CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A022600060002-3
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 6, 2003
Sequence Number:
2
Case Number:
Publication Date:
August 23, 1972
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP79T00975A022600060002-3.pdf | 94.81 KB |
Body:
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Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Top Secret
C 208
1972
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Central Intelligence Bulletin
CHILE: Violence ends but military leaders are
discussing coup plans. (Page 3)
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CHILE: The violence Monday night has abated
following a declaration of a "state of emergency"
that put the army in control of security in the
capital province. Retail merchants met with Presi-
dent Allende and agreed to end their strike.
Before the demonstrations on Monday, several
senior military leaders reportedly were discussing
the possibility of a coup some time in the future.
the service command-
ers agree that eventual mi i ary intervention is
almost inevitable and that some troop commanders
are seeking an appointment with the army chief to
discuss what they consider to be a deteriorating
political situation. Extreme rightists reportedly
have decided to try to provoke a crisis because
they believe that only a complete breakdown in
public order or a blatantly unconstitutional act
by Allende would bring on military intervention.
The armed forces, however, expect such provocations
and are unlikely to react to a contrived emergency.
Concern over accumulating economic and politi-
cal problems probably prompted some military lead-
ers to review their options. They may be close to
agreement on the mechanics of intervention, but
probably not on the circumstances that would war-
rant such action. Further discussions are likely
as military officers re-evaluate their role, but
cleavages within the armed forces will continue
to inhibit any broad consensus.
23 Aug 72
Central Intelligence Bulletin 3
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Top Secret
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