CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A016100090001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
Secret
50
1 May 1970
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No. 0104/70
1 May 19 70
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Laos: Communist forces remain in control of Attopeu
town. (Page 1)
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Jordan-Fedayeen: A new round of negotiations may be
jeopardized. (Page 5)
Libya: The government is trying to grapple with
economic problems. (Page 6)
India: The Chinese satellite has intensified debate
over whether India should develop a nuclear deterrent.
(Page 7)
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Ecuador: A change in the government has been pre-
dicted. (Page 9)
Bolivia: The government hopes to forestall May Day
violence. (Page 10)
International Labor: Chances of a reconciliation
between the AFL-CIO and the ICFTU have diminished.
(P age 11)
NATO-Greece: Defense planning (Page 12)
Albania-Denmark: Diplomatic relations (Page 12)
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Chile-Cuba:
Trade (Page 13)
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Communist Forces Holding Attopeu
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VIETNAM
P.9uG1d 'o
Pass
V. Demilitarized Zone
J
SOC10 N
VIETNAM
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Laos: Communist forces remain in control of
Attopeu town, and fresh Communist action has been
reported in the Bolovens Plateau area.
A Communist rocket attack was directed at the
military region headquarters and airstrip at the
Mekong River town of Pakse. There was no damage.
These same facilities came under similar attack on
two other occasions earlier this dry season. I
The Attopeu garrison commander, who abandoned
the town on 30 April, apparently escaped with about
300 of the original 600-man defense force. General
Phasouk, commander of the southern military region,
has ordered air strikes against munition dumps in-
side the town, which may result in additional civil-
ian casualties. At last report, some fighting was
continuing on the Bolovens Plateau where a govern-
ment relief column is trying to retake a fire base
overlooking Attopeu.
The identity and number of the enemy forces
that attacked Attopeu are still not known. It is
likely that both North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao
units were involved
Phasouk is also claiming that the attack was
the first step in a new Communist offensive in south-
ern Laos designed to secure the Se Kong River, Route
16, and sanctuaries in support of future enemy oper-
ations against Cambodia and South Vietnam. Phasouk
placed a similar interpretation on the extensive
1967-68 Communist offensive in the Bolovens, but
subsequent events did not reveal the establishment
of a major enemy infiltration route well to the west
of the heavily used and defended infiltration cor-
ridor.
Now, however, the Communists' desire to use the
Se Kong River may have increased. Nevertheless, the
1 May 70
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route would be more vulnerable to harassment than
the one already established toward Cambodia and South
Vietnam via Routes 96 and 110.
Phasouk has used the Attopeu attack to urge the
return of southern forces sent to bolster the Meo
units in the north, where the lull in the fighting
has continued for some time. General Ouan, the Lao
Armed Forces chief, reportedly supports this request
and will recommend it to the prime minister.
1 May 70
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Jordan-Fedayeen: A new round of negotiations
may be jeopardized by fedayeen charges that Jordan
is plotting to kill commando leaders.
Yesterday, the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine (PFLP) announced that a Jordanian Army
plot to assassinate top commando leaders had been
foiled. The spokesman pinpointed army commander
Sharif Nasir as primarily responsible.
The publicity given to Sharif
Nasir's plot will make it difficult for even the
more moderate fedayeen groups to accept any accommo-
dation that might entail significant concessions.
The government-fedayeen confrontation last Feb-
ruary was supposedly resolved by an "agreement" that
the fedayeen have since been flouting openly. The
government sorely needs to give at least the appear-
ance of controlling them, particularly in the wake
of the recent disturbances that led to the cancel-
lation of US Assistant Secretar of State Sisco's
planned visit to Amman.
1 May 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Libya: The revolutionary government is making
some effort to grapple with economic problems.
After eight months of ministerial controversy,
it has completed a development budget for the fiscal
year that began on 1 April. The budget is about 26
percent larger than that of the Idris government for
the previous fiscal year. Allocations for industry
and agriculture are more than doubled, while those
for housing and public works remain about the same.
The government building program included in the
budget is designed to ease unemployment and satisfy
political discontent to some extent. Total domestic
expenditures by the government are expected to remain
at the level of last year, however, because of re-
ported cuts in wages and other items.
There is no indication that this government is
any better prepared to implement a development budget
than the Idris regime. As in previous years, allo-
cations are based on a list of projects rather than
a meaningful scheme for future growth. It is un-
likely that all proposed projects can get under way
or that the amounts allocated will actually be ex-
pended during the year.
1 May 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin 6
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India: The launching of a Chinese Communist
satellite has intensified the debate over whether
India should develop a nuclear deterrent.
In recent months, the political right has become
especially vocal in demanding development of nuclear
weapons for defense against China. India could prob-
ably produce a test device within a year of a deci-
sion, to go ahead, but a fully operational nuclear
weapon would not be available for at least one and
probably two years after the initial test. Moreover,
many Indian leaders believe a credible deterrent re-
quires a sophisticated delivery system and that this
is beyond India's present economic means.
Parliamentary discussions following the Chinese
launch reflected the heightened pressure on Mrs.
Gandhi's government to develop nuclear weapons. Al-
though the government apparently failed to mollify
the aroused legislators, the lower house did not ex-
press its concern by voting against the defense
budget later in the day. Nevertheless, the govern-
ment. will continue to be attacked on this emotional
issue.
Pressures for a change in policy are likely to
build as Mrs. Gandhi's minority government moves to-
ward the next general elections, which must be held
by 1972.
1 May 70
Central Intelligence Bulletin 7
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Ecuador: A change in the government has been
predicted unless Congress approves the administra-
tion's fiscal reform program before adjourning on 4
May.
There is widespread agreement that the govern-
ment is not coping with its responsibilities. The
financial crisis of 1969 has continued into 1970
and the government will probably have to continue
inflationary borrowing to cover the sizable budget
deficit. In addition, recurring student disorders
continue to cause fatalities among students and
police.
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Velasco appears to recognize from his own
experience--which includes being forced from the
presidency three times--that the assumption of dic-
tatorial powers could easily coalesce the strength
of his opponents and again lead to his ouster. Ve-
lasco may find, however, that he is unable to resist
the pressures for some sort of change.
I I
1 May 70
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Bolivia: The Ovando government plans to par-
ticipate in May Day celebrations in the hope of pre-
venting violence and obtaining greater labor support.
Security precautions for the May Day celebra-
tions are to be handled by the National Guard, al-
though the army, which has been restricted to its
barracks, has been ordered to maintain a 100-percent
state of alert. The government hopes to control the
activities but also wishes to avoid the creation of
martyrs if disturbances should occur.
The government is also trying to manipulate the
national labor congress that opens today. The Bo-
livian Workers Central, which was suppressed under
the Barrientos regime, has received government fi-
nancing and permission to use the national legisla-
ture building to hold its congress.
1 May 70
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International Labor: Chances of a reconciliation
that would bring the AFL-CIO back to the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) have di-
minished even further.
The ICFTU group on the "American problem" still
plans to meet with George Meany in Geneva this June
for further discussions, but the ICFTU subcommittee
on financing, currently meeting in London, has al-
ready begun to focus on planning that assumes con-
tinued disaffiliation. Although the AFL-CIO's pres-
ence and money are wanted and needed by the ICFTU, a
European labor union source says that the Europeans
feel that they have gone as far as possible to sat-
isfy Meany.
The dispute arose originally over the applica-
tion of the United Auto Workers to join the ICFTU,
which Meany opposed. The application has been re-
jected, but the disenchantment between the ICFTU and
the AFL-CIO continues. Without the AFL-CIO, the
ICFTU, the major non-Communist international labor
movement, will become largely a European-led organ-
ization and its ability to foster the development
of unionism in the third world will be severely
handicapped.
European labor leaders may now also feel more
free to pursue closer contacts between the ICFTU and
Communist labor organizations, to which Meany had
strongly objected in the past.
1 May 70
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NATO-Greece: Yesterday's meeting of the NATO
Defense Planning Committee (DPC) was postponed un-
til 8 May. The action was caused by a Danish deci-
sion to oppose DPC acceptance of a compromise re-
port on Greek force goals. A number of NATO mem-
bers plan demarches aimed at putting the compromise
together again, prior to the rescheduled meeting.
The compromise would permit Denmark, Norway, and
the Netherlands to dissociate themselves from the
report with a footnote. The US and a number of
other allies--including the UK and West Germany--
hope to keep the NATO ministerial meeting, scheduled
for 26-27 May, free of debate on the Greek issue
because it could prove divisive for the Alliance.
Failure to head off the Danish challenge, however,
would almost certainl guarantee that the issue
will be raised.
Albania-Denmark: Albania and Denmark have
agreed to establish diplomatic relations at the am-
bassadorial level, according to an announcement from
Tirana on 29 April. This marks the first return on
Albania's recent overtures to five West European
countries--including Belgium, Norway, Switzerland,
and possibly the Netherlands--for diplomatic and
economic ties. The Albanians hope to achieve greater
political flexibility and satisfy the requirements of
their economy. According to a Danish diplomat, the
Albanians intend to send an ambassador to fill the
long-standing vacancy in Sweden and accredit him also
to both Norway and Denmark. Oslo reportedly favors
relations with Albania, and negotiations are in proc-
ess.
1 May 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Chile-Cuba: A Chilean ship may be used to
transport foodstuffs from Chile to Cuba. This ac-
tion would breach the OAS sanctions imposed in 1964
and, under US law, would subject the ship to the
denial of US bunkering and cargo. It would be the
first time a Latin American vessel had been involved
in the Cuban trade since 1964. Chilean officials
have defended recent commercial deals with Cuba as
"humanitarian" exceptions permitted by the OAS res-
olutions. Use of a Chilean vessel would emphasize
the government's intention to continue its agri-
cultural trade with Cuba and could tempt other
Latin ri n countries to follow the Chilean
lead.
1 May 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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The United States Intelligence Board on 30
April 1970 approved the following special national
intelligence estimate:
SNIE 86.2-70 "Short-Term Prospects
for Political Stability
in the Dominican Republic"
1 May 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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