CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A022000020001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 26, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79f0097-5A02qAffM& -4
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
N?_ 42
26 M 4y 1972.
State Department review completed
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975A022000020001-4
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO22000020001-4
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO22000020001-4
 Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975A022000020001-4
SECRET
No. 0126/72
26 May 1972
Central Intelligence Bulletin
VIETNAM: Situation report. (Page 1)
USSR: Shelest replaced as head of Ukrainian Commu-
nist Party. (Page 3)
JAPAN-CHINA: Sato signals that Tokyo is prepared
to move forward in normalizing relations with Peking.
(Page 4)
CHILE: Communist leaders ready to compromise on
some issues with the governing coalition. (Page 5)
25X6
ITALY: Efforts to form a new government. (Page 8)
SUDAN: Numayri's moves toward the West face stif-
fened opposition. (Page 10)
COCOM: US-European split (Page 11)
25X6
CEYLON: Protests over new constitution (Page 13)
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975A022000020001-4
 Approved For Release 2003/$&49 RDP79T00975AO22000020001-4
SECRET
CAMBODIA
KON
Kohtui
BINH
O NH
s9urr VJtM
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975A
 Approved For Release 2003/19.ECXBSDP79T00975A022000020001-4
C VIETNAM: The Communists are increasing pres-
sure on government positions in several areas.
In the central highlands North Vietnamese
forces supported by tanks mounted new attacks dur-
ing the night against the defenses of Kontum City.
Five enemy tanks have been knocked out. Prelimi-
nary reports indicate that the main enemy attack
has been repelled, but fighting continues in the
area. Yesterday North Vietnamese sappers infil-
trated the city and skirmished sharply with govern-
ment troops before being beaten back. Heavy and
accurate enemy shellings also knocked out a number
of South Vietnamese artillery positions around Kon-
tum and closed the airfield.
Heavy fighting also broke out again north of
Hue overnight as North Vietnamese infantry and tank
forces attacked South Vietnamese marine lines. The
enemy reportedly failed to make a major penetration,
and casualties on both sides are said to be substan-
tial. The South Vietnamese marines raiding behind
enemy lines in Quang Tri in recent days, meanwhile,
report that they have destroyed large quantitites
of enemy equipment and supplies. The enemy losses,
however, will tend to be offset by the substantial
quantities of supplies the enemy is continuing to
move into northern South Vietnam from Laos.
Some of the supplies evidently are intended
for the enemy buildup in the area west of Hue.
Although the Communists are continuing to posi-
tion their forces for offensive operations and are
keeping pressure on government forces on the major
battlefronts, they apparently view their recent 3
26 May 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO22000020001-4
 Approved For Release 2003/$M QDP79T00975AO22000020001-4
25X1
25X1
battle performance as less than satisfacI .
the
Vie namese communist high command in the southern
provinces has issued an assessment of the offensive
that observes that Communist military forces and
political cadre had fallen far short of their ob-
jectives by mid-May.
The document criticizes the military units for
scattering rather than concentrating their assets,
and describes the Communist political operation in
the cities as "paralyzed." The guidance differs
markedly from an earlier optimistic assessment is-
sued by the same headquarters last month.
In North Vietnam, the regime is apparently
still having problems with the performance of its
cadre following the step-up in US bombing and the
increased efforts needed to support the offensive
in the South. The first hint that dissatisfaction
has reached the point where the regime is at least
considering a purge of deficient cadre was contained
in an article on 16 May in the Hanoi city newspaper
by an official of the local party committee. He
claimed that, in a combat situation, the "small seg-
ment" of party members who are unequal to the new
tasks are "no longer worthy of being party members."
These cadre must be ostracized "in time" in order
to keep the party "clean and steadfast."
The article appeared only a few days after the
regime had announced strict new security measures
to curb "socialist abuses." Whether the problems
go beyond effective performance by cadre and re-
flect some cadre dissatisfaction with Hanoi's olic
on the t at present.
26 May 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO22000020001-4
 Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO22000020001-4
SECRET
USSR: A plenum of the central committee of
the Ukrainian Communist Party on 25 May elected
Vladimir Shcherbitsky first secretary, replacing
Petr Shelest.
The change in the Ukrainian leadership had
been expected since Shelest was appointed to the
less important position of deputy chairman of the
USSR Council of ministers last week. Ukrainian
Premier Shcherbitsky was the logical choice. At
the 24th party congress in March 1971, Shcherbit-
sky, a long-time protege of party chief Brezhnev,
became a full member of the politburo in an elec-
tion engineered by Brezhnev--an event which now
makes it clear that Shcherbitsky was being groomed
as Shelest's successor.
The coincidence of recent events suggests
that Shelest, who has a reputation as a critic of
detente, lost out in debate over foreign policy.
His demotion would seem to strengthen Brezhnev's
hand in foreign policy. Shelest has also been a
critic of some of Brezhnev's internal policies
and the demotion may ultimately have an effect in
this area. Shelest may well retain his CPSU
politburo seat for some time, however, as have
Shelepin and Voronov, who were previously demoted
to jobs not calling for politburo status.
In moving up to become first secretary,
Shcherbitsky will soon give up his position in
the Ukrainian government. The speedy change in
the Ukrainian leadership avoids the potential
embarrassment of having President Nixon meet
with Shelest during his visit to Kiev next week.
F77 I
26 May 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO22000020001-4
 Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO22000020001-4
SECRET
25X1
JAPAN-CHINA: Prime Minister Sato has given the
clearest public signal to date that Japan is prepared
to move forward in normalizing relations with Peking.
In Diet debate on 24 May, Sato expressed a fun-
damental awareness that the Peoples Republic of China
is the "sole legitimate" government of China. This
explicit acknowledgment departs from Japan's long-
standing formulation that the Peoples Republic is
merely the government that represents China, and it
meets one of Peking's conditions for the restoration
of relations. Sato used the rationale of China's
entry into the UN to support the need for normaliza-
tion. He skirted, however, China's demands that
Tokyo comment on the territorial status of Taiwan
and abrogate its peace treaty with Taipei.
Sato billed his remarks as a necessary response
to the "flexibility" demonstrated by Chou En-lai last
week. Meeting with a visiting Japanese opposition
party delegation, the premier said that China would
welcome a visit by a representative of the Japanese
Government after Sato's retirement if Tokyo adhered
to Peking's three principles for normalization.
There have also been indications that Peking is tak-
ing a softer line on these conditions.
Sato publicly acknowledged for the first time
on 24 May that the Japanese Government has attempted
to communicate directly with Chinese leaders. His
latest comments were made at his own initiative and
should lay the groundwork for more rapid progress
after his expected retirement this summer, although
there may not yet be full consensus within the gov-
ernment on how to proceed.
I I
26 May 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO22000020001-4
25X1
 Approved For Release 2003/1~VIDP79T00975A022000020001-4
CHILE: Communist Party leaders, temporarily
successful in the showdown within the Popular Unity
(UP) coalition over violent tactics, are now ready
to compromise on some other issues.
The Communists,
agree with President Aide a the con-
stant within the UP must cease. They
reportedly have dropped their opposition to a
cabinet reorganization, so long as they continue
to hold the same ministries. Fearing that Allende's
opposition to a plebiscite is weakening, they will
reluctantly accept the Socialists' insistence on
using this device to test public support for the
government.
On the use of violence, however, no lasting
agreement is likely. The Communists do not be-
lieve that the Socialist leaders' recent public
repudiation of the violent activities of the Move-
ment of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) will end
their behind-the-scenes support for the increasingly
active MIR. In fact, neither the Socialists nor
national leaders of smaller extreme leftist UP
parties can--or want to--control local members who
prefer to make common cause with the MIR.
The Communists are shrewd enough not to unite
their UP rivals by pushing the advantage they gained
last week on the violence issue. They are well
aware that in several areas, such as labor union
elections next week and the mismanagement of the
Chuquicamata copper complex, they are themselves
vulnerable to challenge. They are conscious too
that despite Allende's preference for the cautious
tactics the Communists favor, he has often given
in to hard-line Socialist pressures on vital issues.
26 May 72
Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975A022000020001-4
 25X6 Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO22000020001-4
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO22000020001-4
 Approved For Release 2003/1~ DP79TOO975AO22000020001-4
ITALY: Formal consultation leading to a new
government will begin soon but the prospects for
forming a lasting coalition remain uncertain.
Informal exchanges among top political leaders
show a willingness to reconstitute a center-left
coalition but only if the Socialist Party retreats
from its demands that the Communists be allowed to
contribute to legislative programs. So far, So-
cialist leaders have not publicly committed them-
selves, and they may not take a final position
until internal problems are sorted out at a na-
tional party congress next autumn.
The attractions of power and patronage will
be difficult for the Socialists to resist. Ul-
timately they probably will submit to coalition
discipline and drop their insistence on a greater
parliamentary role for the Communists. Top So-
cialist leaders reportedly have agreed on this
tactic but prefer to wait a decent interval be-
fore they drop the theme they argued so vigorously
for during the campaign.
In the interim, Italy will be governed by a
minority coalition or an all-Christian Democrat
caretaker government. The Socialists reportedly
are prepared to support a tripartite combination
composed of their former center-left partners
(Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, and Re-
publicans) as long as it is understood that the
Socialists will be included in a more permanent
center-left coalition after the fall party con-
gresses.
Christian Democrat leaders also prefer a
temporary tripartite government. They are con-
cerned that Italy's many problems will seriously
weaken their party if they continue to govern
alone. If the Christian Democrats and Socialists
postpone a decision on future cooperation until
26 May 72
Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
pprovedForRelease 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO22000020001-4
 Approved For Release 2003/1SEC]VA DP79T00975AO22000020001-4
after their party congresses in the fall, an all-
Christian Democrat government may be the only solu-
tion available in the near term.
The newly elected parliament convened yesterday
and will spend its first few sessions electing of-
ficers to head the Senate and Chamber of Deputies.
After this is resolved the floor leaders of the
various parties are elected and formal consultations
prior to the naming of a remier-designate by Pres-
ident Leone will begin.
26 May 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 9
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO22000020001-4
25X1
 Approved For Release 2003/ RCJYPDP79T00975AO22000020001-4
SUDAN: The pro-Egyptian faction in the govern-
ment is stiffening its opposition to President Nu-
mayri's moves toward the West.
25X1
Minister of Economics Mansur confided to a US
official in Khartoum that Numayri was coming under
increasingly heavy criticism for going too far in
developing ties with Western nations, especially
the US. In Mansur's view the benefits to be derived
from a formal resumption of relations with the US
would be outweighed by the political storm this ac-
tion would generate.
Mansur's observations should be interpreted
against a background of worsening Sudan-Egypt rela-
tions and the ouster over the past three months of
a number of ministers and other officials who favor
close ties with Cairo. Numayri has now begun to
weed out a number of pro-Egyptian army officers from
responsible positions, and he is said to be ready
to move against some of his remaining critics in the
cabinet.
The Egyptians and their friends in the Khartoum
government have tried to halt Numayri's gradual
loosening of Sudan's ties with the Arab world and
to turn him away from his concentration on domestic
problems. The almost daily meetings of the politi-
cal bureau of the ruling Sudan Socialist Union over
the past week could indicate a climactic debate on
these issues, particularly on foreign policy.
26 May 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO22000020001-4
 Approved For Release 2003/10,qt M.jDP79T00975A022000020001-4
survival might be threatened in the absence of a
more forthcoming US position in the communications
COCOM: The European allies are on the verge
of a serious split with the US on the issue of con-
trols on strategic trade with Communist countries.
At a meeting this week in Paris of the Coordinating
Committee (COCOM) dealing with periodic list review
of export items, the British delegate walked out be-
cause the US could not yet present its final posi-
tion on UK requests for relaxation of controls on
certain communications items. The British regard
these items as touchstones for the success of the
entire list review and noted that COCOM credibility
is already being challenged politically and by in-
dustry circles. The UK delegate charged the US
with "apparent contempt" for others' views. The
British have been supported by the other Europeans
and, in the view of the US mission in Paris, COCOM's
25X1
25X6
(continued)
26 May 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975A022000020001-4
11
 Approved For Release 2d.&0ETIA-RDP79T00975A022000020001-4
DELFT
ISLAND
CEYLON
COLOMBO*
Trincomalee
Batticaloa
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO22000020001-4
 0
Approved For Release 2003/1q':,CIE-1PP79T00975A022b00020001-4
CEYLON: The minority Tamils are becoming more
active in protesting the new constitution enacted
last Monday. The Tamils, who comprise about 22 per-
cent of the population, insist that the new charter
does not adequately guarantee the use of their lan-
guage in Tamil areas of the country. Although most
of the protest activities have remained non-violent,
Tamil students in the Jaffna peninsula reportedly
have begun barricading roads, clashing with the po-
lice, and damaging vehicles and public facilities.
Similar incidents on a smaller scale have been re-
ported at Trincomalee and Batticaloa, which, like
Jaffna, are located in areas where Tamils are con-
centrated. Government security forces apparently
have been exercising restraint so far and have
avoided the use of firearms. They may, however, be
forced to become tougher, particularly if large num-
bers of Tamils decide to support the students rather
than the more restrained Tamil political leaders.
26 May 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975A022000020001-4
 Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO22000020001-4
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO22000020001-4