CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A025800080001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 13, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO25800080001-7 25X1
Top Secret
Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
c 204
13 December 1973
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO25800080001-7
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO25800080001-7
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO25800080001-7
 Approv
25X1
25X1
13 December 1973
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
ARAB STATES - ISRAEL: Sadat removes Shazli as chief
of staff. (Page 1)
UK: Energy situation worsens and labor strife
spreads. (Page 3)
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: The Nine remain divided over
the oil question. (Page 4)
25X1
VENEZUELA: President-elect Perez probably will not
introduce major shift in domestic or foreign policy.
(Page 7)
Yugoslav-Soviet Relations: (Page 8)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 14)
Appro4ed For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO25800980001-7
25X1
 25X1
Appro
C ARAB STATES ISRAEL: The Middle East News
Agency (MENA) reported from Cairo yesterday that
the.Egyptian Army has undergone a shakeup that has
removed chief of staff Shazli, the apparent master-
mind behind plans for the attack on 6 October. The
new chief of staff is General Gamasy, Egypt's chief
negotiator at the now-stalled disengagement talks
at Kilometer 101.
There have been indications that Shazli has
been at odds with Egypt's political leadership and
with War Minister Ismail over Egyptian strategy
during the war. Shazli has recently been the target
of increasing criticism for his failure to retain
the military initiative for Egypt after the success-
ful crossing of the Suez Canal. He apparently was
given a dressing down by President Sadat last week.
Gamasy, on the other hand, has won high marks for
his performance at the disengagement talks.
Among other new appointees are General Hassan
Juraydili as chief of operations, General Fuad Aziz
Ghali as commander of the Second Army, and General
Said Ahmad as commander of the Third Army. These
changes appear to be an effort to remove those pri-
marily responsible for the failure of Egyptian forces
to halt the Israeli penetration of the west bank of
the canal. Both of the new commanders were regi-
mental commanders who led the successful Egyptian
crossing of the Suez on 6 October.
The MENA dispatch notes that the replacements
are designed to reinforce the army command and "to
prepare for the coming stage with commands which are
scientifically and practically qualified for the
kind of war which these commands have witnessed re-
cently and which the Egyptian armed forces might
witness at any time."
0 Numerous cease-fire violations were reported
on both the Syrian and the Egyptian fronts yester-
day. Radio Damascus claimed that at least 20 Israeli 3
Approvo
Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
 25X1
Apprc
0080001-7
C casualties had resulted from "fierce fighting" that
included the use of artillery and tanks. Tel Aviv
acknowledged that Syrian forces had shelled Israeli
positions, but denied that it suffered any casualties.
25X1
Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A02580g080001-7
 25X1
25X1
Apfroved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A025800p80001-7
UK: Prime Minister Heath has asked for an exten-
sion of the month-old state of emergency in order to
deal with the worsening energy situation and the
spreading labor strife that are threatening Britain
with an economic crisis.
The executive committee of the coal miners' un-
ion will meet today to decide whether it will submit
to a vote of the union's membership its dispute with
the government over wage increases. If the issue is
put to a vote, the miners will decide whether to ac-
cept the government's offer or call for a strike.
Otherwise, the ban on overtime, which has cut coal
production by 30-40 percent, will continue.
The decision yesterday by one of the major rail-
road unions to ban overtime and Sunday work until it
receives a better wage offer will further weaken Brit-
.&in's energy situation. The limited amounts of coal
that are being produced will be more difficult to
transport because of the railroad slowdown. Indus-
try's energy reserves, already diminished by the oil
shortage, have been further depleted by the govern-
ment's orders to divert oil to power stations, where
electrical engineers are also engaged in a work slow-
down.
The government has exhausted the simple steps
it can take to conserve energy, and tougher measures
will be needed if labor slowdowns continue. Under
consideration are such measures as a shorter work-
week and a 25-percent cut in heating oil for homes,
factories, and offices. A 17-percent reduction in
aviation fuel deliveries has already been put into
effect.
Future economic forecasts are also gloomy. One
leading industrialist believes that the crisis could
triple unemployment in the next two months. Infla-
tionary pressures next year are expected to be the
most severe since 1945. The government will release
the November trade figures today and the exp ?a on
is that they will reflect a record deficit. 1 -1
Central Intelligence Bulletin 3
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0258000
25X1
25X1
 Ap
Droved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0258000800p
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: Leaders of the Nine are
still divided over the oil question. Their summit
meeting in Copenhagen on 14 and 15 December will
largely be judged on the degree of progress they make
toward resolution of this question. A lack of soli-
darity on this issue would tend to undercut the dec-
laration on a "European identity" that the summit
is expected to approve. It would also make more dif-
ficult the search for compromises on important com-
munity issues--such as regional and industrial
policies--that should be decided by the end of the
year.
The EC Commission, conscious of the growing un-
easiness over the oil crisis, will press for summit
endorsement of a number of measures that would be a
start toward the EC's long-delayed common energy
policy. These measures would empower the Commission
to collect information on oil movements within the
EC and to approve controls over them. The Commission
also wants an EC oil-sharing arrangement, coordinated
conservation measures, and harmonization of oil price
controls.
The Dutch, Germans, and Danes will probably sup-
port these and other measures as a demonstration of
EC solidarity. The French, however, have opposed
oil-sharing and share British fears of offending the
Arabs by any open and formal EC oil measures. In-
stead, Paris may seek summit endorsement of restric-
tions on the power of the international oil companies
and of French plans for development of a European
uranium-enrichment capability.
The British also prefer to focus on long-term
measures, on ways to avoid more severe production
cuts, and on measures to assure EC access to Arab
oil in the future. The British and others may urge
the summit to support the-idea of European-Arab meet-
ings to discuss producer-consumer cooperation. The
French have again recently called on the EC to or-
ganize such cooperation even though Paris, as well
as other members, is bargaining individually with
Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0258000P0001-7
 25X1
25X1
App
Arab oil producers. Six.Arab foreign ministers are
slated to be in Copenhagen during the summit, pre-
sumably to "monitor" European attitudes toward the
Middle East. A Danish official, however, doubts
that the EC foreign ministers--who will also be in
Copenhagen--will meet with the Arabs as a group.
In addition to the urgent oil problem, European
defense cooperation is likely to receive attention
during the private talks. Given the political com-
plexity of the subject, the discussion probably will
not go beyond a preliminary exchange of views, but
even this would be the first discussion of defense
by all nine leaders meeting together. France's re-
cent initiatives on accelerating European defense
cooperation have been in vague terms, but the gen-
erally positive reactions from Bonn may add serious-
ness to the exchange in Copenhagen.
No matter how limited the progress the summit
may make on economic integration issues, the Nine
are likely to announce their intention to step up
political consultations. Despite continued reserva-
tions among some of the Nine about the potentially
damaging effect of summitry on EC institutions, the
leaders will probably endorse more frequent sessions
at the top as well as more effective "crisis pro-
cedures" among the Nine.
Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1 Approlved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO25800
25X1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO25800080001-7
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO25800080001-7
 AOproved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO2580OQ80001-7
VENEZUELA: Carlos Andres Perez' landslide vic-
tory in the presidential election is not likely to
result in a major shift in domestic or foreign poli-
cies. He is expected to continue his predecessor's
firm nationalistic stance on economic matters, partic-
ularly the complex petroleum problem.
Perez will press to advance the date of the take-
over of US and other foreign petroleum concessions,
now scheduled to begin in 1983, but he will also try
to attract new private investment to join with state
enterprises in developing the country's vast unex-
ploited energy resources.
Perez' basic pragmatism and lack of ideological
restraints indicate that he will be a hard but prac-
tical bargainer in dealing with the US and the oil
companies on energy. More specific indications of
his policy toward the US will be in his choice of
persons to handle oil matters and in his willingness
to move forward on a long-term agreement to provide
the US with a guaranteed supply of petroleum in re-
turn for access to US markets for Venezuela's non-oil
exports.
In his first press conference as president-elect,
Perez stated that his administration would not be in-
fluenced by US or other foreign oil companies. While
offering friendship to Washington, he made it clear
that he would use petroleum resources as a lever to
get better treatment for his country. Although Perez
is believed to support conservation measures in oil
production, he has not called for a cutback.
Perez' victory over the governing Social Chris-
tian Party apparently has also carried his Democratic
Action Party to majority control of the legislature,
an unprecedented event in Venezuela. The strong vote
of confidence for the moderately nationalistic poli-
cies of both major parties--they received about 85
percent of the presidential votes cast--points to the
possible emergence of a two-party system and increas-
ing political stability for the country.
Central Intelligence Bulletin 7
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A025800g80001-7
 App
Yugoslav-Soviet Relations
Yugoslav relations with the Soviet union are
better than at any time since the Arab-Israeli war
in 1967. The slow forward movement began in 1971,
gained new impetus during the recent Middle East
war, and was further demonstrated during the Tito-
Brezhnev talks in Kiev in mid-November.
25X1
The Road to Kiev
At the beginning of the 1970s, Belgrade's for-
eign policy was still deeply influenced by what hap-
pened to Prague in 1968 and by attendant fears of a
Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia. Relations with Moscow
and its loyal East European allies had gone sour and
Belgrade's fervor for nonalignment had waned. In the
Communist movement, the Yugoslavs were cultivating
ties with mavericks like China and Romania, who were
prominent in their defiance of the CPSU. On the
other hand, relations with Western Europe and the US
had prospered, both in reaction to the Soviet threat
and in the hope that ties to the West would bring
economic improvements at home.
By 1971, however, Tito perceived that there could
be serious drawbacks in leaning too far to the West.
(continued)
13 Dec 73 Central Intelligence Bulletin
Appr
- 0001-7 25X1
1 1. A 1, 7777 ve or Release ZUU4101"7019 71
 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO25800Q80001-7
--Premature attempts to decentralize and liber-
alize the party and government precipitated a
crisis of nationalism in Croatia.
--Economic ties to the West created large debts
to Western creditors without ensuring adequate
development of the Yugoslav industrial base.
Moreover, the strategic advantages of the West-
ward tilt began to erode as the mood of European
politics shifted toward detente. As Brezhnev increas-
ingly touted his friendly ties with the rest of Eu-
rope and the United States, Tito saw less reason to
maintain his anti-Soviet line. More important, per-
haps, the new atmosphere gave Tito an opportunity to
repair an old breach with the Kremlin in time to win
Moscow's good graces for his successors. His meeting
with Brezhnev in Belgrade in September 1971 set in
train a series of political contacts and expanding
economic ties that were to become the core of the
new relationship.
At the same time, US-Yugoslav relations visibly
worsened as Tito tightened internal discipline, and
as he attempted to revive the moribund nonaligned
movement with himself at its head.
When the Middle East war started, Tito immedi-
ately proclaimed full support for the Arabs--his
principal partners in nonalignment--thus placing
Yugoslavia on the same side with the USSR in an in-
ternational crisis. Belgrade granted over-flight
rights for the Soviet airlift, and began to produce
vehement anti-Israeli propaganda.
Throughout the war Tito promised "all-round"
support to his Arab allies, and there is good evi-
dence that this involved shipments of military goods
that included:
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Ap roved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO2580 080001-7
 Ap roved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79TO0975A025800 80001-7
--mortars and ammunition, and
--trucks, mobile artillery, and tanks.
Tito's generosity was designed not to curry favor
with the Soviets, but to shore up his waning author-
ity in the nonaligned movement, the leadership of
which of had been largely seized by the Arabs at the
nonaligned summit a month earlier. The Soviets, how-
ever, were delighted with Tito's actions and invited
him to meet with Brezhnev in Kiev.
What Tito Got at Kiev
At the end of the visit, Tito signed a warmly,
worded communique describing his talks with Brezhnev
in terms of "trust and confidence." He also dropped
standard Yugoslav demands for wording on national
sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs.
This basic change in atmospherics undoubtedly had
strong underpinnings in the form of agreements on
important political and economic issues. The commu-
nique prominently referred to improved prospects for
political cooperation. A later commentary in Pravda
stressed the similarity of "socio-economic structures
as a stable basis for long-term comprehensive coopera-
tion." Top Soviet and. Yugoslav officials, however,
have been discreetly noncommittal about what tran-
spired.
Moscow reiterated the
pledge contained in the elgrade declaration
that the Soviets would conduct relations on the basis
of complete equality. Combining this renewed pledge
with Tito's statements of "trust and confidence" in
the Soviet leadership may portend increased party con-
tacts in bilateral and multi-party forums.
From Belgrade's point of view, the prospects of
long-term economic cooperation are probably more im-
portant. Moscow had extended Belgrade a $540-million
credit in 1972, and two months ago promised to build
13 Dec 73 Central Intelligence Bulletin
Appr ved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79TO0975A025 00080001-7
 Appro ed For Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP79T00975A0258 0080001-7
a gas pipeline to northern Yugoslavia. The Kiev dis-
cussions indicate a continuing willingness on the
part of the Kremlin to make solid investments in
Yugoslavia.
A New Arms Deal?
Tito probably has requested the resupply and
modernization of the Yugoslav armed forces with So-
viet weapons. The arms Tito sent the Arabs--although
largely obsolete--must have cut deeply into the Yugo-
slav arsenal. Moscow is Yugoslavia's prime supplier
of sophisticated weapons, and Tito may have tried to
capitalize on Belgrade's military aid to the Arabs in
order to present a shopping list to Brezhnev.
Subsequent to the Kiev meeting, vice President
Ribicic admitted on television that Yugoslavia sent
arms to the Arabs and stated that Belgrade would
modernize its armed forces and buy some equipment
abroad. He also said the country would export more
of its small arms production to the Third World--
read Arabs--to defray costs of major new purchases.
If the Soviets do agree to replace Belgrade's
arms losses with modern weapons, the gesture could
allay any residual fears Tito may have about a So-
viet invasion. For his own part, Tito may well have
decided to seek arms in the most accessible market
open to him, that is, a barter exchange market.
The Effects of Kiev
Improved ties with Moscow necessitate several
Yugoslav concessions. Belgrade already plans to back
away from its traditional support of China in defer-
ence to Kremlin sensitivities. In addition, Belgrade
may now begin to mute differences with Moscow on in-
ternational issues, like MBFR, in which Yugoslavia
has an interest but no real influence. This changed
attitude toward the Soviet Union probably will be
detrimental to Yugoslavia's traditional role in the
world Communist movement and in the international
community.
(continued)
13 Dec 73 Central Intelligence Bulletin
Appr ved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0258 080001-7
 Ap roved For Release 2004/07/08 m - 00080001-7
One effect could be a further downturn in rela-
tions with Romania. President Ceausescu, who has
long regarded Tito as both a friend and a fellow
maverick in the Communist movement, is already angry.
During the Middle East war, the Yugoslavs and Roma-
nians competed for a prominent role in finding a
settlement. At the UN, the Yugoslavs were vociferous
in helping to frustrate Romania's offer of troops to
the UNEF. The Yugoslav shift on the Sino-Soviet dis-
pute will add to Ceausescu's anger.
In the long run, if differences between Belgrade
and Bucharest multiply and affect the shared basic
principles that have shaped their relations with
Moscow, it could prove most damaging, for Ceausescu
would become increasingly isolated. His independent
stance in Eastern Europe thus would become more vul-
nerable.
Belgrade can also expect to hear from other Com-
munist parties that have been active in opposing Mos-
cow's attempts to dominate the movement. Certainly
Peking will register its displeasure, as will the
Albanians and the Italian Communists.
Belgrade's generally good relations with Western
Europe have not yet been affected, though some dete-
rioration is possible. Tito will, however, be care-
ful not to rock the boat, both because he wants Yugo-
slavia to play a full :role in European detente and
because of his country's overwhelming economic de-
pendence on Western trade and credits.
Relations with Washington, which have already
slipped from the highpoint achieved in 1970-1971,
are evidently in for more rough sledding. Disagree-
ments over the Middle East have contributed to this
decline, but these alone do not justify the frequently
vitriolic anti-US propaganda in the Yugoslav media.
Such propaganda instead appears to reflect Tito's
desire to distract attention from internal problems
and to win influence over the more radical countries
in the nonaligned movement which dominated the Algiers
summit in September. In order to achieve this goal,
13 Dec 73 Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approived For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A025800080001-7
 25X1
Appro
Tito is paying lively lip service to the "imperialist
conspiracy" line that is common to Third World radi-
cals. In Kiev, Brezhnev also played on this theme
by linking the Allende coup and the Middle East war
as parts of the plot.
Independence versus Collaboration
If there is any single factor that has motivated
Tito's swing toward Moscow, it is his constant search
for those policies that will ensure Yugoslavia's in-
dependence after he is gone. This was true of his
earlier orientation toward the West and of his striv-
ings to make nonalignment a viable world force. In
essence, he currently sees more to gain from Moscow
than from the West.
There are limits to his cooperation with the
Soviets, however. He will not, for example, permit
any kind of formal ties that would even appear to
undermine his independence. He will also avoid re-
strictive relationships with CEMA that would pre-
clude Belgrade's continued relationship with the Com-
mon Market.
At least for the foreseeable future, Tito will
work more closely with Moscow, but within the frame-
work of detente, and only so long as he believes the
Kremlin's avowals that it is dedicated to the peace-
ful settlement of major European problems. Should
Moscow undertake any action that seems to threaten
detente, the Yugoslavs would immediately backpedal
toward the West. Similarly, if Moscow becomes
overly confident of its influence and begins to med-
dle in Yugoslav internal affairs, Tito will be quick
to react negatively.
13 Dec 73 Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO2580p080001-7
 25X1
25X1
Apprved For Release 2004/07/08 - CIA-RDP79T00975A0258
Israel: A British flag tanker, under charter to
Israel, arrived at the Mediterranean port of Ashquelon
on 10 December with 160,000 metric tons of Iranian
crude oil, the first such shipment received since
early October. The ship was originally scheduled to
go to Elat, but instead was ordered to proceed to Is-
rael via the Mediterranean when it was learned that
the ship would lose its insurance coverage if it were
used to test the Egyptian blockade of the Red Sea.
25X1
(continued)
Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1 Appro ed For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A02 800080001-7
 25X1
Appr
some way from conclusion.
Japan-China: The basic trade agreement initialed
on 12 December in Peking is the first pact negotiated
by the two countries since normalization of relations
late last year. The pace of improving relations has
been deliberate; three other commercial agreements
envisaged when diplomatic relations were established,
and which impinge on Japan-Taiwan contacts, are still
'These items were prepared by CIA without consultation
with the Departments of State and Defense.
Central Intelligence Bulletin 15
25X1
25X1 Approled For Release 2004101108 m -
 25X1
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO25800080001-7
Top Secret
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO25800080001-7