CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A023100080002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 6, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Top Secret
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Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
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CHINA REVIEW: Despite the outward appearance of
order, internal stability has not been fully re-
established since the purge of Lin Piao, (Page 4)
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Mao Tse-tung (78) Chiang Ch'ing (56)
Chairman, Central Committee Wife of Mao; First Deputy Head,
Cultural Revolution Group
aSntral Com-
efens er
Chou En-lai (73)
Premier
K'ang Sheng (72)
Adviser, Cultugj
Chi Teng-k'uei (40)*
Vice Chairman, Horan Provincial
Revolutionary Committee
Ch'en Hsi-lien (60)
Commander, Shen-yang Military
Region; Chairman, Liaoning Provincial
Revolutionary Committee
CHINESE COMMUNIST POLITBURO
(Elected April 1969)
Fovincial
mittee
Chang Ch'un-ch'iao (59)
Chairman, Shanghai Municipal
Revolutionary Committee; Second
Deputy Head, Cultural Revolution
Group
Li Te-sheng (61)
Commander, Anhwei Military
District; Chairman, Anhwei Provincial
Revolutionary Committee
Hsu Shih-yu (64)
Vice Minister of Defense; Commander,
Nanking Military Region; Chairman,
Kiangsu Provincial Revolutionary
Committee
Yao Wen-yuan (36)
Vice Chairman, Shanghai Municipal
Revolutionary Committee; Member,
Cultural Revolution Group
*Alternate Members Inactive
Huang Yung-sheng (62)
Ch*e# QU ; MtTitary Af-
fairs ommi
Ch'iu Hui-tso (56)
Deputy _Chiu#-ef
uty Chief Steff; Com-
Yeh Chien-ying (72)
Vice Chairman, Military Af-
fairs Committee
GOVERNMENT LEADERS
Hsieh Fu-chih (69)
Li Hsien-nien (66)
Finance Minister
Wang Tung-hsing (age unknown) *
Public Security Vice Minister; Direc-
tor, General Office, Party Central
Committee
Chairman eople's
li_cSecurit er; Chairman,
Liu Po-ch'eng (79)
Vice Chairm eople's
ss; Military Affairs Committee
Tung Pi-wu (85)
Vice Chair eept s te epublic
na
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China: Domestic Politics, Chinese Style
Despite the outward appearance of order in
China, internal stability has not been fully re-es-
tablished since the purge a year ago of Lin Piao.
The failure to reconstitute the ruling politburo and
replace the military leaders who went down with Lin,
together with the paucity of leadership turnouts and
authoritative policy pronouncements, leaves the clear
impression that tensions still exist among the sur-
viving leaders. Moreover, the protracted campaign
throughout the country to repudiate Lin Piao and the
absence from view of an increasing number of provin-
cial military leaders suggest that military power-
holders in the provinces are under pressure--a situ-
ation that involves real risks for domestic political
order.
A Year of Caution
In view of the magnitude of the problems it
faces, the regime has unquestionably achieved some
notable successes in its management of the Lin cri-
sis. Basic social order has been maintained. The
armed forces have remained stable while being urged
by the regime to be subordinate to civilian party
control. The trend toward moderation in domestic
policies--a trend evident since 1969 and one that
has wide popular support--has been even more pro-
nounced since Lin's departure from the scene. In
the conduct of foreign affairs, Peking has scored
a succession of triumphs in 1972, the fruition of
its decision several years ago to adopt a more prag-
matic and outgoing foreign policy.
Nevertheless, the events of last autumn dra-
matically altered the political edifice in Peking,
and the leadership has been extremely cautious in
picking up the pieces. Peking's problems are most
evident within the politburo itself; only 16 of the
original 25 members named in 1969 are still being
mentioned in the official press by name, and of
these only a dozen appear to be participating in
the affairs of state in a meaningful way. The delay
6 Nov 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 4
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in reconstituting the politburo is undoubtedly associ-
ated with the question of the military's future rep-
resentation on that body. While the regime wrestles
with this problem, the armed forces are without a
designated leader. Marshal Yeh Chien-ying has been
serving as de facto defense minister but has not
been formally appointed to the position.
Because Lin was officially designated Mao's
successor, Peking also faces a major task of working
out a new formula for succession. For several years,
Peking has delayed convening the National People's
Congress (NPC), the state forum for legitimizing in-
stitutional and personnel changes. Presumably this
delay has stemmed from disputes within the leader-
ship, and among these issues has been the wisdom and
utility of many of the changes wrought by the Cul-
tural Revolution. The idea of a post-Mao "collec-
tive leadership" has persistently surfaced in the
past year, but it seems likely that it is the compo-
sition of this collective, rather than the principle
itself, that is presently at issue.
The regime's handling of the Lin affair has
made it appear that the central issue in Peking is
one of civilian versus military control. In fact,
the issue is much more complex. Evidence--some of
it antedating Lin's demise--indicates the institu-
tional problem is a real one. Nevertheless, the
leadership is deeply divided on a much wider range
of policy and personnel questions, and tension be-
tween central and provincial leaders over who exer-
cises primary authority in the provinces is a fac-
tor of growing importance. Moreover, developments
during the Cultural Revolution clearly created and
intensified antipathies between leaders who were
identified with its excesses and those of a more
moderate persuasion. It is hard to believe these
antipathies have now vanished, or that they no
longer cut across institutions and interest groups,
including the armed forces.
(continued)
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The actual facts surrounding the demise of Lin
Piao in September 1971 may never be known. Although
those who were purged with Lin had long career as-
sociations with him, and many, including three at
the politburo level, were clearly' identified with the
excesses of the Cultural Revolution, the affair
claimed high-level military victims at both ends of
the political spectrum. Moreover, a campaign against
ultraleftists--which began in late 1969 and probably
was supported by Chou En-l.ai--has been muted if not
terminated altogether since Lin's purge, even though
all its potential victims have not been disposed of.
Chiang Ching, who was deputy head of the Cultural
Revolution Group which directed Mao's purge of the
old party apparatus, seemingly should have been the
next target, but as Mao's wife she apparently is im-
mune. Two other prominent leftists, Shanghai party
leaders Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan, also con-
tinue to appear frequently in Peking.
In contrast to these inconsistencies in person-
nel matters, China appears at present to be travel-
ing on a single policy track. Rationality and prag-
matism seem to be the order of the day, not only in
foreign policy but also in domestic areas dear to
Mao's heart, such as education. There are no con-
vincing signs that this approach is being opposed
or debated at the moment.
One element that almost certainly is raising
political temperatures is the protracted effort to
repudiate Lin Piao. The notion that Lin, the de-
fense minister and Mao's designated successor, could
turn against his mentor has sharply eroded confidence
in the country's leadership, not only among part
officials but among the populace at large.
6 Nov 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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CHINA: Missing Provincial Military Leaders
Lung Shu-chin
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VNER
MONGOLIA
PEKING l / I
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" n I-i ung -. ,
SHANTUNfG
KIANG'U
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Some members of the leadership may in fact be
exploiting the Lin affair in order to move against
military leaders in the provinces. This impression
has been reinforced in recent weeks by the failure
of an increasing number of these leaders to make
ublic a earances
A move against provincial military leaders,
even on a selective basis, risks jeopardizing domes-
tic political order. The Cultural Revolution de-
stroyed the leadership of the old party and govern-
ment bureaucracies, leaving the military as the only
viable instrument, of control. Some efforts have
been made to re-establish the civilian party struc-
ture and reassert its traditional leading role in
the Chinese polity. It is clear, however, that mil-
itary leaders still hold the balance of power in
the party apparatus outside Peking. Thus, a move
against these military leaders, particularly if it
is widespread, could conceivably cause a breakdown
in control, with no alternative mechanism available
to fill the void.
The continuing denunciation of Lin and the ac-
companying "rectification" movement within the party
and the army seem to have Mao's consent.
n a i ion to
re-esta is ing centra authority over the provinces,
Mao may see the campaign as an opportunity to settle
personal scores with a number of provincial military
6 Nov 72
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leaders, primarily those whose opposition to the Red
Guard movement led him to close out the Cultural
Revolution before he felt he had accomplished all
of his objectives.
On the other hand, Mao must recognize that his
close personal identification with Lin renders him
vulnerable in certain important ways.
Mao and Chou
During 1972, Mao and Chou have seemed to work
very closely on most matters. Chou has constantly
been at Mao's side during the chairman's meetings
with visiting state leaders, and in the course of
the detailed negotiations with foreign powers, Chou
has made it clear that he always defers to Mao on
broad policy matters. Similarly, Mao has on several
occasions publicly acknowledged his confidence in
Chou.
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At this juncture, China's internal problems
seem containable. At present, provincial military
leaders are not faced, either collectively or indi-
vidually, with the massive public attacks and or-
chestrated violence that were so provocative in the
1967-68 period. In the absence of such a direct
Central Intelligence- Bulletin
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challenge--and Peking has gone to some lengths to
indicate that such a challenge is not forthcoming--
it is unlikely that they could or would unite to defy
the authority of the chairman directly. This seems
particularly to be the case in the absence of a
strong and authoritative leader for such a move.
It is difficult to cast Chou in such a role.
His concern for the loyalty of the armed forces to
the political system is surely as great as his con-
cern for the cohesion of the military establishment,
and on both grounds he is likely to attempt to "limit
the damage" rather than place himself at the head of
a group determined to end the selective purge of
the military. Indeed, Chou probably supports the
removal of certain provincial military leaders. The
premier seems to have the endorsement of the chair-
man for much of his domestic program as well as for
his foreign policy, and this is an asset Chou will
not cast away lightly. Thus, a Mao-Chou split seems
highly improbable at the present time.
Mao's motives in the present situation are
equally complicated. Certainly vindictiveness and
a desire to settle old scores--particularly those
arising from the equivocal role of many military
leaders in the Cultural Revolution--play a major
part in the current moves against the provincial
military. The explicit attempts, however, to reas-
sure the military that it is not about to suffer a
thoroughgoing "rectification," coupled with con-
tinued emphasis on conservative and pragmatic poli-
cies at home as well as abroad, seem to indicate
that the offensive is at this point a limited one.
Like Chou, Mao seems intent for the moment to limit
the damage. His objective could well be to estab-
lish a better balance between competing leftist and
conservative forces--and hence further increase his
own freedom of maneuver--by whittling away at the
predominantly conservative military leaders in the
provinces through a process of linking them, how-
ever tenuously, to the Lin lot."
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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