CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A023400050001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 16, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Department review completed
Secret
NO 042
16 December 1972
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No. 0301/72
16 December 1972
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
SOUTH VIETNAM: Communists reportedly plan to sus-
tain military action around Saigon. (Page 1)
SOUTH VIETNAM: Thieu's Democracy Party about to
make public bow. (Page 2)
USSR-EGYPT: Summit delay reflects strains in re-
lations. (Page 4)
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WEST GERMANY: Brandt calls for fight against in-
flation as first order of business. (Page 8)
FINLAND: Kekkonen "threat" to resign may aim at
breaking deadlock over EC treaty and economic is-
sues. (Page 10)
UGANDA : Amin planning to move against British
community. (Page 11)
ANGOLA-ZAIRE: Angolan liberation movements merge,
but their prospects are still not good. (Page 13)
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SOUTH VIETNAM: The Communists reportedly are
planning to continue the currently intensified level
of military action around Saigon for several weeks.
There has been an upsurge in attacks against
government munitions and storage facilities in the
Saigon area during the past few days i
t ommunis s
hopg to nnni--inue these - sapper-type assaults,
and the plans include
infantry attacks against important government facili-
ties and population centers northwest of the capital
just prior to a cease-fire.
Tay Ninh City, the main admin-
istrative center in this area, is included as a
primary target in these plans. Any significant
attack on this important provincial capital would
necessitate a substantial reinforcement of Commu-
nist units in Tay Ninh Province.
South Vietnamese military commanders have re-
cently expressed some concern about the level of
enemy action in MR 3 and the possibility of inten-
sified enemy attacks in the near future. The gov-
ernment's regional commander, General Minh, expects
that the Communists will make determined attacks
instead of breaking down their units into small and
more vulnerable elements as they did in late Octo-
ber. Through this strategy they would hope to
capture a few population centers and prevent the
residents from leaving. They may believe the pres-
ence of the populace would inhibit the use of
friendly firepower and thus hamper government ef-
forts to retake the centers.
Despite such plans, Communist military units
in MR 3 do not appear strong enough to inflict
serious losses on the government over the next few
weeks. They are capable of continuing artillery
fire and sapper raids against a wide variety of
government targets, and they could possibly over-
run some smaller opulation centers.
I
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SOUTH VIETNAM: President Thieu's Democracy
Party, intended to be his main political vehicle
for countering the Communists, is about to make its
public bow.
The party has filed the necessary papers and
has been granted permission to operate. Senator
Nguyen Van Ngai, one of the party's chief organ-
izers, has informed US Embassy officers that pro-
vincial-level party chapters will begin holding
inaugural ceremonies this weekend. Such ceremonies
will continue until February when a national party
convention will be held.
The Democracy Party seems designed more to
strengthen Thieu's position with groups already
sympathetic to the government than to broaden his
popular support. Recruiters have been active for
more than a year, chiefly among civilian officials
and military officers throughout the country. They
have been successful in signing up members, but the
depth of commitment of some of the recruits is doubt-
ful. Some have admittedly joined to avoid harass-
ment or to advance their careers. Many high-level
military officers have joined, but several senior
commanders reportedly have refused because they be-
lieve that the military should not be oriented to-
ward any party. Nevertheless, Thieu believes that
a tighter organization of sympathetic government
elements will enhance the effectiveness of his regime
in postwar competition with the Communists.
Leaders of some of the country's established
parties have displayed concern over the inroads
that Thieu's party is making among their own sup-
porters, and this concern could be heightened now
that the government party is formally getting off
the ground. Many of these politicians probably
would be receptive to cooperating with or even
merging into the Democracy Party if Thieu would
give them a significant role. Thus far, the Pres-
ident and his lieutenants have made only a few
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half-hearted attempts to bring political leaders
outside the administration into the fold. Thieu
holds most of the country's politicians in low es-
teem, and he may feel they would not benefit his
party enough to warrant making any concessions.
He may also believe the party will operate more
effectively with a relatively disci lined following
of officials and army officers.
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USSR-EGYPT: The low profile of the Soviet
military presence in Egypt and the Kremlin's pro-
crastination on scheduling a summit meeting indi-
cate that relations between Moscow and Cairo are
more formal than friendly.
The deputy chief of the Soviet Foreign Min-
istry's Near East Division recently described rela-
tions with Egypt as normal and businesslike "but
without kisses." In a conversation with a US dip-
lomat, he said that Moscow had restated its policy
in clear terms during Premier Sidgi's visit in Oc-
tober, and that the Egyptians were now convinced
that Moscow is firmly opposed to providing the
sophisticated weaponry Cairo had requested. The
Soviet official claimed that the Sidqi visit
"solved all problems," thus obviating the need for
a summit meeting.
From the Egyptian point of view the Sidgi
visit did not "solve all problems," and Cairo will
probably continue to press for more military as-
sistance at every opportunity. The Soviets, how-
ever, are obviously unwilling to give them any
openings, particularly in the framework of high-
level contacts, and do not appear too unhappy with
the current state of play with Cairo. Egyptian
ports are still available to the Soviets. In addi-
tion, Soviet-Egyptian frictions have not impaired
Moscow's relations elsewhere in the Middle East.
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WEST GERMANY: High on the order of business
for the newly formed government will be the continu-
ing fight against inflation, according to Chancellor
Brandt's opening speech to the lower house of Parlia-
ment.
The cost-of-living index, which figured promi-
nently in the recent election, still stands 6.4 per-
cent above the level of a year ago. Shortages of
some foodstuffs as well as the improved business
climate have accelerated price increases. A rapid
rise in industrial orders--primarily from abroad--
has spurred domestic companies to expand employment
and renew investment spending.
As in the past, effective action against infla-
tion will have to come from the Bundesbank. The con-
trols over foreign capital imposed last summer have
reduced the inflow of foreign funds, but the money
supply is still rising rapidly. In an attempt to
slow down excessive credit extension, the bank re-
cently raised its discount rate and the associated
rate for advances against securities. Beyond that,
the monetary authorities are considering a cut in
the commercial banks' rediscount quotas effective
next February. The bank has also again appealed to
the government to adopt firm economic policies in
line with its own efforts.
Brandt's speech, however, indicates that the
government prefers to rely primarily on exhortation.
Falling back on his authority as newly elected head
of government and his personal standing with union
leaders, Brandt made an unprecedented appeal to
labor to hold down wage demands in present bargain-
ing rounds. In fact, West Germany's largest union--
I. G. Metall--has scheduled a late-December strike
vote in the North Rhine-Westphalia iron and steel
industry, where bargaining broke down after employ-
ers met an 11-percent wage demand with an offer of
only half that.
(continued)
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The Chancellor also called on business and in-
dustry to exercise restraint in pricing policy. He
praised the 1973 budget, scheduled for completion
in February, as his administration's contribution
to the stabilization effort, although it probably
will increase federal spending by 10.5 percent.
The speech ended speculation regarding the fu-
ture of the "Superministry." Helmut Schmidt, until
now the economics and finance minister, remains as
finance minister with responsibility for domestic
and international monetary issues, a function pre-
viously reserved to the Economics Ministry. The new
economics minister will be Free Democrat Hans
Friderichs. With economic decision-making left pri-
marily to the Social Democrats who are committed to
a full-employment philosophy, it is unlikely that
the Brandt government will develop an effective anti-
inflationary program.
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FINLAND: President Kekkonen's announcement
that he no longer feels obligated to continue in
office may be a move designed to break the inter-
party deadlock over Finland's signing the EC treaty
and critical domestic economic issues.
After a special meeting with opposition Con-
servative Party leaders at which a Social Democratic
proposal to extend the President's term was rejected,
Kekkonen issued a letter indicating that he felt re-
leased from his promise to continue as president if
necessary. He claimed the situation had changed
since he made the promise last April and cited the
recent leak to the press of classified information
concerning his talks with Soviet leaders last August
as the main factor. According to a press report,
the letter claimed that the President felt he had
"lost Soviet confidence" as a result of the leak.
Although no opponent would stand a chance
against him, he is probably reluctant to campaign
again because of the public criticism that would
emerge. Kekkonen may also be depressed over stale-
mated inter-party negotiations on several pressing
issues as well as by criticism of proposed consti-
tutional changes.
Few in Helsinki believe that Kekkonen seriously
intends to ste down when his term expires in 1974.
the 72-
year-old rest ent is almost certain to remain in
office after 1974. In the meantime, however, the
government must act decisively on the EC treaty and
attendant domestic economic measures. The expanded
EC will come into force on 1 January, and Kekkonen
probably would like to have the EC issue generally
resolved before he visits Moscow on 21 December.
If his "threat" not to continue in office fails to
evoke concessions among the parties, government
t
s
ability will be severely tested.
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UGANDA: The country's British community is
brace3 for President Amin's imminent announcement
of his "drastic decision" on the British presence
in Uganda.
Amin, who has kept up a steady stream of anti-
British statements, has scheduled a meeting on 18
December with 200 representatives of the 3,500-
member British community. Although Amin still may
not have decided on specific measures, he clearly
plans a major move against the British whom he has
described as "imperialists" who are "milking the
country." This could involve the expulsion of some
or perhaps all British nationals and the take-over
of at least some British firms and other property.
The President may not be prepared to initiate a
complete break with London, but he may try to push
the UK into making such a move.
The British, for their part, appear resigned
to at least a diminution of their presence. London
recently announced the cancellation of a $24-million
loan and the cessation of supplements to the salaries
of some 800 British technicians under contract to the
Kampala government. Many British families have been
packing their effects in recent days, expecting the
worst.
Amin's announcement could prompt undisciplined
troops to move against Britons or other white resi-
dents. However, since the ill-fated invasion by
Ugandan guerrillas from Tanzania last September, the
army appears to have directed most of its brutality
against black Ugandans, especially those Amin con-
siders a threat, while avoiding incidents with
Europeans. The deadline for the Asian exodus and
the registrations of remaining Asians and European
missionaries passed without major incidents.
(continued)
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If Amin breaks completely with the UK, he prob-
ably will soon be in need of new scapegoats, and he
might turn on the approximately 700-member American
community. He has strongly attacked the US in the
past. However, the President, who often gives some
warning of impending decisions, has had some unusually
kind words for the US lately. He also plans to re-
cruit US doctors and teachers for service in Uganda,
and he has not included the US in the growing list
of countries charged with "sabotaging" the Ugandan
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ANGOLA-ZAIRE: The two major rival Angolan
liberation movements signed a reconciliation agree-
ment in Zaire on 13 December. Despite this outward
show of cooperation, an effective and united struggle
against Portuguese control of Angola remains remote.
Under the prodding of President Mobutu Sese
Seko, who promoted a reconciliation in principle
last June, the two movements agreed to establish
a Supreme Council for the Liberation of Angola
(SCLA). Holden Roberto, president of the Zaire-
based Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile
(GRAS), is president of the council. Agostinho
Neto, president of the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which operates out of
Congo and Zambia, is vice-president. The GRAE will
head the council's political committee and the MPLA,
the more effective of the two insurgent organiza-
tions, will head the military command. The head-
quarters of the Supreme Council will be in Kinshasa.
On paper at least, the new accord satisfies
long-standing demands by the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) for a united front in Angola. In prac-
tical terms, however, the SCLA is likely to need a
long shake-down period. Both parties suffer from
internal disputes over leadership and tactics, and
neither the moderate GRAE nor Mobutu trusts the
Marxist-oriented and Communist-supplied MPLA. With
both liberation movements represented equally within
the Supreme Council, the potential for continued
disagreement remains strong.
The ultimate success of the reconciliation
rests in large part with President Mobutu, who is
motivated by a strong desire to become one of
Africa's leading spokesmen. Mobutu will probably
attempt to maintain authority over the SCLA by
controlling the purse strings and flow of arms,
although how much control he will have over the
MPLA's main area of operations from Zambia remains
questionable. Mobutu is likely to find himself
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leads to stepped-up operations, the Portuguese may
feel constrained to shut down Zaire's important rail
under increasing pressure to ensure the success of
the new organization. On the other hand, he will
have to take into consideration his relations with
the Portuguese. Heretofore, Mobutu and the Portuguese
have shared a tacit understanding that Mobutu would
restrict GRAE operations and the Portuguese would not
retaliate against Zaire. Now, however, if the merger
outlets through neighboring Angola..
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