CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A021200060001-9
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RIPPUB
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T
Document Page Count: 
20
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 9, 2003
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1
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Publication Date: 
February 17, 1972
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REPORT
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Approved For Release 2003/09/02: CIA-RDP79T00975A02120006-rrt 25X1 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Central Intelligence Bulletin State Dept. review completed Secret N2 042 17 February 1972 Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21200060001-9 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21200060001-9 Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21200060001-9 Approved For Release 2003/64RDP79T00975A021200060001-9 No. 0041/72 17 February 1972 Central Intelligence Bulletin CUBA-US: Castro regime may instigate incident at Guantanamo. (Page 1) EGYPT: Assessment of Sadat's speech. (Page 2) 25X6 PAKISTAN: Economic situation has worsened. (Page 6) ECUADOR: Calm prevails following coup. (Page 7) EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: Preferential tariff agree- ments in Me iterranean. (Page 8) CHINA: Regime intensifies efforts to reinstate veteran civilian officials. (Page 10) JAPAN: Balance of payments strong and yen reaches reTo:d high. (Page 11) ITALY: Christian Democrats decide to form single party government. (Page 13) GHANA: Western creditors to discuss Ghana's debts. Page 14) MALTA: Mintoff's attitude toward agreement with UK Page 15) YUGOSLAVIA: Croatian emigres plan attacks (Page 15) GUYANA: Relations with Communist. states (Page 16) Approved For Release 2003/BEOF'.DP79T00975A021200060001-9 Approved For Release 2003/0~/i72~&Z DP79T00975A021200060001-9 CUBA STATUTE MILES Caracoles Pointf'd C> Y= - L: "SASE GUANTA+0.. BAY Approved For Release 2003/09w( PE P79T00975A021200060001-9 Approved For Release 2003/09 C DP79T00975A021200060001-9 CUBA-US: The Castro government may attempt to create an incident at the Guantanamo Naval Base this weekend to draw international attention to its long- standing claims that the US military presence there is illegal. There is no evidence, however, that the Cubans plan any kind of armed attacks against the base. The most likely focus of such an incident would be the scheduled passage through base-controlled waters of several Cuban merchant ships carrying mem- bers of Cuba's Union of Communist Youth on a round- island tour. The mercnant snips now are pro- ceeding eastward along the southern coast of the island. Since last November, the Cuban Government has evinced an unusual interest in the Guantanamo issue through both public and private means. The joint Soviet-Cuban communique issued on 1 November at the conclusion of Soviet Premier.Kosygin's visit pro- tested the "unlawful presence of the North American military base at Guantanamo." Castro has long maintained that Cuba intends to gain "rightful" control over Guantanamo at "the proper time" through legal and peaceful means. 25X1 25X1 25X1 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2003/051 `bP79T00975A021200060001-9 Approved For Release 2003/09/ a ITP79T00975AO21200060001-9 EGYPT: President Sadat offered no new military or political breakthroughs to the Egyptian people in his first address to the nation since he returned from Moscow earlier this month. Speaking to a national congress of the Arab Socialist Union yesterday, Saclat stressed that "patience and silence" were required during the present phase of the struggle with Israel. He again recounted the events of the last three months which necessitated a "recalcu..ation" of the situa- tion so as to put the nation on a better footing for the struggle. Sadat chas?:ised the US for im- peding progress in the diplomatic arena and alleged that recent manifestations of support for Israel were attempts by the US to recoup its losses in the Indo-Pakistani conflict. Sadat declined to make public any details of his recent trip to Moscow, sa"ing that they would be revealed during a closed piirty meeting today. Although Sadat again characterized the visit as "highly successful," he gave :.ittle indication that he had arranged any new arms deals. In an apparent attempt to put the best face possible on the Moscow talks, Sadat subsequently urged concerted efforts "to absorb sophisticated weapons" and threatened to strike Israel "deep in its territory" if it attacks Egypt's interior. The government's concern over the possibility of a recurrence of student unrest was evident in Sadat's remark that the nation's youth might be in a state of "exhausted patience.." He referred to the intensive dialogue taking place between student representatives and governmeni: officials since the student demonstrations last month, and warned that students should convey further expressions of frus- tration "through the establishment." Although there was little in the speech to a:.leviate student un- happiness over the no war - no peace situation, Sadat appealed for their understanding and announced 17 Feb 72 Central Intelligen.e Bulletin Approved For Release 2003/09( i ,DP79T00975AO21200060001-9 Approved For Release 2003/O'RDP79T00975A021200060001-9 that he had ordered the release of the remainder of hard-core students detained during the January pro- tests. In a move he may hope will have a sobering in- fluence, Sadat ended his speech by threatening to step down from the presidency if he loses the con- fidence of the people. He did not, however, indi- cate that he was seriously thinking of such a gesture at present. Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/0'9) :' iDP79T00975A021200060001-9 25X6 Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21200060001-9 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21200060001-9 Approved For Release 2003/09WC-C61P79T00975A021200060001-9 PAKISTAN: The economic situation has worsened during the past month. Industry is operating at less than a third of capacity, according to the US Embassy. Failure of the government to establish economic priorities, loss of markets in Bangladesh, and the halt in new foreign aid have led to increased investor uncertainty and poor morale among management. Labor unrest has been expressed in a series of crippling strikes. The agricultural outlook has brightened some- what in the last two weeks as badly needed rain has broken the drought. Recent harvests of cotton and rice are described as exceptionally good. Prospec- tive land reforms, however, will complicate the agricultural situation. Bhutto must choose between the probable disruption to production and the effect on government revenues of large-scale reallotments of land, and popular resentment if reforms are moderate in scope. Although imports have been reduced and exports are strong, the trade deficit remains large. The extended deadline for foreign exchange repatriation has passed with little in the way of new inflows. Japan has confirmed that Islamabad resumed interest payments on outstanding loans. According to the US Embassy in Islamabad, Tokyo's delay of pipeline deliveries probably influenced the resump- tion of the payments. Rome has denied a Japanese report that Italy also had received interest pay- ments. Central Intelliger ce Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/098 O g]LP79T00975A021200060001-9 Approved For Release 2003/%":k 1_ DP79T00975A021200060001-9 ECUADOR: The country is calm following the coup, and there has been no popular movement in support of either the ousted President Velasco or Assad Bucaram, against whose presidential can- didacy the military moved. The army commander in Gua a uil apparent y has come down on the side of President Rodriguez. To consolidate the new government's position in that area, the naval zone commander has been named as chief of civil and military affairs. In addition, the government has arrested two men who served as cabinet ministers under Velasco and had gone to the airport to bid him farewell. Bucaram has gone into hiding. Rodriguez' government may have to take at least a moderately reformist line in order to ap- pease those younger officers who supported Bucaram. The more nationalistic-minded officers may try to manipulate Rodriguez or, eventually, oust him if they believe his administration is too protective of the status quo. Some Ecuadorean officers have expressed admiration for the Peruvian military government and may attempt to emulate it. The new government probably will make little modification in the present policy with respect to Ecuador's claim to a 200-mile territorial sea limit. I Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/0 ,qPCI[C,MDP79TOO975AO21200060001-9 Approved For Release 2003/0W RIP79T00975A021200060001-9 EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: The EC's system of pref- erential agreements in the MEditerranean will soon be extended. Negotiations between the community and Egypt and Lebanon have been stallec.for a year by the Arabs' insistence that their national legislation requires them to discriminatE against EC firms and individuals dealing with IsrEel. A solution to this impasse reportedly has keen reached in which the community would in effect turn a blind eye to the Arab boycott. There has been substantial agreement for some time on provisions of the five-year arrangements. The EC is offering a 50-percEnt cut in industrial tariffs, with certain exceptions, in return for a 40-percent reduction in Egyptian and Lebanese tar- iffs on a more limited list cf industrial products. The final negotiations may be complicated, however, by increased import restrictions contemplated as part of Egypt's austerity prcgram. The community also is offering the 40-percEnt duty reduction on citrus imports previously offered to Cyprus and already included in the EC-Israeli agreement. The agreements with Egypt and Lebanon are in- tended by the EC to balance its agreement with Is- rael. More generally, they reflect the community belief that preferences are cne means of extending Europe's influence in the Mediterranean. The com- munity is presently considering requests from Is- rael, Spain, and Malta to reregotiate existing agreements in order to meet the problems they will face when Britain joins the C. In addition to talks with Cyprus on an association arrangement, renegotiations of the association agreements with Turkey and Greece have begun, and similar talks will begin with Morocco and Tunisia later this year. (continued) 17 Feb 72 Central Intelligenc., Bulletin Approved For Release 2003/0w~1~--~DP79T00975A021200060001-9 Approved For Release 2003/0WkiIDP79T00975A021200060001-9 The over-all problem of rationalizing the com- munity's "Mediterranean policy" is, meanwhile, being taken up by the EC's machinery for political con- sultations. It remains doubtful that this policy review will lead the EC to abandon preferences as a political tool, despite the well-known US objec- tions that they are contrary to GATT. Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/09 C P79T00975A021200060001-9 Approved For Release 2003/09/gf,,L jffP79T00975A021200060001-9 CHINA: Peking is intensLfying its efforts to reinstate veteran civilian of:icials who came under severe criticism during the C-iltural Revolution. The provincial press has claimed with increasing frequency in the past two wee;;s that 90 to 95 percent of local cadres have been pol._tically rehabilitated. Many of the officials have returned to their previous positions or to equally responsible posts. The vet- eran cadre issue has been repeatedly debated since the closing out of the Cultural Revolution. Prop- aganda treatment has shifted back and forth between the need to use these experienced officials "boldly" and the demand that they undergo further self-crit- icism and ideological remolding. The current campaign is weighted in favor of emplo"ing the greatest pos- sible number of these people and suggests that a fundamental consensus has been reached. Veteran cadres, in fact, have returned to their jobs in growing numbers in recent years. But progress toward a restoration and reordering of the bureau- cratic structure has been ser_.ously hampered by the enhanced political role of thE! military and by the vigorous resistance of radica:. elements to the rein- statement of officials whom they previously had helped purge. The ouster of some ranking radical politburo members, a prolonged drive agE.inst "ultraleftism" in the provinces, and reassert.ions of the paramountcy of the party in the wake of the Lin Piao affair all indicate that the latest attempt to return to pre- Cultural Revolution organizational norms will be more systematic and determined than previous efforts. Nevertheless, the need to rejt.venate the shattered morale of many of the reinstated cadres and to achieve a balance between civilian and military authority poses problems not easily resolved even Central Intelliger, ce Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/09/ ?(,, i 1 P79T00975A021200060001-9 Approved For Release 2003/0R/jR4~ DP79T00975A021200060001-9 JAPAN: The balance of payments continued to show considerable strength in January, and the value of the yen rose to a record high level by mid-Feb- ruary. A $170-million trade surplus was achieved de- spite seasonal trends that historically have caused trade deficits for the first months of the year. The trade surplus resulted from a 24-percent in- crease in exports, due in part to large increases in sales to the US of automobiles, synthetic tex- tiles, and clothing. More than half of this in- crease in dollar sales, however, resulted from the fact that Japanese exporters raised their dollar prices rather than absorb the impact of revaluation in lower yen prices. Imports rose only ten percent while those from the US declined because of reduced grain shipments. The west coast dock strike, how- ever, may have distorted normal trading patterns between the US and Japan. A short-term capital inflow of $440 million, due mainly to prepayments on export contracts, also aided the payments balance. As a result, official reserves increased $722 million and approached $16 billion at the end of January. 1:n mid-February the yen reached a record high of 303 to the dollar. This is near the high end of the permissible band on the new exchange rates es- tablished in December 1971 and is 18.8 percent above the pre-August 1971 parity level. The Bank of Japan apparently is not interfering significantly in the foreign exchange market and, according to its gov- ernor, no decision has been reached on the point at which the bank will try to stabilize the yen-dollar exchange rate. 17 Feb 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/061ifa 1 - DP79T00975A021200060001-9 Approved For Release 2003/091&:CIA=RDP79T00975A021200060001-9 Chamber of Deputies PCI- Communists * PSIUP- Proletarian Unity MPL- Political Labor Movement PSI- socialists PSDI- Social Democrats PRI Republicans DC- Christian Democrats ,;VP- South Tyrolese PU_I- Liberals PDIUM- Monarchists MSI- Neo-Fascists PLI-31 ' MSI-25 Approved For Release 2003/09/s 1;;Pi*~if79T00975AO21200060001-9 Approved For Release 2003/0O& C& ifDP79T00975A021200060001-9 ITALY: The Christian Democratic party decided on 15 February to form a single party government under Giulio Andreotti to lead the country into parliamentary elections. 25X1 the Neo-Fascists in the parliamentary elections. The Christian Democrats' decision antagonizes their former government partners, the Socialists and the Social Democrats, and is opposed by their own left sector under Foreign Minister Moro. Im- plementation of the decision would make more diffi- cult any reformation of the normal center-left coalition after the election. Right-wing Christian Democrats believe, however, that dissociation from the Socialists would be of substantial, perhaps critically important, help in campaigning against 25X1 17 Feb 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin n -U Approved For Release 2003/Og~C"t'Yk-RDP79T00975A021200060001-9 Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79T00975A021200060001-9 SECRJ1T GHANA: Accra's Western creditors are meeting today in London for an initial exchange of views on Ghana's bid for relief from its heavy debt burden. Reconsideration of the d,bt problem was pre- cipitated by Ghana's announce:nent on 5 February that it was repudiating a por:ion of its Nkrumah era medium-term debt which wa3 allegedly tainted by corruption. On other debt;, Ghana unilaterally announced changes in repayment terms. The British, Ghana's largest creditor, called the meeting to develop a coorlinated, fairly hard- line, multilateral approach. The Netherlands, Belgium, and Norway are also inclined to a tough reaction. Germany, France, aid Italy seem more sympathetic to Ghana's plight. All are concerned about setting precedents that might be used by other debtor countries. Although the junta has riled out meeting with Ghana's creditors as a group, it has hinted that the debt repudiation announce:nent may be subject to negotiation. The Ghanaian; have asked the World Bank to mediate their dispute; with creditors, taking into account the count.:y's broader economic problems. The position of th,? creditors on Ghana's debts will have a substantial impact on the new government's attitude toward :he West and on its economic policies, which are ;till in a state of flux. 17 Feb 72 Central Intelliget ce Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/09 ~ 1 P79T00975A021200060001-9 Approved For Release 2003/09CIRiTDP79T00975A021200060001-9 NOTES MALTA: In talks with Prime Minister Mintoff, Italian officials were given the impression that he now favors concluding an agreement with Britain if some face-saving device can be found. Mintoff informed the Italian ambassador-Ito Malta that he had abandoned his intention of seeking additional money from Libya but still needs an immediate cash payment larger than that offered by the UK and its NATO al- lies. Rome has advanced a compromise formula that would increase the amount of money immediately avail- able and has suggested that it might be useful if Prime Minister Heath invited Mintoff to London--a trip the Maltese leader apparently wants to make. In the absence of an agreement, London is continuing its withdrawal and has set 25 February as the dead- line for dismissal notices to all Maltese employed by the British. YUGOSLAVIA: Anti-Tito Croatian emigres report- edly plan more attacks on Yugoslav missions and air- liners abroad and against Western airlines carrying large numbers of Yugoslav passengers. Airport secu- rity in Sweden and West Germany already has been tightened around all Yugoslavia-bound flights. Belgrade takes the threat seriously, following four bombings last month. (continued) 17 Feb 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 15 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/09 (a&4DP79T00975A021200060001-9 Approved For Release 2003/09/~ ~Q- 79T00975AO21200060001-9 GUYANA: In keeping with his stated policy of political non-alignment and diminished economic dependence on the West, Prime Minister Burnham is continuing to seek expanded relations with the Com- munist world. He reportedly is considering the es- tablishment of trade, and pc,ssibly diplomatic, re- lations with Cuba. Guyana 1.as had non-resident diplomatic relations with tI.e USSR since December 1970, and the two countries now are conducting trade on a small scale. A trade E.greement was signed with China last November any. a permanent Chinese trade mission is expected ir. Georgetown by the end of this month. Burnham alsci is considering the establishment of trade relations with East Germany, Romania, and Yugoslavia. A]-though the potential economic gains from expander. contacts with Commu- nist countries appear limited, Burnham apparently feels that such moves will s-trengthen his domestic political position and -enhance his credentials as a third world leader. Central Intellige ice Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/09/W.(I;kkP79T00975A021200060001-9 Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21200060001-9 Secret Secret Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21200060001-9