CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A025000080001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 9, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Department review completed
Top Secret
9 August 1973
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August
entral Intelligence Bulletin
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CHINA: Role of military in olitics to be a major
issue at 10th Party Congress . (Page 4)
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CHILE: President
the inclusion of
this morning. page 8)
INDONESIA: Suation calm, but scurity precautions
remain in eft- ct. (Page 9)
JAPAN-INDONESIA: Economic aid to Incesia contains
generous l an terms. (Page 10)
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Veteran 48
Current total,
July 1973 178
Civilian 79
New 16 Veteran 63
Civilian 28
Veteran 24
New 4
Military 11
Unknown 18
Total promotions since formation 13
Civilian 10
Veteran 9
New 1
Military 3
Unknown 0
Total purged, absent since January 1, 1973 or demoted 28
Civilian 6
Veteran 4
New 2
Composition of Provincial Party Committees
Original total at formation,
September 1971 158
Civilian 65
New 17 \, , \c
Appro
Military 19
Unknown 3
*Veteran cadre are cadre who held a party or government position
prior to the Cultural Revolution
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CHINA: The role of the military in Chinese
politics is one of the major issues confronting the
Peking regime as it prepares for the 10th Party
Congress. Although the number of civilians on pro-
vincial party committees is growing, senior military
officers still retain considerable power in the
provinces.
The provincial party committees formed in late
1970 and 1971 reflected the military's dominant
position in provincial politics as a consequence.
of the Cultural Revolution. Beginning with and
spurred by the Lin Piao incident of September 1971,
Peking moved to reduce the military's influence in
these organizations by purging some military men
and enlarging the committees through the addition
of civilians. In September 1971 the military had
a three-to-two advantage; now civilian representa-
tion is about equal to the military in absolute
numbers. On the other hand, senior military offi-
cials still hold at least one of the two top spots
in all but three of China's provinces and independ-
ent municipalities.
It is mostly the second-level civilian veterans
who are returning--individuals who served in posi-
tions just below the top provincial and regional
posts prior to the Cultural Revolution. These men
were largely former provincial party secretaries
and vice governors, and many have had expertise in
rural matters; all are experienced administrators
capable of contributing to the resolution of China's
agricultural problems and to the drive to rebuild
party organizations.
Most of the former top men in provincial poli-
tics--pre - Cultural Revolution regional party bosses
and provincial party first secretaries--have not yet
been rehabilitated. Unlike the civilians already
returned, these men were contenders for national
political power; them: rehabilitation undoubted)
is now beina discussed.
9 Aug 73
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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E: ,President Allende apparently hopes
that his inclusion of the military in his new cabi-
net will end strikes and coup plotting.
After several days of growing tension, Allende,
according to a government communique, will announce
this morning that the armed forces chiefs are join-
ing the cabinet. This move is likely tput serious
stress on his Popular Unity coalition.
Previously, the National Party had introduced
in Congress a legally questionable proposal to re-
move the President from office. The Christian Dem-
ocrats are casting around for a new opposition
policy. In the meantime, they are accusing high-
level Cuban visitors of intervention.
The truckers' strike, now in its third week,
is causing serious but not crippling shortages.
Scattered strikes by bus and taxi owners and drivers,
doctors, and copper technicians have been only par-
tially effective thus far. Other groups are weigh-
ing the risks of shutting down, but are deterred
by recollection of the government's harsh economic
retaliation after the protest strike last October.
CA sharp rise in terrorist incidents probably was a
major factor in Allende's incor oration of the
military into the cabinet.
9 Aug 73
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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INDONESIA: The situation remains calm in the
wake of last weekend's anti-Chinese riots in Bandung,
but the government is maintaining security precau-
tions in case of further trouble. The consensus of
local opinion--including some influential civilian
leaders--is that the riots were spontaneous and
based on discontent with prevailing economic condi-
tions, especially unemployment and rising prices,
as well as on traditional Indonesian hostility to-
ward Chinese. The US Embassy reports that the eco-
nomic factors have also helped to increase tensions
in most Indonesian cities.
Government officials have been putting out the
line that the disturbances were organized either by
Communist remnants or by right-wing extremist Mus-
lims, but no supporting evidence has been produced.
The government probably is advancing this explana
tion"in order to avoid acknowledging that economic
factors contributed to the trouble.
9 Aug 73
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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JAPAN-INDONESIA: Japan's economic aid package
to Indonesia this year contains the most generous
loan terms Tokyo has ever offered any recipient
country. In addition to loans and grants for food
and fertilizer totaling $57 million, Jakarta will
receive commodity and project loans amounting to
$169 million at 2.75-percent interest with 30 years
to repay, including a 10-year grace period. Tokyo's
aid terms until now have been consistently tougher
than those of most major non-Communist donors; the
most favorable conditions for Japanese development
loans had been 3-percent interest for 25 years with
7 years' grace.
The loans to Indonesia are partially untied to
permit some local procurement and purchases from
other developing countries as well as from Japan.
However, such limited untying, which does not allow
purchases from developed countries, has the effect
of restricting the bulk of purchases to Japan.
Tokyo has been urged by donor and recipient
nations to allow worldwide procurement. The loans
to Jakarta, like recent partially untied loans to
Sri Lanka and Thailand, are a step in this direc-
tion.
9 Aug 73
Central Intelligence Bulletin 10
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Venezuela: Venezuela is again attempting to
enlist OAS support for a proposal to revoke sanc-
tions prohibiting member states from dealing with
Cuba. Obtaining 12 of 23 votes would in effect
leave the question of relations with Cuba up to
each country. At this point, Venezuela robabl
is one vote short of a simple majority.
*These items were prepared by CIA without consulta-
tion with the Departments of State and Defense.
9 Aug 73 Central Intelligence Bulletin 11
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