referendum, however, and a way might have been found
to avoid the contest had it not been for the in-
transigence of Amintore Fanfani, the veteran Chris-
tian Democrat who is again running the party.
Fanfani brushed aside the misgivings of other
party leaders--including Prime Minister Rumor--and
insisted on going ahead. Fanfani has been trying to
tighten his personal control of the party and may
see the referendum as a way to mobilize the party
for coming local elections..
Many suspect that Fanfani would like to turn
a victory on divorce into a more general political
success. If divorce is resoundingly repudiated,
Fanfani may push. for an early dissolution of parlia-
ment and a new election. The idea would be to break
the country's political impasse by capturing an
absolute majority for the Christian Democrats--an
edge not enjoyed by the party since the 1948 elec-
tion.
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The other three coalition parties--Socialists,
Social Democrats, and Republicans--are in favor of
the divorce law. These parties share a long anti-
clerical history, and they helped push legalized
divorce through parliament.
The divorce dispute has fostered embarrassing
ad hoc alliances between the coalition parties and
the opposition parties on the right and left. In
opposing divorce, for example, the Christian Demo-
crats are campaigning on the same side of an issue
as the neofascist Italian Social Movement. Since
it is considered political suicide in Italy to be
bedfellows with the neofascists, the Christian Demo-
crats are trying to keep their distance. The Com-
munists, however, are doing their best to remind the
voters of this identity of interests--especially now
that neofascist groups have been linked to several
recent bomb attacks in northern Italy.
The three other coalition parties are also un-
comfortable; they find themselves on the same side
of the issue as the Communist Party. While the
Social Democrats and Republicans are adamantly pro-
divorce, their campaigning has generally lacked
punch, apparently because of their concern at being
caught in a public embrace with the Communists. The
Socialists are showing less restraint and are cam-
paigning hard. They do not wish to be overshadowed
by the Communists.
Divorce as an issue has nearly been lost in the
shuffle. The two dominant campaign themes seem to
be antifascism and anticommunism. This polarization
will almost certainly leave a residue of resentment
among the coalition parties and complicate their
efforts to come to terms on bread-and-butter issues
in the future.
The Communist Stake
The Communist Party worked harder than any
other to avoid holding the referendum.
May 11, 1974
the party feared it had more to
ose
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than to gain from a divisive fight over divorce.
Communist leader Enrico Berlinguer has been trying
since October to maneuver the Christian Democrats
into accepting his offer of an "historic compromise."
Under this strategy, he openly aided the government
through the party's influence with organized labor
and in parliament, while at the same time arguing
that the time was ripe to admit Communists into the
national government, since the coalition parties
accepted such support.
Berlinguer tried to get Christian Democratic
leader Fanfani to go along with a plan to cancel the
referendum. Fanfani's refusal to cooperate encouraged
militant Communists who all along have doubted the
wisdom of Berlinguer's search for a modus vivendi
In many ways, the referendum has become a per-
sonal struggle between Berlinguer and Fanfani. Both
men know that their prestige--within their parties
and with the electorate generally--is on the line.
Accordingly, they have been the most vigorous cam-
paigners.
Cloudy Prospect
None of the participants is confident of the
outcome; most believe the vote will be close. The
outcome is made more uncertain by the novelty of
the referendum device in Italy and by the uncertainty
about whether the public perceives the contest as a
vote on divorce, as a contest between left and right,
or as a showdown between church and state.
Perhaps crucial is the fact that the question
on the ballot is worded in an obscure way. The
voter must mark his ballot "no" to keep divorce, and
"yes" to reject it.
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Until recently, the polls consistently showed
a slight majority in favor of divorce. The "un-
decided" category, however, has swelled from 6 to
21 percent in the past few weeks. This development
probably indicates that the Italian voter is in-
creasingly inclined to cast his vote on issues other
than divorce.
If the margin of victory is narrow, it will be
difficult for either the Christian Democrats or the
Communists convincingly to portray the vote as an
endorsement of their positions on other issues.
A major victory for the pro-divorce forces would
encourage Communist chief Berlinguer to keep up his
pressure for an accord with the Christian Democrats
and would strengthen the hand of those Christian
Democrats who are sympathetic to Berlinguer's bid.
A big win by the antidivorce forces would ex-
pose Berlinguer to criticism from many Communists
who have harbored doubts about his drive for better
relations with the Christian Democrats. In addi-
tion, the influence of Christian Democratic leader
Fanfani--already the most powerful single politician
in Italy--would be greatly enhanced.
A convincing win would provide Fanfani with an
even stronger position from which to deal with the
other coalition parties and with the Communists, and
might embolden him to seek a new election. Speculating
about Fanfani's motives has long been one of Italy's
national pastimes. Some observers believe he wants
a mandate to push for institutional reforms that would
create a stronger executive branch, which he would
head as its first incumbent.
The campaign has already added to tensions
within the governing coalition, and the political
stocktaking after the referendum could well lead to
a change of government. Regardless of how the vote
comes out, the Christian Democrats will retain the
initiative, and if the government falls, they will
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probably try to set up still another center-left
coalition with the Socialists.
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the Christian Democrats from continuing the center-
But the record of center-left coalitions over
the last decade is unimpressive, and a Communist win
on Monday could--over the long term--increase the
pressure for a broader coalition, including the Com-
munists, to deal with Italy's pressing social and
economic problems. A referendum victory for the pro-
divorce forces, however, would not in itself prevent
left coalition in the post-referendum period.
May 11, 1974
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