CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A021400050002-7
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
10
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 11, 2003
Sequence Number: 
2
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 11, 1972
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A021400050002-7.pdf189.89 KB
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Approved Forlalease 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00979 21400050002-7 Top Secret 25X1 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Central Intelligence Bulletin State Department review completed Top Secret Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A021400050002-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400050002-7 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400050002-7 Approv~d For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400050002-7 I 25X1 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 GUATEMALA-UK: Arana government suspends negotiations following'British refusal'to withdraw troops from'British Honduras. (Page 3) 25X1 FINLAND: Assessment of factional rivalry in Communist party. (Page 10) 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400050002-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400050002-7 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400050002-7 Approve GUATEMALA-UK: The Arana government has launched the="opening salvo of a diplomatic and propaganda cam- paign opposing Britain's increased military presence in British Honduras. In a communique released yesterday evening, the Foreign Ministry characterized London's decision to increase permanently the size of its garrison and particularly to station Gurkha infantry units in the colony as an act of aggression and a threat to the integrity of the hemisphere. The communique further stated that all negotiations with Britain had been suspended and that the government would take the necessary measures to protect the national interest and dignity of Guatemala. The government noted that secret negotiations between Foreign Minister Herrera and British Minis- ter of State Godber in Washington yesterday had been unproductive. The British had refused to reduce troop strength to normal levels, had refused to com- promise.on the number of reinforcements, and had in- sisted on replacing Grenadiers with Gurkhas. In view of previous government concern that the British troop reinforcement decision be kept secret, the Arana decision to publicize the matter is a par- ticularly significant indication that the government is willing to commit its entire prestige to an all- out effort to reverse the British decision. Herrera, when he returns home, may try to per- suade the cabinet to make a further attempt to win a compromise agreement from the British. Arana and his more impulsive advisers, however, may decide in- stead to bring the matter before the OAS and may take provocative military steps which would further .undermine British willingness to leave themselves exposed to a Guatemalan surprise attack. National- istic sentiment, moreover, may become aroused to such an extent that the government's ability to com- promise is severely restricted. Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A021400050002-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400050002-7 Next 6 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400050002-7 Appro~ FINLAND: The Communist Party's moderate major- ity s feeling the pressure from its conservative rivals as it approaches a party congress on 31 March, but the moderates are not likely to lose con- trol. Leaders of both factions visited Moscow to- gether in mid-February to offer divergent views on decisions to be ratified at the congress. The So- viets avoided supporting either faction and admon- ished them to achieve unity. The two factions sub- sequently appointed an eight-man negotiating com- mittee, which apparently has failed to resolve dif- ferences. A:Lthough the conservatives have fared badly in rece:,c trade union and national elections--they will have 34 fewer delegates than the moderates at the congress--they are demanding increased repre- sentation on the party's leading organs. They also insist on denouncing the Social Democrats, with whose minority government the moderates cooperate selectively and apparently hope to join later in the year. The Communists also are divided on the wage demands they are currently making during Finland's annual contract negotiations. The conservatives oppose any over-all wage pact at all. This split complicates the search for agreement on demands by the national trade union organization, which is dominated by the Social Democrats. A nationwide wage settlement, in turn, is a key factor in renew- ing Finland's economic stabilization program, due to expire at the end of the month. For some time the Communists' moderate leader- ship has been fearful of being outflanked by the conservatives and has adopted a militant pose. This shift accounted in large part for its refusal to participate in the government formed last month. Moderate district leaders, however, lately have shown more resolve. They voted on 29 February to refuse any further concessions from the conservatiu s ( (continued) Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400050002-7 Approve The Communists' electoral front has followed suit. Although the moderates are likely to retain control at the congress, it is moot whether they will feel secure enough to face down future conservative ad- vocacy of militant policies or prevent the conserv- atives from hamstringing the pursuit of policies they refer. Central Intelligence Bulletin 11 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400050002-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400050002-7 Next 6 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400050002-7 Approved Fo'elease 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00021400050002-7 Top Secret Top Secret Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400050002-7