CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A017100110001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 23, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 17, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
50
State Department review completed
:17 September 1970
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No. 0223/70
17 September 1970
Central Intelligence Bulletin
JORDAN: The fedayeen's refusal to carry out its
agreement with the government could induce King
Husayn to move. (Page 1)
CAMBODIA: The Communists are maintaining pressure
on the stalled task force along Route 6. (Page 5)
THAILAND - NORTH VIETNAM: Hanoi apparently is
ready to resume negotiations to repatriate refugees.
(Page 6)
NORTH VIETNAM - JAPAN: A sharp drop in trade is
expected this year. (Page 8)
PHILIPPINES: A leading Huk's capture will not re-
duce (Page 9)
USSR - COMMUNIST CHINA: Ambassador appointed
Page 11)
USSR-PERU: Relief shipment (Page 11)
BOLIVIA: Clash with guerrillas (Page 11)
LIBYA: Military control strengthened (Page 12)
CONGO (K): Cabinet reshuffle (Page 12)
NORTH AFRICA: Spanish Saharan issue (Page 13)
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C JORDAN: The fedayeen's refusal to begin carry-
ing out its 15 September agreement with the govern-
ment could induce King Husayn to move.
One of the first acts of the new military gov-
ernment was the appointment of representatives to
continue talks with the fedayeen under the auspices
of the five-nation Arab mediating committee, which
had been instrumental in negotiating the latest
agreement. Yesterday, however, the chairman of the
mediating committee conveyed the answer of the feda-
yeen central committee to the government. The feda-
yeen, he said, believe that it is impossible to im-
plement the recent agreements "at the present time"
and have renounced their obligation to do so without
giving any reason.
The mediating committee called for an immediate
meeting of the Arab League to consider the new situa-
tion. In a statement over Amman radio yesterday
afternoon, the Jordanian Government said that it
will not tolerate any disturbances or unjustified
provocations, and that it holds the fedayeen central
committee responsible "for everything-which-may arise
out of its negative attitude."
Fedayeen Actions
The fedayeen have taken several steps in reac-
tion to the appointment of the new government. The
central committee ordered the immediate unification
of all Palestinian regular, commando, and militia
forces under the leadership of Yasir Arafat. Accord-
ing to a Fatah spokesman in Beirut, Arafat called in
Arab ambassadors to Amman to tell them that the "re-
sistance movement" would defend itself against Jor-
dan's new "fascist military regime" until the regime
is ousted and a national government set up. Several
areas in downtown Amman have been fortified with
sandbags and roadblocks. The federation of Jorda-
nian labor unions has issued a call for a general
strike today. Arafat does seem to be anxious to
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prevent the situation from escalating, however; he
has ordered the fedayeen not to fire on any military
positions unless they are fired on first, although
they are to repulse any attempt by the army to over-
run fedayeen positions.
The fedayeen will probably use tactics of pas-
sive resistance against the government and wait for
the regime's next move. For its part, the govern-
ment is probably also not altogether clear on its
plans. Despite the severity of his latest step,
the King has gone out of his way to reassure the
Palestinians. Brigadier Daud, the new prime minis-
ter, is of Palestinian origin with a reputation as
a moderate and a conciliator; the new chief of the
royal court is also a Palestinian, and known hard-
liners have been excluded from the cabinet.I
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t hough both sides are prob-
ably closer to an all-out confrontation than ever
before, there are signs that both still hope to
avoid a showdown.
Amman seems to have been generally quiet, al-
though extremely tense, yesterday. There were re-
ports of fighting in Zarqa, however, and newsmen
have told US Embassy officials that all of Irbid ex-
cept for one police post seemed to be in the hands
of the fedayeen.
Negotiations on the Hostags
The British, in particular, are growing in-
creasingly nervous over the fate of the hostages in
view of the dangerous security situation in Amman.
At the meeting of the Bern group yesterday, the UK
representative said that the five nations had to
agree on a negotiating mandate which would include
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a contribution by Israel going beyond the release
of the two Algerians. Otherwise, he said, the UK
might be forced to seek "other solutions." The im-
minent arrival in Amman of two new Red Cross repre-
sentatives may help restore some momentum to the
negotiations, but their role has been complicated
by the announcement of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) that it will deal
with the Red Cross only on an individual country-by-
country basis, not as representing the whole Bern
group. A confrontation between the Jordanian Govern-
ment and the fedayeen could induce the PFLP to use
the hostages as pawns in maneuverin a ainst the re-
gime.
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Current Situation
Population over 125 per sq. nii.
Communist-controlled area
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CAMBODIA: Government reinforcements have
reached the Cambodian Army task force along Route
6, but the Communists are maintaining the pressure.
Latest reports indicate that two battalions
joined the main column on 14 September and that
the Cambodians repaired a key bridge to the south
on 15 September. According to press reports,
however, the enemy has now moved in behind the
government column, occupying a village between
Tang Kauk and Skoun. These reports have not been
confirmed, however.
There is mounting evidence that elements of
the Viet Cong 275th Regiment are involved in the
fighting. Documents to this effect were found on
the bodies of enemy troops.
In the northwest, there are reports of Commu-
nist attacks in Battambang Province, which until
recently was free of significant enemy activity.
The Communists overran and occupied two government
outposts between 20 and 30 miles northeast of Bat-
tambang city on 13 September.
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THAILAND - NORTH VIETNAM: Hanoi apparently
is ready to resume negotiations with Bangkok on
the repatriation of some 40,000 Vietnamese refugees
still in northeast Thailand.
The Thai Foreign Ministry has confirmed press
reports that North Vietnamese Red Cross officials
are scheduled to arrive in Vientiane. on, 25 Septem-
ber on their way to Bangkok to begin bilateral
discussions on the repatriation question. The
Thai Red Cross reportedly has asked the Interior
Ministry to guarantee safe passage for Hanoi's
negotiating team.
The original agreements to repatriate the
Vietnamese, who fled to Thailand during the fight-
ing in the early 1950s, resulted in the relocation
of more than 40,000 to North Vietnam. The agree-
ments were suspended on Hanoi's initiative in 1964,
ostensibly because US bombing rendered refugee
transportation through the Gulf of Tonkin unsafe
and refugee resettlement problems too difficult.
Thai efforts to impose tighter security on
the Vietnamese community, long considered a sub-
versive threat, and the deportation of some Commu-
nist cadre to South Vietnam may have contributed
to Hanoi's apparent decision to reopen talks.
Hanoi, moreover, probably wants to pre.-.empt addi-
tional Thai moves against the Vietnamese community.
The North Vietnamese may also hope to reopen re-
patriation offices in the northeast, from which
they can exert greater influence and-control over
the Vietnamese community and engage in intelligence
gathering and other covert activities.
Hanoi probably does not intend to repatriate
many of the refugees; the regime encountered con-
siderable trouble in reconciling the refugees it
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brought back earlier in the decade to the auster-
ities of life in North Vietnam. Even--if Hanoi fol-
lows through, however, the negotiations will prob-
ably be complicated and any actual repatriation
a slow process. There is no evidence that either
Hanoi or Bangkok views possible repatriation talks
as an opportunity to discuss wider problems.
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NORTH VIETNAM - JAPAN: Trade is expected
to drop sharply this year, but Hanoi is looking
for Japanese assistance to modernize its coal
industry.
An official of the Japan-Vietnam Trade Asso-
ciation estimates that total trade between the
two countries this year will amount to only about
half the $13.3 million of trade recorded in 1969.
The principal reason for the slump is the failure
of North Vietnam to meet the delivery schedule
for coal. As of the beginning of August, only
about half of the coal scheduled for export to
Japan during the first seven months had been
shipped.
Traditionally, coal production falls off
during the summer because of bad weather. it
may rise during the last quarter of this year,
but a sustained increase in output is unlikely
until management is improved, modern equipment
is installed, and labor productivity is in-
creased.
A North Vietnamese economic delegation that
recently visited Japan suggested a barter arrange-
ment under which coal-mining technology and
equipment to modernize the Hon Gai coal mines
would be obtained in exchange for future ship-
ments of coal. Japanese visitors to these coal
fields in early 1970 forecast dismal prospects
for increased coal production until :North Viet-
nam replaces its archaic mine equipment and
modernizes coal transport and processing facil-
ities.
.17 Sep 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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PHILIPPINES: The capture of a leading Huk
commander will provide the Marcos government a
propaganda plum but will not significantly ease
the security situation in central Luzon.
Faustino del Mundo, who uses the pseudonym
of Commander Sumulong, was picked up on 16 Septem-
ber. He is being taken to Manila where President
Marcos will presumably exhibit him as proof of the
administration's progress in reversing the deteri-
orating law and order situation.
Sumulong, formerly the leading Huk commander,
has been eclipsed in recent years by the growth of
a rival Huk organization under Bernabe Buscayno,
known as Commander Dante. Sumulong has concentra-
ted on racketeering, and his interest in profit-
making has erased any ideological content his
movement might once have had. Dante, on the other
hand, professes to be a Maoist. Although there
is considerable doubt about his understanding of
and commitment to Communism, he is backed by
elements of the illegal Philippine Communist
Party, which in recent months has shown signs of
reviving.
Dante's forces number about 300, compared
with Sumulong's armed strength of only about 100.
Sumulong's removal from the scene will not appre-
ciably reduce Huk influence and terrorism in rural
areas of central Luzon, inasmuch as his followers
will continue their banditry.
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USSR - COMMUNIST CHINA: Moscow announced
yesterday the appointment of Leningrad party chief
Vasily Tolstikov as: ambassador to Peking, but gave
no indication when he will actually take up his
post. Several weeks ago the Chinese ended four
months of footdragging by accepting Tolstikov,
but Peking has not yet disclosed its own plans for
the appointment of an ambassador to Moscow. The
Soviets probably view the announcement of Tolsti-
kov's appointment as complementing their less
abrasive attitude toward the Chinese; they probably
judge that the onus now is on Peking to reciprocate.
USSR-PERU: A Soviet cargo ship is en route
to Peru with at least 2,000 tons of relief goods,
including foodstuffs, prefabricated building
materials, and construction equipment. Moscow
had announced earlier that aid not delivered
following the cancellation of the airlift would
be shipped by sea. Only 21 flights were completed
of the planned 65, but one additional flight,
probably carrying urgently needed medical supplies,
was made. Considerably more Soviet aid is now
en route than the 700 tons that 1 have been
transported by the 65 flights.
BOLIVIA: Clashes between the army and guer-
rillas of the pro-Cuban Army of National Libera-
tion (ELN) are occurring with greater frequency.
In fighting on 12 and 13 September there were at
least eight guerrilla casualties while the armed
forces suffered four. Despite the Bolivian mili-
tary's poor state of preparedness, operations
north of La Paz in the past seven weeks have re-
sulted in the death or capture of nearly half of
the guerrillas that participated in the raid on
a mining encampment on 19 July. The increasing
incidence of clashes suggests that the army's
net is slowly bein drawn around the ELN group.
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.17 Sep 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin
(continued)
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LIBYA: Yesterday's cabinet changes have
strengt~iened military control over the government
and have confirmed Major. Huni as number three man
after Colonel Qaddafi and Major Jallud. When the
cabinet was formed last January, civilians out-
numbered members of the military Revolutionary
Command Council; in the new cabinet, council mem-
bers.now form a majority, and the civilian foreign
minister has been replaced by a council member.
Major Jallud, reportedly Qaddafi's chief rival,
retains his title of deputy prime minister, but
he no longer controls the internal security forces
as minister of interior. This job has been given
to Major Huni, who has also been named a deputy
CONGO (KINSHASA): A cabinet reshuffle,
announced shortly after President Mobutu's return
last weekend from a six-week foreign tour, switches
ten portfolios without ousting a single minister.
This is the first extensive reshuffle since the
dismissal of several prominent figures from the
cabinet in August 1969 and may be intended largely
to keep ranking administrators on their mettle.
Mobutu's retention of the defense and foreign
affairs portfolios provides fresh evidence of his
reluctance to dele ate key responsibilities.
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17 Sep 70
(continued)
Central Intelligence Bulletin 12
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NORTH AFRICA: The brief meeting of the heads
of state Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria on 14
September at a Mauritanian town close to Spanish
Sahara seems to have been largely a public re-
lations gesture to dramatize the Spanish Saharan
issue. Apparently, no firm agreements were con-
cluded during the 90-minute meeting, but a tri-
partite policy coordinating committee was set up
and the three leaders decided to confer again.
This demonstration of solidarity is likely to be
the prelude to a new attempt to get the UN General
Assembly to call for an early plebiscite to deter-
mine the political future of the s arsel o ulated
but mineral-rich territory.
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