CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A023100060001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 3, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Department review completed
Secret
N2 042
3 November 1972
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No. 0264/72
3 November 1972
Central Intelligence Bulletin
USSR: Brezhnev may be ill. (Page 1)
JAPAN-USSR: Moscow accepts US along with Japanese
participation in Siberian development project.
(Page 3)
CANADA: Trudeau will attempt to form a new gov-
ernment. (Page 5)
CHILE: Senior military officers appointed to
cabinet. (Page 7)
CAMBODIA: Prospect of cease-fire moves Phnom Penh
to seek new ways to counter Communists. (Page 8)
IRELAND-USSR: Movement toward trade pact and ex-
change of ambassadors. (Page 9)
ICELAND-UK: Fishing rights negotiations. (Page 11)
BAHAMAS: Nassau may seek US aid (Page 12)
ZAMBIA: Transition toward one-party state (Page 12)
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USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev has not been
identified in public since 11 October, and he may
be ill.
Brezhnev did not see Egyptian Prime Minister
Sidqi during his visit to Moscow from 16 to 18 Oc-
tober, nor did he receive the Japanese foreign
minister the following week as expected. Italian
Prime Minister Andreotti did not see the general
secretary during his six-day official visit to the
USSR. Soviet officials reportedly informed both
the Egyptian and Italian delegations that Brezhnev's
absence was due to illness.
Rumors that Brezhnev is under treatment for
cirrhosis of the liver are now circulating in Mos-
cow's diplomatic community. These rumors are at-
tributed to a Romanian Embassy source. Brezhnev
has been hospitalized on a number of occasions in
recent years for a variety of medical problems,
some of them apparently of a minor nature.
In his absence, efforts are apparently being
made to keep Brezhnev's name before the public and
to leave the impression that he is on the job. Pres-
ident Podgorny, during an award ceremony on 31 Oc-
tober, announced that "I have just had a talk with
Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, who asked me to convey his
greetings." The day before, Radio Moscow announced
the publication of a third volume of the general
secretary's speeches and articles.
3 Nov 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 1
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Proposed Delivery Route From Yakutsk
USSR
(53773 11-72 CIA
Pipeline
t(proposed)
CHINA
I
Alternate
pipeline
1 routes Hokkaido
1/ ~
/
i ?`
Tokyo
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SECRET
JAPAN-USSR: Moscow's implicit acceptance of
full participation by the US along with Japan has
removed a major stumbling block to the development
of the Yakutsk natural gas field and pipeline proj-
ect in Siberia. Other problems remain, however.
In talks concluded last week between a special
Japanese mission and Soviet officials, the Soviets
did not bring up their previous position that US ?
firms play only a subcontracting role in the Yakutsk
project. Moscow traditionally has preferred nego-
tiating on a bilateral basis to strike the best
bargain. It appears that only after the Japanese
made it clear that they could not proceed without
US technical know-how did the Soviets relent. The
Japanese have also indicated to both the US and the
Soviets that they would like US investment in the
project. The Japanese mission now anticipates basic
agreement by all three parties by next spring.
The most important economic consideration yet
to be resolved centers on determining the extent
of gas reserves in the Yakutsk field. The Soviet
estimate of one trillion cubic meters of gas is not
adequate to satisfy Japanese requirements after al-
lowing for US and Soviet shares. It will take at
least 12 to 18 months to confirm the Soviet reserve
estimate. The extent of reserves will affect both
the scope of the undertaking and a start-up date.
Questions of financing and transportation also
remain. Moscow wants to finance the $2.5 to 3 bil-
lion project on terms that the Japanese consider to
be too lenient. No decision was reached on trans-
porting the gas from Yakutsk to Japan, although
both Moscow and Tokyo find merit in using a combina-
tion of pipeline and tanker transport instead of a
direct pipeline to Hokkaido.
(continued)
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SECRET
The Japanese mission's expectation of an agree-
ment next spring may be optimistic in view of polit-
ical difficulties between Moscow and Tokyo. Although
both sides have avoided publicly linking political
and economic matters, the contentious Northern Ter-
ritories issue, which has blocked improvement in
political relations, could cloud the atmosphere sur-
rounding economic talks. The Japanese Government un-
doubtedly is very much interested in the Soviet pro-
posals, but at the same time does not feel a great
sense of urgency in concluding arrangements for the
Yakutsk project. Tokyo may well hope that Moscow's
obvious desire for Japanese capital might have some
moderating effect on the USSR's stand on the terri-
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SECRET
CSANADA: Prime Minister Trudeau has announced
that he will stay on and. try to form a government.
In his first press conference following Monday's
election, the prime minister conceded that the Lib-
erals' showing "reflected the view of a good many
Canadians that the government for the last four and
a half years has not been satisfactory." His new
government is expected to be put to the test next
month. Trudeau revealed that he had asked the
Governor-General to reconvene parliament as soon as
possible after official election results are tallied.
In the latest tabulation of votes the Liberals
and the Progressive Conservatives are tied, each
with 109 seats. The New Democrats have 30 and the
Social Credit Party 14. The tie came as the Lib-
erals won an additional seat in Quebec following a
recount in the district of minister of Trade Jean-Luc
Pepin, giving him a five-vote margin over his Social
Credit opponent. Parity with the Conservatives as
well as the possibility of winning additional seats
as other recounts occur over the next month probably
influenced the Liberals to try to form a government.
Trudeau also indicated that the Liberals would
not attempt to woo the New Democrats in order to
have a majority government. He further said the
success of parliament would depend on the coopera-
tion of all parties in the House of Commons. The
head of the New Democrats, David Lewis, had already
announced that he was not interested in a coalition
with either of the major parties but he has said he
will back any "good" legislation they may introduce.
In a press conference following Trudeau's, Lewis
said his party will not obstruct parliament but he
does not believe it can last a full term. The Lib-
erals and the Progressive Conservatives under the
leadership of Robert Stanfield are closer in phil-
osophy to each other than to the New Democrats.
(continued)
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tTrudeau and Stanfield probably will cooperate in or-
der to keep the government operating for the next
several months until a new election is called.
Questioned on how he could govern when his party
was not represented in some sections of the country,
Trudeau responded that the test was to get the con-
fidence of the parliament. Analysis of the election
results seems to indicate that polarization of French-
and English-speaking Canada is on the rise. The Lib-
eral government which has implemented a bilingualism
program received slightly more than half of its sup-
port from Quebec or French Canada. The bulk of the
Conservative votes came from -English Canada.
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C CHILE: The inclusion of three senior military
officers in the new cabinet could improve the cli-
mate for ending the protest strike still in progress.
The most significant new appointment was that
of former army commander General Prats as interior
minister, a post that puts him in line to succeed
Allende in case of the president's incapacitation.
An admiral and an air force general took over the
public works and mining portfolios. Those civilians
who are not holdovers do not appear to be prominent
politically.
The military reportedly welcomed participation
in the cabinet in order to serve as a moderating
influence on government policies. The positions
they hold, however, do not offer them direct control
over the areas of the economy most important to the
opposition. Any calming effect the military mem-
bers' advice may bring could be offset by hotheaded
radicals such as Rolando Calderon, the new agricul-
ture minister. A new army commander has-not yet
been named.
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CAMBODIA: The possibility of a cease-fire in
Cambodia is prompting Phnom Penh to focus on polit-
ical approaches to the Khmer Communist problem.
The government has ordered all provincial offi-
cials and Cambodian Army field commanders to try to
contact local Khmer Communist elements to persuade
as many of them as possible to rally. To complement
this effort, Phnom Penh has also begun to increase
its psychological warfare operations against the
indigenous insurgents. It seems questionable, how-
ever, that these activities will result in sizable
numbers of ralliers from the ranks of increasingly
aggressive and confident Khmer Communist units.
The fact that Lon Nol's unpopular brother,.Lon Non,
is to play a key role in the rallier program is
likely to undercut its effectiveness.
There are still no indications that the govern-
ment is ready to consider high-level negotiations
with the Khmer Communists aimed at a broad political
settlement. Lon Nol, however, has formed a "na-
tional committee of action for peace and concord"
that could provide a forum for discussion of this
problem. The committee will include all cabinet
ministers and representatives of Cambodia's two
Buddhist orders. Apparently in recognition of the
need for greater unity and broader support for the
government, the president has also asked opposition
political parties to join the committee. Republican
Party Chief Sirik Matak has agreed to participate.
Some members of the Democratic Party may also lend
their support to the committee.
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IRELAND-USSR: The Lynch government is moving
toward a trade pact and an exchange of, ambassadors
with the USSR.
An Irish official recently told the US charge
that he believes agreements with the Soviets will
be signed before the end of the year. The basic
policy decision to establish. relations with Moscow
has already been made, and the details of a trade
pact were agreed to during the visit of a Soviet
delegation to Dublin earlier this year. The Soviets,
however, insist that diplomatic relations are a pre-
requisite to completing the trade agreement. Fur-
ther pressure to reach agreement with Moscow stems
from the fact.that after 1 January, when Ireland
becomes a full member of the EC, Dublin will not be
permitted to enter into a separate trade pact such
as the one presently envisaged.
Dublin has long been willing in principle to
establish closer relations with the USSR and East
European nations in hopes that the thaw would help
diminish an adverse trade balance with these states
and thereby lessen Ireland's dependence on trade
with the UK. The government also believes that at
least limited ties with Warsaw Pact nations would
balance Ireland's entry into the EC, thus preserving
the country's traditional "neutrality."
Irish reluctance to conclude the deal swiftly
stems from domestic political considerations, secu-
rity factors, and the attitude of the UK. The Lynch
administration may be hesitant to prod a conservative
public into accepting still another change. The gov-
ernment successfully pushed through a referendum on
EC entry in May, and before the end of the year the
voters will be asked to approve the vote for 18-
year-olds and. deletion of the "special position" of
the Catholic Church from the Republic's constitution.
(continued)
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Dublin also fears potential Soviet meddling in
Ulster. The Irish, who understand the need to keep
an eye on Soviet officials, wish to establish a two-
or three-man mission in Moscow and wou -IJI
limit the Soviets to a similar number.
I j 7
Moscow probably sees several advantages in es-
tablishing relations at this time. It would further
the over-all Soviet drive for expanded relations
with the nations of Western Europe prior to the Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Al-
though the effect of a trade agreement before year's
end would be minimal, its conclusion would be con-
sistent with the USSR's hope to weaken the impact
on Eastern Europe of the EC's common commercial pol-
icy, which comes into effect on 1 January. Moreover,
relations with Dublin would clearly nettle the UK
whose relations with the USSR remain strained.
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SECRET
ICELAND-UK: Negotiations about fishing rights
are in prospect at the ministerial level, provided
the current uneasy truce between Icelandic Coast
Guard vessels and British trawlers holds.
In a message to Icelandic Prime Minister
Johannesson, Prime Minister Heath stressed the
British desire to resolve the issue peacefully and
underscored the dire consequences for both sides
if incidents at sea continued. Before Heath sent
the message, rough weather forced some of the
smaller British trawlers to take shelter in Ice-
landic fjords, where the fishermen risked arrest
and prosecution by Icelandic authorities. The
trawlers were permitted to return to the fishing
grounds when the weather cleared on 30 October.
On 31 October Iceland announced that minis-
terial-level talks would resume at a time and place
to be determined. A British Foreign office spokes-
man subsequently said the talks may take place in
London in mid-November. Foreign Secretary Douglas-
Home will head the British delegation, which will
include Agricultural Minister Prior, a close as-
sociate of Heath. Foreign Minister Agustsson ap-
parently will lead the Icelandic delegation. Ice-
landic Fisheries Minister Josefsson, a Communist
who advocates no. concessions on fishing, probably
will also participate.
The agenda will include special zones in which
the British would be permitted to fish during cer-
tain periods, and limits on the number, size, and
types of fishing vessels. If both governments can
contain their domestic critics, an agreement may
be reached soon.
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SE6IT
BAHAMAS: The Nassau government, facing a pro-
jected budget deficit of at least $15 million by
the end of the year, may eventually turn to the US
defense-related installations in the Bahamas for
revenue. Base agreements will have to be renegoti-
ated after the islands become independent next July.
By then, the effect of the general exodus of white
businessmen after Prime Minister Pindling's over-
whelming election victory last September will prob-
ably make monetary problems even more acute. De-
spite earlier indications that Pindling's victory
might enable him to overhaul his government's eco-
nomic policies and the makeup of his cabinet, he
has not done so. The worsening of his financial
problems so close to independence may soon impel
him to seek help from the US, Britain. or private
sources.
ZAMBIA: The government has just published a
bill to amend the constitution, banning opposition
parties and paving the way for Zambia's transition
to a one-party state before the end of this year.
The bill will probably be passed handily by the
National Assembly when it meets next month. Pres-
ident Kaunda believes a single party system is nec-
essary to end the disruptive influence of the coun-
try's small, tribally based opposition parties.
Kaunda has said he intends to establish a social-
ist-type government in Zambia, and additional con-
stitutional changes, including possibly a whole
new document, are likely to be announced sometime
next year. Kaunda has not revealed precisely what
he has in mind, but he has said he hopes to avoid
the "repressive measures" that characterize many
other one-party states. Imposition of the new sys-
tem could lead to demonstrations by tribal support-
ers of the opposition parties, but security forces
should be able to prevent major disturbances.
Central Intelligence Bulletin 12
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Secret
Secret
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