CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A019500110001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 20, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
State Dept. review completed N? 041
20 July 1971
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No. 0172/71
20 July 1971
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
NORTH VIETNAM: Hanoi has deep misgivings over recent
Sino-American developments. (Page 1)
USSR-CHINA-US: Moscow probably considers that Wash-
ington an Peking are ganging up on it. (Page 3)
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SUDAN: The regime of Revolutionary Command Council
CFairman Numayri was overthrown by a group of mili-
tary officers (Page 7)
USSR-US: Kosygin proposes joint ventures to develop
Sv~oie rraw materials. (Page 9)
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS: Netherlands to
present proposal to solve international monetary prob-
lems. (Page 10)
UK: The government has proposed measures to stimulate
tie lagging economy. (Page 11)
COMMUNIST CHINA - SOMALIA:: Peking will provide sub-
stantial new economic assistance. (Page 13)
MOROCCO: Investigation of the coup continues. (Page 14)
MALAWI-PORTUGAL: President Banda hopes to increase
official contacts with Portugal. (Page 15)
USSR: Kresta II deployment (Page 17)
CHILE: By-election (Page 17)
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BURMA: Cosmetic changes in government age
YEMEN (SANA): Premier resigns (Page 18)
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;NORTH VIETNAM: Hanoi has expressed deep mis-
givirrgs over the implications for Vietnam of recent
developments in Sino-American relations.
Breaking a three-day silence on last week's
announcements, the North Vietnamese party daily
on 19 July published a hard.-hitting editorial
sharply criticizing "socialist" nations that, by
responding to Washington's overtures, fall in with
the Nixon doctrine. Although it did not directly
mention China or President Nixon's upcoming visit,
the editorial inveighed against big powers that
gang up to make small countries do their bidding.
Hanoi's statement asserted that the Vietnamese
Communists would hold to their present course and
would not be bound by pacts or arrangements con-
cluded behind their backs. In a telling sentence,
the editorial reiterated that the US could dis-
engage from Vietnam only by coming to terms with
the Vietnamese and no one else: "Nixon has been
running-in search of a way out. But he has gone
to the wrong place. The exit door has been opened
(i.e., the seven-point proposal), yet he has tum-
bled into an impasse."
Indeed, Hanoi strongly implied that if worst
comes to worst the Vietnamese are prepared to go
it alone. it recalled that through history, the
Vietnamese by themselves have defeated successive
foreign "imperialists," leaving unsaid that the
Chinese have been prominent among them.
North Vietnam's strong reaction and blunt
language probably reflect a reawakening in Hanoi
of latent fears that Vietnamese Communist interests
in Indochina could become enmeshed in big-power
politics, as they were under less favorable cir-
cumstances for the Viet Minh in 1954. Hanoi may
think that by forcefully and quickly weighing in,
it can deflect any notions the Chinese may have
2'0 Jul'- 7
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that Vietnamese Communist interests can be sacri-
ficed to their own. Perhaps more importantly,
Hanoi may also hope to make it clear that Washing-
ton cannot count on relaxed tensions with Peking
to lead Hanoi into compromises it would otherwise
not make. Moreover, Hanoi probably views last
week's announcements in Washington and Peking as
taking the play away from its own seven points and
removing a good deal of the pressure it felt the
Viet Cong proposal had generated onWashington.
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.-'USSR-CHINA-US.- The announcement of President
Nixon 's planned visit to China is certain to heighten
Soviet concern that Peking and Washington are ganging
up on Moscow.
Although initial Soviet comment has been sparse,
reflecting Moscow's stunned surprise over the Sino-US
move, the USSR will undoubtedly view the President's
planned trip as an attempt by the US and China to
gain leverage for extracting concessions from Moscow.
The USSR has failed to note publicly the President's
statement that the development "is not directed against
any other nation" and may repeat the comments of some
of its East European allies that the planned visit
has "anti-Soviet" overtones.
Some initial Soviet propaganda comments have
already sought to fan apprehensions in Hanoi that
Washington and Peking are dealing at North Vietnamese
expense. Moscow has suggested that Washington will
use the development to avoid a reply to the new Viet-
namese Communist negotiating proposal and has implied
that the US and China plan to sell out Hanoi.
Moscow's attempts to score-propaganda points at
Peking's expense, however, will not obscure Moscow's
more fundamental apprehensions about the trend of
Sino-US relations. The visit to China this spring
of the US table-tennis team made a strong impression
on the Kremlin, but Moscow had apparently concluded
that it would lead to only a slow development of
political contacts. Moscow will now be more fearful
that the new Sino-US move portends an eventual de-
velopment of more meaningful US-Chinese collaboration,
which it fears can only work to its own detriment.
The projected visit is unlikely to have any im-
mediate dramatic impact on Moscow's policies in its
current negotiations with either Washington or Peking.
Moscow's position on such issues as arms limitations,
Berlin, and the Sino-Soviet border dispute have a
logic and history of their own. Initially, however,!
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the S
on so
strat
from
ceive
more
both
oviets may feel a need to adopt a firmer stand
me contentious issues, in an effort to demon-
e that Sino-US tactics cannot force concessions
the USSR. Over the longer run, Moscow may per-
itself under increased pressure to be somewhat
forthcoming in its dealings with either or
of its rivals in an attempt to forestall US-
Chinese accommodatio 25X1
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Al Fashir
Al Ubayyid
t Babanusah
alakatE
Juba(
Pak-
wacE
take
Kyoga
Kampala,
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C SUDAN: The regime of Revolutionary Command
Counca RCC) Chairman Numayri was overthrown yes-
terday by a group of military officers.
Press reports from Khartoum have identified the
coup leaders as Major Hashim al-Atta, a former member
of the RCC, Brigadier Uthman Sharaf, commander of the
Republican Guard, and. Colonel Abd al-Munim Ahmad,
commander of the 3rd Armored Regiment. Atta, who has
been declared president of a new ruling council, an-
nounced over Sudanese radio that the former regime
had been overthrown because it was dictatorial. He
said the coup leaders are prepared to cooperate with
"all democratic and nationalist elements in creating
a new government" which would "liberate Sudan from
an alliance between foreign and local capitalism."
He spoke favorably of continued relations with the
Soviet Union.
Numayri had been in difficulty almost from the
moment his own group took control in a coup on 25
May 1969 because of friction between conservative
military officers and left-leaning nationalists in
the government. To placate the officers there were
periodic purges of Communists. Al-Atta, a one time
organizer for the Sudanese Communist Party, was the
victim of one such purge in December 1970, despite
his record as a brilliant officer and talented tech-
nician.
In a bid to gain broad support for the new gov-
ernment Atta promised to attack a number of the
domestic problems which had plagued his predecessor.
To raise hopes for an end to the costly, 15-year
military campaign against the Negro tribesmen of
the south, the new strongman promised eventual home
rule for southern Sudan. He also called for the
participation of the "masses" in administering the
country, although leadership would continue to be
provided by the army. Atta indicated that Sudan
would maintain a strong stand against Israel in the
Arab-Israeli conflict and would support the cause
of the Palestinian resistance.
(continued)
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C Following al-Atta's broadcast, Radio Omdurman
broadcast messages of support for the new leaders
from political, social, and military organizations
in northern Sudan, and Radio Baghdad announced
Iraqi recognition of the new goverLmen
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:'USSR-US: In the highest level appeal to date,
Prim 'Minister Kosygin has suggested that US com-
panies form joint ventures with the Soviets to help
develop the USSR's raw materials.
Kosygin spoke at some length on this subject in
his discussion with several US participants in the
recent "Dartmouth" conference in Kiev. He mentioned
the production of nonferrous metals, timber, phos-
phates, natural gas, diamonds, and exploration of
the continental shelf as possible areas of collabo-
ration. As precedents. he cited arrangements. with
Japan and West Germany where the Western partner is
paid for its assistance from the output of the proj-
ect. He also noted that the Soviets are studying
the possibility of supplying oil to the West under
similar joint ventures.
Kosygin's remarks ignored the negative factors
in US-Soviet trade such as Soviet trading practices
and the lack of interest on the part of US importers
in most Soviet products. Repayment from the output
of a Joint venture instead of in hard currency also
has not appealed to US investors in the past.
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INTERNATIONAL MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS: The Neth-
erla s will propose a package so ution for inter-
national monetary problems at today's meeting of the
Monetary Committee of the European Communities (EC).
The package contains several important elements.
Stricter balance-of-payments discipline would be re-
quired of all countries. For the US, the proposal
recommends the reimposition of mandatory controls on
investment abroad, a toughening of the interest.
equalization tax, and a commitment to redeem any in-
crease in dollars held abroad either in gold or by
drawing on the International Monetary Fund. Exchange
rates would be altered through a three-percent de-
valuation of the dollar and a revaluation of the
Canadian, Japanese, and some EC currencies; exchange-
rate bands also would be widened, except within the
EC. Finally, to help the US, it is proposed that
other countries agree to a more equitable sharing of
military and aid expenditures, and that they actively
encourage investment in the US.
The Dutch proposal is in part an attempt to re-
sume movement toward an EC monetary union by compro-
mising French and West German differences over setting
a date for ending the floating of the mark. Accept-
ance of the package by the EC would imply such a
termination without stating so directly. Although
the Dutch hope that the EC members will agree to
present this package at the international financial
meetings in September, it may serve primarily as a
catal
t f
ys
or discussion and thereby improve the
chances for reaching a common Er position for th
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UK: The Heath government yesterday introduced
into Parliament a package of financial measures aimed
at stimulating the lagging economy.
Finance Minister Barber announced that sales
taxes would be lowered and credit terms eased to re-
vive consumer demand and thus increase employment in
the manufacturing industries. In addition, the gov-
ernment last week announced a $245-million public
works program to increase employment in depressed
areas..
According to the latest economic indicators,
the British economy remains sluggish despite lower
taxes and higher pension allowances contained in the
budget announced in March. The gross domestic prod-
uct dropped almost three percent in the first quarter
of 19.71. Fixed capital expenditure was off by ten
percent, and exports of goods and services were down
seven percent.
The government's latest moves serve a dual pur-
pose.. The reflationary measures will aid output and
t
s
employment, and will also help refute the argumen
of the Labor Party that the depressed state of the
economy precludes British entry into the European
Community at this time. If the UK's growth rate
picks up by fall, Heath will have an easier time
-moving Britain into the EC.
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ANZANIA
YEMEN
(Sava)
ADDIS ABABA
NAIROBI
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COMMUNIST CHINA SOMALIA: Peking has agreed
to provide substantial new economic assistance to
Somalia, perhaps amounting to as much as $110 million.
The agreement, concluded during the visit to
Peking in early June by a Somali delegation, calls
for the construction of a 600-mile road between
Mogadiscio and Northern Somalia. This project could
account for at least half of the new credit. The
remaining funds are to be used for agricultural de-
velopment and light industrial plants. In addition
Peking recently signed protocols to begin work on
projects included under earlier agreements amounting
to some $23 million.
Since the coup in October 1969, other Communist
countries have provided little economic aid to Mog-
adiscio. Earlier this year Moscow canceled a small
part of the debt owed under--a credit extended in:
1961 and agreed to a five-year postponement of the
debt repayment due this year. In addition, it will
provide a small amount of assistance for several
projects including construction of oil depots. East
Germany has provided only a token amount of assist-
ance despite Somalia's diplomatic recognition of
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MOROCCO: Calm prevails throughout Morocco as
the rive is igation continues into origins of the at-
tempted coup of 10 June.
Another 50 to 60 military officers have been
arrested and brought to Rabat for interrogation,
as uuA1 L_L .J
to the ten o icers executed last Tues ay after a
summary court-martial, an unstated number of officers
were peremptorily shot after the Rabat radio station
and military headquarters were retaken.
The King has called an extraordinary session of
the unicameral chamber of representatives for to-
morrow, presumably to approve the law establishing
the state security court that the King said would be
created. What role this new court will play in the
investigation is not yet clear.
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MALAWI-PORTUGAL: President Banda apparently
hopes to broaden his policy of open cooperation
with white-ruled southern Africa through increased
official contacts with Portugal.
A three-day visit to Malawi last week by the
Portuguese minister of overseas--the first visit by
a Portuguese cabinet minister--touched on a wide
range of topics including Portugal's plans for
greater autonomy for its African territories, Lis-
bon's moderate racial policies, and its ability to
support territorial development. The Portuguese
also agreed to provide Malawi with modest financial
and educational assistance,
The major result of the visit, however--and
the one closest to Banda's heart--was an agreement
for future state exchanges. Portuguese Foreign Min-
ister Patricio will visit Malawi later this year,
and Banda will go to Mozambique in September, fol-
lowing a visit to South Africa next month.
Such exchanges are crucial to Banda's open-
dialogue policy, which seeks to prove that black
African states are capable of governing their own
affairs, and that southern African whites need not
fear black majority governments. Equally important
is Banda's own reliance on white southern Africa for
Malawi's economic development and his desire to head
off violent confrontations as a solution to the ques-
tion of black independence in southern Africa.
Although closer ties with Portugal's overseas
provinces may give Banda's policies added weight
with southern Africa, such ties are not likely to
sway many black African leaders, who for the most
part regard dialogue as naive and ineffectual. One
event during Banda's trip to Mozambique that is
likely to prompt strong criticism from these lead-
ers will be his visit to the controversial Cabora-
Bassa hydroelectric project, which has become a
symbol of Portugal's economic colonialism to much
of black Africa and the target of limited insurgency
by anti-Portuguese nationalists.
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USSR: The first of the new Kresta II - class
gui -missile cruisers is about to join an opera-
tional fleet. The ship is now moving through the
Norwegian Sea and probably is headed for the North-
ern Fleet. This improved version of the Kresta-
class cruiser has greater ASW and air defense capa-
bilities. The ship spent nearly a year in the Black
Sea--probably testing its new missile systems--and
now appears to be ready to make routine deployments
with other Soviet surface warships and submarines
assigned to the Nortiern Fleet.
CHILE: The defeat of the administration's can-
didateTin a legislative by-election in the important
Valparaiso port area will encourage the opposition
parties to cooperate. The winning Christian Demo-
cratic candidate was supported by two other parties,
and the government Popular Unity coalition received
approximately the same minority total that it won in
that area in the municipal elections last April.
Despite President Allende's statement that the defeat
would not affect his program, the timing of his co-
alition's projected move toward creation of a uni-
came-Val legislature may be influenced.
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BURMA: In another step aimed at creating the
appearance of a return to normality and permanent
institutions in Burmese political life, the military
oligarchy has dropped the word "revolutionary" in
the official title of the government; it is now
called the Government of the Union of Burma. General
Ne Win, who has been chairman of the ruling Revolu-
tionary Council for the past nine years, on 15 July
named himself prime minister in the "new" government
and reappointed all the incumbent army officers who
serve as cabinet ministers. These changes, which
come on the heels of the restructuring of the gov-
ernment's Burma Socialist Program Party and the ad-
dition of some civilians to government bodies, will
not effectively alter the army's predominant role .in
Burma. They are probably part of a process that in-
cludes the prospective writing of a new constitution
and perhaps other steps designed to give some sem-
blapce of-tivilian partic1pation.
I YEMEN (SANA): Premier Numan has sent his res-
ignation to President Iryani, believing that his
government has reached a dead end in meeting the
country's deepening financial crisis. The ultimate
blow had been the refusal of the consultative coun-
cil to accept a Saudi Arabian loan, an action moti-
vated entirely by political bickering with utter
disregard for the fiscal chaos that might result.
General al-Amri, who previously had been felled by
similar problems, is expected to return from medical
treatment in Cairo to try the premiership once :more,:.
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Secret
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