CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A020600050002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 20, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 2, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Top Secret
C 16
2 December 1971
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Central Intelligence Bulletin
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SOUTH VIETNAM: Thieu preparing to create govern-
ment political party. (Page 6)
WEST GERMANY: Inter-German negotiations on Berlin
accord approach conclusion. (Page 7)
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INDONESIA-CHINA: Chinese take hard line on condi-
tions for normalizing relations. (Page 11)
ICELAND: Strike may bring down government. (Page 13)
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SOUTH VIETNAM. President Thieu is moving be-
hind the scenes to pave the way for a government
political party.
ar ier a orts in this direc-
tion oun ere on -The factionalism and self-interest
of the traditional political groups Thieu sought to
meld into a unified organization. He believes he can
avoid some of these pitfalls now by concentrating on
enlisting individuals rather than on wholesale mergers.
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Despite past failures, Thieu appears to have a
better chance now of forming a tightly knit polit-
ical organization, especially if he bases it on the
far-flung governmental machinery that, in effect,
has served him as a political party. Serious ques-
tions remain, however, as to whether Thieu will be
able to form a party that can attract a large meas-
ure of genuine popular support. Factionalism and
the many sources of dissatisfaction in the country
work against such a venture and, although the Thieu
regime has been trying to fashion programs with
broader appeal, it has a considerable distance to
go to win the backing of many Vietnamese.
The government has suffered from the lack of
an ideologically oriented mass party that could at-
tract the loyalty of the people the way the Commu-
nist Party has in many provinces in the past. Thieu
recognizes this and has advised new party recruits
that, if hostilities are brought to an end, the for-
mation of an effective political group to compete
with the Viet Cong will be extremely important
the government side.
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WEST GERMANY: C The inter-German negotiations
to implement the Four-Power Berlin accord are appar-
ently drawing rapidly to a conclusion.
West German negotiator Egon Bahr has been de-
termined to conclude an agreement by this weekend.)
In response to allied reservations over terminology
in the inter-German draft, however, Bahr had agreed
to make one more effort to win East German accept-
ance of Western language in this week's negotiations.
CBahr,has scheduled a meeting with the allied ambas-
sadors this morning., and thereafter with the West
German cabinet, presumably to review his progress
thus far.3
The parallel negotiations between the West Ber-
lin Senat and East Germany appear to have progressed
smoothly but more slowly. Their negotiators plan
to meet daily for the rest of the week, however, and
Bahr anticipates signature of an inner-Berlin agree-
ment by 8 or 9 December.
C These developments closely follow a visit to
Moscow by West German Foreign Minister Scheel.) Mos-
cow, in an effort to increase pressure on Bonn for
early ratification of last year's Soviet - West
German treaty, took the position that it would de-
lay signing the final protocol of the Berlin agree-
ment until the treaty is ratified. Scheel appar-
ently attempted in vain to convince the Soviets that
such linkage would further complicate the ratifica-
tion process and probably.precipitate a negative
public reaction to the treaty.
(continued)
2 Dec 71
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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According to Scheel, the arrangement with Mos-
cow calls for submitting the treaty for ratifica-
tion following completion of the inter-German agree-
ment and announcing the intention of the Four Powers
to sign the final Berlin protocol at some unnamed .
2 Dec 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin 8
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INDONESIA-CHINA: Indonesia has made little
progress in its informal talks with Chinese repre-
sentatives, thereby justifying Djakarta's desire to
proceed cautiously toward the normalization of re-
lations.
In Djakarta's first direct meeting with a Chi-
nese official since 1967, the Indonesians encountered
a hard Chinese position,
relations are to be normalized,
Indonesia must cease "terrorizing
none i n unists and must free all political
detainees. arrested following the abortive Communist
coup in 1965.
Djakarta's
own. conditions for normalizing relations are that
Peking cease its support of dissidents in Indonesia
and stop its anti-Indonesian propaganda.
Indonesia's military-controlled government is
reluctant to resume relations, suspended in 1967 on
the grounds that Peking had encouraged the attempted
Communist coup, but believes it must prepare for an
eventual accommodation.
President Suharto
stated It hat relations
with China would not be restored until after the
newly selected Congress--theoretically Indonesia's
highest policy-making body--convenes in October 1972.
This would afford the government more time to con-
sider new international developments and to prepare
2 Dec 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin 11
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internal public opinion for a change in policy to-
ward China. In the interim, the government favors
increased direct trade as the best way to begin nor-
malization. I
2 Dec 71
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ICELAND: A general strike, slated to begin at
midnight on 5 December, threatens to bring down Ice-
land's center-left coalition.
In order to avoid the strike, the administra-
tion recently pushed through legislation trimming
the work week to 40 hours and increasing paid vaca-
tions to four weeks as promised in the pre-election
campaign last spring. In. addition, the government's
vow to hike wages 20 percent over a two-year period
for. low salaried jobs appears to be on schedule,
with a six- or seven-percent increase expected this
year. Nevertheless, nearly all member unions of
the Iceland Federation of Labor (IFL) are demanding
a whopping 20-percent increase for all salaries and
up to 30 percent for lower paying jobs.
Because two of the three coalition parties are
labor-based, a strike would test coalition unity
under any circumstances.
I Hannibal
Valdimarsson, leader of the small but pivotal Organ-
ization of Leftists and Liberals, a partner in the
present coalition, reportedly is backing the IFL
demands with the intention of replacing the govern-
ment with a new center-left coalition that would
include the opposition Social Democrats in place of
the Communist-dominated Labor Alliance. Such a gov-
ernment would not have a majority, however, and re-
portedly would rely on the neutrality of the conserv-
ative Independent Party.
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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