CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A026300190001-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
18
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
March 30, 2004
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 11, 1974
Content Type:
REPORT
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Central Intelligence Bulletin
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
Top Secret
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April 11, 1974
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April ,
Central Intelligence Bulletin
C~pNTENTS
ISRAEL: Mrs. Meir announces plans to resign.
(Page 1)
EGYPT-USSR: Moscow may have decided to suspend or
to slow down military shipments to Cairo as pressure
tactic. (Page 3)
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UK-NATO: London may reduce NATO corYtribution to
meet Labor Party pledges on defense spending.
(Page `6)
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USSR: New decree outlines broad program to develop
agriculture in non-black-soil zone. (Page 13)
CHINA: Canton Fair opens on April 15. (Page 15)
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NIGERIA: Government approaches both Western and
Communist suppliers for sophisticated military
equipment. (Page 17)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 19)
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ISRAEL: Prime Minister Meir's announced inten-
tion to resign probably reflects her belief that she
no longer commands the political supporea~e~e?sbera
to govern effectively. It does not app
play to force the badly divided Labor Alignment to
unite behind her.
Mrs. Meir stated that her decision yesterday to
resign is ~.rrevocable." Her Labor colleagues are
calling on11her to reconsider, but party leaders are
not at all optimistic that she wi11. She reportedly
would, however, continue to head a caretaker govern-
ment.
If she does resign, President Kat~ir, after con-
sultations with the political parties, can ask Mrs.
Meir or someone else, presumably from the Labor Align-
ment or the rightist Likud, to form a new cabinet, or?
the Knesset can vote to call new elections on a date
it specifies. Whatever happens, the instability and
uncertainty characterizing the domestic political scene
are :likely to continue for some timerocess?ofoachieving
even further the already difficult p
a Middle East peace settlement.
Labor Party leaders are already casting about
for a successor to Mrs. Meir who could keep the
Alignment together and form a new cabinet. Accord-
ing to press reports, party leaders believe that
Finance Minister Sapir--considered Labor'~oto~PrsPol-
itician and next in party influence only
Meir--is the logical choice to take ?xb~~.c and from
there are strong pressures from the p
within the Alignment for a completely neOVe~adhesh:ip,
preferably untainted by the controversy
government's conduct of the ware last C7ctober and
above internecine party strife. These pressures
tend to work against the old, traditional frontrun-
ners such as Sapir, and favor men like the popular
Yosef Almogi, former minister of labor and recently
elec~ffortsoover thefpastAseveraladaysetoskeephthe
~.ng
Alignment together.
Apr 11, 1974
Central Xntellfgence Bulletin
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Meanwhile, Likud leader Menahem Begin announced
that he will attempt to mobilize support-for the
formation of a cabinet of national unity. The Align-
ment, however, is highly unlikely to support such an
attempt, and Begin probably could not induce suffi-
cient defections from the Alignment to form a gov-
ernment on his own.
Most Labor Party leaders do not favor new elec-
tions, generally believing that no one in the party
stands to benefit from them. Should it prove impos-
sible to form a new cabinet under Labor's leadership,
the Alignment factions would appear to have no choice
but go to the polls once again. In that case, new
elections could take place within three months after
the Knesset voted to call for them.
Until the current polit:.ical crisis is resolved--
and this could take months---the outlook for break-
throughs in the Middle East peace negotiations is
dim. Although a caretaker government could still
pursue the negotiations, it would not be willing to
commit Israel to any binding arrangements beyond per-
haps an initial disengagement on the Syrian front
pending the formation of a xiew cabinet.
Apr 11, 19 7 4 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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EGYFT~-..USSR. Evidence is accumulating that. Mos-
cow may have decided to suspend ar to s:1ow down i.ts
m.i.:l.atary aid shipments to Cairo as a pressure tactic.
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An East European official has reported that de-
liveries were stopped in late March, and the deputy
Tass director in Cairo acknowledged to the US Embassy
on April. 9 that arms supplies had been "cut off. "'
The Soviet implied, however, that there is nothing
immutable about the Soviet decision.
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though Egyptian claims t a osco filling
prewar contracts have been familiar in recent months,
seaborne military deliveries have been maintained at
usual levelso
These reports could, however refer to a Moscow
decision to halt aid shipments at some future date--
after~ for instance deliveries under specific con-
tracts have been fulfilledo A cutoff of aid under
these circumstances would not be immediately detect-
able?
There have been indications over the past several
months that t:he Soviets might be using the level of
their military avid to ressure E t The E tiaras
have tom lamed
t at ov~et compensation
or war losses an the general level of military ai.d
a~?e far from adequateo In addition, the communique
following Sav.et F`ore.i.gn Minister Gromyko? s trip to
Cairo last month did not. mention militar aid
Apr 11, 19 7 4 Cent~ra~ I~el~/gents Billet{r~
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UK-NATO: London may reduce its contribution to
NATO to meet the Labor Party's pledge to reduce de-
fense spending.
Government sources report that in view of the
fact that only 10 percent of UK defense spending is
now allocated to non-European areas, the amount de-
voted to European defense will have to be reduced if
any significant cuts are to :be made. The sources
indicate that the UK intends to bring defense spend-
ing on NATO into line with that of its European
allies.
With the exception of the US, British defense
outlays represent a larger proportion of the gross
national product than those of .the other major NATO
countries. The Labor Party announced after the elec-
tion that it would attempt to reduce defense spending
from its present level of about 5.5 percent of the
GNP to about 3.5 percent. This would bring defense
spending in terms of the percentage of GNP into-line
with that of France, West Germany, and Italy.
Phe major cuts will occur in the 1977-.83 time
period, although some smaller cuts in current pro-
grams are anticipated. Reductions in defense spend-
ing will probably affect equipment modernization pro-
grams, rather than manpower levels. Programs that
may be delayed or even canceled include the European
Multirole Combat .Aircraft (MRCA), the improved Hawker
Siddeley Sea Harrier VISTOL aircraft, and a new small
aircraft carrier now under development.
The multirole aircraft appears to be the most
vulnerable to a cutback and may be canceled alto-
gether. This program contir.-ues to encounter delays,
rising costs, and technological difficulties.
E: o er wo consor ium
me ers invo ve in evelopment of the aircraft--Italy
and Germany--do not have a requirement for an air de-
fense version. The entire cost of develo went thus
would fall on Great Britain,.
Apr 11, 1974
Central Intell/genes Bulletin 6
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Non-Black-Soil Zone of the USSR
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USSR: The recent government decree on the de-
velopment of agriculture in the non-black-soil zone
of the Russian Republic during ].976-80 reveals a much
broader program than hinted at by General Secretary
Brezhnev in his Alma Ata speech last month. Although
land reclamation is described as the program's "basic
element," it will also include t:he application of more
agricultural chemicals, delivery of new machinery,
and the construction of livestock complexes, rural
housing and services, and roads.
The decree notes that the non-black-soil zone is
already an important producer oi: agricultural products,
but it contends that the region's "favorable natural
and economic conditions" are not being fully employed.
The new program, therefore, will concentrate on in-~
creasing crop yields and upgrading farm infrastructure,
rather than bringing completely new lands under cul.ti-
vation--as in the New Lands Program during the 1950s.
The raising of dairy and beef cattle will become
"the main sector of agriculture" in the zone. Priority
attention will also be given to growing grain, pota-
toes, vegetables, flax, sugar beets, and fodder crops.
The decree endorses organisational ref"orms in the
farm sector, especially the creation of inter-farm
organizations. It also resurrects the old plan to
move isolated settlers into larger state and collective
farms by offering them 15-year loans to build new
homes. Responsibility for administering the new pro-
gram is spread among numerous agencies, which will
further complicate the already confused organizational
structure of agriculture. Moreover, the decree seems
to mark an additional erosion of the authority of
Politburo member Polyanskiy's Ministry of Agriculture.
The leading role in implementing the decree wild
go 'to a newly created agency under the joint jurisdic-
tion of the USSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and
Water Resources and the RSFSR Council of Ministers.
Apr 11, 1974
Central Intelligence Bullet/ra 13
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A new RSFSR deputy premier--a former official in the
republic reclamation ministry--was named to supervise
the new agency at that level.
The US5R Ministry of Agriculture is given only
minor responsibilities,and the remainder of the work
is divided among some 25 other ministries, committees,
and organizations. In the past, responsibility for
coordinating their work at the national level would
have been Polyanslsiy's in his capacity as first deputy
premier. Since his demotion a year ago, no one has
been named to take over all of his former functions.
If the Soviets are able to sustain the coordinated
effort required by this program, large fluctuations
in farm output should be dampened. Increased produc-
tion in the non-black-soil zone would be particularly
valuable because this region is a food-deficit area.
Because the area is already heavily populated, the
new program will not need the huge influx of additional
workers that was re hired for the New Lands Frt~gram.
Apr 11, 1974
Centrnt Iratelligeruce Bulletin
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CHINA: Peking has built a new, four-story exhibit
hall to accommodate traders for the month-long Canton
Fair, opening on April 15. The new facilities will.
probably mean increased attendance and the transaction
of a greater volume of business. Total-contracts signed
during the fair last fall were estimated at $1.3 bil-
lion, up from about $1 billion at the spring fair in 1973.
Peking has taken pains to reassure ~areign busi-
nessmen that the current political controversies wall
not affect trade and thus far there have been no ad-
verse effects.
Prices for Chinese goods will remain high, keeping
pace with increasing world price levels, but the sharp
price boasts noted at the spring fair last year a.re un-
likely to be repeated. Peking is currently stressing
export sales to meet its growing impart bill. Foreign
buyers will probably find the Chinese more willing to
meet export requirements on styling, labeling, anti
.packaging. Spot shortages of some goods may force the
Chinese to ration sales among the many buyers.
The US contingent at the fair is likely to surpass
the 245 businessmen wha attended the fair last fall.
US imgorters will probably be pressed to increase their
purchases to redress the huge imbalance in Sino-US
trade. The Chinese incurred an 800-million trade def-
icit with the US last year.
Apr 11, 1974
Centr~sl inatell/gents Bullet{n 15
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NIGERIA: General Gowon's government is starting
to make its first major purchases of sophisticated
military equipment since the end, of the civil war in
January 1970. Both Western and Communist suppliers
are being approached, in keeping with Lagos' emphasis
on avoiding dependence on any one source.
Nigeria's military rulers have long had plans
to modernize the armed forces, the largest military
force in black Africa. The program envisions the
purchase with cash of such items as fighter and trans-
port aircraft, antiaircraft missiles, armored vehi-
cles, artillery, and communications equipment.
Growing oil revenues, which could reach $7.5
billion this year, now permit the government to pro-
cure expensive arms without damage to Nigeria's na-~
tional development plan. The military probably
wishes to get its arms program well launched in ad-
vance of 1976, the target date General Gowon has set
for returning Nigeria ~to civilian rule.
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w n is sc e u e a ma e is irs visa o oscow
next month and a MIG deal might be concluded then.
(continued)
Apr 11, 19 7 4 Central intelligence Btclletin 17
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e mi nary government appar-
en y con roues to harbor misgivings about the relia-
bility of the US as a source of supply because of
Washington?s refusal during the Nigerian civil war
to sell new arms to Nigeria or to supp:Ly ammunition
for weapons sold earlier. Moscow, on -the other hand,
provided Lagos with strong political and military
su ort, includin about 21 MIG-15 and -17 aircraft.
India-USSR: New Delhi has received another
Soviet-~ui3t petya-class frigate. The ship, the ns.nth
of this class to be supplied to India, has been as-
signed to the Western Naval Command at Bombay ~
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Afghanistan-USSR: Afghanistan received 16 more
MIG-17 -iet fighters frn?? the TTR~R nn M~rr+h ~~ ~,._
szs~af-5ovie~G~ s o arrive
in Afghanistan since mid-March. Their delivery brings
the total number of new:Ly arrived planes in Afghani--
stan's inventory to 36 and raises its inventory of
Apr 11, 1974
Central Intelligence Bullet{n
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