CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A018100030001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 23, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Department review completed
Secret
4 O?
23 January 1971
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No. 0020/71
23 January 1971
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
CAMBODIA: Phnom Penh is bracing for additional ter-
rorist actions. (Page 1)
SOUTH KOREA - SOUTH VIETNAM: Seoul has contingency
plans for withdrawing troops from Vietnam. (Page 2)
POLAND: The leadership is showing a new approach to
hand inl g unrest. (Page 3)
CHILE: Agrarian reform is causing apprehension in
the countryside. (Page 5)
ZAMBIA: Political discontent is increasing. (Page 6)
LIBERIA: President Tubman will run for a seventh
term. (Page 7)
THAILAND: Trade with Communist China (Page 8)
CONGO (KINSHASA): Olenga"s return (Page 8)
TRINIDAD: Elections scheduled (Page 9)
VENEZUELA: Natural gas exports (Page 9)
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CAMBODIA: Phnom Penh is bracing for additional
Communist attacks and terrorist actions, but there
are no signs that major Communist elements are moving
into the area.
Prime Minister Lon Nol told the US ambassador
yesterday that he plans to reinforce the capital's
defenses with a trusted brigade of Khmer Krom troops
currently involved in the Route 4 operation and
other troops currently in the Skoun area. In the
meantime, increased security precautions are being
taken to protect Pochentong Airfield and the city's
power plants and petroleum depots, and sweep opera-
tions are under way in the outlying areas from which
the Communist mortar and sapper attacks were mounted.
There are still no signs that the Communists
are in a position to move in force on the city it-
self. Hit-and-run attacks on important targets in
and around Phnom Penh can be expected, however. An
explosion in the residence of the South Vietnamese
ambassador was reported yesterday, indicating the
Communists have also renewed their terrorist activ-
ities in the city.
The attacks are a major departure in Communist
tactics in Cambodia. For the past ten months they
have avoided taking the war directly to the capital,
although they clearly have had the capability of
doing so. Even in the face of increased government
security precautions, the Communists can still make
things a good deal tougher in the city if they are
determined to shake the resolve of the Cambodian
leadership or to bring into question the continuing
viability of the Lon Nol regime.
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SOUTH KOREA - SOUTH VIETNAM: Seoul is seriously
considering the future of its military forces in
Vietnam in the light of US troop withdrawals from
that country.
It is likely that President Pak Chong-hui, who
is up for reelection this year, has other consider-
ations in mind in addition to normal contingency
planning. His recent statement that the government
is studying the phased withdrawal of troops from
Vietnam seems intended to undercut similar proposals
made by the opposition and thus remove the issue
from the election campaign. Pak may also intend to
put Washington on notice that he is raising the
price of the Korean troops in Vietnam. South Korean
tactics in similar situations suggest that he will
argue that domestic political considerations demand
that he be able to show something more to justify
keeping Korean troops in Vietnam when the US is re-
ducing its forces both in Vietnam and Korea.
There are over 48,000 South Koreans organized
in 31 battalions deployed along the coast of South
Vietnam's Military Regions (MR) 1 and 2. The five
battalions operating regularly in MR-1 and the 26
battalions in MR-2 have been careful to keep their
casualties down in recent years, and they have not
inflicted substantial damage on the enemy in their
larger operations.
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POLAND: The new leadership's handling of con-
tinuing a or unrest on the Baltic coast is beginning
to reveal a modus operandi quite different from the
past.
Not wishing to risk the resumption of violent
disorders, the new regime has renounced force as a
way of responding to the people's demands. More
significantly, however, it appears to have made a
conscious decision to allow grievances, many of long
standing, to surface and be catalogued for correc-
tion.
This decision has meant the tacit acceptance
of work slowdowns and the consequent loss of produc-
tion as the legitimate bargaining tools of the work-
ers; there have been no reports of penalties being
imposed on workers involved in such actions. It has
also meant that the security authorities no longer
have a direct role to play on the side of the estab-
lishment in worker-management, discussions; the po-
lice have kept a low profile since the end of the
riots. The only demand made on the workers by the
regime press has been that criticisms and demands
for changes be constructive and within an undefined
realm of feasibility.
Perhaps the most telling evidence of the new
leaders' style can be found in the actions of the
people themselves. The workers on the coast exhibit
an ever-growing confidence that the time has come,
after years of toleration on their part, to correct
many of the faults endemic to Gomulka's style of
rule. It is clear that they have hopes of convincing
the new leaders that this must be done, otherwise
they would not be negotiating with local authorities
and the new officials in Warsaw. They would either
be in the streets or resuming their sullen apathy.
Signs are also beginning to appear that the
workers' hopes, although heavily larded with cyni-
cism, are spreading to other strata of the society.
(continued)
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Students in Szczecin, for example, have recently de-
manded better conditions for study and life. None
of all this is revolutionary in intent; rather it
betrays a strong need to vent pent-up frustrations
and seek real improvements within the system.
The dangers for the new leaders in their adopted
course are obvious, and they have not hidden their
need for time to plan changes, assign priorities,
and find the proper people to carry out reforms.
Their low-key approach indicates not only a desire
gradually to restore calm, but also the pressure of
time. There are fresh reports that the party cen-
tral committee will meet next week in a pivotal ses-
sion that could go far to decide Poland's future
course.
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CHILE: The government's agrarian reform is
causing considerable apprehension in the countryside.
Agriculture Minister Chonchol announced on 18
January that all farms of more than 1,360 acres in
Cautin Province, the scene of recent illegal land
seizures, would be expropriated without regard to
their efficiency. He coupled this statement with
the announcement of a public works and literacy pro-
gram and the launching of the provincial peasant
council. Chonchol tried to calm the fears to the
agricultural sector by labeling as "absolutely
false" rumors that private sector agriculture will
cease to exist. President Allende recently gave
similar assurances to the president of the National
Agricultural Association.
Despite these attempts to soften the impact,
the government's policy is causing farmers a great
deal of unease. Although crops have been good this
year, there reportedly is an attitude of despair
among farmers in Cautin. Many may sell their hold-
ings to the government voluntarily rather than wait
for expropriation. The US Embassy in Santiago com-
ments that this development is similar to other moves
by the Allende government: initial intimidation with
strong threats followed by a comparatively reasonable
alternative that gives the government what it wants
without too much obvious pressure.
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ZAMBIA: Political discontent has risen in
Lusaka, ann government officials are fearful both of
trouble from resident whites and of cross-border at-
tacks by the Portuguese.
President Kaunda, who is attending the Common-
wealth Conference in Singapore, has come under unex-
pected widespread criticism from supporters in his
ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP).
The discontent centers on Kaunda's increasing tend-
ency to act arbitrarily. A troublesome problem now
is that important party leaders are irked because he
recently reshuffled the cabinet and made important
policy decisions without consulting them.
Kaunda is also facing renewed trouble from for-
mer vice president Simon Kapwepwe and other Bemba
leaders who are again complaining of discrimination.
If Kapwepwe and his followers resign from UNIP, as
rumored, the party could lose support among the Bem-
bas, a major source of its strength.
Despite these difficulties, Kaunda's personal
position does not yet appear in danger; he has han-
dled similar problems in the past.
Meanwhile, army units in Lusaka are guarding
several government installations, and armored patrol
units are on alert. These actions caused consider-
able uneasiness in the capital. Many government
leaders are concerned that Lisbon may mount paramili-
tary raids into Zambia similar to those into Guinea
last November.
in addition, the defense minister is worried
about possible sabotage from resident whites because
of Kaunda's bitter opposition to British sales of
naval arms to South Africa.
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LIBERIA: Aging President Tubman's announcement
on 21 January that he will run for a seventh term
ends speculation that poor health might force his
retirement, but the succession question remains the
country's most important political problem.
The 75-year-old Tubman, president since 1944,
is ensured victory in the elections scheduled for
early May. He will receive the formal nomination
of the True Whig Party--Liberia's only party--at a
national convention to be held later this month.
Tubman's announcement that Vice President William
Tolbert would again be his running mate ensures
Tolbert's reelection also.
sesses Tubman's political skills, and he has numer-
Ill health has sidelined Tubman with increasing
frequency during his present term. Should he die or
be incapacitated in the course of the next four
years, Liberia's stability, which presently rests
largely on the highly personal political system
created by Tubman, would be tested. Tolbert, the
constitutional successor, has not shown that he pos-
ous enemies among the ruling elite.
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THAILAND: Bangkok has announced that it has
established a committee to study the feasibility
of trade with Communist China. This move appears
designed to demonstrate that the government is
making every effort to alleviate the country's eco-
nomic troubles, while at the same time underlining
Bangkok's desire to limit economic and political
dependence on the US. It is not clear how hard
Bangkok is prepared to pursue economic ties with
Peking or if the Chinese would be receptive. Al-
though trade with China will not alleviate Thai-
land's balance-of-payments problem, it would be part
of Thanat's effort to expand trade with Communist
countries and to explore the possibility of a po-
litical channel to Peking. Late last year a trade
pact was signed with the USSR.
CONGO (KINSHASA): The return of Nicholas
Olenga, a leader of the 1964-65 Simba revolt, will
be a significant test of President Mobutu's sincer-
ity when he promised amnesty to all political of-
fenders who turn themselves in by 31 January. On
17 January, Olenga was delivered to the Congolese
Embassy in Kampala by Ugandan authorities, who had
kept him under protective custody since 1966. A
Kampala press report, however, implies that Olenga
was returning willingly,
Olenga, because they still bitterly resent being
routed by his hordes of untrained, poorly armed
peasants, and some are likely to seek his execution.
Mobutu is well aware, however, that any openly puni-
tive treatment of Olenga would deter other formerly
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TRINIDAD: Prime Minister Williams has tenta-
tively scheduled the next general election for 21
April, the first anniversary of the imposition of
a state of emergency. Williams apparently intends
to withhold his final decision until he samples
public attitude during Carnival in late February.
Williams evidently selected the 21 April date to
impress upon his political opponents and the radi-
cal elements who on that date two years ago failed
to overthrow his government that he is once again
in control. F_ I
VENEZUELA: Caracas is moving rapidly to de-
velop its natural gas exports. Following President
Caldera's recent decision to place natural gas re-
serves under state control, a government mission in
Paris began contacting European shipyards to deter-
mine if seven methane tankers could be delivered by
1975-76. The government seems confident that it
will be able to secure international financing for
the tankers and for two gas liquification plants,
an investment that will total almost $1 billion.
Although private oil companies, which presently con-
trol the gas reserves under petroleum concessions,
are resigned to Caldera's action, at least one com-
pany intends to initiate a pro forma court action
claiming violation of its concession rights. I
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