CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A017600030001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 18, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
Secret
40
18 November 1.9 70
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No. 0276/70
18 November 1970
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
LAOS: The impasse forestalling negotiations between
the government and the Pathet Lao may have been
broken. (Page 1)
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BURMA: A Revolutionary Council member has been dis-
missed. (Page 3)
MOROCCO: The opposition coalition is using the issue
of "US bases" to embarrass the government. (Page 4)
TURKEY: Time may be running out for the government
of Prime Minister Demirel. (Page 5)
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GUYANA: Burnham is moving toward an authoritarian,
one-party state. (Page 7)
EGYPT: New cabinet (Page 9)
SPAIN - EASTERN EUROPE: Improved relations (Page 10)
ANDEAN COMMON MARKET: Foreign investment limitations
(Page 10 )
GREECE: Regime dissension (Page 11)
IRAN : Voter apathy (Page 11)
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LAOS: The procedural impasse that has fore-
stalled negotiations between the government and the
Pathet Lao may have been broken.
Reports are circulating in Vientiane that the
16 November meeting between Prime Minister Souvanna
and Pathet Lao leader Souphanouvong's representa-
tive--the first since the latter's return to
Vientiane--resulted in an agreement to proceed with
the talks in Khang Khay. A subsequent Lao Govern-
ment communiqu4, however, only states that the two
sides exchanged views on an "eventual meeting." It
did not explicitly state that an agreement had been
reached, and again referred to the government's ne-
gotiator as representing Souvanna as head of govern-
ment rather than as "prince." The communique men-
tions the government's standing offer to intercede
with the International Control Commission to provide
safe transportation for the Communist delegation,
thus implying that the 16 November talks moved on
to the mechanics of a Khang Khay meeting.
Government officials are stating
that the Communists capitulated on the question of
the status of Souvanna's negotiator, but the 16
November communiqu4 has not been subscribed to by
the Communists nor have they yet provided their
version of where things now stand. It may be that,
as in the past, eager government officials have
misconstrued the Communist position. It is also
possible that the Communists and the government have
implicitly, if not explicitly, agreed to move on to
Khang Khay, with each side sticking to its own line
concerning on whose behalf the negotiators are talk-
ing.
18 Nov 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin 1
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BURMA: The dismissal of Revolutionary Council
member Tin Pe completes his political eclipse but
does not presage any changes in Burma's socialist
course.
Rangoon announced on 14 November that Tin Pe,
one-time close associate of General Ne win and for-
merly number two man in the military hierarchy,
was being retired from his government positions at
his request because of ill health. He recently re-
turned from a seven-month exile stemming from scan-
dals in his government ministry that apparently also
led to the recent removal of his brother-in-law and
political henchman, Tan Yu Saing. Although Tin Pe
is definitely in political disgrace, his failing
health has now opened the way for his removal with
a minimum of political repercussions.
Tin Pe was widely regarded as the leader of the
leftist faction in Burma's nu:Litary leadership, but
his departure will. probably not result in any weak-
ening of the regime's commitment to its brand of
socialism. Ne Win is firmly committed to the Marxist
policies often ascribed to Tin Pe's inspiration.
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MOROCCO: The opposition coalition, the Na-
tional Front, is continuing to use the issue of "US
bases" in Morocco to embarrass the government.
On Sunday, the Front issued a communique call-
ing for the immediate evacuation of American mili-
tary personnel from Kenitra, Sidi Yahia, and
Bouknadel, the communications complex used under an
informal agreement with the King. The communique
was featured in both the French-language and Arabic-
language dailies published by the ardently nation-
alist Istigial Party, which led the propaganda
struggle against French, Spanish, and US bases in
Morocco in the late 1950s.
The communique touched on two points about
which the government is sensitive: the "extrater-
ritoriality" represented by US-run stores, schools,
and hospitals associated with the facilities; and
the fact that they are used to support US military
forces, particularly the Sixth Fleet. The Front
asserted that allowing such activity to continue
on Moroccan soil "negates solidarity with the Arab
and Palestinian people" and will not sit well with
"Arab countries that are victims of imperialist
aggression."
The Front has been badly outmaneuvered by King
Hassan in recent months and has been casting about
for issues that might help it to gain some ground.
The fact that the authorities have permitted it to
publish what amounts to a serious condemnation of
the regime could, however, indicate that King Hassan
believes he can exploit the issue with respect to
US assistance.
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TURKEY: Time may be running out for the moder-
ate government of Prime Minister Demirel.
Parliament, which reconvened on 1 November, is
at an impasse because the Lower House has been un-
able to select a speaker, the necessary first order
of business. Numerous ballots have been taken but
no candidate has been able to gain a majority. If
Demirel is forced to accept a compromise candidate,
he will be openly admitting his parliamentary weak-
ness and may touch off additional defections from
the ruling Justice Party (JP). At least two JP
deputies, including the former speaker of the Lower
House, have resigned from the JP in recent days, and
the press is speculating that other resignations may
be imminent.
Demirel received overwhelming support during
the national convention of the JP in late October,
but he has been unable to translate this into firm
parliamentary strength. Conservative dissidents
from the party, who were ousted from the JP last
spring for failing to maintain party discipline,
have joined opposition elements in an attempt to
dump Demirel. The schism within the JP, however,
basically represents a struggle between moderates
and conservatives over personalities, not issues.
Although the conservatives are apparently in a minor-
ity, they will continue to be a disruptive factor
in Parliament until new elections either remove or
substantially reduce them in number.
Unless there is some evidence soon of a move-
ment toward renewed political stability, pressures
will increase among the military leadership to in-
tervene either directly or indirectly.
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GUYANA: Prime Minister Burnham is methodically
moving his government toward an authoritarian, one-
party state.
on 14 November the government announced that
local elections will be held on 7 December, but it
gave candidates only the weekend in which to file.
The opposition United Force Party immediately stated
that it would not participate in the balloting be-
cause it would be impossible for its 700 candidates
to file in the two days allotted. Burnham has re-
fused to extend the deadline, claiming that this
would interfere with a scheduled parliamentary budget
debate.
Last month Communist leader Cheddi Jagan said
that his party would abstain from the elections,
charging that the government consistently and bla-
tantly rigged them. With only minor local parties
in the contest, therefore, Burnham's People's Na-
tional Congress Party will gain almost total control
of local government machinery throughout the country.
The US Embassy comments that Burnham seems to
have deliberately arranged the filing deadline to
make compliance difficult, if not impossible, and
that he anticipated that the United Force would ab-
stain. The ambassador adds that this is the strong-
est indication to date that Burnham is deliberately
headed toward an authoritarian government and that
the prime minister is no longer greatly concerned
about maintaining the machinery or the image of a
democratic system.
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EGYPT: Preliminary reports indicate that the
new cabinet will not differ radically from the
previous one. According to the semiofficial news-
paper al-Ahram, the majority of the former minis-
ters will retain their posts or merely be shifted
to new ministries, with the more important cabinet
members continuing in power. The influence of In-
terior Minister Sharawi Jumah has apparently been
strengthened by his appointment to one of four re-
created deputy premier slots. The cabinet shifts
may be designed to produce a body with which Egypt's
new leaders can work more harmoniously. Some of
the changes may also reflect an effort to bring new
blood into ministries concerned with domestic
economic affairs.
(continued)
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SPAIN - EASTERN EUROPE: Madrid is considering
upgrading its consular representations in Romania
and Poland to the rank of embassies, possibly as
early as the first part of 1971. It has also opened
negotiations with Yugoslavia on the possibility of
establishing consular relations. Spain is moti-
vated by a desire to widen its relations with East-
ern Europe in order to enhance its international
standing. Spain and most of the East European
countries involved want to obtain additional com-
mercial outlets. During recent months, high-level
visits have been exchanged, the Polish airline LOT
began regular service to Madrid, and Spanish po-
lemical anti-Communist broadcasts to Eastern Europe
have been curtailed. F_ I
ANDEAN COMMON MARKET: A draft code governing
foreign investment in the Andean Common Market, a
regional economic grouping embracing Chile, Bolivia,
Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia, is expected to engender
considerable debate within the group's Commission.
The code would limit foreign investment in such
sectors as transportation, utilities, and communica-
tions and restrict operations of foreign-owned banks.
Foreign companies establishing manufacturing facili-
ties would have to offer 51 percent of their stock
for sale to domestic nationals within 15 years for
export-oriented industries and within ten years in
the case of others. Ecuador, one of the two least
developed members, is highly critical of the pro-
posals because it fears foreign investments into
the country would be seriously cut back.
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GREECE: A request by shipping magnate Aristo-
tle Onassis for a beneficial revision of a multi-
million-dollar investment deal is causing difficulty
between Prime Minister Papadopoulos and Coordination
Minister Makarezos. A government committee, headed
by Makarezos, turned down Onassis' request over the
prime minister's objections. The project, which
includes the construction of Greece's third oil
refinery, has been an explosive issue among regime
members since 1968. Makarezos has opposed the prime
minister on this question in the past whenever it
appeared Papadopoulos was willing to grant Onassis
special concessions.. Until the issue is finally
settled, it remains, a potent 11 divisive question
among the regime hierarchy.
IRAN: Final results of the elections held in
early fall for seats on the newly established dis-
trict and provincial councils show a continuing
lack of public interest in the electoral process.
Only about ten percent of the eligible electorate
participated, despite the efforts of officials to
bring the people further into the governing process.
The government's Iran Novin Party captured 130 out
of 150 district councils and all 13 provincial
councils. The opposition Mardom Party sank to a
new low after a dispirited campaign, gaining only
16 district councils. Even this poor showing, how-
ever, was the result of government efforts in Mar-
dom's behalf--a reflection of the Shah's interest
in preserving a two-party system.
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