CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A023100050001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 2, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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No. 0263/72
2 November 1972
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CSCE: Soviets seeking support for their position.
Page 3)
EGYPT: Removal of war minister may aggravate Sadat's
o~ mestic problems. (Page 5)
CAMBODIA: Communists put pressure on route to sea-
port. (Page 7)
WEST GERMANY: Hijacking incident evokes political
reaction. Page 8)
KOREA: Seoul pressing for strong popular endorse-
ment of reforms. (Page 9)
ZAMBIA-PORTUGAL: Talks planned to ease strained re-
lations. (Page 11)
ISRAEL-SYRIA: Israelis reinforce Golan Heights
(Page 12 )
EAST GERMANY: Prisoner release (Page 12)
PERU: Oil strike (Page 13)
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CSCE: The Soviets are engaged in an extensive
series of bilateral consultations with Western gov-
ernments with the clear aim of winning support for
Moscow's positions on a Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.
In these consultations, the Soviets have sought
basic agreement on procedural matters so that the
preparatory talks, scheduled to begin on 22 Novem-
ber in Helsinki, will proceed smoothly and rapidly.
In particular, the Soviets are anxious to avoid
CSCE agenda disputes that could threaten agreement
on beginning the actual conference.
In their references to the procedures and agenda
of the conference, which they hope will begin next
June, the Soviets have reiterated known positions.
They favor a three-stage conference--foreign minis-
ters, working groups, and a culminating meeting at
the "highest level." They want the conference to
produce a declaration of principles that would en-
dorse Soviet views on non-use of force and invio-
lability of frontiers. They wish to lump "cultural
relations" with agenda items on economic and scien-
tific matters. From the Soviet viewpoint, this
would reduce the likelihood of conflict over West-
ern plans to inject a "freer movement" item. Mos-
cow also advocates having the conference form a
permanent body to continue its work and perhaps
plan future sessions.
The Soviets have clearly stated their insist-
ence on keeping talks on mutual and balanced force
reductions separate from the CSCE. They even hope
to keep so-called "confidence-building" measures,
such as advance notification of military maneuvers,
from being considered at the CSCE. The attempt to
exclude complex and probably contentious military
matters from the CSCE is related to Moscow's desire
for a relatively brief conference devoted essen-
tially to general principles. During the recent
visit to Moscow of Italian Prime Minister Andreotti,
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Foreign Minister Gromyko was overheard reminding
Premier Kosygin that the CSCE would have to conclude
by the time that formal MBFR talks began. Kosygin
had earlier told Andreotti that MBFR negotiations
should begin in November 1973, which would set a
limit of four or five months for CSCE. A start in
November would represent some slippage from earlier
Soviet proposals to hold MBFR talks in September or
October.
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EGYPT: President Sadat's domestic problems
may aggravated by the removal of War Minister
Sadiq.
There are no indications that Sadiq is planning
a comeback, but the regime probably is apprehensive
about such a possibility. As a figure of consider-
able consequence, Sadiq represents a potential rally-
ing point for antiregime malcontents. At the time
of the announcement of Sadiq's replacement, civilian
and military police units reportedly were alerted.
Rumors of a purge in the armed forces were
generated by Sadiq's removal, and the head of the
Egyptian Navy, who was considered to be close to
Sadiq, was replaced. Although a wider shakeup might
succeed in removing Sadiq's allies from sensitive
positions, it could also increase dissatisfaction
within the armed forces.
Sadiq's removal may also contribute to a cool-
ing of relations with Libya. President Qadhafi re-
portedly is close to Sadiq and might be inclined to
support a bid for his reinstatement. At a minimum,
Sadiq's replacement is likely to add to Qadhafi's
disquietude over Cairo's recent moves to encourage
a thaw in relations with the Soviet Union.
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CAMBODIA: The Communists are beginning to put
pressure on Route 4, Phnom Penh's only overland
link to its seaport at Kompong Som.
Two widely separated government positions on
the highway were attacked by Communist troops on
1 November. At the same time, the Communists shelled
.several Cambodian positions north of the road near
the Prek Thnot dam in Kompong Speu Province. Gov-
ernment reinforcements reportedly have been dis-
patched to help clear the two short stretches of
Route 4 that the Communists now control.
These attacks, apparently mounted by Khmer Com-
munists, are the first significant Communist mili-
tary activity along Route'4 since May 1971. The
Khmer Communists have indicated that they intend to
step up harassment of the government's main lines
of communication.
Any sustained campaign against Route 4 would
further tax the capabilities of the Cambodian Army,
which thus far has been unable to break the Khmer
Communists' hold over portions of Routes 2 and 5.
A prolonged closure of Route 4 would cause addi-
tional serious supply problems for the Lon Nol gov-
ernment in view of its increasing dependence on
this highway for deliveries of im orted rice, mili-
tary equipment, and other goods.
2 Nov 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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WEST GERMANY: The handling of the Lufthansa
hijacking on 29 October is beginning to evoke a
partisan political reaction that could affect the
parliamentary election on 19 November.
Christian Social leader Strauss has charac-
terized the government's handling of the hijacking
as inept. Strauss echoed the line of the influen-
tial conservative Springer newspaper Die Welt,
which complained that Bonn has now enc7angered the
reconciliation with Israel without any offsetting
improvement in relations with the Arab world. Die
Welt also predicted that West Germany would con-
tinue to be a target for terrorist extortion.
Christian Democratic chancellor-candidate Barzel
has called for a thorough investigation of the af-
fair.
Initial public reaction overwhelmingly sup-
ported the release of the Munich terrorists as the
government's only recourse under the circumstances
if the lives of the Lufthansa passengers were to
be saved. Although this feeling remains dominant,
the government is vulnerable to criticism of the
poor communications between "crisis staffs" in
Bonn and Munich, the role Lufthansa officials
played by default in the affair, and inadequate
security precautions in general.
Developments in relations with Israel and the
Arab states in the next few days could also be im-
portant for German public opinion. Israel followed
up its severe criticism of the release of the Olympic
terrorists by recalling its ambassador for consul-
tations. Bonn has asked Libya to extradite the
hijackers and has warned other Arab governments that
renewed terrorism against West Germany could affect
bilateral relations. At this point, however, German
officials and Israeli diplomats in Bonn do not ex-
pect the hijacking to become a serious impediment
in West Germ n relations with the Middle Ease
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KOREA: Seoul is taking no chances that
proposed cons itutional reforms will fail to re-
ceive enthusiastic popular endorsemen
e government has banned virtually all
political discussion of the draft constitution
that was released on 27 October and will go to
national referendum on 21 November. Several news-
paper executives have already been placed under
house arrest for questioning government tactics.
President Pak is orchestrating an intensive prop-
aganda campaign to drum up support for the new
reforms; leading political personalities and rep-
resentatives of the media have been dragooned
into making public statements supporting the ref-
erendum.
The public has remained largely indifferent
despite the fact that the proposed constitution
creates an extremely strong executive with un-
limited tenure, broad authority over weakened
legislative and judicial branches, and consider-
able latitude to alter national policy goals.
President Pak has attempted to assuage any do-
mestic concerns by appealing to Korean nation-
alism, claiming that his actions are intended to
preserve Korean independence and further the
chances of national unification. In his proc-
lamation announcing the new constitution, Pak
said South Korea can no longer imitate the "dem-
ocratic institutions of others" and stressed the
need to establish a uniquely Korean system. Pak
has also threatened to break off the negotiations
with the North on unification if the new onsti-
tution fails to receive approval.
I I
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,LUANDA
A N G O L A
(Pen.)
Central
Africa
SALTS
RH4
REP, OF,
AFR1C A
TANZAINIA
OZAMBIQUE
{Port)
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ubtimbasl
Ndola
Z A M B I AI
LUSAKA)
Areas of Zambian based
guerrilla activity
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gZ IA-PORTUGAL: Private talks apparently will
i_ ___ _J_-_ i d- -- -- -4-V. MMA r -
lations between the two countries.
Zambian-President aun a s special assistant or
foreign affairs hopes to go shortly to Malawi for
sions to serve immediate needs, but that neither
government is willing to compromise on basic issues.
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discussions with the Portuguese ambassador to t at
country. Relations between Zambia and Portugal
reached a low point last year when Lisbon stopped
shipments of vital Zambian grain imports over Por-
tuguese African railroads for several months in re-
taliation for Zambia-based guerrilla operations
into Mozambique.
Both governments probably welcome the chance
to talk things over. Kaunda has a special need to
avoid trouble with the Portuguese at this time.
He is now wrestling with the problems of deterior-
ating government finances and the political contro-
versy that has arisen over turning Zambia into a
one-party state.
The Portuguese are concerned over a recent in-
crease in guerrilla activity in northwestern Mozam-
bique, and they may feel that this is a good time
to urge Kaunda to curb the guerrillas. The talks
will give them a chance to explore possible alter-
natives to economic and military retaliation which
they have often employed--without lasting success--
to pressure Kaunda.
These discussions are not likely to lead to a
permanent improvement in relations, however. The
record of Zambian-Portuguese negotiations indicates
that both sides are willing to make limited conces-
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NOTES
ISRAEL-SYRIA: The Israelis have moved more
troops, tanks, armored personnel carriers, and 175-mm.
artillery into the Golan Heights,
This movement may e
related to srae ! maneuvers, but could also be in
anticipation of further Syrian artillery attacks or
to alert Damascus that Israeli forces are prepared
for any eventuality. Israel is likely to continue
to use air strikes against targets in Syria, both
in retaliation for Syrian artillery attacks and as
part of Tel Aviv's policy of pre-emptive attacks
against the fedayeen. Any ground operation, however,
would probably be limited primarily to helicopter-
commando raids, considerin Tel Aviv's desire to
limit Israeli casualties.
EAST GERMANY: The government yesterday released
165 prisoners to West German authorities, with more
expected today. This was the first increment of
perhaps several thousand prisoners who probably will
be released in the next two months under the terms
of a broad amnesty declared earlier this month on
the 23rd anniversary of the GDR. Most of the pris-
oners are East German citizens who were convicted
of relatively minor crimes. Some, including yester-
day's batch, are West German citizens. The amnesty
is one of several measures Pankow has taken in re-
cent weeks to improve inter-German relations, and
thus assist Chancellor Brandt in his re-election
bid.
(continued)
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PERU: The outlook for major foreign investments
in the petroleum industry improved further last week
when a US company announced a significant discovery
in its first drilling attempt in the eastern Amazon
basin. Occidental Petroleum Company was the first
of 14 foreign companies to sign joint-venture ex-
ploration contracts with the state oil company--
Petroperu--and the first to commence drilling opera-
tions. Petroperu has drilled six test holes, three
of which were successful. Additional companies are
likely to be attracted by Occidental's find, and
the pace of exploration and development will accel-
erate. Because the oil found has a low sulfur con-
tent, Peru will have no difficulty marketing all
the oil it can produce once a trans-Andean pipeline
can be completed.
2 Nov 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 13
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