CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A021200010001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 18, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 11, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2003/08/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO2120
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
HIP
t'
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Department review completed
Secret
N?_ 042
11 February 1972
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/08/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21200010001-4
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21200010001-4
Approved For Release 2003/08/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21200010001-4
 Approved For Release 2003/08/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975A021200010001-4
SECRET
No. 0036/72
11 February 1972
Central Intelligence Bulletin
LAOS: Irregulars move deeper into Communist rear
areas. (Page 1)
USSR-EGYPT: Moscow seeks to revive four-power talks
and Jarring mission. (Page 3)
USSR: Leading Soviet journal underlines Brezhnev's
role as principal advocate of detente. (Page 4)
NATO: Allies divided over next move regarding
Brosio mission. (Page 5)
THAILAND: Government forces encounter stiff oppo-
sition in major anti-insurgent drive. (Page 7)
25X1
BRAZIL-CHILE: Brazilian Government reportedly will
Help finance commercial transaction with Chile.
(Page 9)
JORDAN: Cabinet changes (Page 10)
Approved For Release 2003/08/26.: CIA-RDP79T00975A021200010001-4
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2003/0W A'RDP79T00975AO21200010001-4
e Hiqhpoint
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/0 1 / IDP79T00975A021200010001-4
 Approved For Release 2003/08MRP79T00975A021200010001-4
c LAOS: Vang Pao's irregulars are moving deeper
into -the -enemy's rear areas south of the Plaine des
Jarres.
Forward elements of one task force are now
about three miles from the southern tip of the
Plaine, and other units are farther to the south
and east. Little resistance has so far been en-
countered, presumably because the irregulars have
not yet moved into any vital areas.
Vang Pao clearly believes that at this junc-
ture the best defense is a good offense. Rather
than digging in at Long Tieng for a costly head-on
struggle with the attacking North Vietnamese, he
has chosen to divide his 12,000-man force, leaving
a 7,000-man contingent to defend Sam Thong and Long
Tieng and sending the remainder to probe deeply to-
ward the enemy's lines of communication. Vang Pao
hopes to recapture the initiative and rekindle the
fighting spirit of his troops, while forcing the
North Vietnamese to divert their forces from the
front lines to protect their supply corridors.
The operation is, however, a calculated risk.
It could so weaken Vang Pao's offensive force that
its future usefulness would be impaired should the
operation
fail
to reduce the pressure on Long Tieng.
Moreover,
the
Communists could attempt to take ad-
vantage of
the
reduced government strength around
Long Tieng
and
Sam Thong to move quickly against
them.
Several indicators suggest that the North
Vietnamese may have nearly completed their prepa-
rations for new attacks. Enemy reconnaissance and
patrol activity has increased both at Sam Thong
and along Skyline Ridge. The new road from the
southern edge of the Plaine to Ban Hintang report-
edly is motorable, promising to reduce supply dif-
ficulties and making it possible to move heavy ar-
tillery closer to the base.
(continued)
11 Feb 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 1
Approved For Release 2003/089~~DP79T00975A021200010001-4
 Approved For Release 2003/08/2gEe4t 79T00975A021200010001-4
C
Much will now depend on whether the irregulars
can move with speed and purpose to stir up enough
trouble in the rear to divert the North Vietnamese
before they can launch an all-out attack on Lon
Tieng and Sam Thong. 25X1
11 Feb 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approved For Release 2003/08/2&1'if144579T00975A021200010001-4
 Approved For Release 2003/08( Ff MP79T00975A021200010001-4
USSR-EGYPT: The Soviets would like to revive
the four-power talks and the Jarring mission in or-
der to reduce pressures on Egyptian President Sadat.
The Deputy Chief of the Soviet Foreign Minis-
try Near East Division, Ye. D. Pyrlin, told a US
Embassy officer on 9 February that while the USSR
and Egypt lacked specific proposals for a resumption
of Jarring's activities, Soviet UN Ambassador Malik
would be sounding out his four-power colleagues on
the matter. The Soviets have long favored a resump-
tion of the four-power talks, although Pyrlin sug-
gested it was Sadat's idea.
It appears that neither Moscow nor Cairo wants
to close any possible door to an initiative for a
political settlement. Pyrlin did not even foreclose
the possibility that Sadat could eventually agree
to entering "proximity" talks with Israel.
The Soviets continue to play for time. In ad-
dition to hoping that their diplomatic initiative
can take the heat off Sadat, the Soviets are point-
ing to the visit of President Nixon to Moscow in
the spring as an opportunity for progress in nego-
tiations. Pyrlin noted that the Soviet leaders had
told Sadat that the Middle East would be discussed
with the President.
Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/08&R(P79T00975A021200010001-4
 Approved For Release 2003/08/W-cC;R EIP79T00975A021200010001-4
USSR: The Soviet party's leading journal,
Kommunist, has strongly underlined Brezhnev's role
as the principal advocate of detente within the
leadership.
The journal's editorial last month evidently
was intended to provide high-level functionaries
with a public definition and justification of So-
viet detente policy in Europe and Brezhnev's for-
eign policy role. The need for such high-level
guidance was indicated last December when the lead-
ership undertook a round of speeches in the prov-
inces to answer questions engendered by Soviet ac-
tivities abroad in the past year.
The editorial credits Brezhnev with promoting
detente through his talks with Pompidou and Brandt.
The basis for this policy, according to Brezhnev,
is the ascendency of "forces of realism" in capital-
ist countries and Europe's resulting "shift" from
a cold war era to one of peaceful coexistence.
The editorial does not associate Brezhnev's
name with any passages critical of the US or its
allies, while Podgorny and Kosygin are identified
with Soviet support of North Vietnam against the
US and Egypt against Israel. Moreover, after noting
President Nixon's planned visit to Moscow, the arti-
cle recalls that Brezhnev, as general secretary,
met "directly" with the French president and the
FRG chancellor, underlining that his party position
is to be considered entirely suitable for dealing
with Western heads of government.
11 Feb 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/08/26F;C]P,-79T00975A021200010001-4
 Approved For Release 2003/08/~ eQbAIWP79T00975A021200010001-4
NATO: The allies are divided over how to deal
with Moscow's continuing reluctance to receive the
Brosio "explorer" mission on force reductions.
On 9 February the Canadians reported to the
North Atlantic Council (NAC) that their ambassador
in Moscow found Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko
notably cool toward the prospect: of receiving Brosio.
A Soviet diplomat in Washington also reportedly told
a Canadian diplomat that Brosio would not be received
in Moscow. The remarks of other Soviet diplomats,
however, reflect instructions not to place Moscow
on record with a definite refusal.
The Soviet position poses a dilemma for NATO.
France, Norway, and Denmark, concerned that the
force reduction question could delay a Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) urge that
the Soviets not be confronted on the issue. A num-
ber of others, supported by Secretary General Luns,
want to issue a public statement that would make it
clear that the Soviets are holding up the force re-
duction dialogue. They do not, however, want to
give Moscow an opportunity to suggest an alternative,
in view of the fact that the Soviets probably would
propose either bilateral discussions with the US or
postponement of force reduction talks until after
a CSCE. Either course would diminish the chances
of dealing with military security issues at a CSCE.
The allies will meet: with Brosio next week to
consider the status of his mission. Brosio 25X1
I _j pro a y
would a amenable to scrapping the mission if, in
the process, the onus could be placed on Moscow.
25X1
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approved For Release 2003/08 ( fpP79T00975A021200010001-4
 Approved For Release 2003/"!W DP79T00975A021200010001-4
NORTH THAII LAND: Counterinsurgency Operation Underway
Target area of
government operati4
Approved For Release 2003/0$J/ ;Ri fIDP79T00975A021200010001-4
 Approved For Release 2003/08/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21200010001-4
SECRET
THAILAND: Government troops have run into
stiff opposition as they conduct. the most ambitious
military operation yet undertaken in the seven-year
struggle against Communist insurgents.
The operation, begun on 20 January, involves
the use of 12,000 troops, including elements from
the elite Bangkok-based First Division. It is sup-
ported by five artillery batteries and an unprece-
dented number of tactical aircraft. The target is
a mountain massif along the borders of Phitsanulok
and Phetchabun provinces in northern Thailand, where
the Communists have over 600 armed men, mostly Meo
tribesmen. This is the closest Communist base to
the central plains and has been the scene of heavy
fighting in the past. Blocking positions have been
established to the north within Thailand and across
the border in Laos by irregular forces, but the in-
surgents are showing little inclination to withdraw
from the target areas. Forewarned about the opera-
tion, they have constructed fortified positions and
cached supplies for a two-month siege. The insur-
gents have been giving ground grudgingly, and the
government troops, hampered by -the rugged terrain,
have not been able to reach their objectives.
Recognizing the importance of the operation,
which is part of a wider campaign planned this year
against insurgent strongholds, :Bangkok has extended
it until at least 25 February. Even if the govern-
ment does not achieve all of its objectives, it has
regained some of the initiative from the insurgents,
and the operation provides tangible evidence that
the leaders in Bangkok are willing to do more than
they have in the past to combat the insurgency.
Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/08/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21200010001-4
SECRET
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21200010001-4
Approved For Release 2003/08/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21200010001-4
 Approved For Release 2003/08/? P79T00975A021200010001-4
BRAZIL-CHILE: The Brazilian Government prob-
ably will prove e a large credit to Chile to finance
the export of 1,000 Mercedes Beni; buses manufactured
in Sao Paulo.
Brazilian Government officials say that a de-
cision on whether to extend the credit is still
pending, but a Mercedes Benz employee has said
privately that the contract has been signed and
that he expects the government to provide major as-
sistance in financing the deal. Chilean newspapers
report the credit will be for $18 million.
Although Brasilia remains totally opposed to
the Allende government's political course, these
ideological differences are likely to be overcome
by the desire to promote exports, particularly of
manufactured products. In pursuit of this end,
Brazil currently is working hard to expand markets;
targets of this campaign include the USSR, Eastern
Europe, and Communist China.
Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/08/ .FCl 79T00975A021200010001-4
 Approved For Release 2003/08/;eift-pqP79T00975A021200010001-4
NOTE
JORDAN: Further changes are likely in the
government in the wake of Wednesday's cabinet shuf-
fle. Although King Husayn brought eight technocrats
into the government in his attempt to find officials
who can deal effectively with the country's mounting
.domestic problems, he still has to find a new prime
minister. He reportedly has postponed this task
until Jordan's future relations with other Arab
states become clearer. Rumors circulating in Amman
during late January indicate that, when the new
prime minister is finally named, Husayn may also
make some long-considered changes in the military
and other non-cabinet posts. F7
11 Feb 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/08hi'-.(bP79T00975A021200010001-4
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21200010001-4
Approved For Release 2003/08/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21200010001-4
 Approved For Release 2003/08/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21200010001-4
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2003/08/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21200010001-4