CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A014800050001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 22, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2004/03/17: CIA-RDP79T00975A01480095,Q,oQ6.
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
5`
JCS review(s) completed.
DOS review(s) completed.
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No. 0253/69
22 October 1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Vietnam: Captured documents reflect decisions
reached in Hanoi during a major strategy review.
(Page 1)
South Korea: Pak is revamping his government and
adopting a conciliatory attitude toward his oppo-
nents. (Page 2)
Chile: An army regiment is still defying govern-
ment control. (Page 3)
Somali Republic: The country remains calm following
the coup. (Page 4)
Iran: The oil consortium's failure to support pipe-
t ni construction may doom the project. (Page 7)
Panama: The government will extend the Rio Hato
Base agreement in return for concessions. (Page 9)
Dominican Republic: Violence continues to charac-
terize the presidential campaign. (Page 10)
USSR: A new novel reads like a primer of conserv-
aTe bugaboos. (Page 11)
Japan: Demonstration aftermath (Page 13)
UK-Spain: Gibraltar problems (Page 13)
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C Vietnam: Recently captured documents give the
impression that the Communists are looking down the
road toward a cease-fire and a temporary territorial
division of South Vietnam.
The documents reflect the Viet Cong version of
decisions reached in Hanoi during a major strategy
review last April. These same meetings led to the
promulgation in Paris of the Communist ten-point
peace plan in May and the "Provisional Revolutionary
Government" in South Vietnam in June. Those moves
laid the ground work for an eventual cease-fire and
the existence of two separate "regimes" pending a
permanent political settlement.
Ho Chi Minh's terminal illness this past summer
may have disrupted Communist plans to develop this
scenario more fully. The continued dissemination of
this line among Communist cadre in South Vietnam,
however, suggests that the basic policies reached
last spring are still intact.
Current projections for the 1970 crop year in-
dicate that South Vietnam's rice harvest will be the
biggest in five years, mainly because of the increased
planting of high-yield miracle rice.
South Vietnam became a rice-importing country
in 1965; since then, rice production has declined 18
percent because of the ravages of the war. The two
varieties of miracle rice first introduced commer-
cially last year, however, give an average crop yield
about 2 1/2 times larger than standard varieties. In
addition, improved security in the countryside has
allowed an expansion of the total cultivated area and
could lead to a halving of the rice imports for next
year, and possibly to self-sufficiency in production
by the end of 1971.
22 Oct 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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South Korea: President Pak has capitalized on
his resounding referendum victory by revamping his
government and adopting a conciliatory attitude to-
ward his opponents.
The pro forma resignation of government and rul-
ing.party members immediately after the referendum
gave Pak an opportunity to remove his presidential
secretary and the director of South Korea's Central
Intelligence Agency, two of the most powerful and
feared figures in the administration. Pak, in effect,
had pledged their removal in order to secure party
unity during the crucial constitutional amendment
process which culminated in last week's referendum.
The new officials appointed to the cabinet and
government administration yesterday are regarded as
competent, noncontroversial technicians by the Korean
public. Additional changes are expected in both the
party and national assembly and probably will further
strengthen the President's position.
Administration officials are not gloating pub-
licly over the 65 percent approval of the third term
amendment, which outstripped Pak's tally in the 1967
presidential election. Pak, himself, has asked the
people to "cheer up" the opposition party. Pak rec-
ognizes that the largely ineffectual opposition party
must be buoyed up if he is to maintain at least the
appearance of a functioning two-party system.
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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C Chile: One of the two army regiments that
mutinied yesterday is still defying government con-
trol.
The leader of the uprising, former First Di-
vision commander General Roberto Viaux, claims that
the action is not an attempt at a coup but an airing
of protest against the military high command. He
said it sought the removal of Defense Minister Maram-
bio and Army Commander Castillo and their replacement
by officers enjoying the confidence of the army.
Viaux had been forced into retirement on 16 October
because the Frei government suspected him of plotting
to force it to comply with military demands for
higher pay and better equipment.
It is still unclear how much support the rebel-
ling Tacna Regiment has. Officers from the noncom-
missioned officers' school reportedly have joined
it, as have other individual officers, but rumors
of movements by five regiments outside Santiago have
not been confirmed.
There is no evidence of trouble in either the
air force or navy, and the air force has been alerted
to interdict any troops moving toward Santiago. The
national police force--the carabineros--has 7,000
of its total strength of 25,000 stationed in greater
Santiago and would almost certainly support the con-
stitutional government.
A prolonged standoff between the Tacna Regiment
and the government increases the likelihood of
greater support for Viaux among the military. More-
over, the longer this confrontation in the center of
Santiago continues, the greater is the chance of some
disturbance. Extreme leftist terrorists who have
been trying to stir up trouble in recent months are
not responsive to Communist party or other discipline
that might keep them in line.
22 Oct 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Somali Republic: The country remains calm fol-
lowing the coup Eay the army and police.
Radio broadcasts indicate a "revolutionary
council" has been formed and the constitution dis-
solved. Prime Minister Egal and members of the
government are under house arrest.
General Mohamed Siad Barre, commander of the
army, and General Jama Ali Korshel, head of the
police, are the only two members of the new council
who have been identified. The junta claims that it
acted to eliminate corruption and tribalism and to
oust those responsible for the "corrupt malpractices
of the ruling classes." The council announced that
all international agreements and treaties will be
respected and that Somalia's foreign policy of non-
alignment will be maintained.
Both the army and police had grievances against
Egal, who had emerged as the key figure in the gov-
ernment following the assassination of President
Scermarche last week. The uncertainty created by
the assassination apparently provided. the opportu-
nity to move against him. General Siad has long
opposed both Egal's detente with Ethiopia and his
attempts to curb defense spending in favor of eco-
nomic development. Police morale has been low ever
since Egal and Scermarche ousted the popular former
police commandant earlier this year.
The military takeover may spell the end of the
detente between Somalia and its neighbors, particu-
larly Ethiopia. The Soviet trained and equipped
Somali Arm has long advocated a hard line toward
Ethio ia
(continued)
22 Oct 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Despite the junta's assertion that it will not
interfere in the affairs of other countries, it has
announced it will support all "freedom fighters."
This statement by itself will probably provoke se-
vere reactions in Addis Ababa and could easily lead
to new tension along the Ethiopian-Somali border.
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e
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TURKEY
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Iran: The international oil consortium's fail-
ure to support a proposed 1,000-mile crude oil pipe-
line from southern Iran to the Mediterranean port of
Iskenderun in Turkey may delay or doom this pet pro-
ject of the Shah.
The consortium, which controls almost all of
Iran's crude oil output, has refused thus far to com-
mit itself to use the pipeline if built. Without
such a commitment, financing for the construction al-
most certainly cannot be obtained.
The consortium thinks that the estimates of pipe-
line construction costs and probable transit tariffs
are too low. It also believes that tankers offer
more secure supply lines in time of crisis. The con-
sortium's lack of interest also is based on the large
capital investments already made to increase Iran's
oil tanker loading facilities in the Persian Gulf.
Iran sees the pipeline as a direct crude oil
outlet to the Mediterranean for markets in western
and eastern Europe. It also would gain a competitive
advantage in supplying oil to Turkey. Furthermore,
Iran hopes that the pipeline would speed development
of oilfields in northern Iran. (Map)
22 Oct 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Panama: The government is willing to negotiate
an extension of the Rio Hato Base agreement in re-
turn for certain concessions.
During a visit to the US earlier this month,
Panamanian strongman General Torrijos told a senior
US military official that he would support continued
US use of the installation on an interim basis until
the 1903 Canal Treaty is revised. Last Friday Tor-
rijos told the US Commander in Chief, Southern Com-
mand, that a suitable quid pro quo would be an in-
crease in the US sugar quota for Panama. Torrijos
had earlier requested four T-28 aircraft and two
helicopters. Although he did not link the request
for military equipment with the base agreement, which
expires in August 1970, it is possible that he may
do so.
Rio Hato, a 19,170-acre training area and air
base, is the only US military installation outside
the Canal Zone. The draft canal treaties resulting
from US-Panamanian negotiations from 1964 to 1967
included arrangements for continued use of the base
by US forces. The draft treaties have not been acted
upon, however, because they were unacceptable to
both sides and because of the political problems re-
sulting from the Panamanian elections and the mili-
tary coup. (Map)
22 Oct 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 9
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Dominican Republica Violence continues to
characterize ? presidential campaign.
Last Sunday police opened fire on leaders of
the major opposition Dominican Revolutionary Party
following a large rally. Party Secretary General
Pena Gomez, among others, narrowly escaped death.
One security officer was killed, and police, who
claim they were attacked, made several hundred ar-
rests. The following day students exchanged gunfire
with police during a university demonstration. Two
students reportedly were wounded.
These were the latest: incidents in what could
be a growing series of clashes between civilians and
security forces. Many policemen, if not trigger
happy, are prone to use st:rongarm tactics. The Com-
munists continue to provoke violence with sporadic
police assassinations, and small bands of militants
in nearly every party are usually ready to start
clashes with the police.
A is a result of the continued violence, Presi-
dent Balaguer's opponents have accused him of di-
recti.ng a campaign of repression designed to pave
the way for his re-election. This is probably not
true, but Balaguer's image suffers from his inability
to control some members of the security network.
His tactic of responding to public criticism by
periodically sacking the police chief has proved
only a temporary palliative.
Few of the political leaders are above resorting
to violent tactics. If Balaguer announces for re-
election, as now seems likely, his opponents will
redouble efforts to mount protests and try to make
good on their boasts.
22 Oct 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 10
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USSR: The first installment of a new novel by
the leading reactionary. writer, Vsevolod Kochetov,
appearing in the conservative monthly of the Writers
Union, reads like a primer of conservative bugaboos.
Kochetov's novel, poor as a work of literature,
deserves attention as an indication of the moods and
preoccupations of conservative intellectuals. The
main point of the novel, What Do You Want?, is that
the rush to discredit Stalin was unjust and seriously
weakened the moral fiber of Soviet society. The
novel's villains take credit for engineering de-
Stalinization. .The author thus places those Soviets
who use labels such as "Stalinist" or "dogmatist" in
league with CIA/West German/Russian emigre schemers,
spies and revanchists.
Samarin, the novel's hero, is a Stalin-boosting
bureaucrat who looks upon the younger generation as
dangerously lacking in vigilance. His equally up-
right son is contrasted with a young blackmarketeer
whose father is a member of the conscienceless, lib-
eral intelligentsia. The liberals are presented as
having milked de-Stalinization for professional ad-
vancement.
Samarin rejects the charge that Stalin failed
to prepare for World War II, noting that the most
important things were done, including the development
of industry, the collectivization of agriculture and
the elimination of the Kulaks and all opposition in
the party.
The spies work for "New World" publishers. In
the novel this name appears in English but a Russian
reader will recognize it as a clear reference to the
liberal journal Novy Mir (New World). One of the
representatives of "New World" explains that "bridge-
building" was developed as a new way to destroy Com-
munism, and boasts that de-Stalinization was exploited
exceptionally well. He laments the growth of the
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National Democratic Party in West Germany as a hind-
rance to "bridge-building." One spy notes that
"bridge-building" is clever but that in the final
analysis it will be German tanks that count.
A Miss Brown, depicted as a CIA agent, explains
that "bridge-building" involves a three-pronged ap-
proach: to wean the oldsters from Communism with
religion, to corrupt the middle-aged with the "cult
of things," and to encourage youth to revolt against
Communist authority. Nevertheless, she "admits" that,
despite Western propaganda, most people in the West
still regard the USSR as the land of opportunity and
prosperity.
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NOTES
Japan: The Sato government probably has emerged
from yesterday's widespread leftist rampage with
stronger public support for its position on main-
taining defense ties with the US. The leftists, by
virtually paralyzing Tokyo and disrupting other ur-
ban centers throughout Japan, seem likely only to
have added to the swing of popular opinion away from
the protesters and toward the government. By suc-
cessfully countering the new "guerrilla" tactics
adopted by the radical students and rounding up
hundreds of the agitators, the police may have set
back plans to disrupt Sato's departure for the US
next month. F7 I
UK-Spain: The UK has become more uneasy over
Spain's harassment of Gibraltar and has indicated
that it will react strongly in the future to such
action. The British fear that if Spain applies more
pressure to the Rock to sever its ties with Britain,
it will seriously threaten the livelihood of the
Gibralterians. London is particularly concerned
with a possible Spanish attempt to interfere with
sea access to the colony, and is drawing up contin-
gency plans that include sanctions against Spain
and a British escort for ships entering Gibraltar
harbor. Madrid is in fact considering further meas-
ures to isolate Gibraltar--tighter control of air
space and territorial waters and a cutoff of European
communications.
22 Oct 69 iewral Intelligence Bulletin 13
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