CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A022600120001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 3, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 30, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
D
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
State Department review completed
N2 41
30 August 1972
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No. 0208/72
30 August 1972
Central Intelligence Bulletin
VIETNAM: Sharp fighting continues in the northern
provinces. (Page 1)
JAPAN-US: Tokyo intends to boost imports from the
US. (Page 2)
NATO-MBFR: Plans for talks on mutual and balanced
force reductions are running into snags. (Page 3)
INDIA-PAKISTAN: High-level negotiators in New Delhi
are trying to work out differences between the two
countries. (Page 4)
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USSR-JAPAN: The Soviets have indicated willingness
to begin peace treaty negotiations with the Japanese.
(Page 6)
BOLIVIA: President Banzer relieves dissident army
officers. (Page 7)
ARGENTINA-CHILE: The Argentine Government is smart-
ing over Chile's decision not to extradite hijackers
(Page 8)
HAITI: The Haitian economy has registered record
gains (Page 8)
JORDAN: Elections may result in violent incidents
(Page 9)
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Gulf of
Thailand
SOUTH VIETNAM
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VIETNAM: Sharp fighting is taking place in
Quang Tri and Quang Nam provinces as South Vietnam-
ese forces try to regain lost territory.
In Quang Tri, South Vietnamese Marines have been
encountering stiff enemy resistance to their probes
north of Quang Tri City, and Airborne troops report
a number of clashes to the south of the city. Enemy
gunners continue to pump thousands of artillery and
mortar rounds into government positions, and addi-
tional enemy armor has been spotted moving south to-
ward the city.
In Quang Nam, a Ranger battalion is holding on
in the district town of Que Son, and other. South
Vietnamese units are conducting limited clearing
operations south of Fire Support Base Ross. New en-
emy attacks in the coastal plains of northern Quang
Tin Province probably are aimed at spreading govern-
ment forces thin.
In the southern half of the country, enemy ac-
tion continues to consist largely of sapper attacks,
isolated small-scale ground attacks, and sporadic
shellings. Early yesterday, Communist sappers blew
up a bridge some 13 miles northwest of Saigon and
blocked a major hiahwavnortheast of the capital.
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NJ ANN-US: Tokyo will offer a plan to boost
impor s from the US by $750 million in conjunction
-anaka talks later this week.
with the NixonT
The package includes the proposed purchase of
$320 million in safeguarded enriched uranium and
another $320 million for aircraft and navigation
equipment. The remainder consists of grain, coking
coal, and gas turbines. Moreover, Tokyo is coupling
an expected normal $400-million increase in agri-
cultural imports to the total in order to increase
the psychological impact of the proposal. The pur-
chases will have little effect on Japanese imports
from the US this year, because delivery of most of
these items will be spread out over a number of
years. The US, however, will benefit immediately
from a capital flow from Tokyo because the Japanese
will prepay for the merchandise.
The Japanese have been considering these meas-
ures for more than two months and part of the pack-
age was presented at trade talks held late last
month. Heated debate among the various ministries
centered on quantities to be purchased and whether
low-interest government, loans would be provided to
finance the imports.
Tanaka probably hopes this package will help
meet his pledge to reduce Japan's trade surplus
with the US to less than $3 billion by next April,
and at the same time avoid any steps that might ad-
versely affect his prospects in elections this ear
or early next.
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NATO-MBFR: Movement toward exploratory talks
with the Warsaw Pact on mutual and balanced force
reductions (MBFR), is now blocked on two fronts:
Consultations in NATO are currently hung up by
disagreement over participation in the talks. The
five "flank states"--Italy, Greece, Turkey, Norway,
and Denmark--believe that since MBFR has been an.
initiative of the entire alliance, all members who
so desire should be represented. All the allies
except France and the US now support a Turkish pro-
posal to rotate representation among the five. The
US has argued that participation should be limited
to those countries with. forces or territory involved,
in effect excluding the flank states from a direct
role.
e US wants MBFR exploration talks to parallel
preparations for a Conference on Security and Coop-
eration in Europe (CSCE), which Moscow has been
seeking. Moscow is clearly aware of allied disarray
on MBFR and probably believes that these difficul-
ties give it a degree of flexibility regarding the
recent US demarche urging agreement to start explor-
at:ionsJ V. V. Kuznetsov, the acting Soviet foreign
minister,. told Ambassador Beam last week that the
US-Soviet summit communique did not imply a commit-
ment to begin MBFR explorations in parallel with
preparations for a security conference.
While Kuznetsov showed little enthusiasm for
MBFR, he did not repudiate Soviet willingness to
discuss it. Neither did he reject the possibility
that MBFR explorations could parallel CSCE prepara-
tions. His main concern was to keep the former from
becoming a new precondition for CSCE. Most of the
NATO allies are willing to wait a short ti to see
if the Soviets will be more forthcoming. Continued
stonewalling, however, will build support in NATO
for a further attempt to prod Moscow into opening
MBFR explorations this fall. Even if Moscow stalls
further, most of the allies would be unwilling to
postpone CSCE preparations, which they expect to
open in Helsinki_in late November.
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,INDIA-PAKISTAN: High-level negotiations in
New Delhi have bought more time for working out
differences between the two countries, but the ne-
gotiators apparently made no significant progress
on the basic issues.
According to the official joint statement, the
deadline for mutual troop withdrawals has been ex-
tended ten days to 15 September. The Indians, who
would have given up much the greater area, had de-
cided against withdrawing pending progress on other
issues. The Pakistanis had no means of forcing the
Indians to meet the original deadline.
One ostensible reason for India's reluctance
to withdraw was the lack of an, agreement on the
line of control in Kashmir. Military negotiators
are now to delineate this line--the location of
troops at the time of the cease-fire last December--
by 4 September. The Pakistanis did not, however,
agree to the Indian contention that the new cease-
fire line eliminates the need for UN observers in
Kashmir.
The Pakistanis satisfied another Indian con-
cern about withdrawal by guaranteeing the safety
of those Pakistanis--mainly Hindus--who remained
in the occupied territory or fled to India during
the war. The Pakistanis, however, have maintained
that there was never any question of the refugees'
safety.
The official statement mentions neither Paki-
stan's refusal to recognize Bangladesh nor New
Delhi's refusal to repatriate the Pakistani pris-
oners of war without Dacca's approval. These two
issues, nonetheless, are primarily responsible for
the latest impasse, and could well continue to
block progress toward any agreement.
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*USSR-Japan: The Soviets have formally indi-
cated their willingness to begin peace treaty nego-
tiations with Japanese officials of "a sufficiently
high level" in Moscow at any time.
The timing of this move suggests that Moscow
hoped to take some of the play away from Japan's
forthcoming summit meetings with the US and China.
The Japanese are unlikely, however, to show any real
interest in starting talks until later this fall.
Preparatory negotiations on the treaty talks
had been scheduled to begin in September. According
to the Japanese minister in Moscow, the Soviet ini-
tiative has made these negotiations unnecessary.
Tokyo, however, plans to do some further probing of
Soviet attitudes when a Japanese parliamentary del-
egation visits Moscow in early September.
Japan's reluctance to begin formal talks stems
in part from its basic suspicion of the Soviets and
its current preoccupation with US-Japanese and Sino-
Japanese relations. In addition, the Tanaka govern-
ment, which is under no popular pressure to improve
relations with the USSR, is hesitant to enter into
talks without a clear prospect of success. The Jap-
anese apparently are still uncertain about how Mos-
cow will handle Japan's demand for the return of the
Northern Territories--the four islands seized by the
USSR after World War II--once peace treaty negotia-
tions begin. Numerous Soviets have professed a will-
ingness to compromise on this problem since Foreign
Minister Gromyko first conceded that the question
could be discussed last January. All of the sug-
gested compromises have fallen well short of Japan's
demand for the return of all four islands, however,
and none of them has been conveyed at an authorita-
tive level.
*Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the analytic
interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency without the participation of the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, Department of State.
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SECRET
BOLIVIA: President Banzer has acted to avert
po n threat from the right.
Second Army Division commander Colonel Juan
Ayoroa has been relieved of his command, along with
his chief of staff and the commander of an important
subordinate Ranger unit. Ayoroa's loyalty to the
coalition government has been in question since his
intervention early this month in the public feud
between his cousin, army engineer commander Colonel
Jose Patino, and the Nationalist Revolutionary Move-
ment (MNR).
Patino, w no was relieved o is command and later
reinstated, may now again be removed, as may another
cousin, Miguel, who commands the Santa Cruz Rangers
and whom Ayoroa visited.
The Ayoroa clan apparently has failed to gain
significant military support for its militantly
anti-MNR stand. Its members are personally dis-
liked by the middle-ranking officers who command
key units in and around La Paz.
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NOTE2
ARGENTINA-CHILE: Buenos Aires has expressed
"deep ispleasure at Chilean President Allende's
decision to send the terrorists who hijacked an
airliner to Santiago two weeks ago to Cuba rather
than back to Argentina. The recall of the Argentine
ambassador to Chile was only the first step in re-
taliation, according to an Argentine Foreign Ministry
source. The source said that Argentina intends to
"tighten the screws" on Chile and may resort to eco-
nomic sanctions. Argentina is an important supplier
of meat and grain, to Chile, where shortages have led
to some belt-tightening in recent months. It seems
unlikely that Argentina will go so far as to turn
its back on an important trading partner or halt
several bilateral projects beneficial to both coun-
tries, but President Lanusse's policy of dropping
"ideolo ical barriers" will suffer a major setback.
HAITI: The economy registered a six-percent
gain in 171, the largest in almost a decade. Light
industry and tourism led the way, reflecting, in
part, Port-au-Prince's slowly improving image with
tourists and foreign investors. The economic situ-
ation can be expected to show further moderate gains,
given continuing political stability. Overpopula-
tion and the lack of resources and effective insti-
tutions, however, will keep the Haitian economy
among the world's poorest.
(continued)
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JORDAN: Elections for officers of the govern-
ment-controlled Arab National Union (ANU), Jordan's
only legal political party, may serve more to ac-
centuate local animosities than to cement national
unity. The scramble for positions on the ballot
has already led to intra-tribal feuding in the north
and could result in some localized violence during
the elections, which start today and continue over
an extended period. The Jordanian Government, at
the insistence of the late Prime Minister Wasfi
Tal, founded the ANU in 1971 to undercut radical
movements, especially among Palestinians, by'bririg-
ing East Jordanians and Palestinians together in a
mass political party. Most Jordanians, however, do
not take the ANU seriously and. would be happy to
see King Husayn scrap the organization altogether.
He will nonetheless probably allow the elections
to proceed, only taking steps to ease the tensions
they have generated.
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Secret
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