CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A016200090001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 13, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
50
13 May 19 70
State Department review completed
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No. 0114/70
13 May 1970
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
USSR-Cambodia: Moscow has bought more time to sort
out t He imp ications of the Indochina situation.
(Page 1)
Lebanon-Israel: Tel Aviv's thrust into Lebanon is
likely to lead to further deterioration of the sit-
uation. (Page 2)
Iran-Bahrain-UN: Independence for Bahrain ends the
150-year old Iranian claim. (Page 5)
South Vietnam: Some Communist units are planning
offensive operations. (Page 6)
Laos: Military activity (Page 7)
USSR: Port calls (Page 7)
UN - Middle East: UNRWA budget (Page 7)
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USSR-Cambodia: Premier Kosygin's telegram to
Cambodian Prince Sihanouk buys more time for Moscow
to sort out the implications of the Indochina situa-
tion.
The Kosygin message, announced by TASS yester-
day, is the first direct gesture of support that
Sihanouk has received from the USSR. It falls well
short, however, of the full diplomatic recognition
already extended his "Royal Government of National
Union" by Hanoi and Peking. It is addressed to
"Mr," Norodom Sihanouk, and it congratulates him
not on the formation of his government-in-exile,
but on the "United Front" which he established soon
after his ouster.
Moscow's failure to recognize Sihanouk's "gov-
ernment" is evidence of its determination to tread
a cautious path in dealing with Indochina develop-
ments. It reflects in part Soviet uncertainty about
the orientation and prospects for success of a
Sihanouk-led liberation movement and, more impor-
tantly, concern over the nature of his relationship
with the Chinese. A common theme in the comments
of Soviet diplomats on Indochina developments since
the ouster of Sihanouk has been the fear that China
will be able to exploit the situation. Sihanouk's
dependence upon the Chinese has increased Soviet
anxiety.
It will be difficult for the USSR to stay out
of step with Hanoi for long on a policy matter of
this importance. Sihanouk quickly accepted the sign
of Soviet support, but made it clear in a telegram
to Premier Kosygin that he was formally requesting
official recognition of his government-in-exile,)
This move will not make Moscow's position any easier,
as it clearly prefers to withhold its full support
at least for the time being.
13 May 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin 1
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I Lebanon-Israel: Tel Aviv's thrust into south-
ern Lehi maytemporarily deter fedayeen activity
but is likely to lead in the long run to further
deterioration of the situation.
In contrast to fedayeen claims of heavy fight-
ing and high casualties, Israeli officials appear
to be trying to depict, their day-long "combing op-
eration" in southern Lebanon as limited. They de-
scribe it as a "screening" action designed to cap-
ture fedayeen and to destroy their bases. Tel Aviv
has given no figures of guerrillas killed and says
only that Israeli forces took 11 prisoners and de-
stroyed some 40 buildings and ten vehicles, while
suffering 1.1 wounded themselves. They also warn
that much stronger ripostes are in the offing if
fedayeen action from Lebanon continues.
With the Lebanese cabinet delicately balanced
between pro- and anti-fedayeen factions, the Leb-
anese Army's communiques may have been an attempt
to head off public criticism of the government for
not acting forcefully enough against the Israelis.
it is possible, however, that a fedayeen-led outcry
may still bring down the cabinet. The US Embassy
in Beirut believes that in any case the Lebanese
public is likely to blame the US for not stopping
the attack and that some groups may even accuse the
US of complicity with Tel Aviv.
Over the longer term, events in Lebanon are
likely to parallel the developments of the past few
13 May 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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years in Jordan. The Israeli attack is unlikely to
deter further fedayeen incursions into Israel for
long. Fearful of initiating yet another government-
fedayeen confrontation with its accompanying domes-
tic political problems, Beirut will probably not at-
tempt to take any strong measures of its own to con-
trol the fedayeen. This in turn is likely to lead
to further Israeli air and ground st 'k
fedayeen concentrations in Lebanon.
13 May 70 Central intelligence Bulletin
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Shat, z
\ P. Arsb
BAHRAIN
'sariSri air aa
Iranian Claim to BAHRAIN Resolved : Other Issues Unsettled
SAUDI
MUSCAT"`
AND
OMAN
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'R A N
.Shiraz
Bandar a
`b ngefi rte ~,~'~ srmee ai
l lj J _ HormAT:.
Umrn al Qalwain "-
AJman
Sharjah l(
Dubai
FE RAT[ON'OFARABAMIRATES
(Bal raa, Qatar and thelaven Trucial States jam'
f - )r STATES
Abu Dhabr
Persian Gulf islands in dispute E1'
between Iran and the Trucial States
The Trm bs: controlled by Ras al,, Kha,mah
claimed by Iran
Abu Musa controlled by Sharjah
claimed by Iran
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Iran-Bahrain-UN: The UN Security Council ac-
tion approving independence for Bahrain ends the
150-year-old Iranian claim to the Persian Gulf is-
land, but other territorial conflicts remain unre-
solved.
A representative of Secretary General Thant,
after discussions with the Bahrainis, reported that
the majority of the population preferred independ-
ence to association with Iran. Tehran had agreed
in advance to accept the report once it was approved
by the UN. Council approval on Monday was unanimous.
Settlement of the Bahrain dispute removes an-
other obstacle to Iranian-Arab cooperation in the
gulf. Conflicting claims to three other tiny but
strategic gulf islands remain unresolved, however.
Iran is determined to gain at least de facto con-
trol of the two Tunbs and Abu Musa, which control
access to the gulf and are also claimed by the
l
y.
sheikdoms of Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah respective
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South Vietnam: Some Communist units within
South Vietnam are planning offensive operations to
take advantage of the diversion of allied forces
to the Cambodian front,
Numerous references to the deployment of al-
lied forces to the Cambodian border have cropped
up in captured document:s prisoner and rallier
statements In many cases,
enemy units were directed to try to strike in areas
where allied strength has been cut back.
It is uncertain how much of an effort the Com-
munists can put together in the immediate future,
as this will depend on the readiness of different
units and other local conditions Nevertheless,
the Communists are probably anxious to get some-
thing going. They may believe that if it is not
severe enoucrh to force the early withdrawal of US
or South Vietnamese troops from the border regions,
the effort might at least score some tactical suc-
cess against. lightly defended areas while upward
of 57,000 allied troo s are committed to Cambodian
operations.
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Laos: Communist military activity continues to
focus on the Bolovens Plateau, where the enemy has
succeeded in dispersing government guerrillas hold-
ing Site 38. The guerrillas are now regrouping in
an effort to reoccupy this key position some ten
miles northwest of the provincial capital of Attopeu.
In the north, a few minor clashes marked an otherwise
quiet day at Long Tieng.
USSR: Some of the Soviet naval units that par-
ticipated in exercise "Ocean" are subsequently show-
ing the flag at several foreign ports. A cruiser
and a guided missile frigate entered the harbor at
Cherbourg, France on 8 May and three other groups of
ships are visiting the African ports of Algiers,
Casablanca, and Lagos. In the Caribbean, a force of
two diesel submarines, a guided missile cruiser, and
a destroyer are currently operating south of Jamaica
and may visit Cuba and some West Indian ports. Last
year Soviet naval units made good-will calls at three
Caribbean or s.
UN - Middle East: The US mission at the UN has
learned that the Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) has
decided to defer most of its planned cuts in serv-
ices to the refugee camps of the Middle East. The
cutbacks scheduled for 1 May had been protested
bitterly by Jordanian and Lebanese officials, who
fear that a reduction in services would facilitate
fedayeen recruitment in the camps. UNRWA will face
a large deficit if cutbacks are delayed, although
it hopes that a special appeal by Secretary General
Thant for funds will help ease its financial prob-
lems. Prospects for a favorable response are not
good, however, and there appears to be no possibil-
ity that UNRWA can avoid eventually instituting sub-
stantial cuts in services.
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