CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A023100110001-2
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
11
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 15, 2003
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 9, 1972
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A023100110001-2.pdf409.63 KB
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Approved For Release 2003/07/29: CIA-RDP79T00975A 10Vf6102 25X1 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Central Intelligence Bulletin Secret N2 41 9 November 1972 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A023100110001-2 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO23100110001-2 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO23100110001-2 Approved For Rese 2003/0B}~I,F-1PP79T00975A100110001-2 No. 0269/72 9 November 1972 Central Intelligence Bulletin NORTH VIETNAM: Hanoi is repairing key rail lines. (Page 1) ARGENTINA: Preparations apparently under way for the return of Peron. (Page 2) YUGOSLAVIA: Tito's popular prestige has suffered because of his drive for greater discipline. (Page 3) UGANDA: Most Asians out by deadline (Page 5) PAKISTAN: Diplomatic moves favorable to Asian Com- munist regimes (Page 5) MALAGASY REPUBLIC - CHINA: Relations established (Page 6) Approved For Release 2003/07IiEP79T00975A023100110001-2 ON" Approved Release 2003/07W- 01&P79T00975A023100110001-2 NORTH VIETNAM: Bridge Repairs CHINA AILAND LAOS aiptio+9 iFMft iTh:RrZ#D ton' duang Tri ,sour -S- VIETNAM Approved For Release 2003/07NJIDP79T00975A023100110001-2 Approved For Rase 2003/9E;PR(P RDP79T00975A 3100110001-2 NORTH VIETNAM: The North Vietnamese have taken advantage of the restrictions on bombing north of the 20th Parallel to repair the vital northeast rail line. Except for a small segment just north of Hanoi, this line is open. Repairs are also being made on the line from Hanoi to Thanh Hoa. Aerial photography shows that the missing center span o the Dap au rail bridge has been replaced and a bypass near the Bac Giang Bridge has been repaired. The Canal des Rapides and the Paul Doumer bridges at Hanoi are being repaired, but both bridges require major reconstruction before they can reopen for rail traffic. By early November, the North Vietnamese had repaired two of the four unserviceable crossings on the rail line south of Hanoi, and the other two are under repair. The Bien Son rail bridge has been rebuilt and a new rail pontoon bridge has been constructed at Ninh Binh. In addition, some of the downed spans have been replaced on the bridges at Phu Ly and Dong Phuong Thuong. No repair activities have been noted at the Thanh Hoa bridge, probably because it is located below the 20th Parallel. 9 Nov 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/0$lZCRiR-PDP79T00975A023100110001-2 Approved For Release 2003/IE-XJDP79T00A023100110001-2 ARGENTINA: The Lanusse government, like the Peronist leaders, appears to be making preparations for the return of Juan Peron. Only hours after Hector Campora, Peron's per- sonal representative in Argentina, announced last Tuesday that the 77-year-old former president would return to his homeland on 17 November, Lanusse told the nation that the armed forces would guarantee Peron's personal safety and deal with any threats to domestic peace by either pro- or anti-Peronists. Lanusse said that he had earlier doubted that Peron would ever return but gave clear indications that he now expects him to come. Peron has said before that he would return, once even coming as far as Brazil before being turned back, and this announcement may be no more than another attempt to throw the opposition off balance and to pressure President Lanusse into agreeing to Peron's demands. It seems more likely, however, that this time Peron has recognized that he must return or face a serious loss of prestige. Most speculation in recent weeks has been that if Peron returns it will be for only a few days and for the purpose of personally endorsing an electoral accord with the military. The short lead time on Campora's announcement and the tenor of Lanusse's speech indicate that the Peronists and the govern- ment may be very close to an agreement on the con- duct of the national elections next March and on the orientation of the government that will take power in May. It is uncertain whether agreement on a presidential ticket will be part of such an accord or whether the problem of finding an accept- able candidate will be worked out later. Central Intelligence Bulletin 25XI Approved For Release 2003! 82?BR f DP79T00975A023100110001-2 Approved For Rase 2003 @]ffoRJ4 RDP79T00975 3100110001-2 YUGOSLAVIA: Tito's popular prestige--his trump card in past disputes--has suffered because of seri- ous doubts about his tough drive to strengthen party rule Although unanimous support for Tito is being voiced at party meetings, he has suffered several important embarrassments. In addition to the res- ignation of Foreign Minister Tepavac, Tito has had to accept the resignation of Koca Popovic, a member of the collective presidency, long-time Tito con- fidant, and a popular figure in Serbia. Popovic's action is clearly intended as a protest against Tito's campaign to combat centrifugal forces in regional party organizations by recentralizing party authority. Popovic's departure is likely to create more doubts about the wisdom of Tito's course. Grumbling in the regime has penetrated to the lower levels, where a few Serb critics have even voiced regret over the fact that the 80-year-old leader is in such good health. Most Yugoslavs still revere Tito as the man who pulled them through World War II and the subse- quent break with Stalin. His design for tighter central control, however, comes as a rude shock, and the growing middle class particularly fears some aspects of his economic program. Tito's in- flated rhetoric about "illegally acquired wealth" has already caused some landlords to evict tenants rather than face charges of amassing "unearned" wealth. During a speech to factory workers in Macedonia on 6 November, Tito tried to allay worker fears that their "earned wealth" would be confis- cated, but he again demanded moves against various traders, merchants, bankers, and speculators. Tito has taken a calculated risk in advocating these new programs, and he thinks he can ride out dissatisfaction. Thus far, he is sticking firmly to the outlines he has set, and has let it be known that he will not be swayed either by grumbling at home or by "distorted" press coverage abroad. (continued) Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2003/0f'WB 1 14DP79T00975A023100110001-2 004 Approved ^or 2003/0/jIPpDP79T00A023100110001-2 The purge in Serbia is now spreading to the public information media. The chief editors of three major newspapers and the head of the state television network have been sacked. Once the media are brought into line, Tito may turn his attention to the remaining support rs of ex-party boss Nikezic. Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2003 ]&BX-RDP79T00975A023100110001-2 Approved For Releease 2003/07a J~P79T00975A 00110001-2 C UGANDA: President Amin's deadline for the de- parture o non-citizen Asians passed yesterday appar- ently without major incidents, and almost all non- citizen Asians were evacuated. About 1,500 state- less Asians remain, however, along with.a few thou- sand Asians with Ugandan citizenship and those ex- empted from expulsion because of their much-needed technical skills. The UN has set up departure cen- ters in Kampala for the remaining stateless Asians and will try to move them to facilities in Europe and elsewhere by the end of the week. Amin has also attempted to hasten the departure of Asians with Ugandan citizenship by ordering them to relocate in rural areas where they will be permitted to engage in little more than subsistence agriculture. As long as Asians remain in Uganda, they will face har- assment, such as Amin's order for a head count today, or more unpleasant incidents at the hands-of the army, now on full alert. PAKISTAN: On 7 November, Islamabad recognized Hanoi, it will recognize Pyongyang today, and may be considering early recognition of Sihanouk's "Royal Government of National Union." Yesterday, the Pakistanis began the formalities for withdraw- ing from SEATO. President Bhutto apparently made these long contemplated moves for several reasons. He wants to increase Pakistan's contacts with other Asian nations, he wishes to improve relations fur- ther with Peking, and he needs to counter criticism by the left wing of his political part that his foreign policy is too pro-American. (continued) 9 Nov 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/"PEATRDP79T00975A023100110001-2 Approved- Release 2003gE4MEI7f'-RDP79TO09 5A023100110001-2 MALAGASY REPUBLIC - CHINA: Diplomatic rela- tions were established with C ina on 6 November dur- ing Foreign Minister Ratsiraka's visit to Peking. The move is the latest step by the six-month-old government of General Ramanantsoa in the redirection of Malagasy's foreign policy, including broadening relations with Communist countries. Diplomatic re- lations were established with the Soviet Union in September. The government apparently views rela- tions with Communist countries as a means of expand- ing Malagasy's trade and aid resources, strengthen- ing its nonaligned credentials, and balancing its close ties with the West. The government, however, would prefer avoiding the establishment of large Communist diplomatic or aid missions on the island. 9 Nov 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2003@RCR!Rlf-RDP79T00975A023100110001-2 Approved Foelease 2003/07/29: CIA-RDP79T009023100110001-2 Secret Secret Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO23100110001-2