CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A026100030001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 4, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 30, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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JJ uary 30, 1974
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January 30, 1974
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
USSR - ARAB STATES: Moscow will probably have to
pay higher prices for Arab oil. (Page 1.)
USSR: Soviets have produced more heavy transport
aircraft than previously estimated. (Page 3)
BELGIUM: Parliament dissolved; new elections to
be held on March 10. (Page 4)
ICELAND: Foreign Minister proposes sweeping modi-
?ication in NATO-base agreement. (Page 5)
IRAN-UK: Iran has ordered additional Rapier mis-
siles and guidance equipment. (Page 7)
BULGARIA: Kaiser Industries concludes memorandum
of understanding on economic projects. (Page 8)
BOLIVIA: Confrontation with peasants continues.
(Page 9)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 11)
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USSR - ARAB STATES: Moscow will probably have
to pay considerably higher prices for Arab oil and
may scale down the amount it had planned to buy.
Soviet purchases would probably be on a barter basis
as in the past.
Earlier this month Iraq reportedly stopped
shipping crude oil purchased by the Soviets, pend-
ing settlement of a price dispute. Baghdad is
demanding that Moscow pay the same price now being
asked of Western customers--about $17 per barrel.
As a result, Soviet plans to obtain 400,000 barrels
per day of Iraqi oil during 1974--three times the
estimated 1973 level--may be in jeopardy. The USSR
had, been obtaining oil at relatively low prices un-
der barter arrangements.
Moscow is also facing price hikes from other
Arab oil producers. Soviet purchases of crude from
Libya apparently halted late last year when Tripoli
notified Moscow that it would not load Soviet tank-
ers unless Moscow paid higher prices. Syria has
refused to export to Hungary the oil remaining under
a 1973 .contract calling for a price of $5.50 per
barrel. Damascus is offering to deliver crude oil
this year for $18 per barrel, but Budapest is wait-
ing for the USSR and Bulgaria to conclude price
agreements with Syria.
Little of the oil purchased abroad by the USSR
is for its own use since it is self-sufficient in
crude oil; most of the oil it purchases is sent to
Eastern Europe. If Arab oil deliveries to the USSR
were substantially reduced, Moscow would probably
continue to provide most of Eastern Europe's needs
at the expense of exports to the West. Even if
sales to Western Europe decline, however, Moscow's
hard currency earnings would rise if sales were made
at the current high prices.
Jan 30, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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USSR:
in icates t e USSR
has produced more heavy transport aircraft than pre-
viously estimated.
The Soviets appear to be dissatisfied with the
supply capabilities of the AN-22, however, and may
not build the 100 initially indicated by Soviet press
releases. does not have the long-range
transport capabilities of the US C-5A. The C-5A can
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Jan 30, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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CBELGIUM: King Baudouin dissolved the Belgian
Parliament yesterday following the failure of Leo
Tindemans, leader of the Flemish wing of the Social
Christian Party, to form a new coalition. The So-
cialists, Belgium's second largest party, refused to
cooperate with Tindemans who then tried to form a
transitional government composed of his own Social
Christians, the Liberals, and three minor ethnic
parties, but he could not overcome opposition by the
French-speaking faction of his own party.
New elections will be held on March 10 and
will probably benefit the Socialists. They are hope-
ful of winning enough additional seats in Parliament
to allow them to form a two-party coalition with the
Social Christians. The Socialists will doubtless
try to capitalize on their championship of an ill-
fated joint Belgium-Iranian refinery venture that
was intended to bring economic revival to the coal
and steel area of eastern Wallonia. By appealing to
Wallonian dissatisfaction with the pace of industrial
expansion, the Socialists hope to strengthen their
position in the government, while laying the ground-
work for state intervention in the energy sector.
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Belgian positions on
EC are unlikely to be affected by election results.
In the meantime, Leburton's caretaker government will
send Minister of Foreign Affairs Van Elslande to the
Washington energy conference as planned. 25X1
Jan 30, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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ICELAND: Foreign Minister Agustsson outlined
a proposal for a modified NATO-base agreement, dur-
ing a televised panel discussion on January 25.
Agustsson proposed sweeping modifications in the base
agreement, which he admitted represented only a
"basis" for further negotiations with the US. Com-
merits by other Icelandic leaders suggest that the
groundwork for a compromise by the government parties
on an eventual agreement has been laid.
Agustsson's Progressive Party, the mainstay of
the three-party coalition, approved four main points
in the proposal:
--the US defense force should leave Iceland in
stages;
--US military aircraft would be allowed landing
rights at Keflavik;
--ground-support personnel and radar installa-
tions would remain; and
--a security force to guard the base would be
retained.
The other two partners in the government--the Liberal
Left Organization and the Communist People's Alliance
Party--are studying Agustsson's proposal.
The Foreign Minister cited his party's desire
for Iceland to remain in NATO as the reason for pro-
posing to allow the US to retain some of the facili-
ties at the base. He interpreted his proposal as
fulfilling Iceland's obligations in that regard.
Spokesmen of the other parties generally hedged
their comments regarding Agustsson's proposal, but
only Communist Party chairman Arnalds said he would
reject any plan that did not call for total with-
drawal of US forces. Nevertheless, Arnalds said he
realized that everything at the base could not be
"cleaned out" at once and interpreted the proposal
to mean that all forces would be removed eventually.
Jan 30, 1974
(continued)
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A recent editorial in the conservative newspaper
suggested that the Progressives were considering a
troop reduction of about 2,000 men, which would leave
the base with about 1,300. The same editorial, how-
ever, speculated that the Communists were unlikely
to allow more than 600 to remain. Both figures are
far below the personnel strength envisioned by US
negotiators.
When questioned about the timing of a final de-
cision on the proposal, Agustsson said only that he
hoped it would be soon. Communists and other left-
ists in the government are probably undecided about
their next move and may elect to engage in protracted
maneuvering or reject the proposal and bolt the gov-
ernment. At present, however, all Icelandic parties
are "studying" the proposal.
.Jan 30, 1974
Central Intelligence Bulletin 6
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IRAN-UK: Iran has ordered additional Rapier
missiles and associated guidance equipment valued at
$1.43 million from London. The order reportedly calls
for both optical- and radar-controlled versions of
the Rapier, and includes 34 Blind Fire radars.
An earlier accord, signed in 1970, called for
the construction of SAM sites and the delivery of
1,400 operational and 225 training missiles to begin
in 1973; it was valued at $112 million.
The British-built Rapier is a lightweight, highly
mobile surface-to-air missile intended for use against
high-speed, low-altitude targets. With the Blind
Fire radar, the Rapier has an all-weather capability.
This would greatly improve Iran's potential response
against nighttime, low-visibility attacks.
Jan 30, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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BULGARIA: On January 26, Kaiser Industries and
the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Trade concluded a
memorandum of understanding--which has no legal
standing--on industrial and economic cooperation.
The memorandum calls for Kaiser studies on a number
of high-priority projects, including a 12-million-
ton steel complex, a large cement plant, reconstruc-
tion of port facilities, and possibly an aluminum
combine. Kaiser estimates the potential value of
the projects at $5-$20 billion over a 20-year period.
The company will seek financing for the projects and
is willing to be repaid largely in products. Only
three days before, Kaiser signed a similar agree-
ment with Moscow.
Jan 30, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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C BOLIVIA: President Banzer has ordered troops
to break up roadblocks and clear angry farmworkers
from the roads near Cochabamba, but the army still
hopes to keep violence to a minimum. The farmwork-
ers yesterday seized a general sent by the govern-
ment to negotiate with them.
The government seems uncertain just whom to
blame for instigating the peasant protests. Banzer
has in the past fabricated conspiracies to justify
action against his opponents, but there may be some
truth in his charges this time. Each of the groups
ostensibly supporting the regime--the military, the
rightist Socialist Falange, and the National Revolu-
tionary Movement--is split internally, and all three
are concerned over the country's worsening economic
situation. Middle-ranking military officers contend
that the government is unwilling or unable to re-
solve the problem, and many of them sympathize with
the farmworkers. The order to break up the road-
blocks could intensify the military's dissatisfac-
tion with Banzer.
Banzer's assertion that there is an interna-
tional conspiracy against his government is far-
fetched. His active "foreign enemies" probably are
confined to Bolivian exiles residing in neighboring
countries.
Jan 30, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin 9
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USSR: The Soviets yesterday brought. back to
earth an unmanned Soyuz spacecraft, in orbit since
November 30. The 60-day flight was probably an
endurance test of the Soyuz capsule in preparation
for longer manned missions with a Salyut space
station. The longest flight of a single Soviet
spacecraft with men aboard was the 18-day Soyuz 9
mission in June 1970. Soyuz 11, launched in June
1971, remained in orbit longer, nearly 24 days, but
the spacecraft spent most of that time docked with
the Salyut 1 space station. The three Soyuz 11
cosmonauts perished when their spacecraft depres-
surized during deorbit.
*These items were prepared by CIA without consulta-
tion with the Departments of State and Defense.
Jan 30, 1974
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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