CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A018600050001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 25, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
N2 40
25 March 1971
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No. 0072/71
25 March 1971
Central Intelligence Bulletin
SOUTH VIETNAM: The Communists may be planning in-
tensified military and propaganda activities. (Page 1)
CHILE: The PDC is stiffening its opposition. (Page 2)
GUATEMALA: Arana may be setting the stage for an-
other crackdown on the left. (Page 3)
NICARAGUA: The two major parties have agreed on po-
litical succession. (Page 4)
POLAND: The government is trying to boost domestic
meat production. (Page 5)
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES - UK: France's position is
arousing some apprehension among other EC members.
(Page 6)
LIBYA: Oil talks (Page 8)
SIERRA LEONE: Coup attempt thwarted (Page 8)
ALGERIA: Bouteflika's trip to Far East (Page 8)
URUGUAY: Release of attorney general (Page 9)
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SOUTH. VIETNAM: Signs of Communist planning for
an intense ication of military and propaganda activ-
ities in South Vietnam have been cropping up increas-
ingly in recent days.
Most of the evidence points to more shellings
and sapper probes beginning late this month; allied
targets in the central highlands and in the area
around Da Nang will probably come under the strongest
pressure, with more limited actions against selected
objectives farther south. In the highlands, prisoners
have reported that elements of three North Vietnamese
regiments are preparing to attack a South Vietnamese
strongpoint along the border.
The Communists are also carrying out a vigorous.
propaganda campaign to brand the recent fighting in
Laos as a major South Vietnamese defeat, and-they may
press additional attacks against allied support bases
in the Khe Sanh area in part to underscore this point.
Enemy spellings, ambushes, and ground probes will
probably continue and possibly intensify in this sec-
tor.
The weakened condition of many Communist units
in South Vietnam and their relatively modest activities
during the past year or so suggest that the new phase
will not be strong enough to cause any great damage
to the allied position. Nevertheless, the South Viet-
namese drive into Laos has given the Communists added
incentive to demonstrate that they are still capable
of bringing significant pressure to bear within the
South. This factor could impel the Communists to
try for a few attacks inside South Vietnam that will
have more dramatic impact than those seen in recent
months.
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CHILE: The Christian Democratic Party (PDC)
is belatedly stiffening its opposition to the Allende
government.
On 22 March PDC legislators seized on several
issues--including alleged involvement of government
officials in a shady copper sale maneuver on the
world market and the question of the amendment of
the constitutional reform bill nationalizing remain-
ing US copper holdings--to challenge the government
in congress.
The PDC seems to have concluded that playing
the government's game has further weakened the di-
vided party. It hopes that this show of determina-
tion will improve its modest chances in the nation-
wide municipal elections on 4 April.
The Communist Party (PCCh) is concerned about
the increasing and outspoken opposition to the Pop-
ular Unity (UP) government
and plans to counterattack strongly. PCCn
leaders want to remove all remaining UP opponents
from the information media and have already staged
one of a series of mass demonstrations planned to
mobilize popular support for the administration.
Both the PCCh and the extremist Movement of the
Revolutionary Left reportedly are aware of plots
against the government and are making plans to
counter such action.
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GUATEMALA: President Arana has claimed the
discovery of a Communist plot, possibly setting the
stage for another crackdown on the left.
The government announcement seems to have been
inspired by the Mexicans' recent revelation of a
Communist conspiracy, and it follows the Mexicans'
lead in giving heavy publicity to the recent capture
of guerrilla material. In raids on 15 and 16 March
security forces captured a large number of Rebel
Armed Forces (FAR) documents elaborating plans for
increased terrorist activity as well as information
on FAR organization, finances, personnel, penetra-
tions, and proposed US and Guatemalan targets.
References in the official communique to the
"attack from international forces" suggest that
Arana may be considering revealing to the public
that Cuban advisers are attached to the FAR. Through-
out the statement also are warnings to "those play-
ing the Communist game," possibly a reference to the
leftist plot headed by former foreign minister Al-
berto Fuentes Mohr, who has reportedly planned
Arana's assassination and a government take-over by
the far left.
There has probably been pressure within the
administration to tighten the state of siege, which
is now in its fifth month, and to resume the coun-
terterror program. The harsh aspects of the secu-
rity campaign were eased after opposition congress-
men stirred criticism against Guatemala in several
Latin American countries. The relatively low pro-
file of the security forces, however, gave rise to
an increase in leftist terrorism. During February
there were 64 incidents of known political violence,
perpetrated mainly by the left. Thirty-three per-
sons were killed, including six security officials.
About a dozen security officials have been assassi-
nated so far this month.
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NICARAGUA: An important agreement on political
succession has been reached by the two major polit-
ical parties.
Under the agreement President Somoza will step
down in May 1972 and a transitional government led
by two members of his ruling Liberal Party and one
member of the opposition Conservative Party will
take charge for two and a half years. There will be
OAS-supervised general elections in 1974.
Somoza, who is constitutionally barred from an
immediate second term, had been unwilling to return
to the political sidelines for five years. Real-
izing the inadvisability of simply flouting the con-
stitution and the difficulty of finding a puppet
president who would also be acceptable to the gen-
eral populace, he sought to entice the opposition
into a national unity government. Under the new
arrangements Somoza will remain as head of the Na-
tional Guard during the term of the transitional
government, his party will retain its majority posi-
tion, and after only two and a half years he will be
permitted to run for the presidency.
The payoff for the Conservative Party is equally
apparent. After more than four decades of political
famine, it will be given 40 of the 100 congressional
seats, three of seven positions on the Supreme Court,
and advisers in each ministry, autonomous agency,
and international delegation. The present constitu-
tion provides for all opposition parties together to
share one third of the congressional seats. The op-
position will also gain access to lower level gov-
ernment jobs for the first time in years.
Although the small political parties frozen out
of the unity government may object to the new arrange-
ment, the agreement supports political stability,
broadens the basis of active political participation,
and strengthens the commitment to a democratic sys-
tem. Still, the troika form of government presents
built-in difficulties and it will take a high degree
of political maturity and statesmanship for the two
parties to work together.
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POLAND: Concern over food supplies has led the
government to provide incentives to boost domestic
meat production.
Tr buna Ludu describes the new measures as the
most far-reacng program" in the history of Polish
agriculture. Higher state purchase prices are being
introduced for slaughter cattle and milk, while hog
prices have been hiked for the second time in three
months. Polish farmers have also been promised
larger quantities of industrial feed mixes at lower
prices. These measures probably will not begin to
pay off, however, until next year.
In the meantime, Warsaw will have to speed up
its purchases of pork just to maintain consumption
at last year's level. Of an estimated 100,000 tons
required by mid-year, West European sources report
sales of only 20,000 tons from Denmark and some un-
specified quantities from
Netherlands.
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EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES - UK: France's in-
creasingly hard-nosed position in the negotiations
between Britain and the European Communities (EC)
is beginning to arouse some apprehension among the
other EC members.
After taking a tough line in the meeting with
the British last week, the French called on their
EC partners to begin considering on 30 March a com-
mon position on various monetary questions involved
in the UK's accession to the Community, including
the future role of sterling as a reserve currency.
Although the Six and the UK agreed last October that
these questions should be "dealt with" at some point,
France's partners are puzzled and perturbed that the
French seem to be pushing now for direct discussions
with the UK. The Five have generally held that
these questions should not be a major negotiating
issue, and that they could be worked out in the con-
text of the enlarged Community when it takes further
decisions to implement economic and monetary union.
Explanations given by the French themselves
suggest that they wish to obtain some commitment now
concerning the lifting of UK controls on capital
movements, the eventual diminution in the interna-
tional role of sterling, and the extent to which the
Community would have to support the UK in the event
it has a new balance-of-payments crisis. It also
seems clear that, by raising these difficult issues
at this time, Paris hopes to strengthen its bargain-
ing hand on other outstanding questions on which the
French have lately become isolated.
On balance, Community opinion--though deeply
concerned that the French tactics could seriously
delay and complicate agreement with the British--
appears inclined to believe that Paris is not trying
to use the sterling issue to block British member-
ship. Rather, it is believed, the French want to
make certain that an understanding on sterling is
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part of an ultimate package worked out with the UK.
Nevertheless, there is a minority view--represented
in particular by some German officials--which is be-
ginning to fear that the entry negotiations could
collapse, or that France's price for avoiding this
may be concessions to the French view that the Com-
munity's institutional structure should remain weak.
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NOTES
LIBYA: The government and the oil companies
have moved closer to a settlement. Some improve-
ment in the companies' response to Libya's demands
for assurances of continued oil exploration activi-
ties has been authorized, and demands for premium
payments for the low-sulfur content of Libyan crude
oil have been satisfied. The companies now are
awaiting responses from Iraq and Saudi Arabia. These
countries have been offered prices somewhat less than
Libya will receive for their part of the oil which
is shipped to the eastern Mediterranean. On the
basis of Iraq's initial reaction, the oil company
representatives expect "long, " negotiations.
SIERRA LEONE: Loyalist army elements have
thwarters coup attempt on Wednesday by army chief
Bangura. He is under arrest and there are no in-
dications of continued resistance by any of his re-
bellious troops. In a recorded radiobroadcast yes-
terday, Prime Minister Stevens asserted he is in
control, but there are still some uncertainties
about the actual situation in Freetown. For one
thing, key army officers have been unable to decide
who should command the army, and discussions among
them are continuing at army barracks outside Free-
ALGERIA: Foreign Minister Bouteflika may soon
depart on a long-postponed trip to Communist China,
North Vietnam, Japan, Pakistan, and India. Although
details of the itinerary remain to be worked out,
Bouteflika's party probably will stop over in Moscow.
This will be the foreign minister's first visit to
the Far East and South Asia, and is designed to
broaden Algeria's contacts. The visits to Peking
and Hanoi will also serve to balance Al eria's ex-
panding economic relations with the US.
(continued)
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URUGUAY: The Tupamaros released Attorney General
BerroOribe Tuesday, after making his 14-day confine-
ment the occasion for "documenting" their charges of
official corruption,, During Berro?s imprisonment,
the guerrillas released purported excerpts from an
interrogation in which the prosecutor allegedly admit-
ted numerous irregularities and indicated he might
resign. The Tupamaros made no mention of British
Ambassador Jackson, whom they kidnaped in January,
but the attorney general said that the ambassador was
in good health and spirits. The urban terrorist group,
in the face of President Pacheco's refusal to negotiate,
apparently intends simply to continue kidnapings in
order to embarrass the administration in this elec-
tion year. The Tupamaros also hope to ensure lenient
treatment for the 250 terrorists the government has
imprisoned.
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