CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A018500100001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 5, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 19, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
fret
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
N9 40
19 March 1971
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No. 0067/71
19 March 1971
Central Intelligence Bulletin
COMMUNIST CHINA - USSR: Peking has issued its
strongest polemical blast in nearly a year. (Page 1)
USSR: Copper production is to be raised by more
intensive use of existing plants. (Page 3)
SOUTH KOREA: The appointment of a vice president
of the government party could cause renewed intra-
party strife. (Page 4)
INDIA: Incumbents have retained the key portfolios
in the new cabinet. (Page 5)
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES - UK: Accession negotiations
remain stalemated. Page 6)
GREECE: Most political detainees are to be released.
(Page 7)
TURKEY: Kidnaping plot (Page 8)
CHILE - NORTH VIETNAM: Hanoi mission (Page 8)
MALAYSIA: Rubber (Page 8)
ARGENTINA: Situation in Cordoba (Page 9)
SWEDEN: Discount rate (Page 9)
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COMMUNIST CHINA - USSR: In anticipation of the
upcoming Soviet party congress Peking has issued its
strongest polemical blast against Moscow in nearly a
year.
The new attack, contained in a joint editorial
by the major Chinese propaganda organs, is essentially
a restatement of the ideological differences that
divide the two parties. It appears designed to drive
home the point that despite recent improvements in
state-to-state relations the fundamental gulf between
Peking and Moscow remains as wide as ever. The Chi-
nese clearly wish to set the record straight on this
score before the 24th CPSU congress begins; in a
sense the editorial is Peking's reply to the invita-
tion to attend the congress the Soviets claim to have
tendered to the Chinese.
In contrasting Chinese adherence to "revolution-
ary violence" to the Soviet brand of "revisionism,"
the editorial accuses Moscow of going "all out" in
the arms race while oppressing people at home and
abroad, and repeatedly denounces Soviet party leader
Brezhnev by name. Nevertheless, specific grievances
against Moscow such as the putative Soviet "threat"
to Chinese territory are not raised, presumably be-
cause the occasion calls for a more theoretical or
ideological statement of the Chinese position. In-
deed, the editorial appears to have been drafted
with a view to avoiding, as much as possible language
which would hamper Peking's diplomatic offensive in
both the Communist and non-Communist worlds.
Like the classic anti-Soviet blasts of the early
and mid-1960s, Peking's current attack on the "revi-
sionists" has domestic as well as international im-
plications. The themes central to the editorial are
also applicable domestically. In this respect Peking
seems to be warning cadres at home against "revision-
ist" sins--a further sign that internal problems have
still not been fully resolved.
19 Mar 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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? Mining, concentrating and
smelting
Area of major expansion
1960--1970
?
?
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USSR: The new five-year plan directives indi-
cate that the 1975 target for copper production will
be achieved by more intensive use of existing plants,
leaving until the end of the decade development of
the giant Udokan deposit in eastern Siberia.
The plan projects a 35- to 40-percent increase
in copper production, compared with a 60-percent
gain achieved in 1966-70. The absolute production
increase, however, is about the same. Copper out-
put is estimated to have reached 1.2 million metric
tons in 1970 and may approach two million tons by
1980.
Increased mechanization of production, improve-
ments in the technology of metallurgy, and gains in
labor productivity will be stressed. This will be
a departure from the extensive development of large-
scale combines, primarily in Soviet central Asia and
the Caucasus, which characterized the 1960s.
Udokan, the location of the largest copper de-
posit in the USSR, is expected to begin production
toward the end of the 1976-80 period. The Soviets
hope for an annual output of 350,000-400,000 metric
tons, accounting for nearly the entire growth in
total copper production for that period. Develop-
ment is hindered by the remote location, rugged ter-
rain, severe temperatures, and large capital require-
ments.
Negotiations for foreign technology and finan-
cial assistance from Japanese, British, and French
firms, under way since 1965; have been complicated
by these technical difficulties. Recent press re-
ports, however, indicate that some agreements may
be concluded shortly. Development costs are esti-
mated at $1.4-2.0 billion, about 50 percent of
which would be assumed by the USSR. A large portion
of the Udokan output probably will be sold in the
West to pay for the foreign assistance.
(Map)
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SOUTH KOREA: President Pak Chong-hui's appoint-
ment yesterday of Kim Chong-pil to fill the new post
of vice president of the government party could pro-
vide the basis for renewed intraparty strife.
As chief architect of the near-bloodless coup
that elevated Pak to power in 1961 and as founder of
the government party, Kim was at the center of much
of the factional infighting that marked the regime's
early years. In 1968, Kim was forced onto the poli-
tical sidelines when his own presidential ambitions
for 1971 almost brought him into open conflict with
Pak. His gradual re-emergence as a political power
has been strongly fought by party colleagues who
have benefited from his political eclipse.
Pak apparently created the post of party vice
president especially for Kim in order to take ad-
vantage of his considerable political talents in
the presidential election in late April and the
National Assembly elections about a month later.
Kim is one of the few--if not the only--government
politicians whose public speaking ability matches
that of Kim Tae-chung, the popular opposition can-
didate for president. Also like him, Kim Chong-pil
is attractive to young people and can be counted
on to be a strong campaigner in his home province,
where support for the regime reportedly has slipped.
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INDIA: Prime Minister Gandhi's new 13-member
cabinet contains five newcomers, but key portfolios
remain in the possession of incumbents.
In an apparent attempt to provide her new gov-
ernment with an image of both continuity and change,
Mrs. Gandhi has shuffled portfolios and personnel,
particularly among the junior members in the larger
Council of Ministers, which includes the cabinet.
She apparently remains content, however, with the
performance of the four veterans who have held the
important portfolios of finance, defense, foreign
affairs, and food and agriculture since the last
cabinet shuffle in June 1970. She kept the sensitive
and prestigious home affairs portfolio, which deals
with domestic security.
One of the more prominent ministers dropped
from the cabinet is Dinesh Singh, former minister
of industrial development and before that foreign
affairs. Singh incurred widespread antipathy--
both domestic and international--while he was Mrs.
Gandhi's confidant in the early years of her prime
ministership.
Her party's landslide electoral victory earlier
this month has largely freed Mrs. Gandhi from her
past concern with political survival and parliamen-
tary opposition. As a result, there could be an
important shift of power from the party and parlia-
ment to the cabinet. Mrs. Gandhi is in a better
position than at any time during her five years as
prime minister to tackle pressing economic and
social problems and to drive through policies that
have previously met stiff resistance from vested
interests.
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EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES - UK: Accession negotia-
tions remain stalemated because of differences among
the Six and British reluctance to show any give on
how much the UK will initially?contribute to the EC's
budget.
At a ministerial-level meeting on 16 March be-
tween the UK and the Six, there was no progress on
the principal outstanding issues--financing, arrange-
ments for New Zealand's dairy exports, and guaran-
tees for sugar exports of the Commonwealth countries.
On financing, France maintains it is now up to Lon-
don to better its initial offer. The other members
want bargaining on this question to resume on the
basis of a Community counteroffer.
All Six agree that certain assurances can be
given to maintain EC imports of New Zealand dairy
goods and Commonwealth sugar, but Paris is less
forthcoming on these issues than the others, perhaps
in the hope of eliciting a tougher position on fi-
nancing from its EC partners.
Should the French continue these tactics, it
seems doubtful that the Six can work out a common
negotiating position before the next ministerial
meeting with the British on 11 May. The British
did succeed in tentatively scheduling two extra
meetings after the 11 May session, and this could
provide more time to thrash out differences. Fail-
ing this, both sides may see some advantage in set-
ting the stage for a "crisis" which would be re-
solved perhaps in marathon sessions or even at the
summit level, where the political importance of
British membership would be clearly in focus.
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GREECE: Prime Minister Papadopoulos has ordered
the release of political detainees, but there is no
sign that he is contemplating an early end to mar-
tial law.
A government spokesman recently announced that
the majority of the 300 political detainees would
be released by the end of April. Some 60 or 70 in-
dividuals still considered to be dangerous will,
however, be sent to remote villages with their fam-
ilies where they will remain under surveillance.
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ten of another 40 persons arrested tor terrorist
acts in late 1970 and since held without charge will
be brought to trial. 25X1
the trial will not take place until September in or-
der to avoid bad publicity during the summer tourist
season.
The wording of the press release was obviously
intended to indicate that the release of these de-
tainees is a follow-up to Papadopoulos' promise on
19 December to do so rather than a result of inter-
national pressure on the government. In any event,
occasional large-scale roundups of persons the re-
gime considers dangerous will continue.
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NOTES
TURKEY: 25X1
the left-
ist Revolutionar Youth Federation 25X1
may soon kidnap a diplomat or one
of his family as a hostage in seeking the release
of terrorist leader Deniz Gezmis. Gezmis, who engi-
neered the previous American kidnapings in Turkey
and who is the self-styled leader of the embryonic
Turkish People's Liberation Army, was captured Wed-
n
sd
l
ith
th
e
ay a
ong w
ano
er
others are still at large.
CHILE - NORTH VIETNAM: Six North Vietnamese
representatives arrived in Santiago on 16 March to
set up a commercial mission and a news agency of-
fice. Chilean Foreign Minister Almeyda announced
that the mission will have the same status as the
existing North Korean one. According to the Chilean
Communist Party newspaper, the mission will become
an embassy when Chile establishes relations with
North Vietnam. Cuba is the only other country in
Latin America with official North Vietnamese repre-
sentation.
MALAYSIA: In an effort to halt declining
prices, the government is now intervening by making
purchases in the world natural rubber market. Nat-
ural rubber prices had been falling steadily since
mid-1969. As the world's largest producer Malaysia
is most concerned about the drop in prices and its
intervention has temporarily halted the decline.
By highlighting the poor market conditions, Malaysia
may hope its action will influence the US not to re-
sume sales of stockpiled rubber.
(continued)
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ARGENTINA: The presence of army troops and
tanks in the streets prevented a renewal of violence
in Cordoba yesterday, but a 14-hour general strike
reportedly paralyzed the industrial city. General
Lopez Aufranc, the commander of the Cordoba military
zone, declared the city to be in a state of emer-
gency and warned that his troops were authorized to
take whatever action necessary to prevent looting
or vandalism. Meanwhile, a key Cordoba labor leader
told a US official that the prime objective of the
Cordoba confederation's "struggle plan" is to force
the removal of President Levingston and bring about
the establishment of a nationalist militar overn-
ment in Argentina similar to that in Peru.
SWEDEN: The Riksbank has lowered its official
discount rate from a postwar high of seven percent
to 6.5 percent to encourage further industrial in-
vestment. This move, concurrent with a lessening
of inflationary pressures after three years of eco-
nomic overheating, follows the recent lifting of the
price freeze on producers' goods. The rate change,
as well as continued government restrictions on
housing and public investment, should stimulate the
transfer of limited investment to the manufacturing
sector.
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