CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A019300050001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 17, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
N?_ 040
17 June 1971
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No. 0144/71
17 June 1971
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
CAMBODIA: The Khmer Communist movement. (Page 1)
EAST GERMANY: Attitude toward Berlin negotiations.
(Page 3)
FRANCE: United action by the Socialists and Commu-
nists. (Page 5)
MALTA: The Malta Labor Party's victory. (Page 7)
IRAN: Interest in the Egyptian oil pipeline.
(Page 9)
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BOLIVIA: Coup possible. (Page 13)
CHILE: Opposition efforts to work together in Con-
gress. (Page 15)
PAKISTAN: Bad wheat crop (Page 16)
INDIA-PAKISTAN: Repatriation of diplomats (Page 16)
COMMUNIST CHINA - CEYLON: Patrol boats (Page 16)
PERU - COMMUNIST CHINA: Sale of fish products
(Page 17)
CUBA-CHILE: Regular airline flights (Page 17)
AUSTRALIA: Foreign exchange reserves (Page 17)
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CAMBODIA: The Communists may have more ethnic
Cambodian cadres on whom to draw in support of the
Khmer Communist movement than has been previously
estimated.
A recent debriefing of a Viet Cong rallier in-
dicates that a steady stream of Cambodians was sent
to Hanoi for training during the 1960s. The rallier,
sai
tnat several small groups o Vietnamese-spec ing Cam-
bodians journeyed from Cambodia to North Vietnam be-
tween early 1962 and September 1970,
At the outset, many of these exfiltrators were ethnic
Cambodians who lived in South Vietnam. As the years
passed, however, the Communists began to recruit
directly from within Cambodia.
As the ethnic Cambodians were moving north,
others were returning to Cambodia and South Vietnam
from North Vietnam. The rallier claims that between
January 1968 and late April 1970 about 11 or 12 Cam-
bodians were infiltrating per day. If this is true,
it means that as many as 9,000 trained KC cadres ar-
rived in the country during that period alone.
The rallier's superiors apparently told him
that most of the cadres who returned to Cambodia be-
tween 1962 and 1967 had gone to North Vietnam in 1954.
In talking with several returnees the rallier learned,
that their training lasted anywhere from six months
to three years. A selected few were sent to the So-
viet Union and Communist China for advanced military
and academic training.
The rallier believed that many of the returnees
were slated to serve as low-to-medium-level cadres,
but the rallier did not specify whether they were
used principally in Cambodia or South Vietnam. The
Communists presumably had a need for Cambodian
speakers both in Cambodia, where they could serve
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in liaison capacities for the North Vietnamese Army
and Viet Cong units that were increasingly using
Cambodia as a base area, and in South Vietnam,
where they could be targeted against the large ethnic
Cambodian community in the delta. Some of the cadres
may also have been involved in the effort before
Sihanouk's ouster to develop an indigenous Communist
movement. Whatever the case, the uneven performance
of the Khmer Communists over the past year and their
dependence on Viet Cong cadres indicates that there
is still a considerable shortage of experienced and
dedicated Khmer Communist leaders.
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EAST GERMANY: Soviet and East German leaders
adopted a positive tone toward the Berlin negotia-
tions, but offered no change. in substance in speeches
at the East German party congress.
Soviet party leader Brezhnev's remarks to the
congress were clearly aimed at casting the Soviet
approach to the Berlin negotiations in the most
favorable possible light. He said that the USSR
wanted an agreement that would ensure "normal con-
ditions" of life for the people of West Berlin and
remove it as a source of tension in Europe. He
added, however, that he did not know whether he
could speak for "our partners in the talks"--presum-
ably in reference to the US, upon whom the Soviets
have attempted to place the responsibility for the
lack of progress.
Brezhnev's comment that the talks are "now
transferring" to the stage of concrete proposals
marks the first time that the Soviets have acknowl-
edged that the negotiations have gone beyond the
exploratory stage. However, Brezhnev went out of
his way to emphasize. that Moscow and Pankow ap-
proached the talks in complete unity, and to suggest
that there would be no concessions at East German
expense. Notably, his endorsement of a Berlin
agreement was tied to the qualification that due
consideration must be taken of the "lawful interests
and sovereign rights" of the GDR. This was probably
meant in part to end speculation of differences be-
tween Moscow and Pankow regarding Berlin.
East German party boss Erich Honecker stressed
that Soviet - East German views are characterized
by "complete unanimity" on all questions. He re-
vealed no objections to the course of the four-power
Berlin negotiations in his keynote address to the
congress on Tuesday. Rather, he went out of his
way to indicate that East Germany would cooperate.
Honecker said the GDR was prepared to contribute
to the "normalization of relations vis-a-vis West
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Berlin" in an effort to realize detente in Europe.
In this regard, the SED leader extended good wishes
for success in the four-power negotiations.
In discussing East German talks with the West
Berlin Senat, Honecker departed from past practice
to assert that "West Berlin is a city with a special
political status," and that it never did and never
will belong to the Federal Republic. This is a
less offensive version of Pankow's standard formula-
tion that West Berlin is a separate political entity
situated on the territory of the GDR. On the ques-
tion of the relationship between East and West Ger-
many, in which the Bahr-Kohl talks constitute the
immediate point of contact, Honecker said that rela-
tions between the two are "only possible on the
basis of the rules of international law" rather than
on the West German basis of an "inner-German rel-a-
tionship."
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FRANCE: Looking toward the 1973 legislative
elections, the newly united Socialist Party is pro-
moting unity of action with the Communists even more
vigorously than in the past.
Francois Mitterrand, who defeated long-time
Socialist leaders Guy Mollet and Alain Savary at
the recent party congress to emerge as de facto
party head, succeeded in pushing through a charter
that calls for talks with the Communists leading
toward a "government program." Such a program,
which will be determined by an extraordinary party
national council in March 1972, would be aimed at
defining policies the two parties would follow if
they came to power.
In decisively rejecting the "third force"
strategy--playing the middle ground between the Com-
munists and the Gaullists--the party has strength-
ened its leftward orientation. Its refusal to enter
into any deals with the center probably reflects its
realization that the center not only is too weak to
be an effective partner but also is too committed
at this juncture to the policy of cooperating with
the government.
The French Communist Party (PCF) thus far has
reacted negatively to the new charter. In an at-
tempt to prod the Socialists even further leftward,
PCF head Georges Marchais implied the party was
much too cautious in moving toward leftist unity.
Although the congress was a triumph for Mit-
terrand, who faded from the French political scene
following the demise of the Federation of Democratic
and Socialist Left in 1968, he will have his hands
full trying to meld the party's disparate elements
into a grouping strong enough to meet the PCF as an
equal partner. The Socialist Party, which now has
90,000 adherents, is an amalgam of the traditional
Socialist Party, the Convention of Republican In-
stitutions, two small Christian socialist groups,
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and numerous unaffiliated socialists. The first
phase of Mitterrand's strategy is to form a union
of the Communist and non-Communist left capable of
displacing the Gaullist majority. Ultimately, he
hopes this coalition will put him into the presi-
dency in 1976. 17 1
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MALTA: The Malta Labor Party's (MLP) narrow
victory in the parliamentary elections suggests that
the new government will have to take a cautious ap-
proach, particularly on East-West relations.
The latest returns from the elections on 12-14
June indicate that the MLP has a one-seat victory,
although there is a possibility that the defeated
Nationalists will contest the outcome. The small
margin could create an unstable political situation
for the new prime minister, Dom Mintoff, but factors
working in his favor include tight party discipline
and the fact that the MLP is tasting power for the
first time in 13 years. The narrowness of the vic-
tory may also be useful to party moderates, who can
argue that it precludes any dramatic and immediate
deviation from past policies.
Malta's foreign policy under Mintoff is likely
to veer toward neutralism and an effort to play off
East against West for the country's economic bene-
fit. Prior to the campaign, Mintoff suggested that
the small NATO presence on Malta was not in keeping
with his concept of "positive neutrality." Labor's
election program avoided any reference to NATO,
however, and Mintoff's recent public statements in-
dicate that his government probably would accept a
continued NATO presence if his demands for "adequate"
compensation are met. He probably will seek to re-
vise the status of the defense and financial assist-
ance agreement with the UK in an effort to reduce
British control over key elements of Maltese for-
eign policy and to secure development aid beyond
1974, when the present arrangement expires.
The Maltese look upon the Arab nations of the
Mediterranean as a potential market and the MLP has
indicated that it would promote better relations
with them. During the campaign, the party expressed
its willingness to enter into an economic agreement
with Libya, and Mintoff may use this possibility to
put pressure on the US and other Western nations to
increase their aid and investments. He may also
see Malta as a potential "honest broker" in such
matters as the Arab-Israeli dispute.
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Iran's Interest Shifting From IRTUP To SUMED Pipeline
UJ Ammo
+2 1_~ JORDAN
(
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Proposed Iran-Turkey
oil pipeline (IRTUP)
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IRAN: Tehran's interest in promoting a pro-
posed Iran-Turkey oil pipeline (IRTUP) has dampened
considerably, and the Iranians may participate in-
stead in the second stage of the Egyptian SUMED pipe-
line.
Spiraling construction expenses for the 1,100-
mile Turkish pipeline have pushed its estimated cost
from $500-700 million to some $1 billion. As a re-
sult, backers of the project would have to increase
their contributions. Tehran is also concerned over
political difficulties and uncertainties in Turkey,
where the line would terminate. Meanwhile, potential
users are balking both at the prospect of higher fees
because of rising costs and at Tehran's demand that
tax rates on oil be based on the Mediterranean prices
rather than on the lower ones at the Gulf.
While failure of the IRTUP project to material-
ize could cost Iran some political embarrassment
with Turkey, it is the Turks who stand to lose eco-
nomically. Ankara not only was looking to the pipe-
line to provide part of its increased petroleum
needs but it also stood to gain from transit fees
and port charges resulting from an increase in oil
traffic at the Mediterranean port of Iskenderun.
Iranian interest in the Egyptian pipeline is an
outgrowth of improved relations between Cairo and
Tehran. The subject of the pipeline reportedly was
broached when Egyptian Foreign Minister Riyad visited
Tehran early this year and followed up in discussions
with Iranian oil officials in Cairo in mid-May. The
Iranians now reportedly have asked consortium mem-
bers to shift their commitments to use the IRTUP
project to the second stage of the SUMED line. Con-
struction of the first stage, to be financed by gov-
ernment-backed loans from various West European
users and direct loans from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia,
could get under way before the end of this year.
Iranian participation in the second stage would help
balance off Tehran's current deal with Israel in-
volving the use of the Israeli pipeline.
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BOLIVIA: Converging forces are threatening to
upset the precarious political balance which has
enabled Juan Jose Torres to maintain his tenuous
hold on the presidency.
Military and civilian opposition groups fear
that Torres will continue to bid for support from
the labor- and student-dominated extreme leftist
"popular forces" when their "popular assembly" re-
convenes on 22 June. A pre-emptive nationalization
or expulsion, with the US Military Assistance Ad-
visory Group (MAAG) the most likely candidate for
elimination, could occur this weekend if Torres
holds true to previous form. Anti-Torres elements
within the armed forces
may decide to to e action around June
even i plans for a coordinated opposition move
have not been completed.
The small pro-Soviet Bolivian Communist Party
has reportedly instructed its members to arm them-
selves in order to assist Torres in defending him-
self in the event of a "rightist" coup.
The "popular assembly" session, however, could
develop into a showdown between Torres and the ex-
treme left. The assembly's agenda includes issues
which could lead it into conflict with the Presi-
dent. While "popular forces" leader Juan Lechin
has adamantly maintained that the assembly will
carry out its decisions, Torres has declared that
this body has no power relationship with the gov-
ernment. A new constitution, scheduled to be pro-
mulgated by Torres on 22 June, is almost certain to
include provisions that will make the assembly
superfluous.
The Torres government is internally divided.
Some officials now appear to be pressing for moder-
ation of Bolivian policy and an attempt to improve
relations with the US. The binational center in
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Cochabamba, which had been closed since it was taken
over by university students on 30 April, was uncon-
ditionally returned to its board of directors on
14 June. high-ranking military officers
are reporte to nave strongly urged the President
not to expel the MAAG. A coup attempt by extreme
leftist elements within the government could result
if Torres shifts the thrust of his policies and
tries to secure support from more moderate political
groups and the military.
Torres' failure to acquire a base of support
has made him vulnerable to attack from many sectors
no matter how he handles the current situation.
The contending forces could continue to cancel each
other out, but Torres' position appears to be weak-
ening.
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CHILE: The Congress may now become the focus
of Chilean political activity.
The opposition parties, spurred by the murder
of former cabinet minister Perez Zujovic last week,
united on 15 June to oust the government coalition
leadership of the Chamber of Deputies by a vote of
78 to 44. Having at last exercised their majority
in the chamber, the Christian Democratic, National,
and Democratic Radical parties now are trying to
overcome their persistent differences to agree on a
new leadership.
This congressional move may strengthen opposi-
tion efforts to work together. It follows the de-
feat of the UP's candidate in the politically im-
portant election for the rector of the University
of Chile on 10 June and attacks by congressional
investigators on the. administration's handling of
the copper mines. The expected return of former
president Frei on 18 June will provide opportunities
for opposition forces to press their case.
In the face of more active opposition, UP leg-
islators are considering plans to frustrate com-
pletely any meaningful congressional action during
the current regular legislative session. Communist
Party leaders reportedly have discussed these plans.
The UP hopes to prevent passage of legislation that
would interfere with the Allende administration's
plans and programs, especially economic ones.
-lanother aim o of n
obstructionist policy would be to lower the
prestige of the Congress and provide Allende with a
psychological advantage if he decides to call a na-
tional plebiscite designed to lead to new congres-
sional elections.
Meanwhile, political tension will certainly be.
heightened by an attack yesterday on the plain-
clothes police headquarters in which several were
killed. In a speech, Allende said the attack was
made by remnants of th
Perez' assassination.
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NOTES
PAKISTAN: The current wheat crop in West Pak-
istan is reported to be the worst since the previous
drought years of 1966-67. More than two million
tons may have to be imported in the next year, an
amount that approximates the anticipated import
needs of East Pakistan. According to a Pakistani
official, production of wheat--by far the most im-
portant food crop in West Pakistan--may amount to
no more than 5.5 million tons. Crops of up to seven
.million tons had been achieved since the "green rev-
olution" of 1968 and West Pakistan in recent years
had even been able to send wheat to East Pakistan.
INDIA-PAKISTAN: The two countries appear to be
making some progress in working out the procedures
for repatriating their diplomats in Calcutta and
Dacca. The main hurdle has been the method by which
the Pakistanis would determine which East Bengali
diplomats were genuine defectors to Bangla Desh and
which were coerced. Both governments have now agreed
to a procedure under which the Bengalis would be in-
terviewed indirectly through a Swiss diplomat rather
than directly by a Pakistani. Nevertheless, all
technicalities have not yet been resolved, and a
solution still could be further delayed.
COMMUNIST CHINA - CEYLON: Peking has agreed to
supply Colombo with small patrol boats beginning
in July. China's first military assistance to Ceylon
probably was agreed to last month at the same time
China extended a $25-million hard currency credit.
As with the credit,.Peking's latest aid probably is
intended to allay suspicions of Chinese involvement
with the insurgents, and to offset recent Soviet and
Western assistance. The Ceylonese probably will use
the patrol craft against illegal immigration and
arms smuggling in the northern part of the island.
'(continued)
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PERU - COMMUNIST CHINA: The Peruvian trade
mission has o tained Chinese agreement on a major
commercial transaction. China will buy 150-200
thousand tons of Peruvian fishmeal as well as other
fish products and 40 thousand tons of copper before
the end of 1972. Permanent offices will be estab-
lished in Lima and Peking to facilitate this in-
creased trade. While in Peking the Peruvian trade
mission received lavish treatment and high-level at-
tention, including a meeting with Premier Chou En-
lai. Despite such broad hints to the Peruvians as
Chou's statement that he hoped that Sino-Peruvian
relations would "grow with each passing day," there
is as yet no evidence of substantial progress toward
the establishment of diplomatic relations.
CUBA-CHILE: Cubana, Cuba's national airline,
intends to begin regular biweekly flights between
Havana and Santiago on 26 June with a maintenance
stop in Lima. A commercial air agreement was signed
last February which provided for Cubana flights to
Chile as well as flights by the Chilean Government
airline to Cuba. The Chilean flights have not yet
ht
i
s
g
started but Cubana has been making special fl
to Chile on an irregular basis.
AUSTRALIA: Increased capital inflows have
pushed the country's foreign exchange reserves up
by one third to an unprecedented $2.2 billion at the
end of April. Much of the increase apparently comes
from heavy US direct investment in Australia's boom-
ing mining industry and a rise in short-term borrow-
ing in the US stemming from Canberra's tight monetary
policies. The increased money supply created by
large capital inflows, however, tends to undermine
Canberra's anti-inflationary policies.
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