CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A018500080001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 5, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 17, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
N? 40
17 March 1971
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No. 0065/71
17 March 1971
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
COMMUNIST CHINA: The regime appears reluctant to
tamper with i3-cal leadership alignments. (Page 1)
CHILE: Allende is charging that there is a plot to
frustrate the Chilean revolution. (Page 3)
FRANCE: The voting pattern remained stable in Sun-
day's municipal elections. (Page 4)
UGANDA: The government is having difficulty re-
establishing public order. (Page 6)
LIBYA: The oil companies face another negotiating
deadline tomorrow. (Page 7)
CEYLON: State of emergency (Page 8)
TURKEY: Military purge (Page 8)
SIERRA LEONE: Constitutional issue (Page 9)
BOLIVIA: Cabinet changes (Page 9)
CHILE: Copper mine intervention (Page 9)
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COMMUNIST CHINA: The pattern of personnel ap-
pointments evident as the provincial parties are be-
ing rebuilt strongly suggests that the regime is re-
luctant to tamper with leadership alignments ham-
mered out during the Cultural Revolution.
The top leadership in the majority of the 13
provincial party committees which Peking has certi-
fied since last December follows closely that of
the provinces' corresponding "revolutionary commit-
tees"--the new governing bodies set up during the
Cultural Revolution. Many of the leaders involved
were at odds in the politically turbulent 1967-68
period, and their appointments to the revolutionary
committees--which frequently followed months of
agonizing debate--were often the product of seem-
ingly fragile compromise solutions worked out in
Peking. By simply confirming these officials as
the new local party chiefs, Peking apparently is
seeking to avoid rekindling the personal and fac-
tional rivalries that marked the formation of the
revolutionary committees.
To date, this practice has produced some anom-
alies; a number of officials who have acquired lead-
ing posts at the national level since 1968 are still
holding on to authoritative positions at the local
level. This almost certainly reflects in part a
desire by these officials to maintain their regional
bases of power. It also attests, however, to the
regime's inability or unwillingness to come to grips
with the problem of finding successors to them at
the local level.
In northwest China, for example, Liu Hsien-chuan
was named first secretary of the Tsinghai provincial
party committee on 15 March despite the fact that he
moved up to an important post in Peking in the spring
of 1968 and has not appeared publicly in his old
bailiwick for nearly three years. Similarly, the
new director of the general political department,
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Li Te-sheng, was appointed first party secretary
in Anhwei in east China this January even though he
spends nearly all his time in Peking performing his
other presumably more pressing tasks as the army's
top commissar.
Rigid adherence to the pecking order established
in the provinces during the Cultural Revolution is
also evident in the unusual treatment accorded an
alternate politburo member who was recently given a
provincial party post below several ordinary central
committee members in the local hierarchy. His fail-
ure to move up to the top party post in the province
is a clear departure from long-standing party prac-
tice and, so far as is known, has no parallel in
China or any other Communist country.
Peking will not be able to evade indefinitely,
however, certain provincial leadership problems for
which there appears no convenient solution. One of
these is in Peking city, where the regime has yet
to designate a new party chief, apparently because
the situation within the politburo is still so un-
settled that the regime is reluctant to take a step
which would confirm the purge of Hsieh Fu-chih, the
Peking municipal boss and politburo member who has
been out of public view for a year.
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CHILE: President Allende and his backers are
intensifying their charges that there is a "sedi-
tious plot" to frustrate the Chilean revolution.
At a Socialist Party plenum on 14 March,
Allende and party secretary general Altamirano
charged that an "international and internal con-
spiracy" exists and asked Chileans to resist it
with force if necessary. Allende said that he
would soon publicize documentary proof of a "plot,"
citing other "evidence," including an alleged sales
maneuver to drive down copper prices on the world
market and make Chileans appear unable to take over
their own copper operations and sales.
Altamirano was more vehement, claiming that
the cancellation of the visit of the US carrier
Enterprise, the alleged arming of rightist Chilean
groups, "interference" by the Supreme Court presi-
dent, and impeachment proceedings against govern-
ment officials all were inspired by domestic and
"imperialist" plotters.
Allende's problems in gaining control of and
managing Chile's important economic levers and
maintaining access to the external capital market
have sharpened the government's tendency to suspect
the US of economic maneuvers against it. The re-
cent suspension of credit to Chilean banks by eight
US banks, and other developments such as increasing
pressure for short-term working capital by US firms
operating in Chile, are seen by Allende and his of-
ficials as part of a general plot.
In his, speech Allende warned that enemies are
aiming to discredit his government's image with an
eye to the 4 April municipal elections. He report-
edly believes that his coalition must win a majority
-
l
era
in those elections in order to justify the acce
tion of its program.
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FRANCE: Analysis of the first round of nation-
wide municipal elections held on Sunday shows that
the over-all voting pattern remains relatively stable,
although the Gaullists registered slight gains.
The results confirmed that Frenchmen tend to
vote for administrators of proven ability in local
elections. The stability in voting patterns was
reflected in part in the abstention rate--about 25
percent--almost identical to that in the 1965 mu-
nicipal elections. More significant is the fact
that in the 193 cities with over 30,000 inhabitants,
103 out of the 109 councils elected on the first
ballot returned the outgoing slate.
The Gaullists, who with their supporters re-
ceived 50.5 percent of the votes cast, did make some
progress in strengthening their grass-roots support.
This success was slightly more visible in Paris,
where there was a clear-cut confrontation between
the left, including the Communists, and the Gaullists.
Although results from the 14 Paris wards were in-
conclusive, the Gaullists are in a favored position
for the run-off ballot next Sunday in nine of these
wards. The government also received a boost from
the fact that 23 of the 36 cabinet members who ran
won on the first ballot and only one, a state secre-
tary, was defeated.
With the disappearance of De Gaulle from the
scene, the Gaullists have been all the more aware
of the need to increase their power at the local
level. Their grass-roots strength has never been
commensurate with the power they wield on the na-
tional scene. The slight gains which they have made
thus far should improve their position as they look
toward the 1973 national legislative elections--the
first they will face without De Gaulle's coattails
to ride on.
(continued)
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The leftist parties held their own in the first
round, but failed to increase the considerable power
they already hold on the local level. They had hoped
to capitalize on the obvious dissatisfaction of many
Frenchmen with the government over such issues as
inflation, strikes, a rising unemployment rate,
and police injustice.
The Communists succeeded, however, in forming
pre-election coalitions with Socialists in more
large towns than ever before. Further coalitions
may help the leftists improve their position in the
final results.
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UGANDA: The military government is having dif-
ficulty re-establishing public order.
Discipline is still a problem within the U
dan armed forces in lar. 25X1
the p cu ion o offi-
comS n men from the Acholi tribe--which has been
disproportionately represented in the armed forces--
is continuing. On 12 March,28 military personnel,
mostly Acholi, were removed from the main prison,
supposedly for interrogation, but were never returned.
In another. area of the country reprisals against the
Acholi have now reached down to the NCO level. The
reprisals are reportedly mainly the work of the
Baganda tribe, who are settling scores dating back
to the coup of 1966 when the Acholi and others in
the armed forces ruthlessly suppressed a Baganda up-
rising.
The incidence of lawlessness is on the rise in
the Kampala area, and some Acholi leaders are con-
cerned that the Baganda will use the occasion of
the return for burial of the Baganda traditional
king, who died in exile following the coup of 1966.
Amin so far has seemed unwilling or unable to
restore order. Although these outbreaks do not ap-
pear to pose a direct threat to his government, Amin
is likely to find it increasingly difficult to es-
tablish a ove nt popular throughout the country.
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LIBYA: Oil companies have been given until
tomorrow to respond to the latest Libyan position
on oil revenues.
Libyan Oil Minister Mabruk
in ica e that a ve-year agreement was ac-
ceptable but insisted that the permanent portion of
the companies' posted price offer--in contrast to
the temporary portion covering freight charges--be
substantially increased. He said the Libyans had
considered some form of nationalization or embargo
yesterday, but were sufficiently encouraged by re-
cent discussions with the oil companies to postpone
any action until Thursday. Oil company representa-
tives are going to London to meet with their prin-
cipals.
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The oil ministers of Iraq, Algeria, Libya, and
Saudi Arabia have agreed upon the price minimum each
country will accept from the oil companies. The
ministers' joint communiqu6 does not commit Iraq,
Saudi Arabia, or Algeria to support Libya's other
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nationalize at the ministerial meeting and to use
retroactive payments as partial compensation. The
Libyans apparently have decided against this action
for the time being and continue to seek a negotiated,
settlement. 25X1
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NOTE S. ,
CEYLON: The government has declared a full
state 7-emergency. Prime Minister Bandaranafke is
worried by the growth of a revolutionary self-
styled "Che Guevarist" movement on the island, Fol-
lowing the attack on 6 March on the US Embassy by
more than 100 extremists, she invoked partial emer-
gency powers, citing as one reason, without, further
explanation, "information available to the govern-
ment." The Ceylonese press on 16 March reported
that an alleged attempt to kidnap a cabinet minister
had been foiled by the police.
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l TURKEY: The Turkish military high command ap-
parentl y taking steps to neutralize all remain-
ing dissident elements within the armed forces, es-
pecially those that have previously been .involved
in alleged plotting activities. Yesterday General
Tagmac, chief of the Turkish General Staff, "for-
ci.bly retired" five general officerso 25X1
I leight or nine colonels
ana a arger number" o middle- and junior-grade
officers are also being summarily dismissed, Al-
though such a purge is to be expected under prevail-
ing conditions, it increases the danger that some
threatened group might attempt a coup in despera-
tion., The widespread military alert, however,
should discourage any such maverick group or enable
the armed forces to quash any coup attempt outside
(continued)
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SIERRA LEONE: Prime Minister Stevens reportedly
is being urged by extremist advisers to change Sierra
Leone's constitution unilaterally. Opposition to
proposed constitutional changes last fall provoked
a crisis that led to the declaration of a state of
emergency. Stevens' efforts to replace the current
parliamentary system with an executive presidency
thus far have been frustrated by an elaborate pro-
cedure for amending the constitution and by politi-
cal opponents who see it as a step toward one-man
rule. The issue remains a divisive one for most
Sierra Leoneans, and armed forces commander Bangura,
albeit a weak reed in previous showdowns with
Stevens, has said privately he will intervene if the
prime minister acts illegally
I BOLIVIA: Cabinet shifts that have been rumored
for severa weeks may be imminent, according to
press sources. Interior Minister Gallardo yesterday
stated that changes were to be made to effect a
"political restructuring" in the country. No offi-
cial statement has been issued thus far, but cabi-
net posts reportedly will be given to the leftist
National Revolutionary Movement, currently the
strongest political party. Military representation
reportedly will be kept to a minimum.
C CHILE: The Allende government has taken over
the operation of two large copper mines in which
Chile has a majority interest of 51 percent and the
US-owned Anaconda Copper Company 49 percent. The
intervention yesterday was made on the grounds of
production irregularities. Production has fallen
below projected levels this year. Labor unrest and
inefficiency are probably the cause of the produc-
tion shortfall, but the government has chosen
st--p;4H to lame the US copper companies.
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