CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A026300200001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 12, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
c 300
April 12, 1974
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I
PApr1i 12, 1974
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
ISRAEL: Terrorist attack likely to provoke reprisals
against fedayeen strongholds in southern Lebanon.
(Page 1)
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USSR: Academician Sakharov modifies opposition to
detente. (Page 6)
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EC-SYRIA: Syrian officials favor establishing formal
links with EC. (Page 10)
BELGIUM: Negotiations for new government break down.
(Page 12)
UGANDA: President Amin may be losing control of the
army. (Page 13)
ETHIOPIA: Further unrest among security forces and
workers. (Page 14)
CHINA: Vice Premier restates usual foreign policy
themes in UN speech. (Page 17)
CHINA: Seemingly unauthorized attacks on provincial
leaders continue. (Page 20)
AUSTRALIA: Nearly 95 percent of wheat available for
export this year has been committed. (Page 22)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 22)
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ISRAEL: The fedayeen attack on the Israeli town
of Qiryat Shemona yesterday is likely to elicit Is-
raeli reprisals against fedayeen strongholds in south-
ern Lebanon. Tel Aviv recently has avoided such re-
prisals lest they endanger peace negotiations; the
government will probably not allow political consid-
erations to deter action in this case because of the
substantial number of Israeli civilian casualties.
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The Popular Front: for the Liberation of Pales-
tine - General Command, a small terrorist group based
in Lebanon, has claimed responsibility for the attack.
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The General Command is not a constituent member
of the Palestine Liberation organization, nor is it
closely tied to any Arab government. However, it
receives some financial and operational support from
Libya, Iraq, and private Persian Gulf sources.
I I
Apr 12, 1974
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USSR: Academician Sakharov, in a retort to
exile novelist Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn on April 3,
has moved away from total confrontation with the re-
gime. He now supports detente while still dissenting
on the lack of democratization in the Soviet Union.
His new position provides a badly needed focal point.
for reformist forces in Soviet society and finds pa.r-
t.i.a1 common ground with the "modernizers" in the
regime itself.
The text of the statement, issued in response
to Solzhenitsyn's "Letter to the Soviet Leaders"
last September, is not yet available in Washington.
The US Embassy, which has read it, sees it as an
elaboration of the dialogue developing in dissident,
ranks, differentiating the inward-looking orthodox
nationalists (Solzhenitsyn) from the outward-looking
modernists (Sakharov, Roy Medvedev, et al,). The em-
bassy reads this dialogue as a reflection of the
divergence in Soviet society between the Westward-
looking modernizers at one end of the spectrum and
the conservative, isolationist nationalists at the
other.
It is possible to see these two strains of
thought, also reflected in the different degrees of
enthusiasm for detente among Soviet leaders and in
the contradictions of Soviet policy. Thus, the re-
gime is encouraging Western-style modernization
through detente, while trying to maintain all bar-
riers against, democratizationo Sakharov adopted a.
very dangerous strategy last year when he divorced
himself from all aspects of the regime's policy by
arguing against trade unless it was accompanied by
democratization. Now in supporting detente--albeit
ultimately for reasons of democratization--he moves
back closer to official opinion and his words gain
added weight.
According to the embassy, Sakharov has provided
a strong and balanced counterargument to Solzheni.-
t.syn's views on the future development of Soviet--and
for So.lzhenit.syn principally Russian--society.
(continued)
Apr .12, 1,974
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While Solzhenitsyn disdains scientific progress and
plumps for a simple, authoritarian society based on
Russian nationalism and the ideas of the Russian
Orthodox Church, Sakharov rejects mysticism and over-
emphasis on ideology, and argues in practical terms
for harnessing science to serve and better the lot
of mankind and for expanding the contacts between
the Soviet Union and the West.
Sakharov sees no absolute good in Russian tradi-
tional values, in contrast to Solzhenitsyn's mystical
belief in them, and argues that Soviet democratic
activists should be equally concerned about the sup-
pression of non-Russian peoples in the Soviet Union.
He takes Solzhenitsyn to task for his view that an
authoritarian system, based on the benevolent patri-
archy of the church, would be most suitable and
healthy for the country. Sakharov states his belief
that only in a democratic system can national and
human character be developed fully. He sees no in-
surmountable barriers to the possibilities for demo-
cratic development, either in Russian history or in
the Russian character.
Sakharov is particularly hard on Solzhenitsyn
for arguing that Russia needs to pull away from the
evil influence of the West and to develop itself in
splendid and simple isolation. He reasons that the
world's problems are so immense that one nation can-
not solve them alone, and he mentions a variety of
issues ranging from disarmament to environmental
protection in which international cooperation is
essential. Sakharov makes a strong case, in this
respect, for expanded trade, scientific and cultural
exchanges, free travel into and outside the country,
and free movement of people and ideas across national
boundaries. He relates this to the development of a
more democratic system in the Soviet Union, and
brings in his theory of the convergence of Soviet. and
Western societies to argue that both voluntary meas-
ures and outside pressures can act as catalysts for
beneficial change.
Apr 12, 1974
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EC-SYRIA: Syrian officials have expressed strong
interest in establishing formal links with the European
Community. During EC Commissioner Cheysson's recent
visit to Damascus, the Syrians declared that they were
prepared for immediate negotiations to broaden economic
cooperation with the community.
Syrian interest in ties with the EC may reflect
President Asad's efforts to balance off the heavy
Soviet economic presence with Western aid. Syria has
struck a number of bilateral deals with the West since
the last major Soviet credit agreement in 1972. Now
that other Arab states have granted Syria considerable
financial aid, Damascus may be interested in negotiat-
ing additional multilateral. development projects. Com-
mission sources in Brussels report that the Syrians
offered the EC a long list of projects from which to
choose.
Until recently, the Syrians have shown little
interest in EC efforts to formulate an overall policy
that would give the Mediterranean states preferential
access to community markets and provide development
aid. During Cheysson's visit, however, Syrian officials
expressed great interest in the present status of the
EC's Mediterranean policy and particularly the status
of negotiations with the Maghreb countries.
Syrian officials insisted that Cheysson sign a
document on behalf of the commission that would express
understanding for Syria's desire to reach agreement
with the community on preferential access to community
markets; technical, scientific, and industrial coop-
eration; and EC financial participation in Syrian de-
velopment projects. Although Cheysson had no mandate
to negotiate and had expected only informal discussions,
he signed the document because it merely embodied the
outline of existing EC Mediterranean policy.
The commission may propose to the EC Council that
formal exploratory talks be opened with both Syria and
Jordan, but the timing of such a step is not clear,
(continued)
Apr 12 , 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin 10
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The community's negotiations with the Maghreb states
and with Spain and Israel have been stalemated by
differences among the Nine. EC agreements with these
states will probably not be concluded before fall
at the earliest, and EC talks with eastern Mediter-
ranean Arab states will not be permitted to get ahead
of the negotiations with the western Mediterranean
countries.
Apr 12 , 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin 11
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*BELGIUM: Negotiations for a new Belgian Govern-
ment broke down last night over the sensitive issues
of regional autonomy and educational reform. Formateur
Leo Tindemans will report to the King today.
Reports earlier this week indicated that Tinde-
mans' powerful Social Christian Party had reached
tentative agreement with the Socialists on these and
other crucial issues. A new two-party coalition was
expected to be in office by Easter. A strong element
within the Socialist Party, however, may have forced
the Socialist negotiators to make demands that were
known to be unacceptable to the Social Christians.
If Tindemans is unable to bring the Socialists
back to the negotiating table, he may attempt to form
a minority government with the conservative Liberal
Party. This could be done if he had the formal or
the tacit support of the linguistic parties, but it
would create serious strains among the Social Chris-
tians. Such a coalition would be highly unstable.
*Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the
analytic interpretation presented here has been produced by the
Central Intelligence Agency without the participation of the Bureau
of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.
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*UGANDA: President Idi Amin may be losing con-
trol of the Ugandan Army to the factions that opposed
him in the fighting which took place on March 23-24.
Amin's opponents are predominantly Christians? and
many belong to the Lugbara and Madi tribes. They ap-
pear to have emerged in a stronger position than first
appeared to be the case from last month's clashes with
soldiers from Amin's Kakwa tribe and allied tribesmen
brought in from Sudan. Amin's opponents forced him
to dismiss Brigadier Husayn Malera as acting army chief
of staff and are now pressing him for further conces-
sions.
Amin reportedly brought a contingent of 400 Lib-
yan troops into Uganda early this week, presumably to
serve as a bodyguard. Libyan President Qadhafi sent
Libyan troops to aid Amin in late 1972, at which time
serious friction developed between Libyan and Ugandan
soldiers. If 400 Libyan troops have in fact arrived,
their presence may further anger the Ugandan soldiers.
Mounting tensions may spur a spontaneous assas-
sination attempt against Amin which, if successful,
almost certainly would touch off extensive fi htincr
between tribally based factions in the army.
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*Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the
analytic interpretation presented here has been produced by the
Central Intelligence Agency without the participation of the Bureau
of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.
Apr 12 , 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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*ETHIOPIA: There have been further outbreaks of
unrest among security forces and labor groups as these
elements press the government for action on their de-
mands for the dismissal of corrupt officials and for
wage increases.
Police units in recent days have stepped up their
protests against unpopular officers, harsh working
conditions, and maladministration. Enlisted men in the
port city of Massawa,,on the Red Sea coast, arrested
their officers on April 8. Members of a police unit
in Harar Province temporarily held their officers cap-
tive earlier this week and forced the appointment of a
new commanding officer. Police at two other locations
in Harar have expressed dissatisfaction with their of-
ficers.
Junior officers and NCOs of the Tenth Mechanized
Brigade in Jijiga, the army's most prestigious unit,
have held the city since April 9 and have arrested
several senior officers and some customs officials for
alleged corruption. The dissidents are also unhappy
with their recently appointed commander. The mechanized
brigade's action, after the Third Division successfully
forced the removal of the deputy chief of staff last
weekend, indicates the military is demonstrating its
strength as a reminder to the government not to falter
in carrying out promised changes.
(continued)
Apr 12 , 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Addis Ababa municipal employees, construction
workers, bus drivers, and railroad employees are on
strike for better pay and working conditions. Health
Department employees and the staff of the governorate
general are striking in Asmara. Railroad strikers
have sabotaged some equipment. Strikers in the capital
have forced the resignation of the mayor of Addis
Ababa, whom they have accused of corruptioii.
*Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the
analytic interpretation presented here has been produced by the
Central Intelligence Agency without the participation of the Bureau
of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.
Apr 12 , 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin 15
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CHINA: Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping's speech
to the special session of the UN General Assembly
on April 10 broke little new ground and essentially
restated moderate themes that have characterized
China's description of the international situation
for several years. Detente with the US emerged
intact, and Teng reserved his fire for the USSR,
which he denounced in uncompromising terms. Teng
stated that the current political campaign in China
was intended to prevent China from becoming an ag-
gressive "superpower," thus implying that foreigners
should not interpret the campaign as an ominous de-
velopment. Throughout the speech, Teng echoed Chou
En-lai's analysis of international affairs as the
Premier had described them in the keynote address
to the Tenth Party Congress last August.
The special session of the assembly obviously
affords China an ideal forum in which to emphasize
solidarity with Third World nations, and Teng took
full advantage of the occasion to curry favor among
the "have-not" states, explicitly placing China it-
self in that category.
He attacked both superpowers for using their
economic strength to "plunder" the Third World and
retard its economic development. Hewing to the now-
standard Chinese analysis, he attributed the unrest
in the world to the superpowers, accusing them of
competing for hegemony throughout the world. Teng
focused his attack, however, on the USSR, which he
singled out as being especially vicious, unscrupu-?
lous, perfidious, and self-seeking. All Teng's
examples of superpower misdeeds referred to the
USSR. His criticism of the US was generally indi-
rect and the mildest possible under the circumstances.
While this expresses a standard Chinese line, Teng's
harsh criticism of the Soviets was also intended to
remind Third World countries that their attention
during the special session should be directed toward
the Soviets as well as toward the developed coun-
tries of the West.
(continued)
Apr 12 , 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin 1.7
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There was no hint in the speech that domestic
criticism of accepting foreign aid and technology,
which has surfaced during the political campaign in
China, had forced a change in Chinese policy. While
re-emphasizing standard Chinese views on the neces-
sity for self-reliance in economic development, Teng
pointedly cautioned that self-reliance does not mean
"self-seclusion" and rejection of foreign aid.
Rather, such assistance and trade, if equitably ar-
ranged, were characterized as beneficial and necessary
for the development of independent national economies.
Teng asserted that US-Soviet detente was a myth
overshadowed by the larger fact of superpower
rivalry, and that balanced reduction of forces and
strategic arms limitation "are nothing but empty
talk." By reasserting this line Teng was indirectly
reaffirming that the policy of improved relations
with the US remains viable.
Reflecting Peking's anger at Soviet efforts to
arrange a world Communist meeting that will almost
certainly be directed against China, Teng attempted
to blunt any ideological criticism that might emerge
in such a meeting by declaring that the USSR's shift
to "social imperialism" means that the "socialist
camp" no longer exists.
Teng combined his exposition on superpower
rivalry
with strong support of Third World economic
goals,
but
in general terms that contained few spe-
cifics.
He
aligned China with demands for higher
prices
for
the underdeveloped countries' raw mate-
rials,
national control of resources and economies
"up to
and
including" nationalization, and a "thorough
change" in international economic relations. He ex-
plicitly endorsed Arab use of the "oil weapon" as a
good example of what developing countries must do to
fight imperialism, and suggested that nations pro-
ducing raw materials form organizations similar to
OPEC.
(continued)
Apr 12 , 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin 18
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If Teng's speech was a major effort at align-
ing China with Third World goals, his treatment of
Europe and the oil weapon demonstrated a keen sense
of the pitfalls inherent in the use of economic
weapons and calls for struggles by poor nations
against the rich. Expanding an idea long inherent
in Chinese policy, Teng explicitly placed the in-
dustrial nations of Europe and Japan in a special
category between the superpowers and the Third World,
pointing out that Europe is the focus of superpower
hegemony. He played down the "rich-vs-poor nation"
theme and focused instead on national control of
economies as an indispensable part of national sov-
ereignty. In endorsing the oil. weapon, Teng cau-
tioned that Third World unity must be preserved and
that equitable economic relations must be maintained
among the developing countries.
Apr 12 , 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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CHINA: The latest People's Daily editorial re-
iterates the call for a reasoned, controlled approach
to the anti-Lin, anti-Confucius campaign, but seem-
ingly unauthorized attacks on provincial leaders con-
tinue to spread.
Recent travelers have observed political wall
posters criticizing a number of provincial party lead-
ers, almost all of whom are military men. The most
recent observations add several names to the growing
list of leaders who have been attacked this year.
Four of the eight individuals involved in the rotation
of regional commanders last December have now been
censured in their former provincial bases. The post-
ers, which have been reported in at least six prov-
inces, apparently continue to violate Central Commit-
tee directives issued earlier this year against crit-
icism of individuals by name. Nonetheless, the impetus
for the poster attacks almost certainly comes from
elements in Peking.
The initial wave of poster attacks, like the
criticisms of two politically offensive operas, ap-
peared to be attempts by Chiang Ching, Mao's wife,
and her radical associates to reorient the course of
the anti-Lin, anti-Confucius campaign. The assaults
on provincial figures may now have broadened to the
point where both her allies and her opponents are
involved.
For the first time, the poster criticisms name
a ranking Peking leader who was the army's top polit-
ical commissar. Party Vice Chairman Li Te-sheng, who
was transferred to head the Shenyang Military Region,
was attacked as a follower of Lin Piao in Anhwei, Li's
bailiwick during the Cultural Revolution. Another first
is the reported criticism of Kiangsu Province leaders
by the leading mass organizations there--the trade
union federation, youth league, peasants' association,
and the like. A few attempts to pass the initiative
for criticism to former Red Guard groups do not seem
to have any steam behind them.
(continued)
Apr 12, 1974
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It is becoming more evident that as the anti-Lin,
anti-Confucius campaign progresses, elements in both
the provinces and Peking are striving for control of
the movement. Some posters in Kiangsu accuse provin-
cial leaders there of having arrested a number of
individuals for putting up wall posters, and the cur-
rent spate of attacks in that province may have been
triggered by this incident.
Posters in Fukien Province criticizing Han Hsien-
chu, the former boss of that province who was transferred
to northwest China at the end of last year, may have been
inspired by more authoritative elements than those re-
sponsible for the attacks on Li Te-sheng and other offi-
cials in east China. A recent article in the party
theoretical journal Red Fly, which seems to point: an
accusatory finger at Han, gives some official weight
to the charges against him. Han has not appeared pub-
licly in his new district since the beginning of the
year.
Political wounds inflicted during the Cultural
Revolution and its immediate aftermath are also being
reopened. An important theme raised in at least two
provinces concerns the so-called 516 Group, an ult.ra-
leftist organization that was the object of a nation-
wide investigation and purge between early 1970 and
the Lin crisis in September 1971. Leaders in Shantung
and Kiangsu are being accused of using the 516 inves-
tigation to purge the wrong persons. The political
left may have raised the 516 question as a means not
only to criticize provincial power-holders but also
to push for rehabilitation of extremists purged at the
end of the Cultural Revolution. Thus far this issue
seems to focus on internecine quarrels at the provin-
cial level, but the fact that it has been raised in
more than one province suggests that local malcontents
may have been encouraged by elements in Peking.
The question of rehabilitation, however, is a
double-edged sword. At both the national and provin-
cial levels, it has been used thus far to resurrect
party officials purged in the initial stages of the
Cultural Revolution--to the discomfiture of the polit-
ical left.
(continued)
Apr 12 , 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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The criticisms of provincial leaders are consis-
tent with an ongoing effort to reduce the political
power of the military, but they clearly involve much
more. The immediate issue of who is to hold political
power in the countryside is an integral part of the
power struggle in Peking, which includes criticisms
of the moderate policy line of the past few years.
This contest will have a important effect on the suc-
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AUSTRALIA: Nearly 95 percent of Australia's
wheat available for export this year has been committed.
Canberra now has less than 500,000 tons left from the
7.4 million tons available to the wheat board for com-
mercial export. An additional 225,000 tons have been
reserved for food aid.
Australia, the world's third largest wheat ex-
porter, has been able to supply its usual customers
but has little left for new ones. Egypt, Japan, and
China have purchased about 1 million tons each, and
other Asian countries accounted for most of the rest.
While world production of wheat is expected to
increase this year, the market is likely to remain
tight. World stocks are low and, as a result, local-
ized shortfalls will have to be met from current pro-
duction. Now that Australia is effectively out of the
wheat market until the next crop year, which begins
in December, buyers must s' to other major suppliers,
such as the US and Canada.
Spain-USSR: Madrid is negotiating with the USSR
for purchase of uranium-enrichment services worth more
than $200 million. If concluded, the deal would be
Moscow's largest enrichment arrangement with a Western
country. A contract is expected to be signed in mid-
April; delive i s would begin in 1978 and continue
through 1990.
Apr 12 , 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Top Secret
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