CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A025200090001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 12, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Department review completed
Top Secret
2?
C
12 September 1973
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Central Intelligence Bulletin
CHILE: Junta moves to restore calm following
Allende ouster. (Page 1.)
WEST GERMANY - USSR: Bilateral talks will concern
West Berlin. (Page 3)
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: Nixon Round of multilateral
trade negotiations begins today in Tokyo. (Page 5)
NONALIGNED CONFERENCE: Conference mainly a forum
for airing grievances against richer nations.
(Page 6)
JAPAN-USSR: Prime Minister Tanaka talks tough prior
to Moscow trip. (Page 8)
THAILAND: New army commander in chief named.
(Page 9)
INDONESIA: Agreement to provide liquefied natural
gas to US utility. (Page 10)
WEST GERMANY: Bonn outlines position on interna-
tional monetary reform. (Page 11)
INDIA: Search for wheat: imports continues. (Page 12)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 13)
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CCHILE: The armed forces, in well-organized and
well-coordinated attacks, ousted the Allende govern-
ment yesterday. Military determination was evident
in the bombing of the presidential palace soon after
Allende defied the ultimatum to resign. The junta
is taking precautions not to be blamed for Allende's
death, the cause of which is still unconfirmed,
and is arranging for a private family burial in his
native Valparaiso today.
The three services and the national police
quickly took over communications, utilities, and
other centers of control. A series of firm, reassur-
ing public announcements reveal careful planning to
restore calm quickly. Military raids on factories
held by armed workers deterred any strong leftist
reaction.
There was extensive sniper fire against troops
during the attack on the palace. Reports of fight-
ing in slum areas indicate that some Allende support-
ers do not intend to give up without a fight. Ad-
ministration supporters were apparently taken by
surprise, however, and may lie low until chances for
retaliation are better. Claims that key Allende
backers are dead could arouse their followers,
The three military members of the junta only
recently assumed command of their respective serv-
ices, replacing chiefs ousted for various reasons.
They are all respected and experienced leaders.
The acting police chief, who is the fourth member,
has much closer relationships with the military
than most top carabinero officers.
The presidency of the junta reportedly will
rotate among the three armed service chiefs, who
will govern for the present with advice from civil-
ians. The junta leaders' first order of business
is to restore public and economic order out of a
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chaotic situation. They have declared Congress in
recess. The junta reportedly has well-developed
plans for some political reforms. These reflect
closer ties with the business and professional guild
leaders responsible for recent shutdowns than with
opposition political party leaders.
The only strong reaction thus far from other
Latin American countries is the Castro government's
charge that its embassy and a Cuban ship leaving
Valparaiso were attacked by the Chilean military.
The junta has announced that it would break rela-
tions with Havana.
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WEST GERMANY - USSR: West German and Soviet
officials reportedly intend to begin discussions
later this month on how to interpret the Quadri-
partite Agreement on Berlin.
West German Special. Minister Egon Bahr on 6
September restated Bonn's contention that progress
in the deadlocked negotiations with several East
European states depends on reaching an understand-
ing with Moscow on the Berlin agreement. Bonn's
negotiations to establish diplomatic relations with
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria are stalled
over the issue of whether West Germany can represent
the interests of West Berlin institutions. A Soviet
representative in effect admitted to the West Ger-
mans that Moscow has instructed the East Europeans
not to give in on this issue.
Bahr stated that he will begin negotiations
with Soviet Ambassador Falin, when the latter re-
turns to Bonn later this month. A senior Foreign
Office official said last week that Foreign Minister
Scheel might also discuss the Berlin issue with
Foreign Minister Gromyko at the UN General Assembly.
Soviet officials, including Deputy Foreign Min-
ister Kuznetsov, reportedly had suggested to West
German representatives earlier that the scope of
the bilateral negotiations be broadened to include
other problems that are vexing Soviet - West German
relations. It is possible that the Soviets may
only wish to use the meetings to complain about al-
leged West German violations of the Quadripartite
Agreement. If they are willing to discuss imple-
mentation of the agreement with Bonn directly, how-
ever, this would signal a change in Soviet tactics.
Moscow previously has been reluctant to discuss
Berlin-related matters with Bonn officials, on
grounds that Berlin is a political entity independ-
ent of West Germany.
(continued)
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The revelation of Bonn's plans by Bahr and the
Foreign Office representative is in part an attempt
to pressure the Western Allies to intervene with
Moscow. Earlier requests by the Foreign Office
that the Allies approach Moscow were turned down
as premature. Bahr last week bluntly remarked that
since the Allies are not willing to talk to Mos-
cow, he will do so himself.
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INTERNATIONAL TRADE: The "Nixon Round" of
multilateral trade talks begins today in Tokyo. At
the conclusion of the ministerial meeting, a trade
negotiation committee will be established to organ-
ize the negotiations, which will probably last about
two years.
Two major problems remain to be resolved: the
nature of the link between trade and monetary reform.,
and treatment of the developing countries, including
the special needs of the least developed among them.
The EC, especially France, wants progress in trade
negotiations to be contingent upon parallel progress
in the negotiations on monetary reform. The US is
pressing for earlier progress on trade reform. The
Japanese are actively attempting to reconcile EC and
US views, but a compromise may not occur until late
in the meeting.
The developing countries are attempting to pre-
sent a united front seeking more favorable treatment,
but differences between them are substantial and
have widened in recent weeks. The major conflict
concerns Latin American opposition to an African
proposal for special treatment for the least de-
veloped of the developing countries. Most develop-
ing countries, although concerned that their inter-
ests will not be adequately advanced, support the
thrust of the draft declaration. Some of the more
militant will, however, press for changes in the
declaration to have it more fully reflect developing
country aspirations.
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NONALIGNED CONFERENCE: The Fourth Summit. Con-
ference of Nonaligned Nations served primarily as a
forum for airing the resentment and grievances of
the poor and weak countries against the rich and
strong. The assembled nonaligned leaders failed to
agree on a clearly defined new role for nonalignment
or to set up a permanent. secretariat to make their
collective views heard more effectively by the great
powers. Nevertheless, the Algiers meeting did focus
international attention for a time on numerous third-
world concerns that will. come up again at the UN and
other international gatherings.
With representatives of more than 70 countries
in attendance, including 52 heads of state or govern-
ment, the Algiers meeting was the largest of the
four summits held since 1961. Prince Sihanouk's
delegation and one from the Provisional Revolutionary
Government of South Vietnam-were seated as full mem-
bers. The conference was extended for one day to
allow.all the delegates and observers who wished to
speak a chance to air their views.
The 20 resolutions and two declarations adopted
in Algiers largely repeated the work of previous
summits. The Middle East resolution was watered
down, but it did call upon nonaligned states to work
on measures for a comprehensive boycott of Israel.
In addition to belaboring the US on Israel and Indo-
china, the nonaligned delegates supported independ-
ence for Puerto Rico and the Panamanian claim of sover-
eignty over the Canal Zone.
The Algiers conference provided losses as well
as gains for some leaders. In blasting the US,
Fidel Castro denounced as divisive counterrevolu-
tionaries those who argue that the "imperialism" of
the USSR equals that of the US. Libyan President
.Qadhafi walked out during the speech and later
castigated Castro as aligned. Prince Sihanouk also
challenged Castro's description of the USSR as a
friend of the nonaligned. In. the end, Castro re-
couped some of his losses by breaking relations with
Israel.
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The USSR lost some ground among the nonaligned
nations because of Castro's overdone tribute and
because of the heavy-handed tactics revealed by the
publication of a letter Moscow sent Algerian Presi-
dent Boumediene on the eve of the conference. Most
of the delegates appeared to lump the USSR along with
the US as rich, powerful, and menacing. By remain-
ing quiet and unobtrusive, the Chinese and their
views about big-power hegemony gained ground.
Algerian leaders are probably satisfied with
the results of the conference, which launched Boume-
diene as a nonaligned leader. He will appear before
the UN General Assembly this fall to present the
conference resolutions. Although disappointed by
the failure to form a permanent secretariat, the
Algerians will make the most of the 15-member coor-
dinating committee to establish Algiers as the non-
aligned capital until the next summit in Sri Lanka
in 1976.
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JAPAN-USSR: Prime Minister Tanaka has signaled
that he will adopt a tough negotiating position dur-
ing his visit to Moscow early next month. The Tokyo
press quotes him as warning the Soviets that progress
must be made on the Northern Territories issue if the
summit is to be a success and economic pacts are to
be signed.
The Prime Minister's tough stand may be intended
in part to prod the USSR to be more forthcoming in
the current negotiations on an agenda for Tanaka's
visit. The Soviets have so far refused to agree
that Brezhnev will even discuss the Northern Terri-
tories.
Soviet occupation of four islands north of Hok-
kaido since the closing days of World War II is
bitterly resented by the Japanese. The Northern
Territories question has been especially prickly
since the US returned Okinawa in 1972, and the gov-
ernment has kept the issue constantly before the
Japanese public. Tanaka's suggestion that he might
return from Moscow "empty handed" prepares domestic
opinion in advance for what might, in any event,
have been an unsuccessful effort at summitry.
Tanaka's position also probably reflects some
Japanese disenchantment with the prospects for Japa-
nese participation in Siberian economic development
opportunities. After months of on-again off-again
discussions on building a pipeline for the Tyumen
oil project, a Soviet Foreign Trade official re-
cently told Japanese officials only 25 million tons
of oil would be available per year; not 40 million
tons as the Japanese had expected.
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THAILAND: A major reshuffle in the leadership
of the armed forces has further strengthened the
position of General Krit Sivara, who has replaced
Field Marshal Praphat as army commander in chief.
Until now, Praphat has been reluctant to turn
over direct command of the army, especially since he
and Krit have never been particularly close. The
top Thai leader, Prime Minister Thanom, probably
prevailed upon Praphat to change his mind. Thanom
and Praphat apparently agreed that Krit has suffi-
cient seasoning to handle the greater responsibili-
ties that go with the army command and that, as a
loyal member of the original 1957 coup group, he
is suited to take over this politically sensitive job.
The major casualty is Thanom's politically ambi-
tious son, Colonel Narong.
it is unlikely that he will
take any overt action against Krit.
A number of loose ends remain to be sorted out.
Prime Minister Thanom may step down from the largely
honorific position as supreme commander in favor of
Praphat. Thanom and Praphat, however, evidently
will retain their positions as prime minister and
deputy prime minister, respectively. Krit's promo-
tion also opens up more room at the top, which
should ease the growing unrest among senior officers
for advancement.
Krit's rise is a tentative step toward solving
the nettlesome problem of political succession in a
country that lacks the constitutional framework for
an orderly transfer of power. Thanom and Praphat
may believe that Narong, in his late thirties, is
ill-prepared to assume the leadership should need
for a successor arise in the next few years. While
it is far from a foregone conclusion that Krit is
the designated heir-apparent to the Thanom-Praphat
regime, he is now clearly the front runner.
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Indonesian Natural Gas to U.S.
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INDONESIA- Pertamina, the state-owned oil and
gas company, has contracted to provide liquefied
natural gas to a US utility over a 20-year period.
Deliveries to Pacific Lighting Corporation are sched-
uled to start in 1978 at a rate of 180 million cubic
feet per day, increasing to 550 million cubic feet
per day by 1980.
The Pacific contract will add over $100 million
annually to Indonesia's export earnings beginning in
1980. To supply the gas, Indonesia plans to con-
struct liquefaction facilities at fields in Kalimantan
and North Sumatra at a cost of at least $700 million.
Pacific will draw all of its Indonesian supplies
from the latter facility.
Prior to the signing of this contract, Japanese
interests had been attempting to acquire rights to
the entire output from both fields. Tokyo will now
have to settle for only a little more than half.
Japanese purchases would add at least $100 million
more a year to Indonesian export earnings beginning
in 1980.
With proven reserves and firm sales agreements,
Pertamina foresees little difficulty in raising
capital for construction of the facilities. The
US Export-Import Bank has approved a preliminary
commitment for a loan to finance a portion of the
North Sumatra facility. Japan will probably extend
credit to finance the remainder of this plant and
the entire Kalimantan plant.
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WEST GERMANY: In a wide-ranging discussion
with US Ambassador Hillenbrand last Monday, Bonn's
Finance Ministry State Secretary Poehl outlined
Bonn's position in the upcoming meeting in Nairobi
on international monetary reform.
Pointing to the sharp increases in German re-
serves that have accompanied past currency crises,
Poehl reiterated Bonn's opposition to a system
whereby pressure, such as a penalty on excess re-
serves, would automatically be applied to countries
reporting large surpluses. He stressed that penal-
ties against such countries should be considered on
an individual basis by an international group.
Poehl also stated that Germany feels "very strongly"
that the new system should allow countries to decide
for themselves to float their currencies when neces-
sary. Criticizing the format of the ministerial
meeting as unwieldly, Poehl suggested that a draft-
ing group of five or six be formed after the Nairobi
meeting.
Poehl also expressed the fear that political
pressures could force the UK and Italy to rejoin the
joint float in the "not too distant future"--a move
which would make the float far less stable. French
insistence on the UK's re-entry as a prerequisite
for EC regional aid payments could lead London to
make such a decision. Bonn remains unwilling to
provide the monetary support necessary to defend
the pound.
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INDIA: After purchasing about 1.8 million tons
of wheat and sorghum during June and July from the
US and Argentina, the Indians have directed their
recent efforts to other markets. Last week, the
Indians approached Australia for 1 million tons of
wheat "as soon as possible." No agreement has been
reached. The Australians, hesitant to commit wheat
exports at this time, cannot in any event deliver
before February. Canada reportedly has agreed to
sell up to 1 million tons of wheat, but only 250,000
tons will arrive before India's major rice harvest
in November. Current stocks and scheduled imports
will allow India to squeeze through the pre-harvest
period. Imports after this time will be used to re-
build the government's drought-depleted stocks.
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USSR: Soviet jamming of VOA, BBC, and Deutsche
Welle radiobroadcasts in Russian ceased on 10 and 11
September. Jamming of VOA broadcasts in Ukrainian,
Georgian, Armenian, and Uzbek reportedly also stopped.
Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe are apparently
still being jammed. This interruption is the first
since the Soviets reinstituted jamming of foreign
broadcasts at the time of the invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia. This action may be intended to reduce for-
eign pressures on the USSR on the eve of the re-
sumption next week of CSCE talks, which will consider
freer movement of ideas, and in the face of protests
in support of dissidents Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn.
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Ecuador: Quito reportedly is considering an
increase in the tax reference price of oil from the
present $3.60 to $5.00 a barrel. This higher price
is in line with the selling price of Ecuador's
royalty petroleum in a recent deal between Quito
and a Swiss firm.
Afghanistan-USSR: President Daud's brother
and confidant, Naim Khan, arrived in the Soviet
Union on 10 September. Afghan officials state that
he expects to see Brezhnev and Kosygin, but the
purpose of the sudden trip remains a matter of spec-
ulation in Kabul.
"These items were prepared by CIA without consulta-
tion with the Departments of State and Defense.
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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