CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A020100070001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 29, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
State Dept. review completed N2 42
29 September 1971
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No. 0233/71
29 September 1971
Central Intelligence Bulletin
SOUTH VIETNAM: Prime Minister Khiem criticizes
Thieu's election decision. (Page 3)
LAOS: Government forces consolidate recent gains.
Page 5)
INDIA: Foreign relief aid falling behind refugee
influx. (Page 6)
TURKEY-CYPRUS: Rotation of Turkish troops probably
will proceed without serious incident. (Page 9)
PERU: Government to increase cooperation in combating
drug traffic. (Page 10)
KOREA: Pyangyang attempting to appear more flexible
in contacts with the South. (Page 12)
BELGIUM: Government measures to stimulate economy.
(Page 3)
SOMALIA: Conspiracy trial reflects President's fear
of coup attempt. (Page 14)
CHILE-USSR: Military credit
(Page 15)
TURKEY: Dissension in the government (Page 16)
IRAQ: Ruling circle shrinks (Page 16)
GUYANA: Bauxite arrangement (Page 17)
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SOUTH VIETNAM: Prime Minister Khiem, who has
worked closely with President: Thieu in the past and
is the President's alternate running mate, is in-
creasingly taking the view that Thieu's decision to
forge ahead with an uncontested election is a mis-
take.
So far Khiem has been ;playing his cards close
to his vest. He has not spoken out openly against
Thieu or been drawn into any of the myriad of anti-
Thieu opposition fronts that have mushroomed re-
cently. He has not spoken out forcefully in support
of Thieu either, however, p,reservin some measure
of independence. By his public silence and private
criticism of Thieu, Khiem probably hopes subtly to
put some distance between himself and the President
and avoid being dragged down with Thieu should the
President's position become untenable.
Khiem is ambitious himself and may well want
to keep his own political options open. He appar-
ently resents the loss of some of his former stand-
ing with Thieu and the fact that he was not picked
as Thieu's primary running mate; he has talked of
running for a Senate seat in 1973 and the presidency
in 1975. Khiem might even feel that he could become
a presidential alternative sooner if Thieu stumbles
badly.
29 Sep 71
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Thou
Muong Sou San
R Aleng
Sala Pho~ $ ?Khaoangville
KhoPn James
THAILAND
Area of
maps
Government-held location
? Communist-held location
Ban
Lao N ga m?
hepone
hateng
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LAOS: Government forces are consolidating
their recent gains in both north and south Laos.
Some 400 Lao Army soldiers are now holding the
town of Muong Soui, west of the Plaine des Jarres,
which was occupied by irregular assault forces on
24 September. The town-can serve as a base to sup-
port Vang Pao's irregular units on the Plaine des
Jarres. Just north of the Plaine, the irregulars
have so far been unsuccessful in their attempts to
reoccupy high ground positions near Phou San.
US pilots report that the North Vietnamese ap-
pear to be moving increasing amounts of supplies to
forward positions north and east of the Plaine.
The government has launched a drive to clear
enemy units from high-ground positions northeast of
Luang Prabang. During the last dry season, the
North Vietnamese used this area as a base for launch-
ing attacks on the royal capital, and the government
hopes to deny it to the enemy during the coming dry
season.
In south Laos, government forces are consoli-
dating their positions in and around Paksong; they
have occupied most of the important high-ground po-
sitions near the town. Determined resistance by
elements of the 9th NVA Regiment, however, has so
far thwarted all government efforts to open Route
23 between Ban Phak Kout and Pakson .
29 Sep 71
Central Intelligcnce Bulletin
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INDIA: The refugee influx from East Pakistan
shows no sign of abating, but foreign relief aid
is not keeping pace.
Indian officials and foreign observers agree
that the current rate of refugee immigration is
about 30,000 a day. According to Indian data, the
refugee population passed the nine million mark
last week. expect an increased
refugee flow next month when traditional crossing
points, blocked for weeks by flood waters, reopen.
Recent refugees have indicated that they fled
mainly because of depredations by Pakistani troops
and fighting between the army and Bengali guerrillas.
E=ra-rge numbers o young men a so nave as
Pakistan because they feared being recruited into
the service of the martial law administration.
Aid pledged for the refugees now amounts to
slightly over $200 million. Some $114 million has
been extended through the UN, and $92 million has
been pledged in bilateral arrangements between
India and other governments or through contribu-
tions by voluntary agencies. US aid accounts for
almost 40 percent of the total extended to date.
Despite outside aid, India has been forced to pay
$300 million--well above the amount of aid India
has received to date. The World Bank reportedly
estimates that another $400 million will be needed
in the next six months even if the influx stops.
29 Sep 71
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GREEC.
Crete
*Ankara
LEBANON
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TURKEY-CYPRUS: The scheduled rotation today
of Turkish troops on Cyprus most likely will take
place without serious incidents, but several recent
developments have raised the potential for trouble.
The semi-annual rotation---usually involving a
force numbering between 300-400 men escorted by naval
craft from Iskenderun to Famagusta--is often accom-
panied by rumors and sometimes by fears of a possible
military confrontation. This time the current dead-
lock in the protracted intercommunal talks, the re-
cent return of former guerrilla leader General Grivas
to the island, and the not-so--veiled threats of pos-
sible Turkish military intervention on the island
have aroused more apprehension than usual.
Although the rumors have lessened and tensions
appear to have eased in recent days, several prob-
lems directly related to the rotation remain. The
Turks finally gave eleventh hour assurances--demanded
by the Greek Cypriots--that their naval escort craft
will remain out of sight of land. There is yet an
apparent impasse over some of the equipment that the
Turks want to bring to the island with the rotating
force and problems may arise when the equipment is
unloaded. As in the past the Turkish armed forces
have taken contingency steps to place major military
units in the Iskenderun area in a state of readiness.
Nevertheless, with high-level diplomatic talks
regarding Cyprus pending in New York and with some
of Ankara's top military leaders absent from Turkey,
it is doubtful that the Turks would make any overt
effort to exploit the current rotation to s
new crisis.F
29 Sep 71
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PERU: The government is willing to increase
its cooperation with the United States in combating
traffic in illegal drugs.
On 24 September Interior Minister Richter in-
formed the US ambassador that he agreed in principle
to the re-establishment of an office of the US Bu-
reau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in Lima. He
added that the government recently had discovered
an extensive narcotics ring within the Ministry of
Interior and that 18 members of the special investi-
gative police now are under detention. In the last
several weeks Peruvian authorities have seized al-
most 100 pounds of cocaine and destroyed 18 cocaine
paste laboratories.
The government estimates that 25,000 Peruvian
families earn their livelihood from growing coca
leaves, and more than $200 million is invested in
coca plantations. Of the 10 million kilograms of
coca leaf produced, 10 percent is exported legally
and the rest is used illegally in Peru, primarily
by highland Indians, or exported illicitly. Al-
though the government is willing to cooperate to
stop the illicit traffic out of the country, only
extensive social and economic changes could make
significant inroads into the use of coca by the In-
dians.
29 Sep 71
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KOREA: Pyongyang is attempting to appear more
flexiSI-e on North-South contacts.
In an unusually lengthy and nonpolemical inter-
view granted the Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun
on 25 September, Premier Kim Il-song re eratrat-tithe
principal elements of Pyongyang's eight-point pro-
gram for unification put forward last April. He de-
parted from past formulations, however, by implying
that North Korea would abrogate its mutual defense
agreements with China and the Soviet Union if South
Korea would sever its military ties with the US. He
indicated that Pyongyang would do this if the treat-
ies "proved an obstacle to peaceful unification."
Kim went on to point out that he had already made
previous concessions to the South by agreeing in
his 6 August statement to talks with the ruling Dem-
ocratic Republican Party. He urged that a dialogue
on the negotiations begin on 1 October.
Pyongyang clearly is trying to maintain the
propaganda initiative at the current Red Cross talks.
By offering to take steps that it knows Seoul will
not follow, Pyongyang is also laying the groundwork
for placing the onus on the South Koreans should the
current talks bog down or fail to hold out a reason-
able prospect for eventual negotiations on unifica-
tion. Pyongyang obviously sees little risk in its
latest gambit, knowing that influential elements in
Seoul have misgivings about the current Red Cross
contacts and that this has made the Pak government
move slowly and cautiously. According to a Seoul
press report on 27 September, a spokesman of the
South Korean Foreign Ministry rejected Kim's proposal.
The 25 September interview also afforded Kim an
opportunity to spell out in the most specific terms
to date Pyongyang's endorsement of the prospective
visit of President Nixon to Peking. Kim used much
the same line of reasoning employed in his initial
6 August endorsement but went on to stipulate that
while the visit may temporarily ease tensions in
Asia it would have no impact on Pyongyang's attitude
toward the US so long as American forces remained
Korean soil.
awl
F 1
29 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin 12
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BELGIUM: The government has taken measures to
stimulate economic growth.
The economy currently is experiencing sagging
domestic and export demand following the 1969-70
boom. Consumption has tapered off and, during the
first five months of 1971, private savings have in-
creased rapidly. Exports--equivalent to about 45
percent of gross national product--are stagnating
as Belgian producers have postponed investment de-
cisions and revised plans downward in reaction to
economic slowdown in other EC countries and to the
current international monetary situation.
To stimulate exports, the government has reduced
the temporary export tax ahead of schedule. Although
the reduction is supposed to apply uniformly to se-
lected products regardless of country of destination,
the selection is expected to include a disproportion-
ately large number of products exported to the US,
the most important being steel. This measure, de-
signed in part to offset the competitive loss oc-
casioned by the US surcharge and the upward drift of
the Belgian franc, will exacerbate Belgium's budget
deficit for the remainder of this year.
Additional measures to stimulate demand include
a reduction of the discount rate, removal of credit
ceilings, and the suspension of instructions to com-
mercial banks not to increase foreign indebtedness.
With the lifting of this suspension, the government
hopes that an inflow of foreign capital will not only
stimulate the economy, but also aid efforts by the
Belgian and Dutch central banks to maintain the
franc/guilder exchange rate within the limits spec-
ified in the recent Benelux monetary arrangement.
29 Sep. 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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SOMALIA: The conspiracy trial of two generals
is the latest indication of President Siad's growing
apprehension over the possibility of moves against
his regime.
The powerful National Security Court is cur-
rently trying Generals Gaveire and Ainanshe, both
former members of the ruling Supreme Revolutionary
Council, and eight other individuals arrested last
May for antigovernment plotting. The government is
asking the death penalty for the generals as well
as for three colonels and a former cabinet minister.
In other recent moves designed to discourage coup
plotting, the government has purged 12 other mili-
tary officers, arrested several local employees of
the US Embassy for antigovernment activity, and ex-
pelled a number of foreigners, including a US Em-
bassy architect charged with plotting against the
Siad government.
The trial could trigger reactions from those
tribal, military, and other elements opposed to the
government. Gaveire once held the defense portfolio,
and before his arrest he was Siad's chief rival as
well as the leading spokesman for disgruntled tribal
groups that lost much of their influence after the
military seized power in October 1969.
29 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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CHILE-USSR: Me Chilean Army high command ap-
parently was pleased by the reported extension of a
Soviet military credit on favorable terms.
The Chilean Army,-
encouraged by President Allende in its eagerness to
update its antiquated material and add to. its weap-
onry, recently sent a high-level mission to Moscow.
That visit led to reports that credit had been ex-
tended and agreement had been reached to exchange
army attaches. By playing on the army's very real
need for new equipment, Allende has moved forward
in his campaign to attract the army's loyalty and
simultaneousl to de-emphasize
the West.
(continued)
29 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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TURKEY: The resignation of two cabinet mem-
bers--tie ministers of communications and natural
resources--in the past two days suggests that dis-
sension is increasing within the government. Ru-
mors earlier this month of imminent cabinet changes
had prompted Prime Minister Erim to issue public
denials. Erim apparently has decided that he needs
a more realistic political balance in his cabinet
to speed parliamentary endorsement of his long-
awaited reform program which was one of the basic
demands of the military when they intervened last
March to force the resignation of Prime Minister
Demirel.
IRAQ: The ruling circle in Baghdad continues
to grow smaller with the dismissal yesterday of
Vice President Ammash and Foreign Minister Shaykhli
from their civilian posts and the Revolutionary Com-
mand Council (RCC). This action presumably is part
of the continuous struggle for ultimate control in
Baghdad in which Saddam Tikriti, RCC deputy chair-
man and deputy secretary general of the governing
Ba'th Party, is said to have the upper hand. Tikriti
has been at odds with Ammash and others, including
President Bakr, who reportedly is ailing and whose
position of power also is uncertain.
(continued)
29 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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GUYANA: Guybau, the government-owned bauxite
operation, has rejected ALCAN's marketing offer in
favor of a more extensive arrangement with Philipp
Brothers of New York. The US company will market
Guybau's entire output of bauxite and alumina after
1 January 1972 and it will aid Guybau in obtaining
financial and technical assistance. According to
a Canadian official, Guyana rejected the ALCAN offer
because of a basic lack of confidence in the com-
pany, which resulted from the recent nationaliza-
tion experience and subsequent unsuccessful efforts
to obtain technical assistance from ALCAN. While
the marketing issue appears settled for the moment,
it remains to be seen whether profitable markets
can be found for the ore, which is in worldwide
oversupply, and whether potential shipping diffi-
culties can be resolved.
29 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin 17
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