CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A020900080001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 12, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
N? 042
State Dept. review completed
12 January 1972
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No. 0010/72
12 January 1972
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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LAOS: North Vietnamese breaching Long Tieng de-
fenses. (Page 1)
VIETNAM: I South Vietnamese
military itary performance in . age 2)
WARSAW PACT: Upcoming summit likely to consider
European security question. (Page 4)
KOREA: Pyongyang proposes direct talks with Seoul
on political matters. (Page 5)
ZAIRE-ANGOLA: Zaire tightens control of Angolan
insurgent group. (Page 6)
NORTH AFRICA - SPAIN: Maghreb countries show re-
newed interest in "liberating" Spanish Sahara.
(Page 7)
ISRAEL-LEBANON: Israeli reprisals (Page 9)
PARAGUAY: High bail set for accused drug smuggler
(Page 9)
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LONG TIENG AREA
Bovernent-held location
~-. '?Communist-held location
A Highpoint
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an Na
PLA/NEy
Phou Sep 'oEs;
Vuong Pot \ y~ J4RRES
?000 LONG
MAT Abandoned by irregulars
I
ha Tam Bleung
41 ha Khoo
Khang Khh
Pha Done
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Occupied by NVA
Sam Thong
4DPhou Pha Sai .
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C LAOS: The North Vietnamese continue to breach
the government's defenses in the Long Tieng area.
On 10 January irregular units abandoned Tha
Tam Bleung and some nearby positions and withdrew
to the south. At last report these units were be-
ing shelled by the North Vietnamese 130-mm. field
guns. The fluid situation now prevailing in the
area will probably make it difficult for other ir-
regular units nearby to attempt to regain the posi-
tion. In addition, the North Vietnamese have now
occupied Sam Thong and the Sam Thong Valley. US
pilots report numerous enemy troops are active
throughout the area, reducing the likelihood that
the valley can be quickly retaken.
Many of the units in outlying positions are
isolated and their aerial resupply and medical
evacuation are increasingly vulnerable to North
Vietnamese firepower. With the Pha Dong - Ban Na
defensive line completely shattered, Sam Thong lost,
and Communist units now in strength in the valleys
close to Long Tieng, the government's strategy ap-
pears to be boiling down basically to tenaciously
defending what it now holds in the hope that the
combination of US airpower and Communist logistic
problems will keep the enemy at bay.
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VIETNAM: Serious personnel problems continued
to plague South Vietnam's armed forces last year
despite an over-all improvement in fighting perform-
ance.
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there was a substantial increase over 1970 in the
number of South Vietnamese (ARVN) regular battalions
assigned to daily operations against the enemy, and
the personnel difficulties stemmed in part from
this increased fighting load.
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I The actual strength of the
armed forces during the period was about 70 percent
of that authorized, while the average ARVN infantry
battalion operated at only about two thirds of its
authorized strength. The monthly average of "troop
replacements" for the military forces as a whole de-
it is ap-
parent that growing war weariness has undercut both
government and enemy recruitment in South Vietnam
in the past year.
ARVN casualties rose by over 11 percent during
the 1971 period, reflecting the increased fighting
load. Partly as a result of the increased combat,
the monthly desertion rate increased by ten percent
in 1971 for a total of nearly 70,000 men during the
eight-month period. Desertions have consistently
hampered the development of the South Vietnamese
armed forces over the years despite major efforts
to stop them.
creased over 38 percent from 1970.
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Although ARVN operations against the enemy im-
proved over-all both in quantity and quality, per-
formance deteriorated in certain key indices. The
number of weapons lost by the ARVN during combat
rose by 123 percent over 1970, and the number of
enemy weapons captured fell by 22 percent. The
latter statistic could, however, reflect an in-
creased reliance on air and artillery in some areas,
in lieu of ground combat.
Manpower shortages also plagued the air force
during 1971, but it managed a very creditable over-
all increase in performance and activity. Air
force sorties rose by over 50 percent during the
period, with gains reflected in all types of fixed-
wing and helicopter operations.
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WARSAW PACT: A Pact summit meeting is to be
held in Prague later this month.
Although the announcement of the meeting Mon-
day gave no particulars, it is likely that issues
related to European security will dominate the
agenda. The Soviets have convened such Pact meet-
ings at key points in their push toward detente and
are likely to take this opportunity to convey their
views on ratification of the Polish and Soviet treat-
ies with West Germany and signature of the final
quadripartite protocol of the Berlin agreement.
To placate the East Germans and to keep them
in step during ratification, Moscow may place new
emphasis on East German recognition and admission
to the UN. Pankow's uneasiness with Soviet moves
in Europe is being reflected in press attacks on
the Brandt government which mirror concern over the
destabilizing impact of the current detente atmos-
phere on the East German internal situation.
The Soviets are likely to use the summit to
reiterate the Pact foreign ministers' call in early
December for initiation of multilateral preparatory
talks for the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe. Moscow continues to propose convocation
of such a conference in 1972, but probably is will-
ing to settle for preparatory steps this year.
Another important agenda item is likely to be
the implications for bloc solidarity of China's
entry into the UN and of President Nixon's forth-
coming trip to Peking. Moscow has lobbied vigor-
ously for opposition to alleged US-Chinese collu-
sion. In the face of continued Romanian opposition
to polemics with Peking, however, the Kremlin prob-
ably will have to be satisfied with a boilerplate
call for continued unity against imperialist in-
trigues.
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KOREA: North Korea has issued a far-reaching
proposal for direct talks with South Korean leaders.
In an effort to gain the propaganda advantage
by a show of flexibility, Premier Kim Il-song has
told Japanese newsmen in Pyongyang that he will pro-
pose a "peace pact" between North and South and a
move to expand the current Red Cross talks to in-
clude political matters. Much of the exclusive in-
terview on 10 January was a mere synthesis and elab-
oration of earlier Pyongyang proposals but, accord-
ing to the Japanese press account, the premier for
the first time used language suggesting that the
actual withdrawal of US troops from the South would
not be a pre-condition for an accord.
This and Kim's generally restrained tone in-
dicate that the interview is but the latest step in
the North Korean campaign to project an image of
reasonableness and accommodation. While accusing
the South of foot-dragging in the preparatory Red
Cross talks, the North in recent months has muted
its invective against the South Korean Government
and has maintained a relatively harmonious atmos-
phere at Panmunjom.
Although for the past several months the Red
Cross talks have bogged down in wrangling over the
agenda and procedural matters, it now appears that
this deadlock may soon be resolved. The South
Korean ambassador who is to lead Seoul's delegation
recently told US officials that the formal negoti-
ating sessions are expected to begin about 1 April.
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ZAIRE-ANGOLA: Kinshasa has tightened its con-
trol of the Revolutionary Government of Angola in
Exile (GRAE) because of continuing dissension within
the Zairian-based Angolan insurgent group.
President Mobutu, GRAE's major benefactor, re-
cently decided that GRAE military operations would
be financed and controlled directly through the
Zairian Ministry of Defense
Roberto that henceforth he could perform only non-
military functions. Although he presumably retains
a political role, Roberto has, at least temporarily,
been reduced to a figurehead.
Roberto and his rebellious military staff have
been at odds for several months over the movement's
long-standing shortage of materiel and financial re-
sources. This continuing dissension apparently
prompted Mobutu to intervene, probably to prevent
conflict within the group from causing civil dis-
turbances inside Zaire, especially among the large
Angolan refugee population that lives along the
Zaire-Angola border. Mobutu has continued to sup-
port GRAE, despite its dim prospects, as an alter-
native to the other two Angolan insurgent groups.
GRAE has long been plagued by leadership con-
flicts, largely because of Roberto's unwillingness
to compromise or to delegate authority. Roberto may
eventually reclaim control of GRAE, however, because
his most competent and likely successors quit the
movement long ago. In any event, the present tur-
moil within GRAE can only further handicap its lim-
Mobutu also to leader Holden
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ited insurgency effort in Angola.
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NORTH AFRICA - SPAIN: The western Maghreb
countries are showing renewed interest in the Span-
ish Sahara.
The foreign ministers of Algeria, Morocco, and
Mauritania agreed at a recent meeting in Algiers to
reinforce their governments' coordinated efforts to
hasten "liberation." of the territory. Nonetheless,
the final communique was moderate in tone, calling
on Spain to adopt a policy that "puts it in step
with history." The attention given the Spanish
Sahara problem in the communique and Algerian press
increases the likelihood that it will be prominent
among the issues to be discussed at a meeting of the
three chiefs of state scheduled for Rabat in late
March.
The three countries had agreed in late 1970 to
intensify their efforts to decolonize Spanish Sahara,
although their conflicting claims to the area remain.
Since that time, they have attempted to reach a mu-
tually acceptable solution with Spain. However, the
potential remains for a renewal of inter-Maghrebian
disputes if Spain ever decides to withdraw. The
discovery of large deposits of high-grade phosphate
ore several years ago reinforced the importance of
the area to all the countries concerned. Spain and
the Maghreb countries supported the 1965 UN resolu-
tion calling for the decolonization of the Spanish
Sahara but Madrid has dragged its feet over holding
the plebiscite suggested by the UN. The UN General
Assembly decided last month to defer further consid-
eration of the territory's status until 1973.
Internal Moroccan politics might undermine the
current unity of the three states. King Hassan has
been moving toward the formation of a government
which might include a nationalist opposition party
that considers Spanish Sahara an internal Moroccan
issue. Hassan's freedom of action to act in concert
with other states may therefore be seriously reduced
before the group has a chance to resolve the Spanish
Sahara issue.
12 Jan 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Israeli Strikes at Fedayeen Sanctuaries
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ISRAEL-LEBANON: The Israeli strikes at feda-
yeen sanctuaries in Lebanon on 10 January followed
several weeks of increased terrorist operations
along the border. Late last week, the commanding
officer of the Israeli Northern Command passed a
warning to the Lebanese through the UN-sponsored
Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission that fail-
ure to restrain the fedayeen would result in "cor-
rective action" by the Israelis. Several terrorist
incidents occurred subsequently, the most serious
of which was the K.atyusha rocket attack on 9 Janu-
ary on Safad--an Israeli town some seven miles be-
low the border that had been untouched by terrorism
since 1948. In the retaliatory operations, the Is-
raelis reported killing an undetermined number of
fedayeen and admitted to the loss of two Israeli
soldiers. Israeli retaliation against the fedayeen
in Syria for the murder and mutilation of an Israeli
engineer in the Golan Heights on 6 January is still
possible, but Israel may want to gauge the effects
of its strikes into Lebanon before taking further
reprisals.
PARAGUAY: The government has set an unusually
high bail for accused narcotics smuggler Auguste
Ricord while the appellate court considers the lower
court's ruling against extraditing him to the US.
Despite fears that Ricord's colleagues would raise
almost any amount to give him a chance to flee the
country, Ricord reportedly found the $317,000 bail
"exorbitant" and indicated he would remain in jail.
The appellate finding will probably be announced
next month, and it will perhaps hinge less on the
legal merits of the case than on whether President
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Stroessner
US outweigh
has decided that warm relations with
the risk of exposing official Para
the
ua an
involvement
in the narcotics trade.
F
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(continued)
Central Intelligence Bulletin 9
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