CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A016100060001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 16, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 28, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
50
28 April 1970
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No. 0101/70
28 April 1970
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
North Vietnam: Hanoi deliberately took a back seat
at the Indochinese summit conference. (Page 1)
El Salvador: The government is pursuing a hard line
toward Honduras. (Page 2)
Somalia: Preventive arrests (Page 3)
Rhodesia: Insurgency group splits (Page 3)
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North Vietnam: The North Vietnamese deliber-
ately took a back seat at the Indochinese summit
conference of 23-24 April.
Although the conference was passed off as the
handiwork-of Cambodia's Sihanouk, who allegedly in-
itiated it and who chaired the opening meeting, the
get-together clearly was sponsored by Hanoi. The
Chinese took no official part in the proceedings
except to provide a site at some undisclosed loca-
tion in South China. The only nod to the Chinese
during the conference came in a brief reference to
Peking's claim to Taiwan.
The conference followed the usual Communist
line on all three parts,of Indochina, but it noted
its "special concern" for Cambodia. The joint com-
munique condemned international efforts to "legit-
imize" the new Cambodian Government, such as Lon
Nolls appeal to the UN and the Indonesian proposal
for an Asian conference, and Sihanouk by inference
denounced the French proposal on Indochina as well.
At this initial meeting the Communists were
careful to work through "fronts" rather than gov-
ernments, and they probably will continue to use
this format in the future, The Viet Cong delegates
came from their Liberation Front and their Alliance,
rather than from the more authoritative Provisional
Revolutionary Government, and the same nonparty
coloration was provided the Hanoi delegates. With
the exception of Premier Pham Van Dong, Hanoi's men
were publicized as representatives of the Father-
land Front. The communique made much of the impor-
tance of the "national united front of each coun-
try"--an apparent attempt to build up Sihanouk's
newly established front. It did not mention a for-
mal organization such as an Indochina front, but it
did. call for further summit-level meetings.
The meeting apparently concerned itself mainly
with propaganda and accomplished little of a con-
crete nature. More difficult organizational and
political problems were held in abeyance.
28 Apr 70
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El Salvador: The government is pursuing a hard
line toward Honduras and is severely hampering the
operation of the Central American Common Market.
Because the government party won in the con-
gressional and municipal elections last month, its
need to use international tension for domestic pol-
itical advantage has lessened. Nevertheless, the gov-
ernment's attitude remains uncompromising. Salva-
doran officials, who earlier had favored creation
of a demilitarized zone along the border, now are
publicly criticizing the idea. In addition, mili-
tary leaders have turned thumbs down on a key Hon-
duran demand that National Guard troops be with-
drawn from the frontier areas.
Salvadoran officials continue intransigent
toward the Common Market. The government has delib-
erately disrupted traffic along the Pan.American
Highway by refusing to repair a key bridge destroyed
on 27 March. If Salvadoran policy continues in this
vein, economic relations with Nicaragua, Costa Rica,
and Guatemala will be threatened.
For its part, the Honduran Government has even
less incentive to move rapidly to ease tension.
President Lopez wants to play the threat from El
Salvador in a high key because he needs justifica-
tion for continuing in office past his constitu-
tional term, which ends in 1971. Moreover, Hon-
duras is placing great stress on demilitarizing the
border, and is unwilling to discuss other matters
until this issue is settled.
Both sides have agreed to talks in Washington
in mid-may, to which high-ranking military leaders
would be invited. If El Salvador is not more co-
operative than in the past, little progress can be
expected.
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NOTES
Somalia: The military regime has rounded up
and charged-a number of civilians and army and police
officers with plotting against the government. Re-
ports vary on the numbers arrested, but some 20 or
30 civilians and six or eight army and police colo-
nels reportedly have been jailed. Former police com-
mander and incumbent vice president of the Supreme
Revolutionary Council, General Korshel, has been
designated the ringleader, and the conspirators have
been accused of being in contact with a "foreign
power." No other details are yet available.
Rhodesia; A split in ZAPU, the only active
Rhodesian surgency group, deteriorated into vio-
lent clashes between rival factions in the Zambian
capital of Lusaka last week. The leadership had a
falling out about five weeks ago. Since then, the
Zambian Government, which hosts the group, has been
trying to get the two sides to reconcile their dif-
ferences. The quarrel seems to have grown so bit-
ter, however, that the two groups may now be irrev-
ocably divided. Such a development would almost
certainly lead to a further weakening of the nation-
alist insurgency effort.
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