CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A020100050001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 27, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
Secret
N2 42
27 September 1971
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No. 0231/71
27 September 1971
Central Intelligence Bulletin
COMMUNIST CHINA: Peking is outwardly calm, but
other evidence points to a continuing leadership
crisis. (Page 1)
USSR: Soviet leaders enlarge travel schedules.
(Page 3)
YUGOSLAVIA-USSR: Belgrade probably remains suspi-
cious of Moscow. (Page 4)
USSR-UK: Moscow protests expulsion of agents.
Page 5)
NORTH VIETNAM - COMMUNIST CHINA: A high-level Chi-
nese politburo legation visits Hanoi. (Page 6)
BELGIUM: Prime minister forced to call early elec-
tions. (Page 7)
UN-DRUGS: Narcotics commission opens meeting.
(Page 9)
UN-AFRICA: Security Council meets on South-West
Africa. (Page 11)
INDIA-USSR-PAKISTAN: Mrs. Gandhi"s visit to Mos-
cow (Page 13)
CAMBODIA: Attack on US personnel (Page 13)
JAPAN: Raid on palace grounds (Page 14)
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COMMUNIST CHINA: Eyewitnesses report that out-
ward calm prevails in Peking, but other unusual de-
velopments suggest that the leadership crisis is
unresolved.
Press reports state that preparations for low-
key celebrations of National Day on 1 October are
going forward in the parks of Peking,c and also that
Canton television will carry a "special and impor-
tant" newscast tomorrow night about the "ci cum-
stances" of the National Day commemoration. 1
There is no heightened military presence
in the capital nor any sign that the Peking garrison
troops are on alert status.
Despite the air of calm in Peking, behind-the-
scenes tension within the ruling politburo apparently
remains high. Three military leaders on the polit-
buro were in the party that saw Vice Premier Li
Hsien-nien off when he departed for Hanoi, but other
top-ranking military figures, including army chief
of staff Huang Yung-sheng and air force commander
Wu Fa-hsien, have been out of public view since the
major leadership meeting convened on 12 September.
There is no new information on Mao Tse-tung?s
health, but a recent report concerning heir-designate
Lin Piao suggests that uncertainty over Lin?s phys-
ical condition, or perhaps his future political role,
may be a crucial factor in the current leadership
crisis. This impression has been reinforced by the
refusal of the Chinese ambassador in Ottawa, Huang
Hua, to comment on rumors concerning Lin during a
conversation with a Canadian foreign affairs officer
on 23 September. :Huang, who appeared tense, point-
edly dodged two direct queries on Lin?s health and
answered the second query by saying that Mao?s health
was excellent when Huang last saw him, Huang left
27 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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PPkina for his Canadian post in the middle of July.
the
traditional National Day holiday banquet os a by
Premier Chou En-lai would be held as scheduled on
30 September. This event may not shed any further
light on Mao or Lin?s status, because neither usually
attends the banquet. Although the decision to hold
this affair probably is intended to convey an im-
pression of normalcy, Peking's postponement of other
scheduled activities suggests that the regime antic-
ipates no early resolution of the leadership crisis.
A,statement by Ministry of Foreign Affairs offi-
cials that all foreign
businessmen have been instructea to depart China"
may be an indication that the regime also is plan-
ning to postpone or cancel the C ton Trade Fair,
cheduled to open on 15 October.
27 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin 2
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USSR: The top three Soviet leaders are con-
tinuing to add new destinations to their already
crowded fall itineraries.
General Secretary Brezhnev, following his
visit to Yugoslavia, unexpectedly flew to Budapest
to brief Hungarian leaders on his talks with Presi-
dent Tito. He arrived in Sofia on Sunday to make
a similar report to Bulgarian officials.
Premier Kosygin reportedly has added Morocco
to his October schedule, possibly between his pro-
jected visit to Algeria and his 17-27 October trip
to Canada. The US Embassy in Ottawa has received a
number of hints that Kosygin may be interested in a
visit to the UN and perhaps meetings with the "highest"
US officials during or after his Canadian stay. The
Soviets have already asked the Canadians if they would
be "unhappy" if Kosygin were to visit the UN after
leaving Canada..
Finally, TASS has announced that President
Podgorny will visit India and Burma on his way to
Hanoi. He is scheduled to stop in New Delhi on 1
October and proceed to Rancrnnn 1-ha nayf- rlnxr I
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YUGOSLAVIA-USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev's
talks with President Tito last week produced a state-
ment of intent to improve relations but probably did
not allay Yugoslav suspicions of Soviet intentions.
The joint statement signed on Saturday calls
generally for increased party, government, and eco-
nomic cooperation. Belgrade, however, will watch
closely for follow-through on promises of the Soviets
to soften their critical attitudes toward Yugoslavia's
experiments in political and economic reform, to
pursue reciprocity in information agreements, and
to help ease tensions in the Balkans. On the latter
point, Brezhnev agreed that a nuclear-free zone in
the Balkans "could be" a means of stabilizing peace
in the area. This position still falls short of
Yugoslav and Romanian demands for a renunciation of
the use of force in the Balkans.
The agreement mentioned the 1955 Belgrade and
1956 Moscow declarations which guaranteed Yugoslav
party and government independence, but the agree-
ment did not specifically satisfy Tito's desire for
a clear-cut Soviet hands-off policy toward his coun-
try. Throughout the visit, there were indications
of Yugoslav uneasiness over Brezhnev's ambiguity on
Yugoslav sovereignty and the Brezhnev doctrine. The
face-to-face talks last Thursday and Friday reportedly
were difficult and Brezhnev abused protocol several
times by keeping Tito waiting. The final communique
was cool, mentioning only an exchange of views on a
wide range of problems.
After his departure Saturday, Brezhnev flew to
Budapest and on Sunday to Sofia, where he probably
briefed local leaders on the effects of the joint
agreement on their special interests in relation
with Yugoslavia. Each of these countries has fig-
ured prominently in the pressures on Yugoslavia
this past summer.
27 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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USSR-UK: Moscow has reacted to London's ex-
pulsion of 105 Soviet citizens for espionage with a
predictable protest of outraged innocence and threats
of retaliation.
In a statement presented to the British ambas-
sador in Moscow yesterday, the Soviet Foreign Ministry
officially protested the British action, branding it
as "groundless" and "fabricated." The statement fur-
ther declared that the expulsions were the latest
manifestation of Britain's policy of creating obstacles
to detente, particularly in European affairs. It also
charged that the move was an attempt to cover up ac-
tivities by British "special services" against the USSR,
including Soviet institutions and personnel in Britain.
The Foreign Ministry statement warned that if the
British measures are left in force, the USSR "will
have nothing to do but take corresponding measures of
reply." TASS meanwhile is quoting British press re-
ports that the ouster "may entail very serious con-
sequences for London." In the past, the expulsion of
Russians for espionage has led to retribution in kind;
however, the magnitude of the British move and the
possibility of further expulsions elsewhere in the
West may temporarily stay Moscow's hand--though prob-
ably not its public media.
The thrust of Moscow's reaction seems as much
directed against the timing and, politics of the
British action as it is at denying the charges. The
expulsions may at least temporarily set back current
Soviet diplomatic initiatives in Western Europe the
Conference on European Security in particular.
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NORTH VIETNAM - COMMUNIST CHINA: The current
visit to Hanoi by a high-level Chinese politburo
delegation, although billed as a routine aid mission,
appears to have an essentially political purpose.
The Chinese initiative itself--sending politburo
member Li Hsien-nien and his aid team to Hanoi rather
than having the Vietnamese come hat-in-hand to Peking--
suggests that more than the annual aid protocol is in-
volved.
In terms of timing it comes shortly before the
scheduled visit to Hanoi of Soviet President Podgorny.,
The Vietnamese are responding enthusiastically,re-
f erring to the delegation as one of "friendship,"
comparing it to Chou En-lai's visit last March, and
are highlighting Chinese support for Hanoi's war aims
rather than Peking's material aid. The tenor of Li's
banquet speech on 24 September is especially pleasing
to Hanoi ears. He engaged in the kind of harsh de-
nunciation of US motives that Hanoi is currently using,
characterizing US imperialism as the "most ferocious
enemy of our times" and criticizing the Nixon adminis-+1
tration for making "noises about a peaceful settlement
while continuing its war of aggression" in Indochina.
Li also offered unqualified support for Hanoi's nego-
tiating posture and reassured the Vietnamese that the
destiny of Indochina would indeed be decided by the
"peoples of the three Indochinese countries."
The Li visit appears to be another Chinese effort
to assuage Vietnamese anxieties generated by the an-
nouncement that President Nixon had been invited to
Peking. For about a month thereafter, Hanoi engaged
in unprecedented polemical lecturing of the Chinese,
accusing them of consorting with the enemy, abandoning
friends, and not being true revolutionaries. These
attacks stopped on 22 August as suddenly as they had
begun, and by mid-September the Vietnamese were delib-
erately avoiding public criticism of Peking. Hanoi
press media, for example,edited out the anti-Chinese
comments of a visiting Japanese Communist delegation.
The Li visit thus restores, at least for public pur-
poses, the image of Peking-Hanoi solidarity unmarred
by any Vietnamese apprehensions over any possible
Chinese effor mediate the Vietnam war in talks
with the US.
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BELGIUM: Strife within the Socialist and
Social Christian coalition parties has forced Prime
Minister Eyskens to call national elections for 7
November, seven months ahead of schedule.
With only two weeks before the reconvention
of parliament, the government agreed to dissolve
both chambers. To assure governmental continuity
during the electoral campaign, the cabinet will
resign only upon the formation of a new cabinet
after the elections.
Eyskens blames the international monetary
situation and an expected billion-dollar deficit
in the country's 1972 budget for the current polit-
ical crisis. Actually, the approaching electoral
deadline had accelerated the centrifugal forces
within the coalition.
Eyskens, leader of the Social Christians, was
unable to maintain order within his own party. The
Flemish faction, backed by the Flemish press, had
previously indicated an unwillingness to act this
fall upon the legislation most desired by the
Socialists--a cultural pact, the institution of
regional economic bodies, and a bill resolving the
disputed situation in six bilingual communes along
the country's linguistic frontier. In early July,
Eyskens had promised these provisions to the So-
cialists and the opposition :Liberals in return for
their support of his program for constitutional
revision. The government's existence largely de-
pended on the fulfillment of this bargain.
The politically confident Walloon (French-
speaking) Socialists, led by party co-president
Leburton, have been eager to test their strength
before the holiday season. More specifically,
competition between Leburton and the current vice-
premier, Andre Cools, for the position of prime
minister has propelled the party in this direction.
The intensely ambitious Leburton, to further his
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political future, has criticized party compromises
with the Social Christians on the recent implementa-
tion of constitutional revision and cultural auton-
omy. On the very eve of a top-level intercoalition
meeting, his inflammatory remarks about the Social
Christians precipitated the crisis.
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UN-DRUGS: Deterrents to international traf-
ficking in drugs will provide the focus for the
four-week meeting opening today in Geneva of the
UN's Commission on Narcotic Drugs .(CND).
The CND, a subsidiary of the Economic and
Social Council, is expected to pay considerable
attention to US-suggested amendments to the 1961
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. The basic
thrust of these proposed amendments is to give
the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB)
mandatory powers in, areas where it currently can
only request voluntary compliance. A number of
countries have expressed reservations, maintaining
that the measures would constitute a significant
infringement on their sovereignty. They appear to
have special concern over the proposal that the INCB
be able to impose a narcotics embargo against nations
incapable of preventing major illicit activity. A
high-level diplomatic conference set for March 1972
will review and take final action on the suggested
amendments.
The recently completed draft convention on
psychotropic (mind-bending) substances complements
the 1961 legislation by identifying 32 chemical-
origin drugs not regulated a decade ago that are
regarded by the international community as dangerous
today. The most notorious example in this category
is LSD. The commission is likely to seek more rat-
ifications--a total. of 40 are needed--to the new
convention in the hope that it can, enter into force
soon. Most observers believe that will occur during
the first half of 1.972. There has been some concern,
however, that international controls over the psy-
chotropic substances will be inadequate--weaker
than US suggestions for amending the 1961 convention.
The less developed countries, primary producers of
the "natural" drugs. regulated by the 1961 convention,
maintain that the new legislation affects less harshly
the developed nations, in which most psychotropics
are manufactured.
(continued)
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The CND is certain to seek more backing for
the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control. The fund was
set up in March and has received its major impetus
to date from a US gift of $1 million, with an ad-
ditional $1 million pledged by Washington. It is
expected to be used to expand greatly the drug-
control efforts of the UN's specialized agencies,
especially the Food and Agricultural Organization,
which is developin economic alternatives to illicit
opium production.
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UN-AFRICA: Today's special Security Council
meeting on South-West Africa could prove to be
highly contentious.'
Impetus for this session was provided by the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in June, when
it issued an advisory opinion upholding the 1966
decision of the General Assembly to terminate South
Africa's mandate over the territory. The Organiza-
tion of African Unity (OAU) is pressing for UN ac-
tion in the wake of the ICJ's ruling and has called
the Council meeting at this particular time in order
to share the spotlight with--and compel the atten-
tion of--the high--level representatives of the major
powers who will be on hand in New York. The delega-
tion from the OAU consists of its chairman, Maurita-
nian President Ou].d Daddah, and several foreign min-
isters.
Ould Daddah delivered an acerbic speech against
the Western powers on Friday, and more of the same
may be in store today. A draft report on South-West
Africa will be submitted to the Council by its ad
hoc committee on the territory, despite the lack of
agreement on some sections in the text. The Africans
are likely to focus on the unresolved points, which
include a call for UN sanctions against Pretoria
should it--as is certain--refuse to withdraw from
South-West Africa Another critical issue on which
no agreement was reached in committee involves in-
terpretation of the Council's embargo on arms sup-
plies to South Africa. The Africans have not, how-
ever, given any sign that they will push for South
Africa's expulsion from UN membership.
The Council session on South-West Africa, com-
bined with the planned high-level OAU mission to
Western Europe next month, is indicative of the Af-
ricans' desire to obtain some kind of satisfaction
on "colonial" subjects, which also involve apartheid
in South Africa and the other white redoubts of Rho-
desia and the Portuguese territories. Among these
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the one likely to engender the biggest squabble in
the Assembly this fall is the African bid to have
spokesmen of the liberation movement designated to
represent the Portuguese territories in the Addis
Ababa - based UN Economic Commission for Africa.
All moves to delay the issue have failed so far, and
the Africans may well have the votes to secure the
designations they desire. If successful, this tac-
tic could lead to similar efforts on behalf of l'b-
eration movements
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INDIA-USSR-PAKISTAN: Mrs. Gandhi's brief visit
to Moscow, scheduled to begin today, is expected to
be devoted largely to discussions regarding East
Pakistan. Indicative of the :Likely subject matter
was the arrival in Moscow on 23 September of D. P.
Dhar, an official of the Indian Ministry of External
Affairs who has been closely associated with formu-
lation of India's policy toward Bangla Desh. Mrs.
Gandhi, in her talks with Soviet leaders, presumably
will be seeking further commitments of diplomatic,
economic, and possibly military support, pointing
out that domestic pressure on her government to "do
something" regarding East Pakistan remains high.
Bengali refugees--.now numbering over nine million,
according to Indian sources--continue to stream
across the border? The Soviets, however, are likely
to urge caution on the Indians, as they apparently
have done on more than one occasi(11_.5.1J1= the crisis
erupted in South Asia last March.
CAMBODIA: The attack on US Mission personnel
in Phnom Penh yesterday is the most serious'incident
so far in the Communists' terrorist campaign against
the US presence in the capital. Two Americans were
killed and another ten wounded at a recreation cen-
ter near the embassy by explosives apparently thrown
by motorcyclists. Earlier this month there were an
abortive attack on the US ambassador and several un-
successful attempts on other US Embassy and military
personnel in Phnom Penh. Enemy elements in areas
just north and northeast of Phnom Penh have recently
become bolder and they may be responsible for the
recent attacks in the ca ital.
(continued)
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JAPAN: The raid by a handful of radical stu-
dents into the grounds of Emperor Hirohito's palace
on 25 September is the latest example of a new stu-
dent willingness to engage in terrorist acts that
fly in the face of popular Japanese attitudes. In
other recent incidents extremist youth groups have
inflicted on police forces numerous casualties and,
at the Narita airport disturbances, three deaths.
The police are concerned that several of the larger
youth groups are now forsaking their traditional
ritualistic protests in favor of extremist activity
involving lethal weapons. They are also concerned
that the use of such tactics during the mass demon-
strations expected after the Diet convenes in mid-
October could lead to widespread violence. Such a
development could readily compound the Sato govern-
ment's anticipated difficulties with the Diet over
the Okinawa treaty and relations with China.
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Secret
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