CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A026400100001-7
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RIPPUB
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T
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21
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December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 4, 2003
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1
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Publication Date: 
May 7, 1974
Content Type: 
REPORT
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Approved For Release 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO26400100001-7 Top Secret Central Intelligence Bulletin Top Secret C308 May 7, 1974 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO26400100001-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO26400100001-7 Approved For Release 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO26400100001-7 Approved For Release 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO26400100001-7 25X1 May 7, 197 Central Intelligence Bulletin CONTENTS WEST GERMANY: Brandt resigns as Chancellor. (Page 1) ISRAEL-SYRIA: Israeli and Syrian aircraft active. (Page 3) USSR-EGYPT: Soviets appear to be applying pressure on Sadat by halting arms shipments. (Page 5) FRANCE: Resounding defeat of Chaban-Delmas further divides Gaullists and clouds party's future. (Page 7) USSR: New commander of Black Sea Fleet appointed. (Page 9) INDIA: Major rail strike expected tomorrow. (Page 13) FEDAYEEN: Palestinian radicals try to undercut Sec- retary Kissinger's negotiations. (Page 15) FOR THE RECORD: (Page 19) 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO264OP0100001-7 Approved For Re *WEST GERMANY: Chancellor Brandt resigned last night in~the midst of one of the most spectacular spy scandals in West Germany's post-war history. In his letter of resignation to President Gustav Heinemann, Brandt took "full responsibility for the acts of negligence" that permitted an East German intelligence officer, Guenter Guillaume, to rise to the position of one of the Chancellor's three per- sonal assistants. In tendering his resignation, Brandt requested that Deputy Chancellor and Foreign Minister Walter Scheel be named caretaker until Par- liament can elect a successor. The Chancellor's action followed an all-day closed door session attended by Brandt, members of the ruling coalition, and leaders of the opposition Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union. Earlier yesterday, the government postponed for 24 hours an official report on the arrest and security implications of the Guillaume affair. The embassy reports that Scheel will only serve on an interim basis and intends to remain foreign minister and head of the Free Democrats instead of going ahead with his previously announced plans to seek the presidency at the federal assembly session next week. The embassy further suggests that Presi- dent Heinemann may now be persuaded to seek re-elec- tion. The best bet to replace Brandt as chancellor is Finance Minister Helmut Schmidt. Schmidt is a member of the moderate wing of the Social Democrats and as such, is acceptable to the coalition's minor- ity partner, the Free Democrats. Despite periods of friction with Brandt, Schmidt has long been con- sidered the Chancellor's number one minister and heir- apparent 25X1 25X1 May 7, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975Ap26400100001-7 25X6 Approved For Release 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO26400100001-7 Approved For Release 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO26400100001-7 Approved F? ISRAEL-SYRIA: Fighting along the Syrian front yesterday was at a higher level than that of the past few days. Both Israeli and Syrian aircraft were active over the front. Israeli aircraft attacked Syrian positions south of the salient, while Damascus stated that its planes struck Israeli targets inside the Israeli-held salient. A UN patrol observed four Syrian MIG-17s bombing an area southwest of Sasa around midday. Tank and artillery fire occurred in several sectors of the front. 25X1 four Israeli aircraft, while Tel Aviv claims to have downed one Syrian aircraft. May 7, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0?6400100001-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO26400100001-7 Approved For Release 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO26400100001-7 Approved For USSR-EGYPT: The Soviets appear to be tightening the screws on President Sadat by halting all arms shipments to Egypt. The last Soviet seaborne arms shipment arrived in Alexandria on April 13. The absence of an arms shipment over a three-week period is unusual. The longest previous hiatus in seaborne military deliv- eries in recent years was a 17-day period in the spring of 1973. Soviet arms shipments began to slow down in March, and only two deliveries were made in early April. The current hiatus in military shipments appar- ently was decided on by the Kremlin in late March or early April--perhaps in response to Sadat's intense anti-Soviet polemics, which began about that time. The interruption of deliveries is the farthest the Soviets have ever gone in using their position as a weapons supplier to apply pressure on the Egyptians. They apparently began foot-dragging on military aid questions late last year when it became clear that Sadat was establishing a new relationship with the US and was turning to the right in Egypt's internal af- fairs. Sadat has muted his anti.-Soviet polemics during the last few weeks, and he and Brezhnev have exchanged letters discussing their differences. It is possible that, in this somewhat improved environment, Moscow might be induced to resume limited shipments of mil- itary assistance as an indicator of its good inten- tions. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the Soviets will continue to seek to pressure Sadat into poli- cies more favorable to Moscow by foot-dragging on May 7, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved ForiRelease 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A046400100001-7 Approved For military aid. In particular, the USSR may hope that its military aid policies will trigger significant misgivings within the Egyptian military concerning the consequences of Sadat's present pol- icies. May 7, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO26409100001-7 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For FRANCE: The resounding defeat of Jacques Chaban- Delmas on Sunday has further divided Gaullist ranks and could lead to the end of Gaullism as the prime political force in France. Regardless of which candidate wins the runoff on May 19, the legislative electoral law, which now favors the Gaullists, is likely to be amended. Both Giscard and Mitterrand have come out in favor of more propor- tional representation in the National Assembly based on population. They would both reduce the number of rural districts where the Gaullists are strong and in- crease urban districts where the other major parties draw their strength. Both Giscard and Mitterrand would expect to gain a significant number of seats at Gaullist expense. Most Gaullists will probably unite behind Giscard for the presidential runoff, although they have appar- ently split into three factions. The first faction, led by Interior Minister Chirac, embittered other Gaullists by aiding Giscard during the first-round cam- paign. This group claims the allegiance of about 70 of the 183 Gaullist deputies. The second group is led by Housing and Development Minister Olivier Guichard, who was close to both De Gaulle and Pompidou. It claims 80 deputies. Guichard has been widely touted as a possible prime minister under Giscard. Guichard, whose major aim is to save the party from total disintegration, hopes to be able to negotiate with Giscard as spokesman for all the Gaullists. He is likely to gain the support of at least Chirac's faction. The smallest group, which controls only about 20 deputies, is led by such hard-liners as Michel Debre and Maurice Couve de Murville, who have deeply dis- liked Giscard for years. Moderate Gaullists reportedly began last week to try to woo the hard-liners over to Giscard for the second round of the election. The May '7, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 25X1 Approved Igor Release 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A026400100001-7 Approved For R4 early endorsement of Giscard by the hard-line Gaullist party secretary general after the first round indicates that most of this group will line up behind Giscard in preference to Mitterrand. Chaban has not yet endorsed Giscard, as some lead- ing moderate Gaullists had hoped, Chirac uic ar , W115 never supported a an s presidential campaign, are not likely to back him for such an im- portant post. Continued intense political fighting within the Gaullist ranks would further reduce the party's already seriously weakened political influence. I May 7, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin ApprovedIFor Release 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO2640010p001-7 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved F USSR: The Soviet Navy has appointed Vice Admiral Nikolay I. Khovrin as commander of its Black Sea Fleet. Khovrin's selection for this sensitive position and his previous appointments suggest that the Soviet naval command is grooming him for a higher post. Khovrin, 52, is representative of a crop of post - World War II Soviet admirals who were too young to have served as commanders in World War II but who have sub- sequently gained experience in. distant naval operations and flag-showing port visits. Khovrin served as the senior officer of several Soviet naval task groups in the Indian Ocean between 1968 and 1970. From 1971 un- til this year, he was second in command of the Soviet Northern Fleet, Moscow's most powerful fleet, which has a large force of nuclear-powered submarines. As commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Khovrin is charged with providing surface warships and logistic support to the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron on a reg- ular basis. In a crisis period--such as another flare- up in the Middle East--he would be responsible for re- inforcing the Mediterranean Squadron on short notice, and perhapq even ing on-the-scene command of the squadron. 1 -1 May 7, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Rel$ase 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A026400100901-7 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO26400100001-7 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO26400100001-7 Approved For a ease - 001-7 *INDIA: A major rail strike expected to begin tomorrow is the latest in a series of trials facing the government of Prime Minister Gandhi. The "Indira Wave" swept aside opposition to the Prime Minister in 1971 and 1972, but it has since receded and left her exposed to her enemies and to a nation bewildered and irritated by successive policy failures and un- fulfilled promises. The government was slow to react to earlier threats, but it is willing to risk a showdown--pos- sibly bloody--with militant railway unions. The army has been called out, to guard, and possibly run, key rail lines in order to keep essential freight moving. Uninterrupted deliveries of coal are partic- ularly essential; many important power plants and factories have less than a week's supply on hand. Some 3,000 railway union members have been ar- rested in the past week, and the unions are now re- fusing to continue negotiations with the government until their arrested leaders are released. The gov- ernment, for its part, says it will not negotiate unless the strike is called oi_f. Employees of the rail system, which is nationalized, have been warned that participation in the strike could cost them their jobs. Not all of the 1.7 million railway workers plan to go out on strike. One of the union federations is associated with Mrs. Gandhi's Congress Party and will not take part, and some of the smaller unions are likely to be intimidated by the government. The large federation of communist and socialist unions, however, which represents more than one third of railway workers, has issued a "final bugle call" for the strike. (continued) May 7, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For FRelease 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A046400100001-7 25X1 25X1 Approved Foil Other problems have compounded Mrs. Gandhi's difficulties. These include: a scarcity of food, rising petroleum prices, a politically volatile un- employment situation, and government corruption and lethargy. Newspapers have been sharply critical of the government in recent weeks, and reports are cir- culating that military leaders are increasingly dis- turbed by political and economic trends. *Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the analytic interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelligence Agency without the participation of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. May 7, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A02P400100001-7 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For R FEDAYEEN: Palestinian radicals, acting through their recently formed "Rejection Front," are attempt- ing to undercut Secretary Kissinger's negotiations and forestall Arab acceptance of any proposal for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. The front consists primarily of fedayeen splinter groups that favor terrorist tactics; they receive financial and operational support from Iraq and Libya. Spokesmen for the Rejection Front have publicly threatened the life of Secretary Kissinger, and mem- 25X1 25X1 Ominous Threats The most ominous threats have come from Ahmad Jabril, whose Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine--General Command is cooperating with other small fedayeen groups in the Rejection Front. I Unlike much fedayeen,rhetoric, these threats from the normally reticent Jabril must be taken seriously. He has a small but disciplined and well- trained organization which has admitted responsibil- ity for the murder last, year of the Israeli assist- ant defense attache in Washington and for the attack last month on the Israeli town of Qiryat Shemona. (continued) May 7, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin 15 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A026400100001-7 Approved For Fe lease 2003/12/10 : - 6400100001-7 25X1 The Qiryat Shemona attack gained the General Command and other fedayeen radicals a degree of in- fluence among Palestinians that is vastly out of proportion to the radicals' limited numbers and nor- mally d political following, 25X1 25X1 Another group in the Rejection Front, the Pop-Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 25X1 I Ihas in the past hijacked airliners a.n rist strikes within Israel to dramatize the Palestinian cause. Political Goals The Rejection Front's basic aim is to prevent Arab endorsement of any settlement that acknowledges israeils right to exist. Its immediate tactics, including terrorism, are designed to forestall a Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement and to dis- rupt plans to reconvene the peace conference in Geneva. 25X1 25X1 25X1 May 1, 19 74 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Pelease 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO26400109001-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO26400100001-7 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO26400100001-7 Approved Fo Portuguese Africa: Armed, forces chief of staff General Costa Gomes, in press conferences in Lisbon and in Angola, has offered a cease-fire to the insur- gents in Portugal's African territories. Some insur- gent leaders are under heavy pressure from militant wings in their organizations to reject the Spinola regime's program for a political settlement in Africa as nothing more than continued Portuguese hegemony under a different guise. Indeed, two major insurgent groups publicly rejected Costa Gomes' bid for negoti- ations in statements yesterday. (continued) May 7, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved Igor Release 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO26400h00001-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO26400100001-7 North Vietnam: Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap yesterday delivered a lengthy address to a large pub- lic gathering in Hanoi marking the 20th anniversary of the victory at Dien Bien Phu. General Giap, who appeared in public last week for the first time in six months, has been reported by several sources to be seriously ill. His presence at the commemorative festivities apparently indicates, however, that he is vigorous enough to stand the strain of an occa- sional public appearance. May 7, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 25X1 Approved Forl Release 2003/12/10 - CIA-RfP79T00975A026400100001-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO26400100001-7 Top Secret Top Secret Approved For Release 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO26400100001-7