CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A021700010001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 15, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
N?- 42
15 April 1972
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No. 0091/72
15 April 1972
Central Intelligence Bulletin
SOUTH VIETNAM: Communists are maintaining heavy
pressure on An Loc. (Page 1)
USSR-VIETNAM: Soviets increase propaganda support
for Hanoi. (Page 3)
PAKISTAN:. Bhutto offers early end to martial law
if assembly approves interim constitution. (Page 4)
WEST GERMANY: Barzel reaffirms opposition to rati-
fication of Eastern treaties. (Page 5)
JORDAN-SYRIA: Damascus quietly removes most bar-
riers to transit of Jordanian exports. (Page 6)
LEBANON: Prospects for parliamentary elections.
Page 7)
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URUGUAY: Four new murders fuel government drive
for security legislation. (Page 10)
MEXICO: Large demonstration will sorely test gov-
ernment's tolerance. (Page 11)
USSR-CUBA: Naval combatants move to Havana (Page 13)
ISRAEL-JORDAN: West Bank elections (Page 13)
JAPAN: Trade surplus (Page 14)
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ORTt
VJET
168
Demilitarized Zone
N
H ue~C.. 'i\
N"g
MR i
U Minh Forest
Gulf of
Thailand
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ang Ngai
MR 2
tha. Trang
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C SOUTH VIETNAM: The Communists are continuing
to put heavy pressure on the South Vietnamese forces
defending An Loc.
Communist forces at the southern end of the
provincial capital are bringing numerous tracked ve-
hicles and trucks close to the city. After three
hours of heavy contact, South Vietnamese forces de-
fending the southwestern edge of the town fell back
and set up a new defensive perimeter. There are
some as yet unconfirmed press reports, however, that
government forces within the town have been doing
fairly well and have recaptured many city blocks
from the enemy.
So far, more than two South Vietnamese battal-
ions have been airlifted into the city to assist in
its defense. Concentrated bombing of enemy positions
around the city has inflicted heavy losses and has
accounted for some of the enemy's tank losses there.
The relief column that had been trying to reach An
Loc appears to be digging in well south of the city.
The airborne brigade that has been spearheading this
column is to be airlifted into An Loc, while the
21st ARVN Division, which makes up the balance of
this relief force, will stay to the south.
The recent appearance of substantial numbers
of enemy tanks and the convergence of over two enemy
divisions make it clear that the Communists plan to
make the battle for An Loc one of the major engage-
ments of the current offensive. They appear to be
accepting a showdown battle in the hope of inflict-
ing such heavy punishment on the South Vietnamese
forces that the morale of ARVN troops throughout
the country will be badly shaken and the Saigon re-
gime faced with serious recrimination and dissen-
sion in the aftermath.
The uninspired performance so far of the 21st
ARVN Division and the airborne brigade leading the
relief column suggests it may have great difficulty
15 Apr 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 1
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Cextricating itself from the area without taking very
heavy losses. Last year, the Communists made good
use of locally superior numbers, supported by tanks,
to harass South Vietnamese columns moving into south-
ern Laos against enemy supply routes. Communist
forces also inflicted heavy punishment on South
Vietnamese units at Snuol last year and hope for a
repeat performance. Allied air power may help to
even the odds somewhat. The enemy is not as strong
in Binh Long as he was in his own base areas across
the border, but it is virtually certain that the
Communist High Command has ordered its units along
Route 13 to do their best to destroy the-South Viet-
namese units in the area.
The enemy is also keeping the pressure on in
the delta. Operating out of the U Minh Forest, Com-
munist units have reportedly overrun 20 of 24 out-
posts in one district of Chuong Thien Province, and
heavy attacks are expected shortly against the cap-
ital of Kien Hoa Province and in Dinh Tuong Province.
The withdrawal of the 21st ARVN Division from MR-4
to help at An Lac is clearly encouraging the enemy
in the delta to adopt more a r ssive tactics.
enemy local
orces throughout the delta have been ordered to be-
come much more active in support of the larger Com-
munist units.
Enemy forces are not concentrated in such heavy
numbers in the delta as they are around An Loc; they
nevertheless appear intent on imposing heavy losses
on government regular and territorial security
forces in order to put the latter on the defensive.
The Communists want to open up the countryside for
more o erations by enemy combat units and political
cadre.
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USSR-VIETNAM: The Soviets have increased their
propaganda support for the North Vietnamese, but
this treatment still falls short of Moscow's output
during previous offensives.
In the last three days, Soviet party leader
Brezhnev, Premier Kosygin, and Defense Minister
Grechko all have met with the North Vietnamese am-
bassador in Moscow. All three Soviet leaders ex-
pressed support for the Vietnamese Communists.
Brezhnev and Kosygin went beyond the previous Soviet
condemnation of. US bombing and demanded its "imme-
diate" cessation. Kosygin also urged that the US
"seriously return to the Paris talks." The meetings
with Hanoi's envoy, taking place in the midst of an
offensive, are themselves unusual gestures on Mos-
cow's part. Moreover, in contrast to Kosygin's
"frank" meeting with the North Vietnamese in Febru-
ary, all were characterized as having taken place
in a "friendly" or "cordial" atmosphere.
Soviet concern for US sensibilities in the pe-
riod prior to President Nixon's visit was evident,
however, in the leadership's reluctance to say any-
thing publicly about the fighting in South Vietnam
or about Hanoi's recent request for "even stronger
support" from its allies. The Soviet press replayed
the North Vietnamese Government statement that was
issued on 11 April but deleted from it Hanoi's re-
quest for "stronger assistance."
Nonetheless, the Soviets have geared up their
domestic propaganda apparatus in support of North
Vietnam. Radio Moscow announced on 13 April that
"massive rallies" had been held in "Moscow, Kiev,
Minsk, and tens of other Soviet cities" to condemn
the "current expansion of American aggression in
Vietnam." This kind of agitation, however, falls
considerably short of the strong, authoritative con-
demnation for which Hanoi publicly has appealed.
It seems intended to serve, at least temporarily,
as a substitute for more direct, official Soviet
criticism of US actions.
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C PAKISTAN: President Bhutto has offered to end
martial law on 21 April rather than 14 August if
the National Assembly approves his interim consti-
tution.
He also told the assembly last night that
parties controlling a majority in local assemblies
will be allowed to form provincial governments in
contrast to present practice wherein the governor,
appointed by the president, is the final authority.
He also promised that parties other than his own
will be represented in the central cabinet.
Bhutto has thus met the most important public
demands of National Awami Party leader Wali Khan.
He may hope to make further opposition by Wali ap-
pear petty even though the basic issues, the most
important of which is the specific relationship be-
tween the central and provincial governments, have
not yet been decided.
Bhutto may also be seeking to overcome any
significant negative reaction to his program in the
assembly. The interim constitution has been sharply
criticized by some opposition leaders, and there
have been rumors that part of his own party might
vote against Bhutto on martial law. Bhutto may have
calculated that, even though he had the votes in the
assembly to carry his programs, the spectacle of
significant opposition to them would have weakened
his position in negotiating with India and made it
more difficult for him to implement his domestic
policies.
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WEST GERMANY: Christian Democratic Chairman
Barzel has reaffirmed his opposition to the ratifi-
cation of the Eastern treaties following his meeting
with Chancellor Brandt on 12 April.
In a statement issued after the meeting, Barzel
asserted that recent Communist concessions and clar-
ifications still do not meet the demands of the
Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Un-
ion. He repeated his earlier call for Brandt to sus-
pend ratification and seek renegotiation with Moscow,
arguing that more improvements, particularly regard-
ing "freedom of movement" between the two Germanies,
could be elicited. Brandt and Moscow have consist-
ently rejected this call.
Barzel was not swayed by North Rhine - Westphalia
Minister-President Kuehn's report of his conversation
with Brezhnev on 11 April. Nevertheless, no major
concessions apparently were granted, and Barzel com-
plained that Kuehn had returned only with clarifica-
tions and interpretations of "doubtful and short-
lived" validity. Barzel did not deny that Germany's
allies favor ratification but claimed that non-rati-
fication would not lead "to isolation or disaster."
He also speculated that, if the treaties were de-
feated, Moscow would still allow the Four Power Ber-
lin Accord to take effect in order to open the way
for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe.
Barzel's statement appears to close off wide-
spread international speculation that a sufficient
number of opposition Bundestag members ultimately
will vote for the treaties to ensure ratification.
Although Barzel will allow his 246 deputies freedom
to vote their conscience when the treaties come up
for the first vote on 4 or 5 May, his latest, state-
ment was adopted unanimously by the opposition par-
liamentary group. If Brandt is correct in believing
that some opposition deputies fear the consequences
of non-ratification, these deputies may decide to
be absent from the vote in May.
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JORDAN-SYRIA: Damascus, without publicity, has
gradually remove most of the barriers that have
prevented Jordanian goods from transiting Syrian
territory since last July.
Following the official decision last month to
allow Jordanian phosphates to transit Syria, Damas-
cus now is permitting Jordan's major export prod-
ucts--fruits and vegetables--to enter Syria on Jor-
danian trucks, which then are allowed to carry goods
back into Jordan. According to Jordanian officials,
merchandise from Lebanon also is being permitted to
transit Syria into Jordan.
Jordan was more seriously affected by the re-
strictions on trade with or through Syria than by
the cutoff of commercial dealings that Egypt an-
nounced last week. More than half of Amman's for-
eign trade is with or transits Syria, whereas less
than ten percent of Jordan's foreign commerce is
conducted with Cairo.
Syria's relaxation of its border restrictions
may be explained by the fact that Damascus is less
directly affected than is Cairo by Libyan and fed-
ayeen pressures to take sanctions against King
Husayn. By acting unofficially and without public-
ity, the Syrians since last fall have been able to
take slow and deliberate steps to ease the effect
of their formal ban on Jordanian commercial traffic,
from which they also derive some enefits.
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LEBANON: In the first round of the parliamen-
tary elections that will begin Sunday, few new faces
will appear, and most of them will be as conservative
as their predecessors.
Elections will be held tomorrow in Beirut and
north Lebanon, followed on the next two Sundays by
balloting in the other sections of the country.
This procedure permits the security forces to con-
centrate on one area at a time in holding down the
violence that usually occurs in Lebanese elections.
Most of the successful candidates will be the con-
servative regional and clan leaders who personally
draw up the electoral slates. The only place where
a leftist candidate has a good chance of winning in
the first round is in the northern city of Tripoli
where Communism and Baathism have considerable ap-
peal among the predominantly Sunni Muslim population.
The front-runner among leftists in Tripoli is a pro-
Iraqi Baathist, who will benefit as much from family
influence and personal popularity as from ideologi-
cal appeal.
Lebanese voters generally follow religious and
family lines at the ballot box. Throughout the coun-
try, therefore, the majority of candidates that will
be returned will be the traditional leaders who have
always dominated local politics and band together in
parliament to maintain the status quo. The inabil-
ity of younger reform-minded "radicals" to break into
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this exclusive club and form an effective parliamen
tary bloc has deepened their disillusionment with
the existing system and its inability to tackle eco-
nomic and social problems.
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CURUGUAY: President Bordaberry is using yester-
day's killing of four men by terrorists, apparently
Tupamaros, to bolster his requests for broad secu-
rity legislation.
Bordaberry has been attempting to secure con-
gressional sanction of a strong new national secu-
rity law to replace the present emergency measures
which are due to be lifted on 30 April. The most.
important provision of the proposed law, giving the
military extensive authority to deal with terrorism,
has met considerable opposition from legislators who
claim these sections are unconstitutional.
In the wake of yesterday's violence, the pres-
ident has decided to ask Congress to permit the
lifting of constitutional guarantees and to give
immediate approval to the proposed national secu-
rity law. He has also ordered security forces to
ensure the continued captivity of the approximately
100 suspected terrorists now in custody. A press
report indicates that the defense minister, General
Magnini, has said that the armed forces now demand
the adoption of stringent measures to deal with ter-
rorism. Bordaberry reportedly has also received
support for his security proposals from some key
politicians, including two of the opposition Blanco
Party men he defeated for the presidency last year.
In a nationwide radio and television address,
Bordaberry condemned the terrorists and said that
their attempts to force the government to abandon
the constitutional path would not succeed.
The death toll on the government side includes
two policemen, a naval officer, and a man who
served as undersecretary of the interior in the
previous administration. The government has claimed
that joint operations by military and police units
caused the deaths of at least eight Tupamaros, in-
cluding an important leader, and the capture of
many more. The security forces will continue-their
drive against the terrorists.
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CMEXICO: A large protest demonstration by stu-
dents, peasants, and workers in the capital today
will be a severe test of the government's willing-
ness to allow dissent.
The government has put the military in Mexico
City on full alert in expectation of possible trouble.
Upwards of 50,000 demonstrators are expected at the
rally that began earlier this week as a protest
march by peasants from rural areas near Mexico City.
Most of these marchers were halted peacefully short
of the capital by government officials, who per-
suaded them to turn back. A splinter group, headed
by a local Communist party agrarian leader, continued
on, however, and its numbers have grown with the
addition of students and workers from Mexico City.
The peasants and workers are protesting gov-
ernment agrarian and labor policies, and the stu-
dents, whose addition in large numbers will add a
volatile dimension to the protest, are promoting
their causes, particularly support for striking
colleagues at Sinaloa University.
the local Communist party is
supporting o ay s demonstration and is trying to
take control of the protest. The party has ar-
ranged for demonstrators to be brought into the
capital from several areas of the country. Dissi-
dent leftist union leaders and their followers are
also participating in the rally.
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Soviet Naval Visits to Cuba
Jan Feb Mar Aor May Jun Jul Aun
20-27
14-29
15 days
1971 -
18 days 10 days
17 days
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USSR-CUBA: Two Soviet naval combatants that
have been in Cienfuegos since 5 March moved to Ha-
vana on 14 April. During the nearly six-week port
call at Cienfuegos, the Kotlin-class destroyer and
the F-class submarine made several out-of-port sor-
ties to operate with Cuban ships. If the ships
follow the pattern of previous visits to Havana,
they also will conduct joint naval operations in
the Gulf of Mexico. This deployment is the longest
visit of Soviet combatants to Caribbean waters, ex-
cept for a call at Havana that began on 31 October
1971 and lasted 12 weeks, due in part to repairs re-
quired by another F-class submarine.
ISRAEL-JORDAN: The recent municipal elections
in the northern part of the occupied West Bank left
essentially unchanged the relative influence of the
Israelis and the Jordanian Government on the local
population. Israeli officials claimed that the mere
holding of elections was an endorsement of their
occupation policies, but Tel Aviv at the last moment
had to threaten local Palestinian officials with
sanctions against their communities if the voters
did not turn out. The Jordanian Government, after
first trying to torpedo the elections, tacitly ad-
mitted its inability to control their outcome. West
Bank residents themselves initially protested the
elections but ultimately accepted them and voted for
their traditional conservative leaders. The south-
ern portion of the West Bank is scheduled to hold
its municipal elections on 2 May, and the outcome
is likely to parallel the results in the north.
(continued)
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JAPAN: The trade surplus of $1.8 billion for
the fir qsiuarter of this year represents an increase
of 62 percent over the same period last year and in-
dicates that the revaluation of the yen has not yet
had an impact on Japan's foreign trade. The surplus
was partially offset by larger deficits in the cap-
ital accounts that resulted from government curbs
on advance payments for exports and increases in its
purchases of medium- and long-term foreign securi-
ties. The continued strong performance of the Japa-
nese export sector, however, may increase the belief
among various foreign and domestic businessmen that
the yen remains undervalued. Given the trend in
the trade balance, official holdings of reserves,
which now stand at $16.7 billion, could easily ap-
proach $20 billion by the end of the year.
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Secret
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