CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A021400090002-3
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
9
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 23, 2003
Sequence Number: 
2
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 16, 1972
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A021400090002-3.pdf113.68 KB
Body: 
Approved Forlease 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T0097f,Qrb21400090002-3 Top Secret DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Central Intelligence Bulletin Top Secret 16 March 1972 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A021400090002-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400090002-3 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400090002-3 Approve 25X1 25X1 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 CHILE: Allende maneuvers to blunt military opposi- tion (Page 4) 25X1 25X6 25X1 25X6 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400090002-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400090002-3 Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400090002-3 Ap ILE: President Allende's assiduous attention to t e military apparently continues to work to his advantage. The prospects that the Chilean military will soon oust Allende are poor,j __f sev- eral recent shifts in key military assignments indi- cate that Allende is ensuring that any coup attempt would fail. Allende will also renew his effort to include at least one top military leader in the cabinet, Such an appointment would lend the prestige o ze military to Allende's poli- cies and blunt potential military opposition but would not strengthen the cabinet because Chilean military officers are not well trained in political and economic matters, as are their Peruvian counter- parts. Relations with the military have been a top priority with Allende since the murder of the army chief, on the eve of Allende's assumption of power, rallied the armed forces to their role of defenders of the constitution. He has flattered them, de- fended them against critics, raised their pay, and dealt deftly with their reluctance to be drawn closely into many aspects of his administration. Many in the military strongly resent Allende and his Marxist policies and supporters. It seems cer- tain, however, that the deep divisions and the inde- cision now so apparent among all Chileans are re- flected in the armed forces. Nevertheless, if the power struggle n ht and left soon develops into violence, the military a and police will har be a =e to avoi taking and Central Intelligence Bulletin 4 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400090002-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400090002-3 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400090002-3 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400090 b02-3 25X1 25X6 25X1 (continued) Central Intelligence Bulletin 8 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400090002-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400090002-3 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400090002-3 25X1 Approved Fojelease 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79TO09 021400090002-3 Top Secret Top Secret Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400090002-3