CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A022900060001-1
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
16
Document Creation Date:
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 30, 2003
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 4, 1972
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP79T00975A022900060001-1.pdf | 540.83 KB |
Body:
Approved Release 2003/08/05: CIA-RDP79T00"tA -
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
N2 41
4 October 1972
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No. 0238/72
4 October 1972
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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CAMBODIA: Communists keeping government forces off
balance. (Page 1)
DENMARK: Trade union leader to replace Krag as
prime minister. (Page 2)
BURMA: Potentially serious food shortage. (Page 3)
MEXICO: Government showing sensitivity over inter-
nal security matters. (Page 6)
MALAGASY REPUBLIC - USSR: Diplomatic relations
established. (Page 7)
SRI LANKA: Insurgent movement very much alive.
(Page 9)
CHILE: Santiago will seek credits for US grain
Page 11)
PHILIPPINES: Decree on foreign oil companies
(Page 11T_
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CAMBODIA: The Communists are keeping govern-
ment forces off balance on several fronts.
Khmer Communist elements have set
back the
gov-
ernment's efforts to reopen Route 5 to
regular
truck
convoys carrying rice from Battambang
Province
to
Phnom Penh. In recent days they have
destroyed
a
bridge and gained control over a four-mile stretch
of Route 5 some 33 miles northwest of the capital
near Oudong. The Cambodians are now trying to or-
ganize another operation to clear the road, which
had been due to open to traffic this week.
East of Phnom Penh, government units in the
vicinity of Neak Luong have met some strong Commu-
nist opposition. Two Khmer Krom battalions that
were involved in the government operation to drive
the Communists from a key high-ground position over-
looking Neak Luong have been dispersed by sharp Com-
munist ground attacks and shellings.
In Takeo Province, Cambodian forces have once
again cleared Route 2 between Phnom Penh and the
town of Takeo. Portions of the highway have been
badly damaged by the recent fighting, however, and
the Khmer Communists still hold a four-mile sec-
tion of Route 2 south of Takeo.
The Communists can be expected to sustain and
perhaps intensify their offensive actions against
the government's principal lines of communication.
In doing so, they will seriously complicate Phnom
Penh's efforts to obtain sufficient supplies of
rice over Route 5 and via the Mekong River. If the
Cambodians remain pinned down at Neak Luong, the
Communists will be in an improved position to har-
ass the shipping convoys on the Mekong.
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DENMARK: The ruling Social Democrats have
chosen Anker Jorgensen to succeed Jens-Otto Krag as
prime minister.
Krag resigned yesterday a few hours after Den-
mark voted overwhelmingly to join the European Com-
munities. Krag was vague concerning his motives for
resigning, but claimed he had been looking for an ap-
propriate opportunity to step down. He probably
viewed the EC vote as this opportunity and as the
capstone of his domestic political career.
Jorgensen, 50, has been president of Denmark's
largest trade union since 1968 and a member of par-
liament since 1964, but he has never held a minis-
terial post. His left-wing stance on most issues
may make him particularly acceptable to those ele-
ments of the party that opposed entry into the EC,
and his appointment may therefore represent an ef-
fort to reunify the party. /-The new prime minister
has until recently been a vigorous critic of US pol-
icy in Vietnam as well as of other aspects of Amer-
ican life'. 'i
Jorgensen's one-time opposition to EC member-
ship may enable him also to patch up relations be-
tween his party and the leftist Socialist People's
Party (SF), which opposed EC membership and on which
the Social Democrats depend for a majority in par-
liament.. If Jorgensen does appeal to the SF, the
present government might be able to stave off elec-
tions, at least for a time. The three bourgeois
opposition parties look stronger in the wake of the
referendum, and they apparently want new elections
to recaptures the mandate they lost last year.
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BURMA: Prime Minister Ne Win has failed to
present any constructive proposals for dealing
with a potentially serious food shortage, and pub-
lic unrest remains high.
Shortages of rice and scare buying during the
summer drove prices up, and at least ten warehouses
near Rangoon were looted early last month. The
price of cooking oil also shot up as a result of a
poor oilseeds crop and a cut in imports. Some lo-
cal authorities seized private stocks for public
distribution.
The rice problems stem largely from long-
existing government policies and bureaucratic in-
eptitude. When Ne Win came to power in 1962, free
trading in rice was abolished and the government's
procurement price was set so low that rice produc-
tion has declined. The government has had increas-
ing difficulty procuring rice for distribution in
the cities and for export. Moreover, during a
slump in the world rice market in 1969 and 1970,
Rangoon made matters worse by encouraging produc-
tion of-substitute crops.
Government stocks of rice currently are suf-
ficient only to meet the needs of urban areas at
a reduced rate until the next harvest in December.
Rural areas are being left to fend for themselves,
although private stocks there were sold during the
summer in order to take advantage of higher prices.
In a speech to a high-level party conference
on 29 September, the prime minister admitted that
rice and cooking oil were in short supply, but
recommended only that. consumers tighten their belts
and shift to other foods until the harvest. Re-
jecting any suggestions of a change in policy, he
blamed the price rises on worldwide inflation and
complained that farmers were growing crops tha
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would bring in the'most money, rather than those
called for by the economic plan. Consumer dis-
gruntlement, however, will be kept within manage-
able limits by the government's tight security
controls.
4 Oct 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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MEXICO: The government has shown its sensitiv-
ity over internal security matters by rebuffing op-
position attempts to air the subject.
The governing Revolutionary Institutional Party
(PRI) used its overwhelming congressional majority
to vote down a proposal by the major opposition party
to question the defense minister about recent guer-
rilla activity in the southwest state of Guerrero
and "acts of violence" elsewhere. A PRI spokesman
charged that such an inquiry would turn Congress into
a "body of inquisition," and make the army appear to f
-
be serving "interests contrary to those of the peo
ple." The opposition countered by questioning the
reality of the government's much heralded "demo-
cratic opening," supposedly exemplified by recent
highly publicized appearances before Congress of th
'
s
finance and foreign ministers. The government
insistence that the re-
ith it
s
action was in line w
cent incidents are acts of common criminality rather/a-
than symptoms of a serious security problem.
The administration no doubt is concerned that
a quizzing of the defense minister might uncover em-
barrassing information about the security situation.
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MALAGASY REPUBLIC - USSR: The establishment of
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, announced
at the end of Foreign Minister Ratsiraka's trip to
Moscow, is the latest in a series of foreign policy
changes carried out by General Ramanantsoa's govern-
ment.
The communique announcing the decision made no
reference to the form of representation, but the
Malagasy prefer that a Soviet envoy to another Afri-
can country be accredited to Tananarive on a non-
resident basis. The two countries will probably now
negotiate commercial accords similar to those ini-
tiated by President Tsiranana's government in 1967
but never implemented. The establishment of rela-
tions marks a significant departure from the policies
of Tsiranana, now only a figurehead, who was wary of
contacts with Communist countries and had permitted
relations with only two East European countries on
a non-resident basis.
Since coming to power in May, the new govern-
ment has ended economic aid from the South African
Government, begun strengthening previously neglected
relations with other African countries, and made a
sizable financial contribution to African liberation
movements. Ratsiraka recently paid a highly success-
ful visit to Tanzania as a first step toward broaden-
ing contacts between the two countries. While in
Dar es Salaam, Ratsiraka discussed
the possibility of establishing commer-
cial relations with Peking, but avoided the question
of diplomatic relations.
The changes reflect the government's wish to
dissociate itself from the policies of Tsiranana and
to develop a more nationalist-oriented foreign pol-
icy while decreasing dependence on France. The new
policies also are determined to some extent by eco-
nomic considerations. Increased trade and aid from
Communist countries could help bolster the sagging
economy, although ideology clearly prevailed over
economics in the case of South Africa. I
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0 Insurgent prison escapes
`J~fria
DEIII
SLAND
A. v , I R )
Anuradhapur?
Kandy,-,.,,
Daluga
COLOMBO
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SRI LANKA: The insurgent movement, which vulsed the country 18 months ago, remains very much J
alive.
Youthful insurgents continue to make their pres-
ence felt, mainly in the North Central Province.
The most recent incident was an assault on a jail,
by about 30 armed men who succeeded in freeing some
35 prisoners, most of them captured insurgents. Laf .
June the government was embarrassed when some 80 in-
surgents escaped from detention camps in three sep-
arate incidents. A number of minor disturbances-- -3
mostly holdups--have also been attributed to insur-
gent groups in recent months.
Well over 1,000 insurgents were killed and at
least 15,000 captured in the large-scale uprising
of April 1971. The rebels seem to lack the cohesion
and resources to carry out a similar attempt again
soon, but they appear capable of undertaking more
limited operations such as robberies, sabotage, or
even terrorist actions. A number of small isolated.
bands are at large, and their numbers probably will
be augmented from among the more than 12,000 persons fat
who have been released from government detention-
camps in recent months. The government, which is
currently prosecuting insurgent leaders, claims it
has been releasing only those whose involvement last
year was marginal, but some of these youths probably 3
were radicalized during their long detention and
may be joining or aiding insurgent groups.
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LE: The government plans to seek US com-
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modify export credits to finance part of its 1973
grain purchases. Should credit not be available,
Chilean officials have been authorized to use scarce
foreign exchange to pay for the grain. The head of
the government agricultural marketing agency is
under great pressure to contract for next year's
needs. Other suppliers, such as Argentina and Aus-
tralia, apparently will supply only about half of
Chile's requirements because of poor crops, commit-
ments to other customers, and doubts about Santiago's
ability to repay existing grain export credits.
Chile will need to import nearly one million tons
of wheat and about one half million tons of corn
next year.
PHILIPPINES: President Marcos' recent decree
offering incentives to foreign companies to engage
in oil exploration probably will fail to attract
major investment, in the short term at least. Al-
though the decree appears to offer favorable condi-
tions for US investments, it is uncertain whether
it will be implemented or whether it would be up-
held by the courts following the end of martial law.
Foreign oil companies, already increasingly fearful
of nationalization, have suspended the :Limited oil
exploration work that had been under way. Moreover,
concern with declining profits in the companies'
distribution operations has led some of them to con-
sider leaving the Philippines altogether.
4 Oct 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 11
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